

National Approaches to Military Capability Planning: A Comparative Analysis

By

Vikram Lathwal, Assistant Professor

Faculty of Law, SGT University, Gurugram, Haryana, India

Email Id- vikram_flaw@sgtuniversity.org

Sh. Sachin Gupta, Chancellor

Department of Management, SOMC, Sanskriti University, Mathura, Uttar Pradesh, India

Email Id- chancellor@sanskriti.edu.in

Mr. Vaibhav Shankar, Assistant Professor

School of Law, Galgotias University, Greater Noida, Uttar Pradesh, India

Email Id- vaibhav.shanker@galgotiasuniversity.edu.in

Abstract:

The (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) NATO Defense Planning Process (NDPP) is commonly used to assess national defense planning and policy. Considering that the NDPP requires broad and agreed criteria to determine the various countries' military capabilities. It would also be beneficial to analyze how governments of the world, we're currently living in, closely examine their efficiency inside the capability-based strategic planning, that intend to build communal initiatives which would lead to independent countries whereas to attempting the necessity. This study looked at how the concepts of the NDPP is founded and how they were mentioned in defensive military planning process, as well as why national defense plan documents should be changed in the same way as the NDPP. The study was conducted to address the aforementioned concern as well as to recognize the common strategies or instruction. Current study also examined the extent of the implementation of national procedures of originating nations which is likely to be related to NDPP concepts and also European's Union (EU) capability development concepts.

Keywords: Defence Planning Procedure (DPP), European's Union (EU), National Defense Planning Procedures (NDPP), North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

Introduction

The defence planning procedure (DPP), in several the NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) nation-states is frequently compared to the NATO Defense Planning Process (NDPP), despite the fact that it is not stated that national defense planning procedures should be altered in the same way that the NDPP process. It is completely indisputable one of the primary goals of all NATO members or their national defense planning procedures should be to meet the Alliance's aspiration criteria. Furthermore, it is debatable whether such a reality necessitates a thorough examination of NATO defense strategy methodologies with the intention of incorporating these into national defense systems (Jones, 2016). To identify a solution to the aforementioned problem, a study was conducted whose goal was explicitly focused at:

- Determining the extent to the different nations, the national planning procedures agree with the NDPP ideas as well as the European Union's (EU) capability to develop the principles.
- Recognizing interesting outcomes or when building a specific national capacity approach to planning, best practices from all over the national capability planning process should be considered,

1.1. Creating an Analytical Framework:

The primary need for beginning the analysis was to create an appropriate countries' structures must be provided for comparative study. Following that, countries were chosen based on the criteria outlined below (Chow, 2013):

- This research entirely focused on NATO or EU member countries in Europe,
- This study also included the NATO countries as well as the European union member states, and also NATO and the EU are both members,
- The goal intended to investigate small and medium-sized nations, and also ones regarded as large in terms of geography and people.
- This study involves either long-standing NATO/EU members or states that joined NATO or even the EU recently, that is, after 1999 for NATO but after 2004 for these European Union.
- Only nations possessing national conceptual papers dealing with defence, including defence white papers, defensive military policies, doctors, and so on, were studied planning on the building capacity.

Planning Based on Capability:

The capability-based planning technique begins by analyzing the original policy direction, as well as the safety environment for the technological future or the initiation of defence objectives as well as duties. Modeling the future environment perceives the potential planned events that produce the risk and the intelligence scenarios. The important abilities to carry out the missions as well as the responsibilities of defence in the future are defined based on the output circumstances. The capacity of defense to convey these consequences which the accomplish goals an also the responsibilities are referred to as “capability”. The issue in which defence capabilities would be required in the future to anticipate the potential security problems, dangers, or intimidations. Capability-based planning enables the identification of future defence capabilities as well as the development of defence capabilities, particularly for directing precious resources of military capabilities which are essentially necessary. There are different designs of capability-based planning in the literature. The stages depicted in Figure 1 shows an instance of a Capability-Based Planning (CBP) paradigm.




Figure 1: Represents the “Capability-Based Planning Model” and Political Guidance with Available Resources.

The first stage of the CBP process is Political Guidance Analysis. The major inputs include national interests or aims, national security as well as defence policies, the roles or importance of allies, friendly states, international defence organizations, and so on. This Political Guidance Analysis consists of the steps described below:

- Define the defence strategy.
- Limitations, defence missions, Level of Aspirations (LOA), and the priorities must all be identified.

The very first phase is a thorough study of main national security, defence, or foreign relations papers to determine political intents for defence as well as political intentions for international affairs implications for defence. The second stage is to determine the economic and political limitations of defence. These results third and fourth steps of Political Guidance Analysis can be achieved thanks to first and second stages of Political Advisory Research. Overall completion of such processes allows for the accurate determination of defense missions, levels of aspiration, and objectives. . In this stage, the key inputs are national interests, whereas an environmental impact study would be conducted to detect current problems or developments that may have an impact there are 4 steps to this Environmental Assessment:

- Collect the essential information.
- Analyze the data
- Recognize possibilities, risks, or dangers
- Create a reasonable set of significant scenarios.

Literature Review

Mitar Kovac et al. in their study discussed a methodology that attempts to objectify the ranking of defence development choices. This model is based on the Capabilities Based Planning technique, which identifies the required defence capability that is based on potential security risks. The result shows the model that takes critical account factors from situations, which are necessary capabilities, as well as the option costs to rank the capability development choices for optimal option selection. Expert assessment is a valuable method for determining the parameters and their values. In terms of the following supports, the provided model allows decision-makers to be presented with the rank and priority of development options, influencing the choices for defence expansion. On the other hand, professional opinion of used parameters might just have a negative influence on abstractions. On the other end, the specialist utilized has a detrimental impact on the abstraction of this model. In terms of growth choices, this concept might be a useful tool for defence strategies and also the priorities for defence innovation determined. It is critical to analyze operational objectives, consequences, and tasks in line with specified planning scenarios to establish capability requirements. The strategy given is primarily designed for use in the defence industry, although it may be used in a variety of other organizations (police, security agencies, etc.) (Kovac, Stojkovic, & Mitic, 2013).

Cheng Boon Koh et al. stated in study, in real-life scenarios to assess the role of emotional intelligence and leadership effectiveness, and even fewer have differentiated between actual and perceived leadership effectiveness. This study, also included 86 officer cadets from the Republic of Singapore Air Force, looked at these connections in a military environment. Actual leadership performance was determined using behavior patterns

leadership evaluation criteria submitted by the participants' managers. Emotional intelligence was found to have significant positive correlations both with perceived or real leadership effectiveness, as rated by coworkers and colleagues, accordingly. This study provides a deeper emotional maturity as a worldwide phenomenon and demonstrates that it is substantially connected to leader performance in a military training simulation. The findings have practical significance for enhance the leadership effectiveness through the use of emotional intelligence (Koh & O'Higgins, 2018).

Blagojevic, Veljko et al. conducted in a study, when assessing the United States' military capability, it is different requirements among military force or military power. An armed action is an organization that would be prepared or educated to employ force. America is undeniably the world's most powerful power, and it is a reality. Therefore, the word military power encompasses a much broader range of concepts than military force. It also involves components about the danger of using force, as well as a variety of other actions about the use of armed power in global politics, such as worldwide military cooperation, joint military exercises, and the, decision to buy as sell as the sale of weapons or heavy weaponry, and much more. This paper concentrates on this specific sector of military strength, which is defined as an intention to participate in the US armed force outside of its national boundaries. The purpose of this study is to examine the history of the United States' strategic thinking on military force as a foreign policy tool by evaluated the important processes in various historical contexts from their establishment to the present. These findings of this study will be useful indications for the potential use of military might in US foreign policy in particular in prospective struggles for globally leadership development (Blagojevic, 2020).

Tušer et al., debated in a study, the availability of collaboration of the Czech Army with some other elements of emergency crews in the performance of non-military recovery as well as dumping activities in Czech Republic regions. In light of the current worldwide epidemic Covid-19 and the concurrent mass mobilization of resources or assets of the rescue firm's major and subsidiary divisions, effective teamwork in practice has proved critical. The purpose of this study is to promote civil-military cooperation by evaluating emergency preparedness during a national emergency. Findings of the study, the researchers designed evaluation criteria for assessing the level of preventative involvement of the Czech Army's forces or resources (Tušer, Jánský, & Petráš, 2021).

Shamaila Amir et al., examined in a study, in the recent past, the factor of leadership has acquired significance in the running organizations., Leadership development is the most crucial organization that makes for the military forces since it develops other cognitive necessities such as morality, inspiration, confidence, resolve, dedication, and so on. The changing operational climate and technology improvements need prospective military commanders to adapt to the current and future environment to accomplish their leadership function. The purpose of this study is to sketch out the qualities of prospective military leaders. Leadership is best summarized by "An army of sheep commanded by a lion is better than an army of lions commanded by a sheep," said Alexander the Great." In military groups, there is no substitute for effective leadership. With the rising complexities of social combat, exacerbated by cutting-edge technology, it's become extremely important for military commanders to possess not just all of the inspiring personality attributes as well as professional capabilities. As a result, the future operational environment will necessitate a military leader who possesses the traditional personality traits of a warrior who leads soldiers in the face of unfathomable danger, while also remaining aware of the difficulties faced by the dynamics of technological advances as well as the international society (Amir, 2018).

Discussion

Among the 12 nations that qualified were "Belgium," "Netherlands," "France," "Germany," "Denmark," "Italy," "Estonia," "Poland," the United Kingdom, Sweden, Finland, as well as Norway. In terms of predicted outcomes, the study was founded on a review of literature derived from theoretical strategy study deals with military strategy and capabilities development within the framework of national security and defence policy. Even though the research findings are based on a collection of only 12 nations (that's hardly a substantial number once evaluating the total of 22 countries that are representatives of both the Nato alliance), the entire shape or attributes of the scrutinized nations allow for several important inferences to be made.

3.1. Setting up a Research Method:

A set of comparison determinants was devised as a methodological concept for researching to analyze distinct defensive military planning techniques and also to examine the degree to which chosen states prioritized respective sensitive topics over NATO and EU overall strategy. These variables emerged as a result of the Strategy Map technique as well as functional art aspects - Means, Ways, or Ends shown in Figure 2.




Figure 2: Represents the Strategic Map and Operational Art Elements Combined (Petras, 2017).

The Joint Operation Planning, which particularly provides methods for making plans, preparing, or implementing military operations commanded by the US Army, describes the confluence of the Strategic Map as well as a practical art. This strategy, though, is widely used among NATO or EU governments for reasons other than planning activities. As a result, the component Ways were updated to precisely reflect a general design of defence planning procedures as used by evaluated countries. The adjustment of the component Ways arises from a framework of the defensive system strategic planning, which is essentially initiated by democratic guidelines designed to reflect a large lot of political, military, financial, legitimate, civil, as well as innovation factors that have a significant or indirect effect on global as well as local security situations.

The democratic guidelines, aided by military support providing a comprehensive overview of the operating area, are followed by conceptualizing circumstances of potential military engagements, identifying requirements, as well as structuring force units required to accomplish given edges of combat actions. Table 1 provides a summary of the features of the respective comparative factors.

Table 1: Depicts the overview of the several types of major determinants and their properties

“Determinant”	“Characteristics”
“Politic strategy”	Consideration of security precautions based on an examination of the global and regional security environments
“Military strategic planning”	Armed forces' roles in domestic and international contexts
“Operational”	Limitations of situations enabling armed forces operational engagement
“Criteria for Recognition Capabilities”	Restriction of capacity needs to be required to achieve intended goals
“Structure of Force Units”	Construction of force framework with respective components as an instrument for improving intended goals

3.2. Application of Determinants Outcomes:

The comparison factors used on the examined nations allowed them to reveal respective priorities concerning national issues opposing NATO or EU military and intelligence policy objectives. This study was based on the premise that the relationship between language strategic purposes as well as The collective security principles of NATO or the collective security and defense policies of the EU played a critical role in deciding orientations in the national capability of the development process (Hodicky, 2017).

3.3. Factors of Politico-Strategic or Military Strategic Variables:

When conceiving their national defence and security policies as well as incorporating capability development programs, all 12 nations emphasize the need for a powerful togetherness of country's interests with NATO/EU aspirations, according to the outcomes of the implementation of both politico-strategic and military-strategic factors. Nonetheless, the degree to which states replicate NATO or EU planning principles differs markedly from one another. Except for France, practically all states' principles as implemented via NATO (Olsen, 2020), defence strategies were significantly more predictable than principles as implemented within EU planning. Denmark is the sole notable exception, as it does not participate in the EU's security and defense policies (Young, 2018).

3.4. Operational Determinants, Capability Needs, as well as Force Unit Structure:

Furthermore, factors - Operational Factors, Capability Requirements, or Force Units Structure - were important for a more complete depiction of how various nationalities shape their national defence planning and management. From a national standpoint, identifying capacity needs is the outcome of just a few key subcomponents that are critical in defining the future growth of the national military services including their ability to accomplish predicted aspirations. These would be the sub-processes are:

- Determination of capabilities needs based on studies of immediate or medium-term potential threats,
- identifying future patterns in growing capabilities demands that represent a long term view of security considerations,
- Principles gained through preparing, organizing, or carrying out military activities
- The flexibility of defensive military research and innovative base to deliver weapon technologies and systems capable of meeting relevant capability requirements.

The framework of the “European Union's Capability- Development- Plan (CDP)” is being used as a theoretical foundation for constructing the various sub-processes. CDP analyses the global security climate in the medium and longer-term as well as determines the competencies required to address emerging potential threats. This article stated a unified approach to competence development among EU member states based on 4 sub-processes. In an ideal world, all of these sub-processes would be close to one another. This technique outlined in the CDP was used in all nations under consideration. The overall outcome of this implementation demonstrated that not all of the countries under consideration approach in the very same manner, cross-connection.

This is clear that almost all countries identify capabilities needs in in the short to midterm, in combination with an assessment of military war experiences. Countries including the Netherlands, Germany, Italy, Sweden, Finland, and Norway have utilized to continue with the long-term verification of identification of capacity requirements and also to offer an evaluation of how well their military security technological, and industrial foundation can indicate newly emerging identified needs. It is fairly characteristic for all examined nations that their systems for identifying capability requirements are generally implemented throughout their national armed force organizations. First two countries, France and the United Kingdom, successfully established a functioning cross-connection among all stated sub-processes. In other words, this conclusion emphasizes the notion that only France, as well as the United Kingdom, have well-defined objectives for national defense and security strategy Considering all of the outcomes of the three primary techniques of defence strategy may easily be produced through the use of Operational Determinant, Identification of Capability Requirements, and Force Units Structure:

- A strategy that is based purely on ideas that reflect, national intelligence or military policy, above all (UK),
- A strategy that is primarily concerned with ensuring collective security inside the Euro-Atlantic area in tandem with some other national intelligence and military challenges (the "Netherlands," "Germany," "Italy," "Norway," "Estonia," and Poland).

- The strategy centered on national security threats, as well as objectives arising from the The European Union's shared intelligence and military policy (– for example, "France," "Sweden," or "Finland").

3.5. *Analysis Synthesis Outcomes:*

These following is a summary of the conclusions from an investigation of national methods to capabilities planning:

There are no national capability steps that can help that precisely equivalent to NATO as well as EU development planning,

Given the complexities of national interests and concerns in foreign policy as well as security policy, this is not feasible to develop a standardized planning process that would be recognized and executed by all states. This conclusion applies to both NATO nations as well as Members of the European Union. This goal is to provide effective national chapters for NATO's Defence Planning Capability Survey (DPCS), wherein the states contribute their national commitments to NATO ([Gerta, 2021](#)), regularly. A section of the DPCS is devoted to summarizing the country's commitments to the EU. As a result, the DPCS serves as a unifying factor for summarizing country contributions to NATO or EU planning objectives. As a result, the major problem only such national pledges are to be presented by NATO nations and EU member states that adhere to the standard format and needed specifications relating to their armed services' capabilities ([Odehnal et al., 2021](#)).

4. Conclusion

In the national defence planning procedures, countries use specially designed national methods for capability planning. The diversity or segmentation indicates that the main capability planning is the result of many strategies adopted and arising from the national defence and the security policies which might or might not by NATO the EU's combined military and intelligence policy or collective defense goals. According to the findings of the investigation, no nation has implemented the strategic planning in the manner of an integrative process, such as those employed by NATO or the EU. Because if a nation was not using NATO as well as EU planning practice in its entirety, NATO planning fundamentals generally influence national methodologies far more than EU design guidelines. In terms of national specific characteristics as well as politico-military aspirations, countries are also employing methodologies specially designed for trying to conceive armed force frameworks, communicating what work needs awareness and engagement of force units, and capabilities recognized as essential for accomplishing project political and military-political ends. This study also indicated that under certain circumstances, governments use portions of NATO or EU capacity development planning which have been adequately adjusted for national objectives. A strong correlation between identifying the force units on of capabilities requirements and current military force organization is characteristic of unique national strategies for defence planning. Determined capability requirements are often assigned in preparation to appropriate military units at the national level of planning. Nations frequently give priority to capability development which was before force units that are meant to receive providing necessary.

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