

Countering Prejudice and Religious Intolerance of Indonesian Students towards Fellow Muslims of Different Madhhab

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Abstrak

Pros and cons of a Shiite minority in Indonesia adorn social media, scientific discussions, sermons in mosques, to religious lectures at universities. The Government and the Indonesian Ulema Council (MUI) have never banned Shiites. Nahdhatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah, Indonesia's largest Islamic mass organization, see Shia as Sunni. But there are some Ulema MUI, NU, and Muhammadiyah who mis-lead it. Some local governments have banned Shiite religious activities. The anti-Shia group was inclined to condemn, mislead, disperse the teaching, burn down houses of worship, and even expel the Shiites. They enter the university campus and influence students. As a result, many students hate Shiites and consider them infidels. The study results were more than half of the students were intolerant of religion and minority Madhhabs. Most religious lecturers do not care about student exclusivism. The inclusive lecturers feel uneasy and look for teaching models that can change this wrong mindset.

Contribution: This article contributes to increasing religious moderation and warding off student religious prejudice against fellow Muslims from different schools of thought. The teaching model of the Sunni-Shia madhhab typology has proven to be effective in changing students' negative preconceptions against Shia. Before the lecture, students had a bad feeling that the teachings of the Imam, the position of faith and disbelief of the companions of the Prophet, the pillars of faith, and the pillars of Shia Islam deviated from Islam because they did not have evidence from the Koran and Hadith. But after college (six lectures), they changed completely.

Keywords: Islamic religious education, madhhab of typology learning model, religious tolerance, Sunni-Shia, the peculiarities of the Shiite teachings

Introduction

Shia Islam has been present in Indonesia since the VII-X century AD (Hasmy **1993**; Sofjan **2013**: x; Daneshgar **2014**). But this school was only widely known after the Iranian Islamic revolution in the 1980s (Dewi **2016**). Many students are also influenced and become Shiite (Zulkifli **2016**). Cum (Iran) alumni and sympathizers then established many Shia institutions. In 2015, the number of Shia in Indonesia, according to Jalaluddin Rakhmat (the central figure of Shia Indonesia), was around 5 million people (Junaidi **2015**). Indonesia became a reference source for Shia in Southeast Asia (Sofjan **2013**).

Since the early 1980s, Indonesian Anti-Shia groups have been suspicious of Shia developments. They are ulemas, missionaries, and Islamic activists with a Wahhabi-Salafi mindset. Some of them come from the most influential Islamic mass organizations, plus the influx of Middle-Eastern alumni, some of whom have an intolerant religious perspective. The first time they played in the NU Structure. In 1994 they founded the KPPNU (Coordination of the Central Executive Nahdlatul Ulama) to hold an Extraordinary Conference to bring down Kiai Abdurrahman Wahid (Gusdur) on charges Shia. Despite the government's support, they failed. Kiai Gusdur remains the General Chair of PBNU (the NU Executive Committee). The same thing they repeated. Kiai Said Aqil Siraj accused Shia, but Siraj was elected as the General Chair of PBNU (Khosyi'in **2016**). This means that the moderate and pluralist groups within NU are powerful (Siswanto & Ngadri **2022**). Kiai Abdurrahman Wahid (Kiai Gusdur) has become Indonesian religious moderation and pluralism (Taufani **2018**). Failing to destroy Shia through the most significant Islamic mass organization, in April 2014, they established the Anti-Shia National Alliance (Annas) in the city of Bandung (Abubakar et al. **2018**). The establishment of the alliance, which was attended by the Mayor of Bandung and the Governor of West Java, agreed to choose a preacher from the Middle East as its chairman, while the rival Kiai Gusdur, as Chair of the Syuro Council (annasindonesia.com **2018**).

Anti-Shia groups are so worried about the conversion of Sunnis to Shia (Zulkifli **2016**). Many Sunni communities in big cities follow Shia rituals (Muwahidah **2016**). They are intensively writing articles (books, magazines, websites, and YouTube). Their missionaries bravely disbelieved in this school. Even some university mosques became agents of anti-Shia Propaganda. Violence against residents and Shia da'wah institutions also emerged. This counter group has led to a violation of the principle of religious freedom (Hasim **2012**).

The promotion of the anti-Shia group was a huge success. Islamic activist students are more in touch with their missionaries and read anti-Shia websites. Their ministers are very active in influencing the campus community. The results of the research show that religious intolerance and radicalism are increasing. The Indonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI) reported its research results. More than half of 1,800 respondents from 9 provinces throughout Indonesia agreed with acts of violence against Ahmadiyah and Shia (Pamungkas **2018**). In a 2006 study, 49% of 110 students had an exclusive religious mindset. In 2009 the research was extended to students in West Java. The result is that 51% of 1,000 students in West Java have an exclusive religious mindset (Rahmat **2012**). Similar to the results of the LIPI research, in 2018, the majority of 100 UPI students accepted NU and Muhammadiyah, but they rejected Shia (Rahmat & Fahrudin **2018**). In 2020, more than half of 300 UPI and UNISBA students will be intolerant (Yahya & Rahmat **2021**). At the secondary education level, religious intolerance also occurs. More than half are intolerant of the 500 high school students in big cities (Firdaus & Rahmat **2016**). Most of the MTs (Islamic Junior High School) and Islamic Junior High School in West Java are intolerant. At the same time, the State Junior High School students are tolerant

(Rizal & Rahmat 2019). Similar to the research results in Pakistan, madrasa students are the most intolerant (Hanif et al. 2019). This means that religious education has been teaching intolerance.

Indonesia has undergone a paradigm shift due to increased ethnic and religious conflicts over the past decade. These changes have an impact on multicultural education (Puspita, A 2022). Religious education needs to be rooted in a multicultural perspective that is supported by theological insights (Baidhawiy 2007). Kompas news – the leading daily newspaper in Indonesia – with expert sources defines intolerance as a problem of understanding religion and the weakening of nationalism. They consider intolerance the most dominant source due to shallow, partial, and not deep religious understanding. Kompas concluded that intolerance is a serious threat that could endanger the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia/NKRI. (Sanusi & Muhaemin 2019). We developed a school typology learning model that is thought to increase religious tolerance and counter the seeds of religious radicalism by majority Muslim students against the Shia minority. The question is, how is the acceptance of students toward the Shia minority? How about the effectiveness of the Sunni-Shia typology learning model in increasing student acceptance of the Shia minority?

Sunni-Shi'a Conflict and Harmony

Shia Islam is the Islam of followers of Ali bin Abu Talib and the descendants of the Prophet who have the right and right to become imams (called *ahl al-bayt*) up to the 12th Imam, Imam Muhammad Al-Mahdi. Shia Islam was born at the same time as Sunni Islam, which was only 1-3 days after the death of the Prophet Muhammad. The main problem is that the Shia believe that the Prophet appointed Ali ibn Abu Talib as his successor. In contrast, the Sunnis believe that the Prophet left the affairs of his successor to the deliberations of the Muslims. The Muhajirin and Ansar were representatives of the people at that time, appointing Abu Bakr (2 years), then Umar (10 years), Uthman (13 years), and Ali (5 years) as the successors of the Prophet. The expansion of Islamic territory occurred during the first 25 years. Meanwhile, there was no expansion of Islamic territory during Ali's time because Ali was busy facing the onslaught of other Muslims who disagreed with Ali. After the death of Ali, Islamic leadership returned to the hands of Sunni Islam. This means that Sunni Islam was the absolute majority from the beginning, while Shia Islam was a very minority. In fact, during the Umayyads and the Abbasids (almost 600 years), Shia Islam was constantly spied on by the rulers. Shia Islam only breathed religious tolerance during the reign of the Mongols after the collapse of the Abbasid rulers in 1258 AD. Shia later had its sultanate into independent countries in modern times (Newman 2022). Data for 2009 Shia Islam is found in Iran (66-69.5 million or 90-95%), Iraq (19-24 million or 55-65%), Yemen (7-8 million or 35-40%), Azerbaijan (5-7 million or 50-65%), etc. While in predominantly Muslim countries, the second majority in Pakistan (25 million or 15%), Turkey (6-9 million or 10-15%), Afghanistan (3 million or 15%), and India (12.3-18.5 million or 10-15%) (Wikipedia 2020). Meanwhile, in Indonesia, according to Jalaluddin Rakhmat (the main character of Shia Indonesia), about five million people (Junaidi 2015).

The Shia-Sunni conflicts in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen are more due to political factors. Conflicts purely due to madhhab factors often occur in Pakistan. In Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood has constantly vilified the Shia minority in print and television (Rieffer-Flanagan 2016). Moreover, since the founding of this country, Saudi Arabian clerics have been anti-Shia (Ismail 2012). As for the Sunni-Shia harmony, there are several countries. The majority of Turkey's Muslims are Sunni. But Shia Muslims live in peace in Turkey (Erdogan 2015). The majority of Azerbaijani Muslims are Shia. But Sunni Muslims pray in congregation at the

Heydar Mosque – the most prominent Shia mosque in Azerbaijan and the Caucasus (trtworld.com **2019**). Meanwhile, in Indonesia, there are models of conflict (in Sampang Madura) and harmony (in Jepara) (Siradj **2013**; Hilmy **2015**; Saefudin & Rohman **2019**).

The existence of Shia in Indonesia is the most exciting phenomenon. This school has been present in Indonesia since the X century AD (Daneshgar **2014**), even since the VII century (Sofjan **2013**: x). Even Shia was once the ruler of Aceh, Sumatra (Hasymy **1993**; Dewi **2016**). Shia teachings seep into the body of Nahdhatul Ulama (NU), Indonesia's largest Islamic mass organization (Hasim **2012**), especially into the instructions of Sufism/ṭariqa and the Syafi'i school of Islam typical of Indonesia. Shia priests (12 Imams) are not only respected but are also a lineage chain. Some Shia teachings such as respect for the saints, pilgrimage to the grave, prayers, and *tahlil* of death have become part of the official teachings of Sunni Islam in Indonesia. 46 ṭariqa link their lineage to Shia Imams to Imam Ali ibn Abi Talib, except the Naqshbandiyah link it to Abu Bakr Siddiq (Fata **2011**), but subsequent genealogies are via Shia Imams. For example, the Qodiriyah wa Naqsyabandiyah (TQN) Order, including the Suryalaya TQN (Tasikmalaya, West Java) – the largest TQN in Indonesia – follows the Shia line of Imamate from the 1st to the 9th Imam, from Imam Ali ibn Abi Talib to Imam Ali Ridha (Khotimah **2014**). Even the Syathtariah Jogomerto congregation (Nganjuk, East Java) followed the Shia Imamate from the 1st to the 12th Imams, from Imam Ali ibn Abi Talib to Imam Muhammad Al-Mahdi Al-Muntazhar (Affandi **2002**). Ashura commemoration has become entrenched in Indonesia. Helfrich et. al. reported that in 1888 the Tābūt Festival was held in Sumatra (Daneshgar et al. **2015**). This festival is still running in the western region of Sumatra. It is a religious and cultural expression phenomenon that transcends sectarian boundaries (Daneshgar et al. **2013**). It's just that the teachings of Imamate and some Shia teachings are still foreign. (Atabik **2015**). In the 1970s, Shia adherents in Indonesia still kept their beliefs a secret (Dewi **2016**).

Since the outbreak of the Islamic revolution in Iran under the leadership of Imam Khomeini, Shia has become widely known in Indonesia. Shia's books began to be read by the public. For the first time, the sympathetic intellectuals even became Shia. Then the students who study Shia fiqh (Dewi **2016**). They learn in Iran. Many students are also influenced and become Shia (Zulkifli **2016**). Many Shia institutions were then established in Indonesia. In 2015, the number of Shia in Indonesia, according to Jalaluddin Rakhmat (the central figure of Shia Indonesia), was around 5 million people (Junaidi **2015**). Indonesia became a reference source for Shia in Southeast Asia (Sofjan **2013**).

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attended by the Mayor of Bandung and the Governor of West Java, agreed to choose a preacher from the Middle East as its chairman, while the rival Kiai Gusdur as Chair of the Syuro Council (annasindonesia.com **2018**).

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Intolerance and violence against Shias in Indonesia seem to be a historical and political impact on the Middle East and South Asia. Shia minorities in Saudi and Gulf countries have been poorly treated because Saudi clerics have been anti-Shia since the establishment of this kingdom (Ismail **2012**; Khaleeli **2016**). After the United States invasion, the Sunni-Shia conflict in Iraq made several Iraqis migrate to Canada. It turned out that the conflict between the two Muslims from different schools of thought was carried over to Ottawa (Jafar **2017**). Even in Europe, they have conflicts. But in Austria, there is the Sunni Shia ecumenism, which is expected to be a model of the Sunni-Shia brotherhood in western Europe (Widiyanto **2018**). Sipah Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) produces a variety of anti-Shia literature in Urdu (Mirza **2017a**) that influences the religious mindset of Pakistan's Sunni community. Therefore, violence against the Shia minority in Pakistan is systematically organized (Mirza **2017b**).

The beginning of the violence against Shia was in neighboring Malaysia. In 2010 there was an attack on the Shia minority at the Hauzah Ar-Ridha community center near the city of Kuala Lumpur (Musa **2013**). The Malaysian government even supports it by restricting the movement of the Shia (Samuri & Quraishi **2016**). It seems that this violence is seeping into Indonesia. In 2011 there were burnings of houses, mosques, and Islamic boarding schools and the expulsion of the Shia minority in Sampang Madura (Fianto **2015**). This case raises the concern of many parties. The Minister of Religion is currently giving a specific statement about the need to resolve the Sampang case (Saifuddin **2014**). In 2015 the mayors of Bogor (West Java) and the mayors of Balikpapan (East Kalimantan) rejected Shia residents to commemorate Ayura Day. In 2017 the commemoration of Ashura Day in Bandung Regency (Ijabi **2017**). Hundreds of men in white robes came to scare the Shia people in the morning. Fortunately, hundreds of police managed to secure the situation.

The Sunni-Shia conflict in Indonesia is undoubtedly different from that in the Middle East and South Asia. First, the number of Shia communities in the two regions is vast. In 2015, it reached 60-65% (Wikipedia **2020**), and in South Asia, although a minority, it reached 60 million people (Robinson **2014**). Second, the history of the Sunni-Shia conflict in the two regions has been going on for a long time, while it is still new in Southeast Asia.

The way Indonesia responds to Shia is different from countries that legitimize anti-Shia. First, Indonesia's slogan is *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika* (diverse religions, cultures, and customs but united). Second, the Indonesian Ulema Council (MUI), as the official organization of ulama throughout Indonesia in 2005 – reinforcing the 2000 fatwa – declared Ahmadiyah, not Islam (MUI **2005**). This fatwa has received criticism from legal observers and religious pluralism activists with accusations that many MUI people from the Wahhabi-Salafi circles are very anti-Shia and Ahmadiyah (Purnomo **2010**). But the MUI has never made a deviant fatwa

against Shia, asserting that moderate Shias are both Muslim (Junaidi **2015**). Third, NU and Muhammadiyah – the two most prominent Islamic organizations in Indonesia – affirm that Shia is Muslim (Siradj **2013**; Syamsuddin **2017**; Darajat **2017**). Fourth, scholars and experts at the State Islamic University `Ulum al-Islam develop moderate Islam (Zamimah **2018**; Shofiyuddin **2019**).

Model of Madhhab Typology

A teaching model is a beneficial approach to improving teaching and learning in higher education (Groccia **2012**). Researchers believe that the (appropriate) teaching model is a characteristic of superior teaching (Behar-Horenstein & Seabert **2005**). Shariati (**2022**) mentions that the progress of a nation depends on the accuracy of the problem-solving method. There is no doubt that Aristotle was more genius than Francis Bacon, and Plato was more genius than Roger Bacon. However, the two geniuses who developed the analogical method could not change the world. With his scientific method, the two Bacons could change the world. To understand religion, Shariati recommends a religious typology method, which is to compare two or more religions objectively and honestly by examining the main elements of faith (God, the Holy Scriptures, the Prophet, the human characteristics of the target of the Prophet's da'wah, and the qualifications of the Prophet's cadres). We modified this method into a school typology because it aims to build students' religious tolerance towards fellow Muslims of different schools of thought. We compare Shia Islam (a minority sect) with Sunni Islam (a majority school). The elements of the schools that we reach, first, the history of their birth – are these two schools of thought formed by the Prophet, or did they emerge after the Prophet? Second, the main points of their teachings – especially Imamatus versus Khilafah, the position of the Prophet's companions, the pillars of faith, and the pillars of Islam, do have any valid references? Credible?

Previous research on the NU-Muhammadiyah school of the typology learning model has proven successful in increasing the acceptance of UPI students towards the two most prominent Islamic organizations in Indonesia (Rahmat & Fahrudin **2018**). The Islamic-Christian study of religions (religious typology) learning model has proven to increase the religious tolerance of UPI and UNISBA students toward Christianity (Rahmat et al. **2019**). The dialogue-argumentative method, which contains typologies of religion and schools of thought, has proven successful in increasing the religious tolerance of UPI and UNISBA students toward minority religions and sects (Yahya & Rahmat **2021**). Inclusive teaching materials, which contain religious typologies and schools of thought, have proven successful in increasing the religious tolerance of UPI and UNISBA students towards minority religions and sects (Rahmat & Yahya **2022**). We suspect that the Sunni-Shia typology teaching model effectively increases religious tolerance and counteracts the seeds of student religious radicalism against Shia Islam.

Methodology

Research Design

This study aims to describe and test the effectiveness of the typology Madhhab learning model in PAI subject to increase Muslim students' acceptance of Shia Islam. The study used mixed-method—qualitative research to describe the learning process of the typology of the Sunni-Shia school of thought. At the same time, the quasi-experiment test the effectiveness of the model. The practical classes used the Madhhab typology model, while the control group used the conventional model. Before and after learning, we conducted a pre-test (February 2021) and post-test (April 2021) with a scale of student acceptance of Shia Islam.

Sample Selection

The experimental class research respondents were PAI lecturers who were open and ready to implement the Sunni-Shia school typology learning model. Meanwhile, student research respondents are PAI lecture participants in the even semesters of 2020-2021. This study's population were students of UPI who had enrolled in the Seminar on Islamic Religious Education (SPAI) course for the even semester of 2020-2021. The sample was determined purposively by selecting classes where the lecturers were voluntarily willing to use a model of teaching the Sunni-Shia typology. The sample size was 190 students from the experimental and the control class. Each faculty and study program is the same.

Research Instruments

The research instrument was a scale of religious tolerance in Yes – Doubt – No for each item—a total of 30 items measuring religious tolerance towards Shi'ites: 15 items were positive statements, while the other 15 were negative. A Delphy test was conducted on five experts who approved 30 items. Then we selected each of the six items for the five aspects of the Shia and their teachings (30 items) as follows:

The quantitative research instrument is an inventory of student acceptance of the five aspects of Shia Islam as follows:

- Shia's presence,
- Imāmah,
- Position of the Sahāba,
- Criticizing the Shia Faith,
- Criticizing the Islam Pillars of Shia.

The options for each item are Yes – Doubt – No. We compiled 40 items: 20 positive items and another 20 negative. Three experts carried out the Delphy test. They agreed to receive 30 things which happened to be 15 positive items and 15 negative items.

Test item validity and reliability through the IBM SPSS Statistics 26. The truth was tested through Pearson's two-tailed correlate bivariate analysis, while reliability used the alpha scale analysis model. The test results showed that 30 items are valid 25 are good at the .01 significance level, and five are .05. In addition, the reliability of $r = .95$ was significant at alpha .01.

Table 1. *Examples of positive and negative items on research instruments*

No.	Yes	No	Statement
1 (+)	I agree with the Minutes of Amman that Shia = Sunni. Both are Muslims.
2 (+)	The successor of the Prophet: Khulafaur Rasyidin (Sunni) or the Holy Imam (Shia), are both the results of <i>ijtihad</i> that need to be respected.
3 (-)	I agree with the preacher who said the Shia were <i>kafir</i> because they became the Prophet's companions after the Prophet's death.
4 (+)	I agree with Quraish Shihab, who said that Shia believes in the Sunni faith pillars.
5 (-)	The Islam pillars of Shia are different from the Sunni, showing that Shi'ism is not Islam.
Etc.			

Analyzing of Data

Data analysis used descriptive and inferential statistics. Quantitative data were analyzed using comparative techniques between experimental and control classes and post-test results, specifically the IBM SPSS Statistics 26 with Paired Samples.

Findings/Results

Student Acceptance of Shia

Student acceptance of Shia before and according to experimental or control class lectures can be seen in the following tables.

Table 2. Student Acceptance of Shia

Before/After College	Classes	Strongly agree	Agree	Neutral	Do not agree	Strongly disagree	Total *
Before College	Experiment	8.3%	17.0%	44.6%	27.9%	2.2%	100%
	Control	8.2%	16.6%	45.6%	27.2%	2.4%	100%
After College	Experiment	11.3%	39.0%	35.9%	12.6%	1.2%	100%
	Control	8.8%	17.3%	44.5%	27.1%	2.3%	100%

* n = 190 students Experiment Group & 190 students Control Group

Before the lecture, only a few experimental and control class students accepted the presence of Shia Islam (15.3% and 14.7%). More than half of the respondents were neutral (51.6% and 53.7%), and even about a third rejected Shia's presence (33.1% and 31.6%). As for after lectures in the experimental class, there was a change. More than half accepted Shia's reality (50.3%), more than a third were neutral (35.9%), and only a few rejected Shia's presence (13.8%). While in the control class, there was no change.

Table 3. Students' Attitudes towards Theology of Imama

Before/After College	Classes	Strongly agree	Agree	Neutral	Do not agree	Strongly disagree	Total *
Before College	Experiment	7.4%	16.5%	45.0%	26.9%	2.2%	100%
	Control	7.2%	16.9%	46.6%	27.0%	2.3%	100%
After College	Experiment	10.7%	32.0%	37.3%	18.7%	1.3%	100%
	Control	7.3%	17.5%	45.9%	27.0%	2.3%	100%

* n = 190 students Experiment Group & 190 students Control Group

Before college, less than a quarter of the experimental and control class students understood Imamate theology (23.9% and 24.1%). Less than half of the respondents were neutral (51.6% and 53.7%), and less than a third rejected Imamate theology (29.1% and 29.3%). As for after lectures in the experimental class, there was a change. Nearly half accepted Imamate theology (42.7%), more than a third were neutral (37.3%), and only a few rejected Imamate theology (20.0%). While in the control class, there was no change.

Table 4. Students' Attitudes Towards Shia Theology About the Position of the Companions of the Prophet

Before/After College	Classes	Strongly agree	Agree	Neutral	Do not agree	Strongly disagree	Total *
Before College	Experiment	5.0%	10.3%	51.6%	30.9%	2.2%	100%
	Control	4.6%	10.1%	53.7%	29.5%	2.1%	100%
After College	Experiment	13.2%	24.2%	39.4%	22.1%	1.1%	100%
	Control	4.9%	13.0%	50.5%	29.3%	2.3%	100%

* n = 190 students Experiment Group & 190 students Control Group

Before college, only a few experimental and control class students understood Shia theology regarding the position of the Prophet's companions – there were believers and unbelievers (15.3% and 14.7%). More than half were neutral (51.6% and 53.7%), and about a third accused the Shias of being infidels because they disbelieved the companions of the Prophet (33.1% and 31.6%). As for after lectures in the experimental class, there was a change. More than a third understand Shia theology about the position of the companions of the Prophet (39.4%), more than a third are neutral (39.4%), and less than a quarter continue to accuse the Shia of being infidels for the infidelity of the companions of the Prophet (23.2%). While in the control class, there was no change.

Table 5. *Students' Attitudes Against the Pillars of Faith Shia*

Before/After College	Classes	Strongly agree	Agree	Neutral	Do not agree	Strongly disagree	Total *
Before College	Experiment	7.9%	17.0%	44.6%	28.0%	2.5%	100%
	Control	8.0%	16.6%	45.2%	27.8%	2.4%	100%
After College	Experiment	12.5%	27.4%	39.0%	20.1%	1.0%	100%
	Control	7.9%	16.4%	45.7%	27.7%	2.3%	100%

* *n* = 190 students Experiment Group & 190 students Control Group

Before college, only a quarter of the experimental and control class students understood Shia's Pillars of Faith (24.9% and 24.6%). It turns out that Shia Muslims also believe in the six pillars of the Sunni Muslim faith. Less than half of the respondents were neutral (44.6% and 45.2%), and almost a third accused Shia of being unbelievers because they refused to believe in angels, books, and destiny (30.5% and 30.2%). As for after lectures in the experimental class, there was a change. Almost half of the respondents view the Shia Pillars of Faith as being the same as Sunnis (49.9%), more than a third neutral (39.0%), and only one fifth still accuse the Shia pillars of faith of being wrong (21.1%). While in the control class, there was no change.

Table 6. *Students' Attitudes towards the Pillars of Shia Islam*

Before/After College	Classes	Strongly agree	Agree	Neutral	Do not agree	Strongly disagree	Total *
Before College	Experiment	7.5%	16.4%	47.0%	26.9%	2.2%	100%
	Control	7.6%	16.5%	46.6%	27.0%	2.3%	100%
After College	Experiment	12.7%	35.0%	33.3%	17.7%	1.3%	100%
	Control	7.3%	17.4%	46.2%	26.8%	2.3%	100%

* *n* = 190 students Experiment Group & 190 students Control Group

Almost a quarter of the experimental and control class students understood the Shia Pillars of Islam (24.9% and 24.6%) before college. It turns out that Shia Muslims also practice the five pillars of Sunni Islam. Less than half of the respondents were neutral (47.0% and 46.6%), and almost a third accused Shia of being infidels because they refused to pronounce the shahada (29.1% and 29.3%). As for after lectures in the experimental class, there was a change. Almost half of the respondents view the Shia Pillars of Islam as being the same as Sunnis (47.7%), a third are neutral (33.3%), and only a few still accuse the Shia pillars of Islam of being wrong (19.0%). While in the control class, there was no change.

The Effectiveness of Model of the Madhhab Typology

Table 7. Mean of Experiment Group, Mean of the Control Group, and t-test of Students' Acceptance of Shia Islam

Group	Mean 1	Mean 2	t-test	Remark
1. Post-pre experiment	33.394	26.021	10.564	Significant at alpha .01
2. Post-pre control	26.911	26.168	2.873	Significant at alpha .05
3. Pre-experiment-control	26.021	26.168	-.138	Not significant
4. Post-experiment-control	33.394	26.911	4.769	Significant at alpha .01
5. Experiment-control gain	7.374	.741	9.059	Significant at alpha .01

* n = 190 students Experiment Group & 190 students Control Group

Table 7 shows that the experimental and conventional PAI teaching improves students' acceptance of Shia Islam by $t = 10,564$ and 2.873 , significant at alpha $.01$ and $.05$ with $df 189$. Initially, the two groups had a relatively similar mean tolerance score, precisely 26.911 and 26.168 or $t = -.138$, which was not significant at alpha $.05$ and $df 189$. However, after college in April 2021, the experimental class score increased to 33.394 while the control group had only 26.911 , which is shown by $t = 2,873$ or significant at $.05$ df alpha 189 . This difference was confirmed by the gain test using $t = 9,059$ or significant at alpha $.01$ $df 189$. Therefore, the *Madhhab* typology model effectively increases students' acceptance of Shia Islam.

Discussion

Before college, about half of the students did not know Shi'a. Students who know mostly reject Shi'ism because of the influence of intolerant social media. For instance, the Takfiri Salafis – an Islamic extremist group fighting to uphold Islamic law – are anti-Shi'a and often accuse moderate Muslims of being kafir (Zenna & Pieri 2017; Olsson 2020; Amal 2020). Even though during the Covid-19 pandemic, students were more in contact with social media (Taja et al. 2021).

Researchers found that the main issue was not understanding Sunni and Shi'a. They think Islam is Sunni. Shi'ism is not Islam or a deviation from Islam. No wonder they accuse the Shiites of heresy and disbelief. They consider the position of Abu Bakr, Umar, Uthman, and Ali as caliphs, respectively, as texts from the Qur'an and hadith. While the Shi'a Imamate is a deviation. All of the Prophet's companions were just and proper believers; they considered texts from the Qur'an and hadith, so the statement that some of the Prophet's companions had a lousy character they thought a comment that deviated from the Qur'an and hadith (Tawandorloh et al., 2021). Likewise, they regard the pillars of faith and Sunni Islam as an affirmation of the Prophet as the pillars of faith and Islam, so they accuse the pillars of faith and Shi'a Islam of deviations.

The Prophet forbade *takfir* (Sahih al-Bukhari 2013, hadith No. 6104; Sahih Muslim 2013, hadith No. 111). The most prominent Islamic organizations in Indonesia, NU and Muhammadiyah, agree that Shi'a is the same as Sunni; both are Muslims (Siradj 2013; Syamsuddin 2017). The central MUI also emphasized that Shi'ism is not prohibited in Indonesia (Junaidi 2015). Previous great scholars such as Mulla Ali al-Qari al-Harawi and Imam Ghazali forbade *takfir* (Web-NU 2020). Minutes of Amman (4-6 July 2005) based on fatwas of significant scholars and world religious organizations – among others, Al-Imam Akbar Shaykh Al-Azhar Egypt, the Turkish Religious Affairs Council, the Grand Mufti of the Kingdom of Jordan, the Saudi Arabian Arabiyyah Academy of Islamic Fiqh, and the Mufti

The Great Shia of Iran) – asserts, "Anyone who follows and adheres to one of the four schools of Ahlus Sunnah (Shafi'i, Hanafi, Maliki, Hanbali), the two Shia schools of Ja'fariyyah and Zaydiyyah, the Ibadziyyah school and the Zahiriyah school is a Muslim. It is not permissible to disbelieve one of the followers/adherents of the schools mentioned above" (Risalah-Amman 2005). Even the Kibr al-Ulama Council of Saudi Arabia warned about the dangers of *takfir* (Faizah 2018). The recent Al-Azhar International Conference (27-28 January 2020) produced 29 formulations for the renewal of Islamic thought, one of which is the No. 7 prohibitions of *takfir* (Conference-Al-Azhar 2020).

The statistical, Madhhab typology model increases students' acceptance of the Shiite. The results are in line with previous studies. Biographical writing can enhance the students' tolerance of the diversity of ethnic and religious backgrounds, thus reducing the students' religious prejudices in Surakarta (Thoyibi et al. 2022). Multicultural education improves educators' understanding of the complexities of different cultures (Doucette et al. 2021). An open dialogical approach can prevent religious radicalism among students (Faure-walker 2019). Inclusive teaching models increase religious tolerance. The Madhhab typology NU-Muhammadiyah has increased student acceptance of the two largest Madhhabs (Rahmat & Fahrudin 2018). The typology Sufi and Shari'a model increased students' acceptance of Sufism (Rahmat et al. 2016; Rahmat & Yahya 2021). The Qur'ān-based religions study model has increased students' religious tolerance toward other religions (Rahmat et al. 2019). Likewise, in faith. The Qur'ān-based spiritual study model has increased the religious tolerance of students in enormous cities towards other religions (Firdaus & Rahmat 2016).

A multicultural-based learning model has reduced religious conflict among high school students (Syahbudin & Hanafi 2017). Pesantren Takeran, the first modern boarding school established in 1886, produces religious and tolerant graduates. The prime factor is that the founding clerics and caregivers have developed a peaceful and moderate Islamic religion (Rahmat 2018; Hidayat et al., 2022). Based on Knitter's models, Ruth Vilà Baños et al. Measured the impact of interfaith dialogue on secondary school teachers and prospective teacher students. The result is excellent. Most respondents are in the Mutuality model (58.5% of teachers and 64.6% of students) and Acceptance models (22.9% of teachers and 24.4% of students). Only a small proportion is in the Fulfilment model (17.8% of teachers and 10.8% of students) and Replacement models (.7% of teachers and .2% of students) (Baños et al. 2020).

Other research findings also support the importance of religious inclusivism. One in three lecturers in the control group has an inclusive spiritual mindset, while the other two lecturers appear exclusive. Inclusive lecturers successfully increased student acceptance of the Shiite, $t = 4.64$ (significant), while the other two lecturers failed, $t = .06$ (not substantial). This finding is the same as the research results in high school that the prime factor increasing student religious tolerance is teacher inclusivism (Irham 2018). An essential lecturer/teacher inclusivism factor is humility (Basinger 2016) because intolerant people are arrogant (Hosen 2017). The inclusive lecturers who use the model of Madhhab typology are far more successful than just inclusive lecturers, with a gain of $t = 5.96$ (significant).

The model of inclusive education in the community has also succeeded in building a peaceful and tolerant society (Sumarna et al., 2022). Kandang Semangkon Village, Lamongan Regency (East Java), is the most significant contributor to Islamic terrorism in Indonesia. In March 2015, 16 terrorists were caught on the Turkish-Syrian border because they wanted to join ISIS. It turns out that 10 of the 16 terrorists came from this village. Why radical? It turns out that Islamic education in the town teaches religious radicalism. Some lecturers from universities in Lamongan did de-radicalization by teaching moderate and tolerant Islam

(Budiyanti et al. 2022). After one year, the village was free from religious radicalism (Lutfiyah et al. 2016). Then the training of the Score-A model (Spatial, organization, religion, cultural, and economic awareness) succeeded in increasing the soul of Indonesian nationalism. After six months of training and assistance, they realized that the social capital of the Indonesian people was united in diversity (Komarudin et al. 2019).

The occurrence of religious harmony in the community was because religious leaders and local community leaders developed a peaceful and tolerant life. District of Bangsri (Jepara, Central Java) as the Shia center is the best Sunni-Shia exclusivism model in Indonesia. In this subdistrict, Shia has four mosques/mushallas and one pesantren. The key is the Sunni-Shia figure in this district respects the diversity of the Madhhabs, joint social-religious activities, and marriage (Saefudin & Rohman 2019). In contrast, the Omben (Sampang) is the worst model because the Ulema and community leaders are intolerant and misperception to Shia (Siradj 2013; Hilmy 2015).

Likewise, peaceful life in various religious communities because of the exclusivism of religious leaders and community leaders. For example, in Bandung, three multi-ethnic villages and religions live in harmony. Here stand several churches (Catholic & Protestant), viharas (Buddha), and monasteries, besides several mosques, because they respect each other's religion and ethnicity (Firdaus & Rahmat 2019). So also happened to Muslim and ethnic Chinese communities of Buddhism and Confucianism in Sunan Gunung Djati Cirebon (Munawar & Rahmat 2021). Sufistic religiosity builds peace and religious tolerance (Yahya et al., 2022; Fahrudin et al., 2022).

Even most Hindus live in harmony and peace because of the inclusivism of religious leaders and community leaders. For example, Catur Bali Village (Bali Province) is a harmonious multicultural village between Hindu natives and Chinese Buddhists. Initially, acculturation occurs through joint social-religious activities, then through marriage. Finally, they built a temple with Hindus and Buddhists in one building (Winaja et al. 2019).

Conclusion

Before college, about half of the students didn't know Shia. The students who mainly knew rejected Shia. The point is that they do not understand what Sunni and Shia are. They think Islam is Sunni. Shia is not Islam or a deviation from Islam. No wonder they accused Shia of being heretical and infidel. They consider the position of Abu Bakr, Umar, Uthman, and Ali as caliphs, respectively, as texts from the Qur'an and hadith. At the same time, the Shia priesthood is an aberration. All of the Prophet's companions were just and true believers. They considered texts from the Qur'an and hadith so that the statement that some of the Prophet's companions had a lousy character they thought an idea that deviated from the Qur'an and hadith. Likewise, they consider the pillars of faith and Sunni Islam as an affirmation of the Prophet as the pillars of faith and Islam, so they accuse the pillars of faith and Shia Islam of deviations.

The school's typology teaching model has proven to be effective. After college, most students accepted Shia and understood the peculiarities of its teachings. They consider Shias and Sunnis to be Muslims, even though they are still Sunnis. The concept of *Imama* and *wilayat* they value has strong evidence from the Koran and Sunni hadiths, not the influence of Persian culture. The Shia accusations of disbelieving in the companions of the Prophet they regard as an extreme Shia view as some radical Sunnis who disbelieve in the Prophet's parents and uncle

(Abu Talib). They value the pillars of faith and the pillars of Shia Islam as having solid arguments. The advantages of this school typology teaching model are; first, students understand aspects of the Sunni-Shia school in more depth based on credible references; and second, students accept the presence of other schools (in this case, Shia) even though they remain as Sunnis. We recommend that Islamic Education lecturers implement the Sunni-Shi'a school of typology learning model in Islamic religious education so that students' religious prejudices disappear and their religious moderation increases.

Recommendations

The role of PAI lecturers in determining the correct method to increase student tolerance for followers of other religions/schools is significant in the world of education. Lecturers are expected to be able to apply the results of this study because the learning model of the Sunni-Shia school typology in PAI is essential so that students' religious prejudices disappear and their religious moderation increases. Through this method, lecturers can encourage individuals to increase understanding in a balanced way to distinguish between prejudices and authentic teachings from minority schools from credible sources. For further research, it is recommended to use data on schools' teachings from the perspective of credible scholars and use this method to eliminate students' prejudice against the teachings of schools that are accused of being deviant when they are not.

Limitations

The main weakness of this study is that we did not detect student intolerance before lectures. Is it because of ideological factors (anti-madhab groups), or is it a factor of prejudice from social media? In addition, the number of samples is small (190 students in the experimental group and 190 students in the control group), thus limiting generalizations because the number of UPI students reaches 40,000 students.

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