

Controlling Neighbouring States in Conflicted Regions: Key to Successful UN Peacekeeping in Post-Cold War Conflicts

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This research examines key factors in the success or failure of United Nations (UN) peacekeeping action in post-Cold War conflicts. During the Cold War, the UN developed a conflict management system based on (comparatively rare) peacekeeping operations (PKOs) which proved reasonably successful. After the collapse of the bipolar system, the UN, now unhindered and much more active in that regard, tried to adjust its peacekeeping practice to the changing character of armed conflicts in the new era. As a highly legitimate public international organization, it intervened in regions plagued by civil war, often stabilized seemingly hopeless situations, and in some cases was even in a position to promote sustainable peace. It conducted successful PKOs in several parts of the world such as Southern Africa (Namibia, Mozambique) and Central Asia. However, in certain cases, as in Somalia and Angola, it failed to secure peace and establish a viable government. What was the difference between these operations? Is there a factor which determines success or failure in post-Cold War UN peacekeeping operations?

To answer this question, the present study analyzes the process and effectiveness of the UN PKOs based on the extent of the conflict resolution effort, measured through capability and intention, made by actors at three distinct levels. First, the international level involves the conflict resolution objectives and efforts of the UN and its member-States. Second, the regional level influences the attitudes of neighbouring States in connection with a given UN peace operation. Third, the domestic context governs whether key local parties to the conflict cooperate or not, and the degree to which they agree with the goals pursued by the UN. On the basis of that distinction, this article claims that DDR (Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration) is the most important programme in UN peace operations, and that the regional policies of neighbouring States are the deciding factor which makes the difference between success and failure in a peacekeeping operation, or more generally in peace-building efforts. In post-Cold War conflicts where the UN intervenes, the main actors are often non-State factions incapable of independently building and sustaining their military power. As they rely on military assistance from neighbouring states, cutting or curbing that assistance is a critical step in achieving peacekeeping goals.

In order to validate this hypothesis, the present contribution will proceed in two phases. The first examines eleven cases with a view to identifying the key factor for a successful peace operation among the various programmes that are usually part of peace efforts at the various levels. The second conducts a more focused comparative case study in order to probe how the identified factor is operating under the influence of other variables. After selecting two representative cases of UN peace operations, this study will use a qualitative approach to compare the effectiveness of PKO programmes and the roles

of diverse actors in resolving armed conflict. Process tracing, which identifies how the hypothesized causal mechanism is operating in empirical cases, will be adopted as the main research method.¹

Research Design

PKOs in Post-Cold War Conflicts

The UN classifies its approaches to conflict management into five categories. The first, conflict prevention, involves the application of structural or diplomatic measures to keep intra- or inter-State tensions and disputes from escalating into violent conflict. The second, peacemaking, generally includes measures to address conflicts in progress and usually involves diplomatic action to bring hostile parties to a negotiated settlement. The third, peacekeeping, is a technique designed to preserve the peace, however fragile, where fighting has been halted, and to assist in implementing agreements achieved by the peacemaker. The fourth, peace enforcement, involves the application, on the strength of a Security Council mandate, of a range of coercive measures, including the use of military force. The fifth, peace-building, involves a range of measures meant to reduce the risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict by strengthening national capacities at all levels for conflict management and to lay the foundation for sustainable peace and development.²

After the Cold War came to an end, the UN focused on internal conflicts to determine which among the five categories was the most effective under the new circumstances. Early peace support operations, designed by then Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld, had been monotonous missions which involved intervening in a conflict area, setting up a buffer zone, and monitoring the ceasefire. Such operations were conducted in the context of conflicts *between* functional States, i.e. sovereign political communities with an official government and reasonably stable governance system. However, these traditional PKOs became ineffective in post-Cold War conflicts now for the most part taking place *within* failed or dysfunctional States with weak governance and a far from perfect monopoly on the legitimate use of organized violence. In response to the changed security environment and character of conflict, the UN advanced the concept of “multidimensional” PKOs. Whereas traditional PKOs focused on ceasefire implementation and prevention of escalating disputes,³ this new variety added the internal political process to the list of its major concerns and concentrated on making the factions “settle for peace”. Peacekeeping now routinely includes missions such as emergency assistance, monitoring democratic elections and building social and governmental institutions.

Post-Cold War PKOs tend to be a combination of multidimensional peacekeeping and peace-building. Peacekeeping can now be defined as all types of activity meant to prevent the recurrence of armed conflict and sustain peace in post-conflict situations. This

¹ George & Bennett, 2004, p.20.

² UN Departments of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and Field Support (DFS), 2008, pp.17-18.

³ Tharoor, 1995, p.53.

consists of three programmes⁴: (1) DDR, which provides the basis on which all other PKO activities rest, since a favourable, non-violent environment is a precondition for them. It covers disarming the soldiers of warring factions, as well as provision of accommodation, food, and jobs to facilitate their return to civil society ; (2) humanitarian assistance, which furnishes relief supplies and medical care so as to prevent problems caused by disease, starvation and unsheltered refugees ; (3) governance-building, which organizes democratic elections as a means to restore a viable political system and put in place an adequate sociopolitical infrastructure for sustainable peace.

Scope of Research and Case Selection

This research restrictively focuses, among UN peace support activities, on the multidimensional peacekeeping and peace-building operations that have taken place after the end of the Cold War. If defined by their formal mandate, the number of such completed operations since 1990 amounts to fifteen. However, considering that some of these missions addressed the same conflict and thus overlapped, the series of research cases under study only includes eleven operations, as listed in Table 1 (next page).

The evaluation of peacekeeping outcomes has given rise to long and lively debates concerning the criteria for deciding whether operations succeed or fail.⁵ Two approaches have been used: top-down and bottom-up. The top-down approach concentrates on whole operations in macro fashion, with a view to identifying the character and contribution of a given PKO. It is based on four recognized criteria: (1) has the mandate been completed? ; (2) has the conflict been terminated?; (3) have casualties and victims been minimized during the operation? (4) has the conflict recurred?⁶ If these criteria are applied, six out of the eleven cases can be identified as successful operations. For its part, the bottom-up approach takes a more analytical view. Paul Diehl and Daniel Druckman have suggested a comprehensive framework, based on whether or not three core goals (violent abatement, conflict containment, conflict settlement) have been achieved by pursuing the goals and performing the programmes of multidimensional peacekeeping and peace-building.⁷

This paper combines both approaches. First, it evaluates the entire sample of cases based on the top-down method for a macro view comparing the significance of peace/conflict resolution programmes at the three (international, regional, domestic) levels. The results are then further probed in focused case studies following the bottom-up approach for a micro view tracking the flow of events and the logics of action undergirding it.

⁴ UN (DPKO and DFS) doctrine in fact mentions three multidimensional PKO and five peace-building programmes. However, considering DPKO's operations procedure and actual practice, they can be collapsed into three essential programmes.

⁵ There has been a lot of research and debate about the criteria of success and failure of PKO. See : Diehl, 1993 ; Johansen, 1994 ; Druckman, 1997 ; Pushkina, 2006.

⁶ Bratt, 1996.

⁷ Diehl & Druckman, 2012, p.215.

Table 1: List of cases

	Continent	State	UN Mission	Start date	Period of observation
Success	Africa	Mozambique	ONUMOZ	1975	1992-1994
		Sierra Leone	UNOMSIL, UNAMSIL	1985	1998-2005
		Burundi	ONUB	1965	2004-2006
		Namibia	UNTAG	1960	1989-1990
	Asia	East Timor	UNTAET	1979	1999-2002
	America	El Salvador	ONUSAL	1979	1991-1995
Failure		Angola	UNAVEM-I, II	1975	1991-1999
		Somalia	UNOSOM-I, II	1960	1992-1995
		Liberia	UNOMIL	1980	1993-1997
		Rwanda	UNAMIR	1962	1993-1996
	Asia	Cambodia	UNTAC	1967	1992-1993

Some idea of the respective amount of international effort put into peace support/ conflict resolution in each of those cases (Fig.1 below) can be obtained by applying the following formula :

$$IE_1 = \left(\frac{M_1}{\sum M} + \frac{F_1}{\sum F} \right) \times \frac{\sum P}{P_1}$$

in which IE = International Effort; M = military strength deployed to the conflict region; F = humanitarian assistance fund (not included in the PK fund); P = popularity.




Figure 1 : Amount of International Effort to Resolve Conflict

For a more focused comparison, two cases need to be selected based on the logic of closest similarity when controlling for unnecessary variables. In Table 1, the operations in Mozambique, Burundi and El Salvador succeeded despite low international inputs. These three cases were in fact influenced by a stronger factor, namely the regional factor, which existing research does not include. Among these three cases, the El Salvadorian case was excluded after controlling for the continental variable, and the operation in Burundi proved unsuitable for this case research because of the fair amount of controversy surrounding the evaluation of its outcomes.⁸ As a result, the “success” case selected for the purpose at hand is the operation in Mozambique.

As for the “failure” case, the operation in Cambodia, which is the only failed one in Asia, was excluded after controlling for the continental variable. Considering the colonial variable, the operation in Angola, which (like Mozambique) became independent from Portugal in the mid-1970s, was the selected one in that category. So that the focused comparison to come (below, p.14 onwards) will bear on the operations in Mozambique and Angola.

Framework of Analysis

For a more systematic and effective treatment, this article relies on a framework of analysis that, as shown in Table 2 (next page), combines the three levels of analysis (international, regional, local) and the three essential PKO programmes (DDR, governance-building, humanitarian assistance, planned and executed simultaneously, though by different actors pursuing different objectives and applying different manuals).

Any effort to resolve conflicts exhibits at each level two major facets: capability and intention. At the international level, given that the all missions were conducted by the UN, the intention behind them is already identified and the effort mostly focuses on capability – on the manpower and materiel the UN can mobilize. At the regional level, the intentions of neighbouring States are important. Compared with the opposing non-State factions, neighbouring States have stronger military and economic capabilities. Therefore, the effort at that level will be analyzed in terms of the latter’s intentions. At the domestic level, both capabilities and intentions play a role and need to be considered: the former in terms of the core factions’ real or potential military impact on the peacekeeping operation ; the latter in terms of whether the factions cooperate with the UN or not.

Derived from this framework of analysis, indicators are defined for measuring the variables. An effort variable at each level is measured by means of three values. At the international level, capabilities can be high (+), normal (0) or low (–). At the regional level, the effort of neighbouring States can be estimated as positive (+), neutral (0) or negative (–). At the domestic level, as capabilities only play a role when intention is hostile to the peace

⁸ ONUB is criticized for the exclusion of one of the influential factions during the governance-building process. However, Bratt (1996) insists the operation in Burundi was successful because the new Burundian government eventually comprehended the excluded faction and there was no recurrence of armed conflict after the UN operation.

process, the extent of effort is measured on the basis of the strongest factions’ intentions as either positive (+), or neutral (0), or negative (–).

Table 2 : Framework of analysis

	DDR	Humanitarian Assistance	Governance-Building
International Level	Military strength deployed for peacekeeping (Capability)	Human and material assistance resources (Capability)	Dedicated plans and teams (Capability)
Regional Level	Cooperation of neighbouring States (Intention)	Cooperation of neighbouring States (Intention)	Cooperation of neighbouring States (Intention)
Domestic Level	Acceptation of the programme (Capability + Intention)	Acceptation of the programme (Capability + Intention)	Acceptation of the programme (Capability + Intention)

Regional Factors in DDR Processes

The Importance of DDR

The need for DDR derives from the uncertainty felt by belligerent factions as to the intentions of other factions, thus making peace itself uncertain and vulnerable. As PKOs endeavour to eliminate that uncertainty, DDR – the most effective and basic of the programmes – accomplishes this because it focuses on factions’ capabilities, thereby removing doubts as to hostile intentions now deprived of military assets.

In the case of Angola, for instance, the peacekeeping operation failed despite the establishment of a new government because DDR could not be implemented. Conversely, the Mozambique PKO, though performed with small budget and manpower resources, resulted in a stable peace due to the success of the DDR programme.

To prove this point, the results of the three peacekeeping programmes are analyzed. The success or failure of DDR is evaluated based on the extent of demobilization of the conflicting factions or the militia groups which they control. Humanitarian assistance is deemed successful or not depending on the crude mortality rate (CMR)⁹ observed in the camps built to shelter and support war refugees and internally displaced people (IDP). If that programme keeps the CMR below 1, then it can be evaluated as a success.¹⁰ The success or failure of the governance-building programme can be assessed according to whether or not democratic elections were held in acceptable conditions and a viable official government was established.

⁹ CMR = Death Rate per Day/100,000.

¹⁰ UNHCR issues an emergency alert when the CMR rises over 1.

Table 3 : Comparison of the UN Peacekeeping Sub-Programmes

		DDR		Humanitarian Assistance		Governance Building	
		Result	Congruity*	Result	Congruity*	Result	Congruity*
PKO Success	Mozambique	Success	☑	Success ¹¹	☑	Success	☑
	Sierra Leone	Success	☑	Success ¹²	☑	Success	☑
	Burundi	Success	☑	Failure ¹³		Success	☑
	Namibia	Success	☑	Failure ¹⁴		Success	☑
	East Timor	Success	☑	Success ¹⁵	☑	Success	☑
	El Salvador	Success	☑	Failure ¹⁶		Success	☑
PKO Failure	Angola	Failure	☑	Failure ¹⁷	☑	Success	
	Somalia	Failure	☑	Failure ¹⁸	☑	Failure	☑
	Liberia	Failure	☑	Failure ¹⁹	☑	Success	
	Rwanda	Failure	☑	Failure ²⁰	☑	Failure	☑
	Cambodia	Failure	☑	Success ²¹		Success	
Result**		11		7		8	

* Success / failure congruity between the result of sub-programme and the entire operation.

** The number of operations which have congruity of the result between sub-programme and the entire operation.

Analyzing the eleven peacekeeping operations within the framework, Table 3 brings to light three major findings. First, the success or failure of the humanitarian assistance programme does not affect the outcome of the entire peacekeeping operation. Among the cases held to be successful from a humanitarian viewpoint, the results of the whole peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance programmes are identical except for the Cambodian conflict. However, among the failed humanitarian assistance cases, divergent outcomes occur three times out of a total of seven.

Second, the research shows that a successful governance-building programme, generally used as an index of overall success for peacekeeping, is not a valid index. In the Angolan, Liberian, and Cambodian cases, while UN-organized democratic elections took place, violent conflict recurred as factions with military capabilities at their disposal

¹¹ CMR = 0.63 (1992). Cf. Azevedo, 2002, p.122.

¹² CMR = 0.3 (2001). Cf. Salama, Spiegel, Talley & Waldman, 2004.

¹³ CMR = 3 (1993-94). Cf. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. “International Notes Health Status of Displaced Persons Following Civil War – Burundi”, *MMWR*, vol.43, 1994.

¹⁴ CMR = 8.7 (1990), United Nations Stats Division : <http://unstat.un.org> (search : 1st October 2012).

¹⁵ CMR = 0.2 (2000). Cf. Friedman & Spiegel, 2000.

¹⁶ CMR = 5.3 (1990-95). Cf. United Nations Stats Division : <http://unstat.un.org> (search : 1st October 2012).

¹⁷ CMR = 20.3 (1994-97). Cf. Davis, 1996 ; Charles Keely, Holly Reed & Ronald Waldman, “Understanding Mortality Patterns in Complex Humanitarian Emergency”, in Reed & Keely (eds.), 2001; Marschner, 1999.

¹⁸ CMR=14.45 (1991-92). Cf. Moore *et al.*, 1993 ; Toole & Waldman, 1993.

¹⁹ CMR=14.3 (1996). Cf. Nabeth, Michelet *et al.*, 1997.

²⁰ CMR=42.8 (1994). Cf. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 1996; Paquet & Van Soest, 1994.

²¹ CMR=0.3 (1989). Cf. United Nations Border Relief Operation, *Annual Epidemiological Report: Summary Health Statistics for Thai-Kampuchean Border Encampments* (1989).


contested the results of the election, and in Liberia and Cambodia the official government collapsed.

Finally, the success or failure of the DDR programme is identical with the result of the whole peacekeeping in all eleven cases, thus confirming that DDR success is the most important component of successful peacekeeping.

The Importance of Regional Factors in the DDR process

Among the three levels of effort to resolve conflict (international, regional and domestic), the regional factor is the most significant when it comes to bringing the DDR process to a positive conclusion. It determines the success or failure of peacekeeping missions. Since the purpose of DDR is to neutralize the military capability of the conflicting factions, the initiative of neighbouring States to sustain their military assistance to this or that faction is critical.

Figure 2 : Comparison of the International DDR Effort²²



As regards capabilities, the international factor – the international community’s effort to resolve conflicts – can be measured by sizing up the military strength actually deployed. Figure 2 shows the extent of international effort mobilized, which is formulated by dividing the number of peacekeepers by the volume of the military factions that are the

²² International Effort for DDR = $\frac{\text{Number of Peacekeepers}}{\text{Number of Soldiers in Military Factions}}$

target of the DDR sub-programme. It strongly suggests that deployment of a large number of peacekeepers tends to be helpful for DDR success. However, there are some exceptional cases, such as Mozambique, El Salvador and Cambodia. In Mozambique and El Salvador, DDR was successful even though the number of peacekeepers was small. On the other hand, the Cambodian DDR programme failed although the international community intervened with a large military force, compared to the average of successful cases. Considering these cases, the international factor cannot account for the results of the DDR programmes.

The role of the domestic factor is analyzed by examining two factors: intention and capability. Since 1991, the UN has launched into peacekeeping operations mostly in civil wars. In such conflict situations, the most significant factor is which side has the strongest military capability. Since the weapon systems that are used in internal conflicts are small-arms (rifles, mortars or small rocket launchers) which do not make a critical difference on total military capability, this can be quantified through the number of combatants.

Table 4 : Indicators for Domestic Effort

	DDR		Humanitarian Assistance		Governance-Building	
Domestic Effort	+	Accepting the programme and making own plan for DDR	+	Active cooperation with the programme	+	Organizing elections and building own political institutions
	0	Accepting the DDR programme	0	Accepting the programme	0	Organizing elections, building institutions with UN help
	-	Rejecting the programme	-	Rejecting and interrupting the programme	-	Rejecting the programme

Table 5 (next page) illustrates the results of a comparison of the military strength deployed by the various armed factions in the conflict areas considered, computed on the basis of the UN peacekeepers’ DDR plans; shaded lines in the table indicate the faction which was willing to accept the UN DDR programme.

Considering both capability and intention, the will of the militarily strongest faction to go along with the DDR process is a critical component of the domestic factor. Therefore, as already mentioned, this factor is characterized through the attitude of the strongest factions towards the UN’s DDR programme based on their official position with regard to the UN mission and records of violation of the agreement and DDR mandate (see Table 6, on p.11 below).

Table 7 (also on p.11) synthesizes these definitions and corresponding indicators at all three levels.

Table 5 : Comparison of the conflicting factions’ military strength

	Conflict Case	Factions	Strength	Percentage
Success	Mozambique	FRELIMO	66,922	73.08
		RENAMO	24,648	26.92
	Sierra Leone	CDF	15,000	34.88
		RUF	15,000	34.88
		Sierra Leone Armed Forces	7,000	16.28
		AFRC	6,000	13.95
	Burundi	CND-FDD (Nkurunziza)	25,000	62.5
		Burundi Armed Forces	7000	17.5
		CND-FDD	3,000	7.5
		FNL	3,000	7.5
		FROLINA	1,000	2.5
		CNDD	1,000	2.5
	Namibia	SWATF	21,661	52
		SWAPO	20,000	48
	East Timor	Pro-Indonesian militia	10,000	88
Gusmao		1,332	12	
El Salvador	El Salvadorian Armed Force	56,000	86.92	
	FMLN	8,430	13.08	
Failure	Angola	MPLA	115,640	69.90
		UNITA	49,800	39.80
	Somalia	SSDF	10,000	34.69
		USC/SNA	9,300	32.26
		SNF GALGA DUJI	8,000	27.75
		USF	1,530	5.31
	Liberia	NPFL	35,000	65.38
		UNIMO	10,500	19.61
		AFL	8,037	15.01
	Rwanda	Rwandan Armed Forces	200,000	88.89
		RPF	25,000	11.11
	Cambodia	CRAF	42,368	81.02
KPNLAF		6,479	12.39	
NADK		3,445	6.59	

Table 6 : Domestic Factor in DDR Processes

		The faction supported by UN	Strong military capability*	Cooperation with DDR	Congruity**
Success	Mozambique	FRELIMO	☑	+	☑
	Sierra Leone	Sierra Leone Government		0	
	Burundi	Burundi Government		+	
	Namibia	SWAPO	☑	+	☑
	East Timor	Gusmao		0	
	El Salvador	El Salvador Government	☑	+	☑
Failure	Angola	MPLA	☑	+	
	Somalia	USC/SNA		0	
	Liberia	NPFL	☑	+	
	Rwanda	Rwandan Government	☑	-	☑
	Cambodia	Cambodian Government	☑	+	

* Faction with military strength amounting to over 50% of the total force levels involved in the conflict (cf. Table 5).

** Congruity between the willingness of a “strong” faction to cooperate and the result of the entire operation.

Table 7 : Indicators for DDR

		International Level		Regional Level		Domestic Level	
Effort for DDR	+	$S < 40$	+	Supporting DDR	+	Accepting the programme + making own DDR plan	
	0	$40 \leq S < 50$	0	Non-intervention	0	Accepting the DDR programme	
	-	$50 \leq S$	-	Military assistance to certain faction, intentionally	-	Rejecting the programme	

In this table, **S** is the ratio of soldiers available to armed factions to the size of the peacekeeping force²³:

$$S = \frac{\text{Number of Target Soldiers for DDR}}{\text{Number of Peacekeepers Conducting DDR}}$$

On that basis, as revealed by Table 8 (next page), cases in which the strongest faction cooperated with the DDR programme occurred three times among successful missions. Of five failed missions, only one (Rwanda) saw the strongest faction oppose UN DDR. Finally, the domestic level provides no clear explanation for the success or failure of the DDR programme.

²³ Official US Army assessments suggest that the force ratio required in stabilization operations is 20 troops per 1,000 insurgents at a minimum and 25 per 1,000 insurgents if possible. US Army, 2006, pp.1-13.

Table 8 : Comparison of Efforts to Implement DDR

		International Level		Regional Level		Domestic Level	
		DDR Effort	Congruity*	DDR Effort	Congruity*	DDR Effort	Congruity*
Success	Mozambique	+	☑	+	☑	+	☑
	Sierra Leone	+	☑	+	☑	0	
	Burundi	+	☑	+	☑	0	
	Namibia	+	☑	+	☑	+	☑
	East Timor	+	☑	0		0	
	El Salvador	-		+	☑	+	☑
Failure	Angola	0		-	☑	+	
	Somalia	0		-	☑	0	
	Liberia	-	☑	-	☑	+	
	Rwanda	0		-	☑	-	☑
	Cambodia	+		-	☑	+	
Result		6		10		4	

* Congruity between the result of the entire operation and DDR efforts at each level.


The weak showing of the international and domestic levels contrasts with the stronger influence exerted by the regional factor. Comparing efforts in favour of DDR based on the indicators formulated in Table 7, regional efforts influenced the result of peacekeeping in ten of the eleven cases considered. In failed operations, especially, regional effort in favour of DDR was the critical factor.

Military Assistance from Neighbouring States

Specified as good offices, humanitarian assistance and halting military support, the regional level is thus the most significant contributing factor to the DDR programme. If a neighbouring State halts its military assistance to an armed faction, that faction cannot long sustain its military activities. Moreover, States in the region can exercise political pressure on domestic factions, and if such political influence aims to stop the fighting, it is apt to be decisive since they can usually project military forces more rapidly, thereby settling the conflict more effectively, than the UN, which has to follow long and complicated procedures to mobilize multinational military power. This is especially the case if the armed faction could only come into being in the first place thanks to the military assistance of a neighbouring State, or when such a State cultivates a militia group for its own political or strategic purposes. Hence, during a peacekeeping operation, a neighbouring State's intention with regard to an ongoing conflict is critical for peacekeeping success.

The mechanism at work at the regional level can be formulated as in figure 3 below:

Figure 3 : Regional Level's Influence on DDR Processes



Case Study : Angola and Mozambique

Comparison of the DDR Programmes

The DDR Programme in Mozambique

A conflict raged for years in Mozambique between the ruling socialist Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (FRELIMO) and a conservative movement known as the Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (RENAMO). FRELIMO was founded during the Portuguese colonial period and first expanded in and around the Tete province. After independence, it established the Republic of Mozambique. Unfortunately, it could get neither legitimacy nor support from the Mozambican people. President Samora Machel concentrated on sustaining his power and was negligent in failing to develop his country's economy and society. As a result, many anti-government factions sprang up and threatened

FRELIMO.²⁴ RENAMO, the biggest anti-government organization, was established by former military officers. The failure of FRELIMO's agricultural policy helped RENAMO gain support and power in rural areas.²⁵ When the South African Republic (SAR) started to supply RENAMO with weapons, attacks against FRELIMO were intensified and the conflict between the two factions escalated into full-scale civil war.²⁶ Faced with the devastation it generated, the international community reinforced its efforts to bring about a peaceful settlement in Mozambique. Talks for peace progressed²⁷ and finally on 4 October 1992 the representatives of FRELIMO and RENAMO signed a General Peace Agreement (GPA).

Pursuant to GPA's provisions, the UN established ONUMOZ to disarm the forces on both sides and organize democratic elections.²⁸ ONUMOZ started a DDR programme, and tried to integrate soldiers of FRELIMO and RENAMO into the Mozambican Defence Force (FADM). However, the two factions failed to share trust and confidence : despite ONUMOZ's DDR programme, persistent armed conflict was rekindled throughout the country.²⁹ UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali visited Mozambique and met the leaders of the two factions in a bid to overcome the military distrust between them. His main confidence-building plan was a deployment of UN police to keep the peace. As the two leaders agreed with the suggestion, in the end, the UN dispatched 128 policemen to Mozambique and provided detailed action plans to educate and train the existing 18,047 Mozambican police officers.³⁰

Through its Secretary General's proactive stance of, the UN recovered its influence on RENAMO and FRELIMO and efforts to keep law and order provided a favourable environment to build confidence between the two warring factions. ONUMOZ performed its DDR operations by securing major airports and harbours and by occupying the headquarters of RENAMO. It designated three military zones and forty-nine assembly areas in order to conduct the disarmament of militia. In total, ONUMOZ disarmed and demobilized about a hundred thousand soldiers, who gathered in the designated areas in cooperation with UNOHAC.³¹

While the DDR programme of UNOMOZ was in progress, Africa entered a period of geopolitical turbulence. At the regional level, the Apartheid regime which was the basis of SAR's colonial system had collapsed; at the international level, the Cold War had

²⁴ Kenny, 1998, p.12.

²⁵ Wang, 2007, pp.84-85.

²⁶ Kenny, 1998. p.13.

²⁷ Hume, 1994, p.16 ; Kenny, 1998. p.14.

²⁸ UN Security Council Resolution 797 (1992. 12. 6).

²⁹ UN Security Council, *Note by the President of the Security Council* (1992. 10. 27).

³⁰ UN Security Council, *Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Mozambique* (1994. 1. 28), pp.1-3.

³¹ UNDP 1994, p.324.

abruptly ended. The change also affected the SAR's policy of interference in Mozambican internal affairs. Deprived of South African active military support, RENAMO started to worry about its future in a changing Mozambique. It did not have enough political supporters to counter FRELIMO, and its guerrilla tactics had long earned it a poor reputation.³² It thus had little choice but to take part in the DDR programme of ONUMOZ.

However, it was not so easy to recover from the anarchy that had prevailed for so long in the country. Faced with a security condition that was still unstable, the DDR and governance-building programmes were delayed. To remedy that situation, the UN Secretary General demanded that GPA be implemented without delay and suggested new schedules for conducting the DDR programme swiftly.³³ According to the plan, the DDR process had to be completed by June and the final election had to be held in October of 1994. The Security Council endorsed the Secretary General's proposed timeline in September 1993.³⁴

Though a slow-moving DDR programme had brought RENAMO's discontent to a head, it did not have enough military power to destabilize FRELIMO and ONUMOZ, and the DDR process progressed steadily as peace talks and negotiations went on.³⁵ ONUMOZ established the National Commission for Reintegration to support, educate and provide demobilized soldiers with jobs and housing. As a result, about 100,000 soldiers were disarmed and demobilized by 1994 as expected, and among them, 30,000 soldiers were integrated into the Mozambican armed forces.³⁶ Right on the eve of the election, Afonso Dhlakama, RENAMO's leader, tried to resist the UN peace plan, but the military force at his disposal had already been minimized and it was impossible to restart the civil war.³⁷

The DDR Programme in Angola

The dispute between the political factions which headed the liberation movement in Angola under Portuguese colonial rule escalated into bitter armed conflict soon after independence. The socialist MPLA (Movimento Popular de Libertação), the biggest faction, took the lead. Another two factions emerged in the moderate-left and conservative camps : the FNLA (Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola) and Jonas Savimbi's UNITA (União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola). While these three factions had cooperated in fighting against colonial rule, after the withdrawal of Portugal, they struggled for power within the post-colonial government.

The withdrawal of the Cuban armed forces brought a peaceful mood in Angola and UNAVEM-II was established pursuant to the Bicesse Accords in 1994. UNAVEM-II

³² Sidaway & Simon, 1993, p.17.

³³ UN Security Council, *Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Mozambique*, S/26034 (1993. 6. 30).

³⁴ UN Security Council, *Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Mozambique*, S/26385 (1993. 8. 30).

³⁵ Leao, 2004, pp.14-15.

³⁶ United Nations Office of the Special Advisor on Africa (OSAA), 2007, p. 15.

³⁷ UN Department of Public Information (DPI), 1994, pp.330-332.

planned a DDR programme for both MPLA and UNITA, which brought together international and regional efforts. Placed under monitoring by the US, Russia and Portugal, a Joint Political Military Commission (JPMC) consisting of the representatives of the MPLA government and UNITA was launched. A Joint Verification and Monitoring Commission (JVMC) was established to implement the JPMC-led DDR process. The UN joined the JVMC as an observer and monitored the whole programme. According to the DDR plan, MPLA and UNITA would end the hostilities as from 15 May 1991 and launch both JVMC and JPMC by May 31 to start demobilizing and disarming the soldiers gathered in the assembly areas to be designated in advance by the JPMC. Finally, the UN would complete the DDR programme by establishing the FAA (Forças Armadas Angolanas) consisting of soldiers from both MPLA and UNITA.³⁸

UNAVEM-II implemented the action plan through JVMC. It identified 165,440 soldiers – 115,640 from MPLA and 49,800 from UNITA – as its DDR target. By September 1992, 61,994 former combatants, i.e. 41 percent of the objective, had been demobilized. The pace of the operation was faster as regards MPLA than it was with respect to UNITA : by that date, 45 percent of the MPLA government force and only 24 percent of UNITA combatants had been disarmed. The collected weapons were stored in the assembly areas and transferred to the FAA. However, it failed to collect *all* of the weapons³⁹ as the soldiers, worried about a possible resumption of the civil war, often refrained from turning them in. Mistrust towards the UN and its peace process was widespread in Angola. As a result, many of the small arms used in the armed conflict ended up in civilian hands.

The last phase of the DDR plan was the establishment of the FAA, a regular force of 50,000 soldiers : 40,000 in the land force, 6,000 in the air force and 4,000 in the navy. The land force was a sensitive issue to both factions because it was the most critical and largest part of their respective military power. The process was closely monitored by JVMC as well as by both sides ; soldiers from both camps were inducted into the new national force on the basis of a one-to-one ratio⁴⁰ ; the process was crowned by the setting-up of an integrated command system on which both sides agreed.⁴¹

Nonetheless, mistrust between the MPLA and UNITA persisted, and the DDR programme ran into some difficulties as MPLA leaders tried to absorb the UNITA soldiers into the governmental force unilaterally, and UNITA set up an underground parallel organization. In June of 1992, both factions organized the Joint Police Monitoring Group (JPMG) to look after security in all 18 provinces. JPMG was a very sensitive and critical project, because much in the way of influence and control in all of Angola hinged on it. Therefore, the size and organization of police forces and operations were decided on through consultations between the two factions. Yet, as MPLA dispatched 30,000 governmental

³⁸ UN DPI, 1994, p.238.

³⁹ UN DPI, 1994, p.242.

⁴⁰ Porto & Parsons, 2003, p.23.

⁴¹ UN DPI, 1994, p.242.

forces to man JPMG without UNITA's agreement, mistrust redoubled and UNITA decided to operate a secret police force which did not participate in the DDR programme.⁴²

Despite upcoming elections, the DDR process was not completed. The legislative and presidential ballots were held on 29 and 30 September 1992 : MPLA took 53.7% of the vote in the former and MPLA's leader Santos led the pack in the latter with a 49.6 popular vote percentage. As Santos had failed to pass the 50% mark, a second round of presidential voting was required by law. Savimbi, the leader of the UNITA, did not participate in the run-off election, and contested its outcome, claiming electoral fraud. He pulled his soldiers out of the FAA and declared war against MPLA again, attacking the governmental force in several regions. In spite of an arms and oil embargo imposed by the international community to pressure it, UNITA sustained the armed conflict thanks to military support from Zaire. UNAVEM-II could no longer control the situation in Angola and was finally forced to withdraw from 45 of the 67 areas where its troops and teams were stationed. It was subsequently replaced by UNAVEM-III.⁴³

The Regional Factor in DDR programmes

Accounting for DDR Success in Mozambique

In the Mozambican case, neighbouring countries, white Rhodesia chief among them for a while, had intervened since the initial period of the conflict. The Rhodesian government, through its Central Intelligence Organization (CIO), supported the establishment of RENAMO and provided it with weapons and war materials to start and conduct a civil war. Rhodesia's political and military purpose was to counter the support that Mozambique's President Machel provided for the Zimbabwean National Liberation Army (ZANLA) which resisted the Rhodesian government's white supremacist regime.⁴⁴

When Rhodesia's Smith regime eventually caved in and gave way to Zimbabwe's black majority rule, the South African Republic (SAR) took over. The SAR's Apartheid government intervened in Mozambique to help RENAMO resist FRELIMO. The South African Military Intelligence Directorate (MID) furnished RENAMO with advanced weapons systems and trained its soldiers, with the result that RENAMO's military strength rose from 500 to 8,000⁴⁵ and the conflict in Mozambique escalated to a brutal civil war.

The SAR's intervention in Mozambique had two purposes. First, the FRELIMO-led Mozambican government supported the militia groups fighting the Apartheid regime within South Africa. A civil war in Mozambique and an alliance with RENAMO were thus

⁴² Vines, 1998, p.15.

⁴³ UN Security Council, *Report Submitted to the Security Council by the Secretary-General in accordance with Resolution 799, S/25149* (1993. 1. 25).

⁴⁴ In return, RENAMO provided Rhodesia with intelligence about ZANLA's activities in Mozambique : see Sun-ae Wang, 2007, pp.84-85.

⁴⁵ Kenny, 1998, p.13

obviously in the SAR's interest.⁴⁶ Second, the SAR wanted to retain its economic hegemony in southern Africa by containing the sea trade of southeastern African countries. Mozambique served as an important traffic hub which made it possible for landlocked countries like Malawi and Zimbabwe to gain access to maritime trade routes. As South Africa's ally, RENAMO destroyed traffic infrastructures in Mozambique to paralyze sea trade in the region.⁴⁷

Halfway through 1981, RENAMO launched lethal attacks against the FRELIMO government in nine out of Mozambique's ten provinces.⁴⁸ President Machel realized that the DDR programme would not progress unless the SAR stopped supporting RENAMO. He accordingly entered into negotiations with the South African regime, which eventually led to the Nkomati Accord of March 1984. In this agreement,

[...] both countries resolved not to harbour hostile forces or allow their countries to be used as launching pads for attacks on one another. Mozambique agreed to expel the African National Congress from their country while South Africa agreed to cease its support of RENAMO [...].

This was thought to be the start of peaceful co-existence, but the Accord failed, especially from Mozambique's perspective. South Africa managed to obtain the removal of the ANC presence in Mozambique, but RENAMO activities increased as South Africa continued to clandestinely support the organisation. The country had been forced into the agreement as a result of economic dependence on South Africa. Once it became clear South Africa was not keeping its end of the agreement, the Accord collapsed.⁴⁹

However, with the SAR's Apartheid regime now the butt of strong international pressure, the two countries agreed to revive the Nkomati Accord on 26 May 1988, thus paving the way for the DDR programme's eventual success in Mozambique.

Explaining DDR Failure in Angola

The failure of the peace operation in Angola stemmed from the failure of DDR in which the weakness of the regional commitment to a peace settlement played out as a spoiling factor.

When in 1975 armed conflict broke out in Angola among independentist forces, the great powers decided to intervene either directly or indirectly. On the Communist side, the USSR provided the Socialist MPLA with military and economic support, and Cuban proxy forces took an active role in the war. In the other camp, the US supported UNITA through Zaire and the SAR (which both shared a common border with Angola), and provided military assistance. Moreover, some countries were politically involved in the Angolan

⁴⁶ Kenny, 1998, pp.13-14.

⁴⁷ UN DPI, 1994, p.321.

⁴⁸ Finnegan, 1992, p.32.

⁴⁹ Quote from South African History Online: <http://www.sahistory.org.za/dated-event/sa-and-mozambique-revive-nkomati-accord>.

conflict for economic reasons – mainly for the massive natural resources Angola holds. France (which had interests in many oil companies operating locally) and Brazil (claiming homogeneity of cultural and historical identity, and looking for cheaper oil imports) both supported the MPLA ; so did Sweden, which provided development assistance.⁵⁰

However, the role played by these international influences paled when compared with developments on the regional scene. South Africa had the strongest armed forces on the continent, enjoyed regional hegemony, and not even international sanctions could stop it from directly intervening in Angola and feeding the nascent civil war.⁵¹ In June of 1975, it dispatched armed forces to Angolan territory in the name of protecting its hydroelectric assets in Namibia. Moreover, the SAR conducted joint military operations with UNITA in order to stop military support flowing from Angola to SWAPO, the armed movement which fought for Namibian independence from the SAR.⁵²

Politically, the SAR needed alliances in the region to support its regime, now almost universally condemned by the international community for its policy of racial segregation. Militarily, it wanted to set up a buffer zone insulating it from African nationalist armed factions which threatened its national security. Economically, suffering from international sanctions, the SAR was interested in Angola's abundant oil and supply of diamonds.⁵³

However, because it did not have a detailed action plan to infiltrate troops into the central region of the territory, South Africa was in no position to establish a pro-SAR government in Angola through direct intervention, concentrating instead on supporting UNITA. On the day when Angola officially became independent from Portugal, the SAR armed forces were 120 miles away from the capital : too far to interrupt the establishment of the MPLA government physically.⁵⁴ As a consequence, Angola turned into a threat to the SAR in two ways. First, the MPLA government allowed the ANC and SWAPO to set up military bases along the Angolan border, which were strategically placed to infiltrate guerrillas into South Africa's northern region.⁵⁵ Second, the threat from Communist countries, which supported the MPLA, was rising. Cuba dispatched some 25,000 troops to Angola and the USSR started to enlarge its military and economic assistance to MPLA. The SAR, which could not count on even tacit support from Western countries, was no longer safe under the international bipolar structure. The perception of these threats led it to include intervention in Angola in its *Total Strategy for National Security*. The SAR implemented it through clandestine operations by special forces and a proxy war by UNITA.⁵⁶ This was the start of a long civil war between MPLA and UNITA.

⁵⁰ Tvedten, 1997, p.35.

⁵¹ Malaquias, 2007, p.75.

⁵² Marcum, 1978, p.268.

⁵³ Hallett, 1978, p.349.

⁵⁴ Malaquias, 2007. *op.cit.*, p.75.

⁵⁵ Tvedten, 1997, *op.cit.*, p.76.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, p.65.

After the collapse of the Apartheid regime, in 1994, military support from the SAR to UNITA ceased. However, UNITA, which had already accumulated enough economic resources through diamond smuggling to stand its ground, soon found another supporter to substitute for South Africa: Zaire, an old enemy of MPLA, provided the channels and routes for weapons smugglers with an eye on Angola's diamonds, and thus further fed the civil war.⁵⁷ Zaire was assisted in the process by the US. The Reagan Administration supplied UNITA with weapons ranging from small arms to anti-aircraft missiles. In 1989, the new Bush Administration provided it with phased military support to the tune of 15 million dollars through the Karona base.⁵⁸ Zaire's President Mobutu thought that the brokering business was in many ways beneficial. First, he could apply pressure on other factions with US approval and backing. Second, the military equipment provided by the US was not only for UNITA, but also for the Zairian armed forces. Third, Mobutu could count on UNITA's proxy war to counter MPLA.

The end of the Cold War brought changes to US policy towards the African States and the political order prevailing in the region. When the SAR's Apartheid regime gave way to majority rule, the US stopped supporting UNITA. Zaire, however, extended its military support in violation of the UN arms embargo declaration.⁵⁹ Though UN Secretary General Kofi Annan condemned the arms smuggling through the Zairian border, Mobutu went on to hire the services of a private military company as well as military experts from Belgium, Israel, Morocco, France, Germany and Zimbabwe to train UNITA combatants in guerrilla tactics and special forces operations.⁶⁰ Now fully equipped and trained⁶¹ thanks to Zaire, UNITA was soon transformed from the militia group that it was into a regular military organization.

Mobutu had three reasons for supporting UNITA though the US ceased to do so. When Washington changed its African policies, he feared political isolation and needed a regional partner. Zaire was then fighting to the West against the Congo, and to the East against the pro-Tutsi militia groups which threatened it because of its pro-Hutu policy. Mobutu wanted to sustain military networks which were formed during the Cold War for strengthening Zaire's clout in Africa. Militarily, he wanted to secure the border between Angola and the Congo. MPLA's strong presence along that border would have made it very difficult to control, since the costs of deploying military forces along a 30,000-mile long line was high. Thus, Zaire thus relied on UNITA's proxy war to protect it. Economically, the weapons and diamond smuggling was a source of income which enabled President Mobutu to maintain his political grip on Zaire for 32 years.⁶²

⁵⁷ Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, 2001.

⁵⁸ Windrich, 1992.

⁵⁹ Hart & Lewis, 1995, pp.74-78.

⁶⁰ Cleary, 1999, p.149.

⁶¹ Human Rights Watch, 1994, p.55.

⁶² UN OSAA, 2007, pp.8-9.

Conclusion

The comparison of eleven post-Cold War UN peacekeeping operations has identified the regional effort in favour of a peaceful settlement as the most important factor in DDR programmes, on which the success or failure of UN peacekeeping depends. The most significant element in peacekeeping is the military strength of belligerent factions, which makes them capable of sustaining armed conflict. This is usually made possible only if outside military support is available from neighbours with reasons of their own to help one of the factions, or to keep the conflict alive. Hence, DDR programmes capable of curbing military assistance from neighbouring States is the key to success. This mechanism, as illustrated by a comparative examination of UN history in Angola and Mozambique, is what comes to light when the study bears on otherwise very similar cases that differ in one important respect: whether the peacekeeping effort achieved its objectives or not. UNAVEM started a peace process in Angola under favourable conditions. However, it failed to complete its DDR programme because of Zaire's military support of UNITA. In the case of Mozambique, ONUMOZ initiated the operation with many handicaps; however, when South Africa stopped providing it with military support, RENAMO could no longer frustrate the UN's peace process. After the DDR programme targeting both sides of the civil war was completed, the peace operation proceeded as planned. In all cases, the regional factor proved more significant than either the domestic or international factors in accounting for success or failure of UN peacekeeping operations.

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