

# Educating Military Leaders: The US and South Korea in Comparative Perspective\*

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In many nations, as military service evolved as a profession, receipt of officer's commissions was determined by social class background. It was assumed that aristocratic families would produce leaders, either through genetics or through tutoring and socialization during childhood and adolescence. Thus, status in civilian society and the subordination norms associated with it – notions of who should defer to whom – became a source of legitimacy for the officers' authority (Segal & De Angelis, 2009). This model was common in European nations. It applied to naval as well as land forces (e.g., Elias, 2007). Such an assumption, however, became an issue due to warfare's increasing technological complexity, and as officer corps and nations grew more socially and culturally diverse in a globalized world, where military forces now operated increasingly in coalition formations.

The service academies of Britain, France, and the United States were established in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Their establishment was driven primarily by technological advances in warfare such as the development of cannons and mortars. These weapons required officers to learn sufficient mathematics to be able to compute, or at least estimate, the trajectory of ordnance so that fires could be placed on target. They also needed to study engineering to design fortifications to protect their own forces from the weapons of adversaries. Britain's Royal Military Academy at Woolwich was founded by King George in 1741 to prepare "gentlemen cadets" for engineering and artillery service. France's *École Militaire* was similarly established in 1751 to teach the sons of the aristocracy mathematics, engineering, and artillery. It was replaced after the French Revolution by the *École Polytechnique*, which became the model for West Point in the United States. Following the European lead, Thomas Jefferson, in 1802, sought and received authorization from the US Congress for a Corps of Engineers, which "*shall be stationed at West Point... and shall constitute a military academy*" (Segal & Ender, 2008). Thus, the first Western military academies were primarily schools of engineering and artillery. Leadership was not part of the curriculum.

The American academies that we will first discuss – the Military Academy at West Point, New York (Ender, Kelty & Smith, 2008), the Naval Academy at Annapolis,

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Maryland (Trainor, Horner & Segal, 2008), and the Air Force Academy at Colorado Springs, Colorado – remained primarily engineering schools until after World War II. These schools fall under the purview of the Department of Defense. The teaching of leadership there has changed markedly over time, not only on account of growing diversity within the ranks and across shared battle spaces, but also as American officer corps increasingly engaged in missions other than the kinetic operations common in conventional wars.

This article raises the question as to how insights and principles of leadership education at US service academies spread into similar schools in other countries. The Korea Military Academy (hereafter KMA) is the best place to find an answer to this question, for two reasons. First, KMA opened as a regular four-year institution in 1951, when the American academies began integrating leadership education into the curriculum. As KMA was modelled after West Point, its leadership education cannot be understood without considering American influence on KMA education. Second, the teaching of leadership has changed over time at KMA according to the skills and competencies required of the Korean officer corps, not necessarily seen as identical with those expected of the American officer corps. This study will first explore the history of the leadership programme in the American academies; it will then analyze leadership textbooks for KMA cadets to highlight how academic influence gets shaped in the KMA leadership education.

### **Establishment of the Leadership Courses in the Academies**

Western military forces began to apply principles of psychology during World War I, particularly in the area of selection and classification testing, to choose who would serve and in what capacity (Segal, 2005). World War II became a major inflection point for the broader military application of behavioural science. American corporations had been increasingly using organizational psychology and sociology in their human resource management, and the military followed suit. With World War II on the horizon, the War Department sought help from Harvard University professor Samuel A. Stouffer, who was an expert on sociological research methods (Ryan, 2013). He established a research branch that mobilized the best social psychologists and sociologists of their generation. They conducted survey research and field experiments in order to collect data on American soldiers. They added information on soldiers' attitudes to the aptitude measurement tools that were used for military personnel management. Stouffer's team conducted more than 200 surveys of American soldiers during World War II. One of the most frequently explored areas in these surveys was soldiers' evaluations of their leaders.

Many of the officers and non-commissioned officers in command early in World War II were from the cadre of the small volunteer force that America maintained between the world wars. They included men who had chosen military service as an alternative to unemployment during the Great Depression. The junior enlisted personnel were frequently young men who were drafted or enlisted out of secondary school or college. These conscripts and volunteers had higher levels of education, on average, than the leadership cadre (Stouffer *et al.*, 1949). The leaders did not have normative claims to compliance on

the basis of their status in society. They did have power as a result of their organizational positions, but power is a weaker basis for compliance than status (Lucas & Segal, 2010). The evaluations of Army unit leadership by their citizen-soldiers were not high.

Historically, the United States had not maintained large standing armies in peacetime. It mobilized for war, calling up reserves, seeking volunteers, and conscripting young men when necessary. They were demobilized at the end of hostilities. After World War II, with the advent of the Cold War in a politically polarized world, the United States maintained a large standing peacetime army for the first time (Segal & Segal, 2004). General Dwight Eisenhower, Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, was an avid consumer of behavioural science research, and he was concerned about the attitudes of soldiers regarding their leaders. He wrote to General Maxwell Taylor, who had been a noted commander of airborne infantry units during World War II and who subsequently had become the superintendent at West Point. Gen. Eisenhower complained to Gen. Taylor that West Point had been doing a poor job at preparing cadets for leadership positions in the Army (Ender, Kelty & Smith, 2008). Gen. Taylor responded by establishing the Office of Military Leadership (OML) at West Point. General Taylor also codified for the first time the Cadet Honour Code.

Three early issues were whether leadership instruction should be part of the academic programme or imbedded in military training, on what disciplines it should draw, and who should be instructors. Initially, it was regarded as military training, conducted by Army officers who reported to the Commandant of Cadets. It quickly became seen as a branch of applied psychology, and became the Office of Military Psychology and Leadership (MP&L). However, by the 1960s, officers were being sent for graduate education in both psychology and sociology before teaching in the programme. The Naval Academy was established 43 years after West Point, partly as a result of a purported mutiny by midshipmen aboard the USS Somers. It also started teaching leadership in the 1960s (Trainor, Horner & Segal, 2008). The Air Force Academy, founded in 1954, taught leadership from its founding, deactivated the programme four years later, then reactivated it in 1961, with specializations in psychology, management, and sociology.

At KMA, taking its cue from West Point, these three issues were set out from its founding in 1951 – at a time when the Korean War (1950-1953), in which the US government provided major military support to South Korea, was raging. Firstly, KMA activated a (three-hour credit) military psychology and leadership course and included it into military training. Secondly, the Department of Military Leadership and Psychology (DMLP), which reported to the Commandant of Cadets, was established to teach leadership on January 1<sup>st</sup>, 1953. Finally, the DLMP consisted of Army officers and in the late 1950s KMA began sending officers for graduate education to produce instructors with graduate degrees. In this period, KMA used West Point's military leadership textbook<sup>1</sup> and

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<sup>1</sup> United States Military Academy, 1959.

other US Army Field Manuals as study material for Korean cadets.<sup>2</sup> Having no capacity to develop its own insights and principles of leadership instruction, KMA continued the course set by the American academies in the 1950s.

## **Paradigm Shift and Convergence in Leadership Education**

Early in the twentieth century, a dominant theory of leadership was that it was an individual characteristic – individuals either were leaders or they were not. The so-called Great Man theory of leadership (Carlyle, 1888), particularly as it was taught in the military, was highly influenced by the study of military history and the examples set by great generals. A common approach to teaching leadership was to bring retired flag officers to the academies to serve as role models for the cadets and midshipmen. A flaw in this approach to leadership was that it raised questions about whether leadership could actually be taught, or whether instead it was an innate characteristic of individuals. It also led to accusations that the academies were preparing cadets to be generals, but not lieutenants. Many academy graduates were likely to lead platoons and companies. Few were likely to command armies in the field.

Early in the second half of the twentieth century, two changes took place in the world of ideas that changed conceptualizations of leadership. One was a revolution in the field of military history. The new military history, rather than emphasizing leaders, put soldiers into the picture. It turned away from a unitary focus on great generals. John Keegan's book, *The Face of Battle*, focused on the experiences of rank and file soldiers in three historic battles (Keegan, 1976). This was an exemplar of this genre. Probably more importantly, industrial sociology and psychology were increasingly regarding leadership as a characteristic of a relationship – that between leaders and their followers – rather than as an attribute or trait of individual leaders. This was particularly important in the United States, which did not have a hereditary aristocracy. Instead, it had an individualistic value system which suggested that individuals could improve their social positions through hard work. One example of the behavioural science orientation to leadership was the observations of Harvard-educated social psychologist George C. Homans, a Navy Reserve officer who served aboard several ships in World War II. Homans had taken part in some of the industrial research conducted by Harvard faculty. He felt that he could make a contribution to the Navy by trying to understand the social dynamics of the ships' company (Homans, 1947). His sociological papers based on these observations contributed to the development of social exchange theory (Homans, 1958). This approach saw social relations and processes, including leadership, as involving transactions among group members, with human behaviour being based on a calculus of rewards and costs (not usually monetary).

The transactional approach to leadership (Bass, 1985), of which Homans' social exchange theory is a variant, assumes that leaders have resources with which to reward

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<sup>2</sup> Department of Army, 1958.

their followers in return for their compliance. The traditional great man approach in fact can be viewed through a lens that sees soldiers being rewarded by deriving status from their serving under high status officers or in high status regiments. The Great Men frequently derived their greatness from their social positions. In the absence of a high status officer class, the resources available to officers to reward their soldiers become important.

Interestingly, the modernization and rationalization of military units in the interest of efficiency has deprived leaders of some of the potential rewards they could dispense in the past. When company commanders had their own supply sergeants, mess sergeants, and paymasters, they could get their soldiers dry socks, better food, and help resolve problems with pay. With the increasing concentration of resources at higher organizational levels of battalion, brigade, or division, and the advent of direct deposit of pay, the rewards that small unit leadership can dispense are less obvious. They still have some control over leave time and military decorations. They also have punishments that they can dispense as a cost of subordinate noncompliance, but in the calculus of leadership, costs are generally less effective than rewards.

Transactional leadership seems most effective in corporate settings that have consensual norms governing status relationships, with cultural consensus on the value of rewards, where the costs of compliance are low, and where followers can compute whether the rewards of compliance justify the expenditure of their effort. They can evaluate, as individuals, whether they are receiving an honest day's pay for an honest day's work. Leadership, or management, can compute what they can afford to give workers for their efforts. It is a system that is well adapted to an individualistic culture (Segal, 1981). KMA adopted the paradigm shift in leadership theory, highlighting that military leadership consists of each leader's characteristics, the situation, and group dynamics. The Korean military leadership textbook published in 1963 indicates that trait theory cannot directly contribute to solving the problem that military leaders will face in their organization (KMA, 1963, p.38). In order to improve leadership education, KMA revised the curriculum to increase credit hours for the military leadership and psychology course from two to five and to offer management course and small group dynamic course as a selective course in 1967. However, KMA failed to develop a leadership model which is more adaptable to a more collectivist culture in South Korea, simply adopting the transactional leadership model.

## **Military Culture and Divergence in Leadership Education**

### **Individualistic Culture and Transformational Leadership in the United States**

The American military at times seems to reflect the individualism of American culture. The All-Volunteer Force (AVF) that replaced conscription in the United States in 1973 explicitly replaced civic values based upon citizen responsibility to share in the common defence with the values of the labour market (Moskos, 1977). The exchange of service for pay and benefits required monetary rewards that were far greater than was the

case in the era of conscription. The recruiting theme of “*Be all that you can be*”, early in All-Volunteer Force days reflected Psychologist Abraham Maslow’s hierarchy of needs (Maslow, 1970 [1954]). This was based primarily on the fulfilment of individual needs, and attended to collective concerns only when these individual needs were filled. The more recent “*Army of one*” campaign similarly seems to focus on the individual. Both seem to imply that a crucial task of leadership is to deal individually with subordinates and negotiate their rewards to elicit their compliance. Such transactional leadership may well be appropriate in military settings that approximate the working conditions of the civilian economy, such as in offices and in peacetime garrison settings. The emerging wisdom is that this approach is less applicable when the status system of civilian society and norms of subordination are changing. In situations of cultural diversity, American norms of status, authority, and individualism are not universally accepted.

The military historically had been dominated by white men, to whom both women and racial and ethnic minorities had been subordinated. The US Army had been racially segregated until the Korean War (Bogart, 1969). Women in the Army had been segregated in their own branch – the Women’s Army Corps –, had served under a strict quota, and been restricted in the ranks they could attain and the occupational specialties they could select. The AVF’s architects anticipated no change in the racial composition of the force after the end of conscription (Gates *et al.*, 1970). They also did not anticipate women playing a major role in the force. They were wrong. The Army was not successful in recruiting the requisite number of young white men, and became dependent on the recruitment of minorities and women to maintain strength levels. The representation of women and minorities increased among recruits. The service academies admitted women by order of the Congress, ultimately opening the door to senior leadership positions. Minorities, evaluating their market positions in the military versus the civilian labour market, saw less discrimination in the armed forces, and disproportionately elected to remain in service. They moved into leadership positions that were at variance with the normative status structure of American society. Not having external status to draw upon to legitimate their positions, they had to use organizational power as a resource in leadership transactions. As mentioned earlier, power is a weaker basis for leadership than is status.

During the early years of the AVF, the location and staffing of the leadership programme at the service academies also changed. At West Point, Military Psychology and Leadership (MP&L) became the Department of Behavioural Science and Leadership, reporting to the Dean rather than the Commandant of Cadets. The Department has become increasingly interdisciplinary, and with an increasing number of civilian PhDs on the faculty. At the Naval Academy, the Department of Leadership, Ethics, and Law reports both to the Commandant and the Dean. Unlike West Point, it does not house an academic major. However, for the last several years the Navy has been sending officers to PhD programmes in sociology and organizational psychology to fill Permanent Military Professor (PMP) of Leadership positions. It also has civilian sociology and psychology PhDs on its faculty. The Department of Behavioural Sciences and Leadership at the Air

Force Academy offers a Leadership Studies option within its academic major, and has both civilian and military psychologists and sociologists on its faculty.

In addition, all three academies have entered into partnerships with civilian universities to provide Master's level education in behavioural science to officers who have been selected to serve as commanders, trainers and mentors for the cadets and midshipmen who will be the next generation of leaders. West Point cooperates with Teacher's College of Columbia University in the Tactical Officers' Education Programme (TOEP); the Naval Academy cooperates with the College of Education, the Department of Sociology, and the Department of Psychology at the University of Maryland in the Leadership Education and Development (LEAD) Program ; and the Air Force Academy cooperates with the University of Colorado in the Air Officer Commanding (AOC) Master's programme. During this period, the norms of status and authority were changing in the American labour force, and by derivation, they changed in the military.

In the last quarter of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, America was learning how to manage and lead a volunteer military force recruited on the basis of labour market dynamics. At that time, Political scientist James MacGregor Burns introduced the concept of "*transforming leadership*", now more frequently referred to as "transformational leadership", to describe how some political leaders advance their followers and themselves to higher levels of morale and motivation (Burns, 2003). He rejected the give-and-take of rewards and costs in individual relationship between leader and follower. Instead, he hypothesized a leadership style that changed organizations and people through the ability of the leader to change values, perceptions, aspirations, and expectations by serving as moral exemplars working for the benefit of the group, the team, or the organization, rather than the individual. The transformational leader inspires his or her followers to put the collective good ahead of their individual wants.

This perspective has been adopted by organizational psychology, and has been shown to yield benefits in terms of morale and productivity in American industry, even in the context of an individualistic culture. It should be especially appropriate in the context of military organization, where unit operations are essential to mission accomplishment, and where collective values such as morale and cohesion have been emphasized. And it may well be more appropriately applied to volunteer forces than to conscription-based forces, which have a high component of coercion, and where the costs of non-compliance with leadership are high, visible, and difficult to escape. However, as noted earlier, rewards are more effective in eliciting compliance than is punishment. It is also notable that nations that have manned their military forces through conscription in the past are moving away from this model.

This is not to say that the transformational leader ignores the desires and needs of individual followers. On the contrary, transformational leadership, like transactional leadership, emphasizes relationships between leaders and followers. It differs from transactional leadership in that it encourages followers to focus on collective rather than individual goals. Among the major responsibilities of the transformational leader is to

maintain open communication with followers, solicit their ideas, incorporate their views in a shared vision, mentor, support, and coach them, and celebrate their contributions in pursuit of collective goals. They must, however, be motivated to take these shared goals as paramount.

This is accomplished by articulating a powerful, understandable, and precise vision that appeals to, and inspires followers because they helped shape it and share proprietorship in it. It must include a sense of purpose and optimism about success that inspires them to raise the energy level of the group by investing more effort in their tasks. One dimension of this vision is generally a conception of the group as a learning organization, questioning assumptions, encouraging learning and creativity, and developing improved ways of accomplishing collective tasks. Thus, transformational leadership is less of a top-down model than is transactional leadership. It is based on shared responsibility. The transformational leader also serves as a role model for high standards of ethical behaviour. He or she must gain the respect and trust of followers, and to do so must demonstrate that they are also respected and trusted. Respect, trust, and loyalty are sentiments that must be reciprocated to be sustained, and there is no more important context for these sentiments than a military unit deployed to a conflict.

### **Collectivist Culture and Charismatic Leadership in South Korea**

Modernist theory has argued that technological and economic changes are linked with predictable patterns of cultural change. While South Korean and US military cultures might be close to start with due to early American influence in Korea, the communal character of military life varied greatly in extent between the two countries. South Korea has a strong family-directed culture that penetrated into military organization to hinder the growth of individualism – the mainstream of American culture (Fukuyama, 1995, pp.62-63). As the individualism of American culture and labour market dynamics made American military more inclined towards private life and material gain in the 1970s, KMA leadership education began to diverge from the courses set up by the American academies.

To begin with, KMA refused to adopt a transformational model of leadership and began teaching cadets that charismatic leadership is a better model for military organization for at least two reasons (Shin, 1994). Firstly, adopting a transformational model of leadership requires a change in the way military forces have historically done business, although many of the great leaders of the past were transformational leaders long before the term was coined. Secondly, charismatic leadership is more useful to overcome extraordinary physical and emotional challenge in times of serious crisis like combat. It is also important to note that charismatic leadership is presumed to replace self-interested pursuits with more collectivistic endeavours by strengthening the salience of a shared identity (Meindl & Lemer, 1983).

Since the start of the Korean War in 1950, the South Korean military has not gone through the type of organizational change that took place in the US military with the advent of the AVF, and especially since the Cold War's demise (Table 1, below). The I/O

(Institutional/ Occupational) model posits that military cultures differ substantially with regard to the normative orientation of employees (Moskos, 1997). If the institutional orientation prevails, serving in the military becomes a part of communal life. South Korean military culture appears to be rather institution-oriented if compared to the more occupation-oriented American military culture because universal conscription has played a role in reinforcing the Koreans’ sense of themselves as a distinct national group (Fukuyama, 1995, pp.140-141).

**Table 1** : Comparison between the U.S. military and the South Korean military

<b>Forces Variables</b>	<b>United States (since 1990)</b>	<b>South Korea (since 1950)</b>
<b>Perceived Threat</b>	Subnational	North Korean invasion
<b>Force Structure</b>	Small professional army	Mass army, conscription
<b>Major Mission Definition</b>	New missions	Defence of homeland
<b>Dominant Military Professional</b>	Soldier-statesman; Soldier-scholar	Combat leader

Source for the United States : Charles C. Moskos, John Allen Williams & David R. Segal (eds.), *The Postmodern Military: Armed Forces after the Cold War*, New York, Oxford University Press, 2000, p.15.

This independent development of leadership theory was made possible only after KMA entered into a more academic atmosphere with increasing number of instructors with graduate degrees in the 1970s. KMA had in point of fact gradually increased the number of graduates among uniformed faculty since 1956. But this policy caused a problem, namely that officers staying more than a handful of years in the instructor position at the Academy could damage their career prospects. In order to respond to this problem, Army headquarters introduced a new system after 1966 which enabled students with Master’s degrees to serve as instructors at KMA instead of going for nearly 3-years’ compulsory military service. As a result, as shown in Table 2, the number of civilian instructors increased rapidly in the early 1970s. The growth of both uniformed and civilian instructors with graduate degrees laid the foundation for further development of the leadership model peculiar to South Korean culture, including publication of a textbook of leadership theory and practice (Kim, 1973), which no longer was a translated version of the West Point textbook and the US Army Field Manual.

**Table 2** : Inflow of military and civilian instructors with graduate degrees (1966-1974)


<b>Year</b>	<b>1966</b>	<b>1967</b>	<b>1968</b>	<b>1969</b>	<b>1970</b>	<b>1971</b>	<b>1972</b>	<b>1973</b>	<b>1974</b>
<b>Military</b>	16	17	15	14	24	21	26	21	21
<b>Civilian</b>	5	0	6	6	6	32	38	19	11

Source: KMA, *Yuksa 50 Nyonsa* [50 Year’s History of KMA], Seoul, KMA, 1993, pp.271-272.

Along with the independent development of leadership theory, progress toward psychology-oriented leadership education made KMA distinguishable from the American academies. In 1972, the Department of Military Leadership and Psychology was expanded to be the Office of Military Leadership and Psychology, reporting to the Commandant of Cadets rather than to the Dean. This organizational change came concomitantly with a curriculum revision that replaced the five-hour credit military leadership course with two sequential courses: “General Psychology” (a two-hour credit) and “Military Psychology” (a three-hour credit). Contrary to the American academies, KMA sociologists belonged to the Department of Comparative Sociology, which was founded to teach cadets how to criticize communism in 1964. Expanding their role in anti-communist education, sociologists rarely saw leadership as a branch of sociology. As a consequence, the teaching of military leadership was conducted solely by psychologists and the Office of Psychology became less interdisciplinary. It was not until 1995 that KMA integrated the Office of Military Leadership and Psychology with the Department of Management, reporting to the Dean rather than the Commandant of Cadets, and offered a major in behavioural science solely consisting of psychology.

In the last decade of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, two more serious changes came that took KMA further away from the course set by US service academies. First, rapid economic growth changed the composition of draftees. During the earlier stage of economic development, the proportion of the draft-age population who had completed high school or more was low and the illiteracy rate was high. South Korea then recruited its military leadership cadre from high school graduates (HSGs) or higher. The leaders could base normative claims to compliance on their intellectual superiority over the rank and file as well as on their organizational position. In the 1990s, as shown in Figure 1 below, the proportion of those who had some college education doubled. This change in educational attainment levels could deteriorate the evaluations of army unit leadership by draftees, decreasing their confidence in the armed forces (Inglehart, 1997, p.301). As a result, it became an urgent matter to develop leadership skills among cadres. However, the direction taken by the American academies and KMA when it came to leadership education diverged greatly.

**Figure 1** : Growth of Educational Attainment Levels in South Korea



Source : National Bureau of Statistics, [www.index.go.kr](http://www.index.go.kr)

Second, North Korea caused a first nuclear crisis by declaring that it would withdraw from the Non-Proliferation Treaty in March 1993. Rising military tension between the Koreas increased the need for a military education of immediate practical use for military leaders. Therefore, contrary to American service schools that entered into partnerships with civilian universities, the critical role in this process of developing a leadership model fell to military educational institutions. South Korea's National Defense University – a graduate school mostly reserved for military officers and government officials – first offered a leadership programme at Master's degree level in 2000, and founded a leadership research laboratory in 2002. KMA, for its part, created a Leadership Center for the study and teaching of leadership in 2004, and since 2005 has provided cadets with two separate Bachelor's degrees in military science and their majors. During this period, perhaps because the military leadership research institute was mostly manned by retired full colonels rather than by Ph.Ds, it was presumed that military leadership skills can be gained through experience in military organization rather than through academic research.

## **Conclusion and Implications**

Changes in model of military leadership in the United States have taken place in part because of the changing status structure of the nation. Women are increasingly moving into positions of authority over men. Members of racial and ethnic minority groups are assuming positions of authority over whites. It is crucial that the new generation of leaders earn the respect and trust of their followers by making them partners, rather than having to use power and punishment as leadership tools. When a leader has to resort to punishment, leadership has failed. Meeting the needs of military leaders peculiar to South Korea, for four decades the path followed by KMA in developing its model of military leadership diverged from the American academies. However, there is a great possibility that leadership education may converge again. The changing social structure in South Korea also has called for change in model of military leadership. Military leaders' intellectual superiority has been challenged by the increasing education attainment of draftees, and organizational norms are weakening as individualism replaces collectivist family culture.

The increasing cultural diversity that characterizes America also characterizes modern military operations. Coalition operations require that soldiers from multiple nations and multiple cultures share the same battlefields (Laurence 2011a). One of the great challenges faced by Gen. Eisenhower as European commander in World War II was getting American and British forces to work together, to say nothing of incorporating the Free French and Polish forces. Even coordinating the efforts of several armed service branches from a single nation is a challenge, for each branch has its own culture, history, and values. As South Korea has increased its participation in UN peacekeeping operations, multinational cooperation to build up sustainable peace in civil war countries becomes a critical issue for policy makers. In addition, South Korea has tried to develop a culture of jointness across the branches of the South Korean military, integrating Army, Navy, and

Air Force Colleges into a Joint Military College. The traditional notions of leadership which are peculiar to South Korean military do not serve well here.

The era of nations going to war alone is over. The modern leader in conventional operations must motivate the cooperation of personnel from a range of organizations and cultures participating in a coalition. The situation is more complex when we consider the kinds of military operations that have characterized the post-modern world of the twenty-first century. We must incorporate some allies and confront some adversaries who are not agents of nations, but rather represent tribal, clan, or religious factions. The modern leader must be able to communicate and build trust and respect with followers who do not wear the same uniform as he or she. The leader must also be able to communicate and build mutual trust and respect and build alliances across cultural lines, including cultures that may regard Western officers as the latest iteration of colonialism (Laurence, 2011b). And the leaders of whom we speak are not only generals and colonels. Counter-insurgency and peacekeeping operations are small unit operations. The official on the ground who may be called upon to make very rapid decisions that have great strategic consequences may be a lieutenant or a sergeant. Thus, it is essential that we teach adaptive leadership practices in entry-level leadership education, and reinforce it through the continuing military education that is one of the hallmarks of the military profession.

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