Irina Goldenberg, **Joseph Soeters & Waylon H. Dean (eds.)**, *Information Sharing in Military Operations*, Cham, Springer, 2017, 274 pp.

Reviewed by Eyal Ben-Ari

Information is a prime resource in any military operation. In today's world marked by a plethora of joint or coalition warfare often reaching down to the tactical level the sharing of information is all the more important if not more difficult. This volume tackles issues centered on information sharing by looking at the interpersonal, organizational, and technological enablers *and* barriers that appear in multinational and multiagency military, humanitarian, and counterterrorism operations. It is comprised of contributions that are empirically based and cover a gamut of operations, whether they be those of the United Nations, special operations headquarters, or other multinational enterprises from around the globe (indeed there are cases from military efforts in such diverse places as Mali, Iraq, or Afghanistan). Moreover, for civilians such as me, the chapters also offer much information gleaned from internal military sources that are not readily available to outsiders. The argument, cogently formulated by the editors, is that for operations to succeed there is a need for a holistic approach to information sharing : that is, one that includes all of the dimensions of sharing, be they trust and informal channels of communication or organizational and technological platforms. Moreover, the editors contend that military officers should learn from previous experiences in the planning and execution of information sharing. In all, this is a useful and at times highly insightful volume that is a mix of social scientific and organizational research along with guidance and recommendations for designing information sharing systems.

Spanning sixteen chapters, the collection includes integrative pieces at its beginning and end penned by the editors. Let me briefly sketch out the individual contributions and then go on to the deal with some of the wider issues that this volume raises.

"Information Sharing in Military and Security Operations" by Joseph Soeters (one of the editors) introduces the volume by setting out the unique problems of the military in sharing information (due to security-related considerations), and the move in many operations to multinational settings that necessitate working across organizational and national boundaries. Soeters goes on to explain why information sharing is important for the success of missions and the barriers to such sharing. Importantly, he also explains the distinction between non-sharing and non-receiving that is, the barriers to actually accepting and internalizing information shared. The introduction ends by sketching out the unique contribution of each of the chapters. The chapter by Victor Catano and Jeffrey Guager, "Information Fusion : Intelligence Centers and Intelligence Analysis", explains how an understanding of the importance of information sharing emerged after 9/11 and how the leaders of NATO developed fusion centers of intelligence analysis. This is basically a descriptive piece that concludes that fusion centers are the better alternative to simply

dealing with information in isolation. The next chapter, "Oh, Didn't Anyone Tell You? The Importance of Intra-Organizational Information Sharing", by Irina Goldenberg, Mathieu Saindon and Jumana Al-Tawil raises an important issue : the perceived fairness of information sharing by military supervisors and how this affects such things as job satisfaction and affective commitment. The crucial concept they utilize, with much success, is that of informational justice (itself a component of organizational justice) and they use it to show that what is involved in information sharing is much more than cooperation centered on information since a sense of justice has many more organizational benefits.

The next chapter by Delphine Resteigne and Steven Van den Bogaert titled "Information Sharing in Contemporary Operations: The Strength of SoF Ties" is one of the most fascinating in the collection. The authors studied the Special Operations Headquarters in Kabul, Afghanistan, to find that different international headquarters may be marked by different dynamics, with the Special Operations Headquarters (SoF) headquarters characterized by a strong insular and more secretive nature than other such centres. Yet, at the same time they persuasively argue that the regular forces may learn much from the example of SOF (especially as regards such issues as trust, the link to the strategic level and mutual risk-sharing). The following chapter titled "Information Sharing among Military Operational Staff: The French Officers' Experience" by Barbara Jankowski offers analysis of information sharing between the tactical, operational and strategic levels of the French military. Jankowski again underscores the fact that for information sharing to thrive, technology and procedures are not enough since trust, informal relationships, or practices of time management must be cultivated as well.

One of many important essays charting out the informal side of information-sharing is the chapter by Ritu Gill and Megan M. Thompson titled "Trust and Information Sharing in Multinational-Multiagency Teams". Basing the argument on previous research on multiple organizational settings outside the military, they explain the role of trust specifically on multinational and multiagency settings. It adds very good distinctions between different types of trust and ways in which a breach of trust may be rectified. Glen Segell's chapter "Information Sharing at United States Central Command" explains how the United States attempts to share information with partnering forces from 20 countries. The fascinating aspect that he raises is the problems related to cultural diversity within this network. This contribution also includes useful sections on non-sharing and the sharing outside of combat missions (for instance in training). The chapter titled "How Information Sharing Improves Organizational Effectiveness in Coalition Operations" by Andrea Rinaldo, Esther Vogler-Bisig and Tibor Szvirczev Tresch, continues many of the issues raised by Segell. It focuses on the organizational effectiveness of NATO Headquarters and ends with recommendations for proper cultural training and linguistic skills as necessary to good sharing and the importance of common information platforms.

The next two chapters focus on interactions between the Japanese Self-Defense Forces and other countries. Robert D. Eldridge, in his chapter "Information Sharing Between US and Japanese Forces before, during, and after Operation Tomodachi",

explains the history of the two countries interactions leading up to and including Japan's triple disaster. It shows that the participation of American forces alongside Japanese forces increased sharing significantly. He persuasively argues that it was previous ties that were crucial to the success of sharing in this mission. In her chapter titled "Conditions for Effective Intelligence and Information Sharing: Insights from Dutch-Japanese Cooperation in Iraq, 2003-2005", Chiyuki Aoi focuses on the Al-Muthama province in Iraq where the forces of the Netherlands and Japan were deployed between the years 2003 and 2005. Aoki clarifies that there was an in-built asymmetry between the two forces given the strict limitation put on the Japanese side by the Japanese government but that it was overcome due to the goodwill of the Dutch. She further explains that beyond the actual organizational and operational dimensions, this mission had long-term political implications for Japan as this was its first Japanese mission to a war zone since World War II.

Based on sustained fieldwork, the chapter titled "Information Sharing in Military Organizations : A Sociomaterial Perspective" by Gijs Van den Heuvel analyzes the cooperation between Dutch, Australian, and other allied nations in two Afghan provinces (Uruzgan and Kandahar) between the years 2006 and 2010. He takes a sociomaterial approach, one that sees social and material worlds as inextricably entangled to show its analytical utility. The chapter titled "Information Sharing in Multinational Peacekeeping Operations" by Unsal Sığrı, A. Kadir Varoglu, Ufuk Bsar, and Demet Varuglu deals with information sharing in the European peace operations in Bosnia. Based on interviews, the authors argue that negotiation and collaboration, so necessary to peacekeeping, can be constituted through information sharing. Sebastiaan Rietjens and Floribert Baudet, in their chapter titled "Stovepiping within Multinational Military Operations: The Case of Mali", comprises an investigation of the UN mission to Mali. Focusing on gathering intelligence, it explores the kinds of problems encountered in such multinational settings comprised of many nations and different types of forces. They end their essay by pointing out how to overcome the obstacles posed by "stovepiping": create a common system, form *ad-hoc* civilian-military teams, or simply accept bottlenecks.

The next set of essays move towards how information sharing is related to the wider environments within which multinational forces operate and specifically the political environment in which wide swathes of the public want to know what happens in operations. In his masterful essay "Managing the Media during the War in Mali : Between Restriction and Pragmatism", Saïd Haddad analyzes how the French military communicated about their actions in Mali. He shows how information sharing was marked by a balance between restriction and pragmatism and that the armed forces actually have a range of tools to deal with the media. Nina Hellum's chapter titled "The War at Home : Putin's Information Strategy toward the Russian Population" investigates how Vladimir Putin targeted the Russian population with an information strategy aimed at convincing them of the legitimacy of intervention in Crimea. She emphasizes that in a successful media campaign leaders need to be aware of multiple publics.

The final essay in penned again by two editors, Irina Goldenberg and Waylon H. Dean and is entitled "Enablers and Barriers to Information Sharing in Military and Security Operations: Lessons Learned". It offers a very good summary of the main findings and contentions of the diverse contributions to the volume. Outlined in a clear one-and-a-half page table listing out enablers and barriers to information sharing, it makes clear that social and organizational issues are more important than technological ones. It also adds two more enablers that are not depicted in the table : the interdependence between enablers (for example pre-deployment training being a precondition for willingness to negotiate among team members) and mutual reinforcement between enablers (the virtuous cycle between sharing information and trust building).

This volume offers a diverse set of contributions from a large variety of disciplines and as such the chapters can be read individually. To the great credit of the editors however, the introduction and conclusion do a very good job of integrating the findings in a way that shows the key threads – that of enablers and barriers to information sharing – running through the different chapters. For social and organizational scientists, the importance of the volume lies in the way it underscores how central informal channels of communication are for formal systems to work. In addition and especially given the nature of many multinational and multiagency missions today, it adds the importance of various cultural issues that may enable or impede good sharing.

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