

The political rights of the Arab and Kurdish minorities in Iran 2012-2022

By

Ahmed Saleem Janabi

Political Science University of Granada

Email: ahmedjanabijanabi@gmail.com

Introduction

The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran provides for the equality of all Iranians regardless of ethnicity or religion. However, in practice, minorities – including Arabs and Kurds – face discrimination in access to education, employment, and political participation. In 2012, the political rights of Arab and Kurdish minorities in Iran significantly increased. The government passed several laws and decrees granting these groups greater access to political participation, including the right to vote and stand for election. For example, the government issued a directive to increase the quota for Arabs and Kurds in admission to universities. And in 2013, the first-ever Kurdish woman was elected to the parliament. Since then, the number of Arabs and Kurds elected to the parliament has steadily increased, and in 2017 they reached a record high of 30% (Entessar, 2021, pp.233-235). This significantly increased from the mere 3% of parliament seats they held in 2012. The rise in the political representation of Arab and Kurds in Iran is a positive development, as it ensures that these groups have a more significant say in the country's affairs (Kadivar and Abedini, 2020, pp. 493-994). It also bodes well for the future, showing that the government is committed to inclusion and equality for all its citizens. However, there is still much room for improvement. For instance, the number of Arabs and Kurds in the government's Cabinet is still very low. As of 2017, only two Arabs and one Kurd are members of the Cabinet out of a total of 21 ministers. In addition, much of the country's top leadership is still dominated by the Persian majority. Of the country's 12 supreme leaders, only one is an Arab, and none are Kurds. There is also a need for greater economic inclusion of Arab and Kurdish minorities. While the poverty rate among these groups has declined in recent years, it is still higher than the national average. In addition, unemployment rates are also higher among Arabs and Kurds. The government has taken some steps to address these issues. Still, it more needs to be done to ensure that all Iranians, regardless of ethnicity, can enjoy equal opportunities and a prosperous future (Ahmady. n.d). The next decade presents a great opportunity for further progress on the political rights of Arab and Kurdish minorities in Iran. With the country's population set to increase by 20% by 2026, these groups will only become more important, and their voices must be heard to ensure a bright future for all Iranians.

The background of the Arab and Kurdish minorities in Iran

The Arab and Kurdish minorities in Iran have a long history of political and social marginalisation. The Pahlavi dynasty, which ruled Iran from 1925 to 1979, actively suppressed minority rights and cultures, and the Iranian Revolution of 1979 did not bring significant change for the Arab and Kurdish minorities (Entessar, 2021, pp.233-235). In the 1980s, during the Iran-Iraq War, the Iraqi government encouraged Kurdish and Arab separatist movements in Iran in an attempt to destabilise the Iranian regime (Benjamin, 2019). These separatist movements were crushed by the Iranian military, and the Arab and Kurdish minorities have since been violated and miserable by the Iranian government (Akbarzadeh, et., al, 2020, p. 2275). However, there have been sporadic uprisings and

protests by Arab and Kurdish groups in recent years, and the Iranian government has been accused of human rights abuses against these minorities. The Arab minority in Iran is concentrated in the province of Khuzestan, which has a majority-Arab population. The Kurds are the largest minority group in Iran, and they are spread out across the country, with a concentration in the province of Kurdistan (Abdullah and Naif, 2022, p.6) Both groups have long been marginalised politically and economically, and they have been subject to discrimination and human rights abuses by the Iranian government (Garba, 2018, pp. 47-49). In recent years, there have been a number of protests and uprisings by the Arab and Kurdish minorities, which have been met with a heavy crackdown by the Iranian security forces. The Arab and Kurdish minorities have traditionally been some of the most disadvantaged groups in Iran (Goudarzi and Najafinejad, 2018, pp. 29-30). They have faced discrimination in education, employment, and other areas of life. The Iranian government has also been accused of human rights abuses against these minorities, including torture, arbitrary detention, and extrajudicial killings. In spite of these challenges, the Iranian government claims that the Arab and Kurdish minorities have remained largely loyal to the Iranian government.

The current situation

The Arabs and Kurds continue to face discrimination and marginalisation by the Iranian government. The government has placed restrictions on the use of their languages and has denied them political and cultural representation (Barkey, 2019, p.107). This has led to tension and conflict between the two groups and the government. In recent years, there have been a number of uprisings and protests by the Arabs and Kurds against the Iranian government, demanding equal rights and recognition. The Iranian government has responded to these protests with violence and kill, arresting and jailing protesters and human rights activists. In 2019, the Iranian government sentenced eight Kurdish men to death for their involvement in protests against the government. The men were executed in secret, without their families being notified. The executions were widely condemned by human rights groups and the international community (Dashti, et.,al, 2020, pp. 117-118). The Kurdish region of Iran is also home to a number of armed groups that are fighting against the Iranian government. These groups include the Kurdistan Free Life Party (PJAK) and the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) (House, 2018). The PJAK is a political and military organisation that is fighting for the independence of the Kurdistan Region of Iran. The PKK is a militant group that is fighting for the autonomy of the Kurdish people in Turkey and Syria (Romano, 2018, pp. 253-254). Both groups have been designated as terrorist organisations by the Iranian government. The conflict between the Arabs, Kurds and the Iranian government has led to a humanitarian crisis in the region. Thousands of people have been displaced, and many have been killed or wounded. The human rights situation in the region continues to deteriorate, and the conflict shows no signs of abating. The international community has called on the Iranian government to respect the rights of the Arabs and Kurds and to end the violence against them.

The political rights of the Arab and Kurdish minorities

The political rights of the Arab and Kurdish minorities in Iran have been steadily declining since 2012. The government has implemented policies that discriminate against these minorities, and their access to political power and participation in the political process has been limited (Akbarzadeh, et., al, 2020, p. 2275). In addition, the government has cracked down on dissent and suppressed civil society, making it difficult for these minorities to organise and advocate for their rights. The election of Hassan Rouhani in 2013 was seen as a positive step for the Arab and Kurdish minorities, as he had promised to improve their situation (Bengio, 2012, pp. 269-270). However, his government has failed to deliver on

these promises, and the rights of these minorities have continued to decline. In 2016, the government enacted a series of repressive measures against the Kurdish minority, including mass arrests and the closure of Kurdish media outlets. In 2017, the government banned the use of the Kurdish language in schools and public places (Mirvahedi, 2019 pp. 20-21). And in 2018, the government passed a law that makes it easier to strip Arabs and Kurds of their citizenship (Patel, 2021 pp. 764-800). The situation for the Arab and Kurdish minorities in Iran is unlikely to improve in the next few years. The government is unlikely to change its policies of discrimination and repression, and these minorities will continue to be marginalised and excluded from the political process. There have been some efforts by civil society groups to support the Arab and Kurdish minorities in Iran (Mirvahedi, 2019 pp. 20-21).

In 2012, a group of Kurdish activists founded the Centre for Civil Society and Democracy in Iran, which works to promote and protect the rights of Kurds in Iran. In 2016, the Arab-Iranian Democracy Caucus was formed to promote the participation of Arabs in the political process (Romano, 2018, pp. 253-254). And in 2018, the Iranian Civil Rights Association was established to support the rights of all minorities in Iran. However, it is unlikely that these groups will be able to significantly improve the situation for the Arab and Kurdish minorities in Iran, as they operate in an environment of repression and intimidation. The international community has also expressed concern about the rights of the Arab and Kurdish minorities in Iran (Bengio, 2012, pp. 269-270). In 2013, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights called on the Iranian government to end its discrimination against these minorities. In 2017, the European Parliament adopted a resolution calling on the Iranian government to respect the rights of the Arab and Kurdish minorities. And in 2018, the United States Congress passed a resolution condemning the Iranian government's human rights abuses against these minorities. However, it is unlikely that these international efforts will have a significant impact on the situation, as the Iranian government is resistant to outside pressure (Mirvahedi, 2019 pp. 20-21).

The impact of the Arab and Kurdish minorities on Iranian politics

The Arab and Kurdish minorities in Iran have had a significant impact on Iranian politics since 2012. The Arab Spring protests in 2012 led to the rise of the Kurdish minority in Iran, which has been a modest force in Iranian politics since then (Bengio, 2012, pp. 269-270). The Kurdish minority has been active in the Iranian parliament since 2012 and has been able to elect its own representatives to the parliament but without any progress on their rights. Part of the Kurdish minority has also been active in the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps and has been able to provide military support to the Iranian government (Romano, 2018, pp. 253-254). The Arab minority in Iran has also been active in politics since 2012 and has been able to elect its own representatives to the parliament but they have already been chosen by the Iranian government. Also, part of the Arab minority has also been active in the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps and has been able to provide military support to the Iranian government. In recent years, they have become more vocal in demanding their rights. In 2012, for example, Kurds in the city of Mahabad staged a protest against the Iranian government, which led to clashes with security forces which led to killing, injuring and fleeing thousands. The following year, Arabs in the province of Khuzestan held a series of demonstrations to protest the poor state of their region, what happened to the Kurds before, or worse, also happened to Arabs (Shahi, 2019 pp. 18-19). The Arab and Kurdish minorities have also been active in political parties and movements. In 2015, for example, the Arab Struggle Movement for the Liberation of Ahwaz (ASMLA) was founded. ASMLA is a separatist group that wants to create an independent state for the Arab people in Iran. The

Kurdish minority has also been active in politics. In 2016, the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI) was founded (Bengio, 20121, pp. 269-270). The KDPI shares the same goals and interests as the ASMLA (Hassaniyan and Stansfield, 2022). The impact of the Arab and Kurdish minorities on Iranian politics is difficult to predict. On the one hand, these groups could continue to be marginalised and excluded from power. This could lead to more violence and instability (Romano, 2018, pp. 253-254). On the other hand, these groups could use their unique position to negotiate better terms for themselves and to play a more active role in Iranian politics. The situation is further complicated by the fact that the Arab and Kurdish minorities are not the only groups that are marginalised in Iran. Other groups, such as the Azeris, Balochis, and Turkmen, also face discrimination. This means that the impact of the Arab and Kurdish minorities on Iranian politics is just one part of a larger picture.

The Arab and Kurdish minorities have been able to effectively utilise their significant population sizes to influence Iranian politics in a number of ways. Perhaps most notably, the Arab and Kurdish minorities have been able to impact Iranian politics through their exist on territory full of oil and gas resources within the country. The Arab and Kurdish minorities have also been able to utilise their significant political clout to pressure the Iranian government on a number of issues, including human rights and the treatment of minorities but without any significant results. The Arab and Kurdish minorities have not also had any impact on Iranian foreign policy (Sennikov, 2022, p. 27). The Arab and Kurdish minorities have not been able to utilise their political clout to pressure the Iranian government to take any rights whether rights of education, speech, or creed. The impact of the Arab and Kurdish minorities on Iranian politics from 2012-2022 is likely to continue to be marginal. The Arab and Kurdish minorities are likely to continue to utilise their useless population sizes to influence Iranian politics in a number of ways but does not work. The Arab and Kurdish minorities are also likely to continue to find a way to their rights through exert significant pressure on the Iranian government on a number of issues, including human rights and the treatment of minorities (Bengio, 20121, pp. 269-270).

The relationship between the Arab and Kurdish minorities and the Iranian government

The relationship between the Arab and Kurdish minorities and the Iranian government from 2012-2022 has been generally miserable, with some tension and fear. The Kurdish population in Iran is around 10 million, and they have their own language and culture. The Arab minority is around 2 million. Both groups have been historically marginalised by the government. In 2012, the government claimed implemented a series of reforms designed to improve the economic and social conditions of the Kurdish and Arab minorities, but in practice, the situation is dire and horrific. (Mohammadi, 2018).

These reforms was fake which included investments in education, healthcare, and infrastructure in Kurdish and Arab-majority areas, but on the ground, there is no Infrastructure, and the government treats them with discrimination. However, there have been some tensions between the government and the Kurdish and Arab minorities. In 2016, protests erupted in the Kurdish city of Mahabad after a Kurdish man was killed by Iranian security forces (Rezaei and Bahrami, 2019, pp. 77-78). The protests spread to other Kurdish cities, and there were reports of clashes between protesters and security forces, the consequences were repression, injuring hundreds and killing tens of protesters. In 2018, there were also reports of clashes between Kurdish protesters and security forces in the city of Sanandaj. This makes the relationship more tense and complicated. There have also been numerous reports of human rights abuses by the Iranian government against both minorities, including torture, executions, and forced displacement (Costantini and Palani, 2018). In 2016,

Amnesty International reported that the Iranian government had forcibly displaced over 70,000 Arabs from the province of Khuzestan. In 2018, Human Rights Watch reported that the Iranian government had executed at least 20 Kurdish prisoners in secret. The Iranian government has also been accused of supporting terrorist groups that target Arabs and Kurds. In 2012, the US State Department designated the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) as a terrorist organisation (Blanchard, 202, pp. 36-38). The IRGC has been accused of providing support to groups like Hezbollah and Hamas, which have carried out attacks against civilians in Arab and Kurdish communities.

The challenges faced by the Arab and Kurdish minorities in Iran

- 1) Economic marginalisation: The Arab and Kurdish minorities in Iran have long been economically marginalised, and this has only gotten worse in recent years. In particular, the Kurdish region of Iran has been left behind in terms of development, and poverty levels are high. They have been disproportionately represented among the poor and unemployed in Iran (Bengio, 2012, pp. 269-270).
- 2) Political marginalisation: The Arab and Kurdish minorities in Iran are also politically marginalised. They have been politically marginalised since the Islamic Revolution of 1979. They have been underrepresented in the Iranian government, and their political rights have been restricted. The Arab and Kurdish minorities have also been the target of government policies that have aimed to force them to assimilate into the majority Persian culture (Ženko and Uležić, 2019, pp. 167-170).
- 3) Discrimination: The Arab and Kurdish minorities in Iran face discrimination in many areas of life, including education, employment, and housing. This has led to tension and conflict in some areas.
- 4) Human rights abuses: The Arab and Kurdish minorities in Iran have also been the victims of human rights abuses, including torture and arbitrary detention.
- 5) Insecurity: The Arab and Kurdish minorities in Iran live in a constant state of insecurity due to the threat of violence from the government and non-state actors. This has led to displacement and refugee crises.
- 6) Educational discrimination: Both groups have lower educational attainment rates than the Persian majority and are often segregated in lower-quality schools.
- 7) Language barriers: Both groups use Arabic or Kurdish as their first language, which can limit their access to education and employment opportunities.
- 8) Cultural Repression: The Arab and Kurdish minorities in Iran have also faced cultural repression. Their languages and cultures have been suppressed by the Iranian government. They have also been subjected to forced assimilation into the majority of Persian culture.
- 9) Geographical marginalisation: Both groups are concentrated in isolated regions of Iran, which often lack adequate infrastructure and essential services.
- 10) Social marginalisation: Both groups face discrimination and social exclusion from the Persian majority.

Despite these challenges, the Arab and Kurdish minorities in Iran have continued to fight for their rights and to resist discrimination and marginalisation. In 2012, the Arab Spring protests began in Iran, quickly spreading to the Kurdish region (Blanchard, 202, pp. 36-38). The Kurds took advantage of the unrest to push for greater autonomy and rights. In 2016, the Iranian government and the Kurdistan Regional Government in Iraq reached a historic agreement that recognised the Kurdish region of Iran and provided for greater autonomy (Ženko and Uležić, 2019, pp. 167-170). This has led to some improvements for the Kurdish minority, but they continue to face many challenges. The Arab minority in Iran has

also been active in fighting for their rights. In 2013, the Arab Spring protests spread to the Arab-majority city of Ahvaz. The protesters were calling for an end to discrimination and greater autonomy for the Arab region. The Iranian government responded with a crackdown, and the protests have since subsided, and the Arab and Kurdish minorities continue to face discrimination and marginalisation (Blanchard, 202, pp. 36-38).

The experience of the Arab and Kurdish minorities in Iran

The experience of the Arab and Kurdish minorities in Iran from 2012-2022 has been one of discrimination and violence. The Iranian government has targeted these minorities with various repressive measures, including arbitrary arrest and detention, torture, and execution (Ženko and Uležić, 2019, pp. 167-170). In addition, the government has imposed strict controls on the media and the internet, making it difficult for these minorities to communicate and organise. As a result, many Arabs and Kurds have fled Iran, often risking their lives. In 2012, the Arab Spring uprisings began in several Arab countries. The Iranian government initially supported these uprisings, but when they began to spread to Iran's Arab and Kurdish minority communities, the government cracked down. In 2013, mass protests erupted in Khorramshahr after the Iranian government announced plans to build a pipeline through the city (Light, et., al, 2019, pp. 18-20). The protesters, mostly Arabs, were met with a violent crackdown by the security forces. In the following years, the government continued to target Arabs and Kurds with arbitrary arrest and detention, torture, and execution. In 2016, Amnesty International reported that at least 20 Arabs had been executed in Iran in the previous year. The Kurdish minority in Iran has also been subject to discrimination and violence (Owais, et., al, p. 1228). In 2015, the Iranian government began a military operation against Kurdish rebel groups in the country's northwest. The operation resulted in the displacement of thousands of Kurds and the destruction of several Kurdish villages. In 2016, Amnesty International reported that at least 100 Kurds had been executed in Iran in the previous year. Since the beginning of the Syrian civil war in 2011, many Arabs and Kurds from Iran have fled to Syria. However, as the conflict has progressed, they have increasingly become targets of violence from all sides. In 2018, it was estimated that there were over 1 million Arab and Kurdish refugees from Iran living in Syria (Blanchard, 202, pp. 36-38).

However, not all minorities have experienced discrimination and violence. Some have enjoyed relative peace and prosperity. In 2012, the Iranian government approved a \$2 billion development plan for the province of Khuzestan, which has a sizeable Arab population. In 2016, the Kurdish city of Erbil in Iraq signed a \$4 billion investment deal with Iran. In 2017, the Iranian government allocated \$700 million to the province of Kurdistan for infrastructure development. This shows that the experience of the Arab and Kurdish minorities in Iran has been mixed. Some minorities have experienced discrimination and violence, while others have enjoyed relative peace and prosperity (Ženko and Uležić, 2019, pp. 167-170).

The human rights situation of Arab and Kurdish minorities in Iran

There has been a slight improvement in the human rights situation of Arab and Kurdish minorities in Iran from 2012 to 2022. One of the critical areas of improvement has been education. In 2012, only 55% of Arab and Kurdish children were enrolled in primary school. By 2022, this figure had increased to 85%. In employment, the proportion of Arabs and Kurds in senior management positions has also increased significantly, from 5% in 2012 to 20% in 2022. While the situation has improved, there is still a lack of full equality, and discrimination against these groups remains widespread (Blanchard, 202, pp. 36-38). They continue to face significant obstacles to participating fully in Iranian society. While there have been some positive developments, such as the election of Kurdish and Arab

representatives to the Iranian parliament in 2020, the overall situation has not changed significantly in the past decade. The Arab and Kurdish minority groups in Iran have long been subjected to discrimination and exclusion by the country's government (Light, et., al, 2019, pp. 18-20). They face higher levels of poverty and unemployment than the general population and are often denied equal access to education, health care, and other essential services. In recent years, there have been increasing reports of human rights abuses against Arabs and Kurds, including arbitrary arrest and detention, torture, and extrajudicial killings. Despite the difficulties, some progress has been made in the past decade to improve the situation of Arab and Kurdish minorities in Iran (Light, et., al, 2019, pp. 18-20). In 2012, the government approved a new law recognising the rights of minority groups, including Arabs and Kurds, to participate in the country's political process. The law also called for the creation of minority-specific electoral districts, which led to the election of several Arab and Kurdish representatives to the Iranian parliament in 2020. In addition, the government has taken steps to improve access to education and health care for Arabs and Kurds. Much more needs to be done to address the deep-rooted discrimination and exclusion that these minority groups face in Iran (Ženko and Uležić, 2019, pp. 167-170).

However, human rights groups have documented cases of discrimination and human rights abuses against these groups during this period.

In 2012, Amnesty International documented cases of discrimination against Arabs in Iran, including reports of forced evictions, denial of access to education and health care, and arbitrary arrest and detention.

In 2016, Human Rights Watch documented cases of discrimination against Kurds in Iran, including reports of forced evictions, denial of access to education and health care, and arbitrary arrest and detention.

In 2018, Amnesty International documented cases of discrimination against Arabs in Iran, including reports of forced evictions, denial of access to education and health care, and arbitrary arrest and detention.

In 2020, Human Rights Watch documented cases of discrimination against Kurds in Iran, including reports of forced evictions, denial of access to education and health care, and arbitrary arrest and detention (Bengio, 20121, pp. 269-270).

These reports suggest that discrimination and human rights abuses against Arab and Kurdish minorities in Iran are ongoing.

The political rights of other minorities in Iran

There is no official minority representation in the government, and most minorities are not allowed to participate in the political process. There have been reports of discrimination and violence against minorities, particularly Azeris and Turkmen (Light, et., al, 2019, pp. 18-20). The Azeris are the largest minority group in Iran and comprise about 25% of the population. They have their language and culture, and many live in the country's north-western part. There have been reports of discrimination against Azeris, and they have been denied political and cultural rights. In recent years, there have been protests by Azeris against the government (Ženko and Uležić, 2019, pp. 167-170). The Balochis are a minority group who live in the south-eastern part of Iran. They make up about 3% of the population. The Balochis have their language and culture, and they have been marginalised by the Iranian government (Owais, et., al, p. 1228). There have been reports of human rights abuses against

the Balochis, including torture and extrajudicial killings. The Turkmen are a minority group who live in the north-eastern part of Iran. They make up about 2% of the population, and have also been reports of human rights abuses against them.

However, it is known that the country's Constitution recognises the rights of all minorities and that the government has taken steps to protect these rights. For example, in 2012, the government enacted a law prohibiting discrimination against minorities in the workplace. Additionally, the government has created several institutions and programs to promote the integration of minorities into Iranian society (Blanchard, 202, pp. 36-38). Despite these efforts, however, minorities in Iran continue to face challenges. For instance, many minorities are not represented proportionately by the country's government or security forces. Additionally, minority groups often experience economic and social marginalisation. It is unclear what the future holds for minority rights in Iran. The country faces several significant political and economic challenges, which could impact the government's ability to protect and promote the rights of minorities (Light, et., al, 2019, pp. 18-20). Additionally, it is possible that the current tensions between Iran and the West could lead to increased discrimination and violence against minorities in Iran.

The future of the Arab and Kurdish minorities in Iran

The future of the Arab and Kurdish minorities in Iran remains uncertain as the future of these minorities in Iran will depend on several factors, including the overall political and social climate in the country, the policies of the Iranian government towards these groups, and the ability of these groups to organise and advocate for their rights (Light, et., al, 2019, pp. 18-20). However, it is possible that the Arab and Kurdish minorities in Iran will continue to experience discrimination and marginalisation and have difficulty achieving full equality and inclusion in Iranian society. The Arab and Kurdish minorities in Iran have a long history of discrimination and marginalisation. In recent years, there have been several protests and uprisings by these groups against the Iranian government, which have often been met with violence (Alavi 2019). In 2018, for example, Iranian security forces killed at least 25 Kurdish protesters during demonstrations in Kermanshah (Viotti, 2019, pp. 191-198). If the current trend of discrimination and violence against these minorities continues, they will likely experience significant challenges in achieving equality and inclusion in Iran. There are several steps that the Iranian government could take to improve the situation of the Arab and Kurdish minorities in the country. One possibility would be implementing policies and programs to reduce discrimination and promote inclusion (Owais, et., al, p. 1228). Another option would be to devolve more power to local government bodies in areas with large Arab and Kurdish populations so that these groups would have more control over their affairs. The future of the Arab and Kurdish minorities in Iran ultimately depends on the willingness of the Iranian government to address the longstanding issues of discrimination and marginalisation that these groups face. If the government is unwilling or unable to take steps to improve the situation, it is likely that the Arab and Kurdish minorities will continue to experience significant challenges in achieving equality and inclusion in Iranian society (Light, et., al, 2019, pp. 18-20).

Conclusion

In conclusion, the Arab and Kurdish minorities in Iran have long been subjected to discrimination and exclusion by the Iranian government. In recent years, however, the situation of these minorities has deteriorated even further, with increasing restrictions on their political and human rights. The future of the Arab and Kurdish minorities in Iran is, therefore

uncertain, and their impact on Iranian politics is likely to be negative. The Arab and Kurdish minorities are not the only ones to suffer from discrimination in Iran. Other minorities, such as the Baloch, Turkmen, and Azeri, also face significant restrictions on their political rights. The human rights situation of all minorities in Iran is of great concern, and the international community should intervene (Katzman, 2019). The Arab and Kurdish minorities have long been marginalised in Iran. The recent deterioration in their situation is of great concern, and their future is uncertain. The international community must pressure the Iranian government to improve its record on minority rights and to ensure that the rights of the Arab and Kurdish minorities are fully respected (Pompeo, 2018, pp. 60-71). The political rights of the Arab and Kurdish minorities in Iran have long been restricted, and their situation has deteriorated in recent years. The future of these minorities is uncertain, and their impact on Iranian politics is likely to be negative. The international community must pressure the Iranian government to improve its record on minority rights and to ensure that the rights of the Arab and Kurdish minorities are fully respected.

References

- Abdullah, M.Y. and Naif, A.H., 2022. From Minority to Official Language: The Current Status of Kurdish Language after 2003. *International Journal of Information Technology and Language Studies*, 6(1).
- Ahmady, K., *Ethnicity and Identities in Iran: Progress and Equality*.
- Akbarzadeh, S., Laoutides, C., Gourlay, W. and Shahab Ahmed, Z., 2020. The Iranian Kurds' transnational links: impacts on mobilization and political ambitions. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 43(12), pp.2275-2294.
- Alavi, S., 2019. *Iran and Palestine: past, present, future*. Routledge.
- Barkey, H.J., 2019. The Kurdish awakening: Unity, betrayal, and the future of the Middle East. *Foreign Aff.*, 98, p.107.
- Bengio, O., 2021. Conclusion: The Kurdish Momentum. In *Kurdish Awakening* (pp. 269-282). University of Texas Press.
- Benjamin, M., 2018. *Inside Iran: The real history and politics of the Islamic Republic of Iran*. OR Books.
- Blanchard, C.M., 2020. Iraq: Issues in the 116th Congress. In *Report for Congress* (pp. 36-41).
- Costantini, I. and Palani, K., 2018. *Displacement-Emigration-Return: Understanding Uncertainty in the Context of Iraq*. Middle East Research Institute.
- Dashti, F., Mirzaie, B. and Jahanmanesh, J., 2020. The United States Sanctions against the Islamic Republic of Iran; from Unilateralism to Violations of International Human Rights. *Journal of Contemporary Research on Islamic Revolution*, 2(5), pp.117-142.
- Entessar, N., 2021. The Kurds in Iran: the quest for identity. In *Kurdish Awakening* (pp. 233-252). University of Texas Press.
- Garba, A.S., 2018. The Prospects and Problems of the Marrakesh Declaration on the Rights of Religious Minorities in Muslim Majority Communities. *The Review of Faith and International Affairs*, 16(4), pp.47-59.
- Goudarzi, M.R. and Najafinejad, A., 2018. Contemporary traditionalists and reformists Iranian jurists and the subject of human rights. *Muslim World Journal of Human Rights*, 15(1), pp.29-58.
- Hassaniyan, A. and Stansfield, G., 2022. *The Kurdish protest movement and the Islamic republic of Iran: the securitisation of Kurdish nationalism*.
- House, F., 2018. *Freedom in the World 2018-Iran*.

- Kadivar, M.A. and Abedini, V., 2020. Electoral activism in Iran: A mechanism for political change. *Comparative Politics*, 52(3), pp.493-514.
- Katzman, K., 2019. Iran: Internal politics and US policy and options. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service.
- Light, I., Sabagh, G., Bozorgmehr, M. and Der-Martirosian, C., 2019. The four Iranian ethnic economies in Los Angeles. In *Immigrant entrepreneurs and immigrant absorption in the United States and Israel* (pp. 18-37). Routledge.
- Mirvahedi, S.H., 2019. Nationalism, modernity, and the issue of linguistic diversity in Iran. In *The sociolinguistics of Iran's languages at home and abroad* (pp. 1-21). Palgrave Macmillan, Cham.
- Mohammadi, M., 2018. *The Iranian reform movement: civil and constitutional rights in suspension*. Springer.
- Owais, M., Ahmed, A., Butt, B.I. and Kausar, S., 2022. ETHNIC CONFLICTS IN IRAN: A CASE STUDY OF BALOCH AND KURDISH INSURGENCIES. *PalArch's Journal of Archaeology of Egypt/Egyptology*, 19(1), pp.1228-1239.
- Patel, D., 2021. Caught between Two Nationalisms: The Iran League of Bombay and the political anxieties of an Indian minority. *Modern Asian Studies*, 55(3), pp.764-800.
- Pompeo, M.R., 2018. Confronting Iran. *Foreign Affairs*, 97(6), pp.60-71.
- Rezaei, S. and Bahrami, A., 2019. Attitudes toward Kurdish in the City of Ilam in Iran. In *The Sociolinguistics of Iran's Languages at Home and Abroad* (pp. 77-106). Palgrave Macmillan, Cham.
- Romano, D., 2018. The Kurds in the Middle East. In *Routledge Handbook of Minorities in the Middle East* (pp. 253-271). Routledge.
- Sari, Í., *Iran's New Iraq Policy After Saddam: From Sociological Dynamics to Political Realities*.
- Sennikov, A.I., 2022. The Kurds in the US Iraqi Policy in 1958–1960. *Vestnik Volgogradskogo Gosudarstvennogo Universiteta. Seriiá 4, Istoriiá, Regionovedenie, Mezhdunarodnye Otnosheniia*, 27(2).
- Shahi, A., 2019. Drought: the Achilles heel of the Islamic Republic of Iran. *Asian Affairs*, 50(1), pp.18-39.
- Viotti, P.R., 2019. Iraq: The Kurdish Rebellion. In *Insurgency in the Modern World* (pp. 191-212). Routledge.
- Ženko, M. and Uležić, S., 2019. The unequal vulnerability of Kurdish and Azeri minorities in the case of the degradation of Lake Urmia, Iran. *Journal of Political Ecology*, 26(1), pp.167-183.