

Reserves Force Formation Policy: Opportunities, Challenges, and Potentials

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Abstract

The issuance of Law Number 23 of 2019 on Management of National Resources for State Defense and its derivative regulations in the form of Government Regulation Number 3 of 2021 is the basis for the Ministry of Defense to form a reserve force that will support the Indonesian Soldiers (TNI, Tentara Nasional Indonesia) as the main force in facing threats within the framework of the universal defense system. The purpose of this study is to analyze the opportunities, challenges, impacts, and potentials of forming a reserve force in Indonesia that is planned to recruit 25 thousand personnel and form 35 battalions. This study employs qualitative method with data collection techniques in the form of observation, interviews, and documentation. This study found the pros and contra of the formation of reserve forces. Its legal basis is the result of limited socialization, past trauma in the New Order era, large financing amid the COVID-19 pandemic, fear of the reserve troops being used as a tool of certain political interests, and there is fear of deviations from elements of the reserve forces in the community.

Keywords: Policy, Government, Defense, Reserve Force

Introduction

In public policy, a set of laws has been enacted to fill the gap concerning people participation in state defense efforts as a reserve component (reserve forces or reserve soldiers) that will assist the main component (Indonesian National Military or TNI) in conducting a universal defense system to oppose both military and non-military threats. The set of statutory policies includes Law Number 23 of 2019 concerning Management of National Resources for State Defense, Government Regulation Number 3 of 2021 concerning Regulations for Implementing Law Number 23 of 2019, and Regulation of the Minister of Defense Number 3 of 2021 concerning Establishment, Determination, and Development of Reserve Components.

Based on these juridical laws, the government, in this case, the Ministry of Defense, has prepared and disseminated the information concerning reserve components in coordination with TNI, TNI-AD (Army), TNI-AL (Navy), and TNI-AU (Air Force) Headquarters. In terms of priority scale, the land-based reserve forces took precedence in 2021, followed by sea and air-based reserve forces in 2022. By 2021, the Ministry of Defense aims at recruiting 25,000 reserve forces and forming 35 battalions as headquarters for these forces across Indonesia.

The formation of the reserve force is voluntary and this is a key component of the universal defense system established in National Defense Law Number 3 of 2002. The universal defense system doctrine emphasizes the importance of managing all national resources that can be transformed into defense resources (natural resources, human resources, artificial resources, national facilities, and infrastructure) (Samego, 2014). Human resources are trained, fostered, and transformed into the main TNI, reserve, and supporting components (Susetyo, 2016).

In dealing with military threats, TNI is in charge, and if they need support, the reserve component will be dispatched (Wirahadikusumah, 2001). These reserve forces are recruited from the community and are educated and trained in basic military training to achieve the basic qualifications equivalent to TNI. Therefore, they can be mobilized at any time during emergencies or if the state is at war to assist the TNI in repelling, battling, or crushing any enemy threat.

Since its independence, Indonesia has not had any reserve force. The urge to form a reserve force was impeded by the absence of laws and regulations due to diverse perspectives among the state's components about the idea. The enactment of Law Number 23 of 2019 concerning the Management of National Resources for State Defense has been difficult. The foundation of this Law is the unification of the Draft Law on Reserve Components, the Draft Law on Supporting Components, and the Draft Law on State Defense. These three draft laws had been debated in the Indonesian parliament since 2007, with numerous parties rejecting them, causing the process to drag on and never be ratified.

The government and parliament agreed to merge the three laws into Law Number 23 of 2019 concerning the Management of National Resources for State Defense amid the omnibus debate on job creation laws and the momentum for the 2019 presidential elections. After a long wait and ambiguous discussions about the formation of reserve forces, this is a historical moment that provides a clear legal basis for the government, the Ministry of Defense, and TNI to prepare for and to form a reserve component that had never existed since Indonesia's independence in 1945. The announcement of the proposal to organize a reserve force has inevitably sparked a long public debate, given that the formation of a reserve force is a novel concept in Indonesia.

The formation of reserve forces in Indonesia is a fascinating subject to study because Indonesia has recently formed reserve forces. It should be noted that there is no study on reserve force formation in Indonesia since this law was adopted. Even if there are studies on this topic, they are primarily focused on the process of drafting the reserve component law and the politics in parliament (Zuhri, 2015), civil movements that oppose the reserve components law (Riyanto, 2017), and comparing state defense, military service, and reserve components (Hakim, 2019).

To fill the gap, this study seeks to provide a useful novelty because there has not been any studies (state of the) analyzing the formation of reserve forces and their impact following the enactment of this Law can be found. It is expected that there will be many problems and implications that will arise from the formation of the reserve force considering the birth of the law has also caused a prolonged polemic. Therefore, it is urgent to investigate this topic further to reveal new ideas.

In addition, this study also offers a fresh perspective on the formation of reserve forces, which are rarely addressed in the academic world. Some of them only investigate from the state defense, military service, and civilian militarization perspectives. In practice, this study also can assist all concerned parties, particularly the government and the ministry of defense, to be cautious to anticipate undesirable consequences or repercussions that may develop in the future as a result of the formation of the reserve force.

This study aims at finding the answers to the questions: What are the opportunities and challenges of forming a reserve force in Indonesia? What are the positive and negative impacts of the formation of the reserve force? What are the potentials of reserve force formation within the framework of the universal defense system?

Method

This study employs a qualitative method to analyze this relatively new phenomenon,
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which is the formation of reserve forces in Indonesia. Qualitative study is a method to describe and analyze certain phenomena as they are occurring and systematically reveal the underlying meaning of data and facts (Sugiono, 2017). Qualitative methods place a greater emphasis on narrative, phrases, and words to explain a phenomenon while avoiding using numerical data that may skew the outcomes (Subagyo, 2021).

In-depth interviews, observation, and documentation were done to collect the data. Purposive sampling was employed to select informants who have firsthand knowledge of the topic of the study. The informants of the study include the representatives from the Ministry of Defense, TNI, local government, entrepreneurs, and the general public. The types and the number of informants can be seen in the following table:

Table 1: List of informants

No	Informants	Total
1	Director General of Defense Potential, Armed Forces Major General Dadang Hendra Yudha	1
2	Director of National Defense Resources, Armed Forces Brigadier General Fahrid Amran	1
3	Military Area Command III/Siliwangi Commander in Chief, Armed Forces Major General Nugroho Budi Wiryanto	1
4	Army Headquarter Operations Staff Medium-Grade Aide Officer, Infantry Colonel Andrian Susanto	1
5	Head of the National Unity and Politics of Cimahi, Mardi Santoso	1
6	The Chairman of the West Java Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Cucu Sutara	1
7	Representative of Jenderal Achmad Yani University Student Regiment, Karim Indra Kurniawan	1
Total		7

Observation processes were conducted at the Ministry of Defense and the Military Area Command (Kodam) III/Siliwangi. The focus was on the planning, dissemination, recruiting, and training process of the two institutions. Attending coordination meetings, dissemination events, and reviewing the locations that will be used to select, recruit, and train the reserve forces, particularly in the Kodam III/Siliwangi area, provide opportunities for observations.

Documentation was done by searching, collecting, sorting, analyzing, and presenting secondary data from the government annual reports, documents released by the Ministry of Defense, and the analysis results of the laws and regulations about the formation of reserve forces. In addition, secondary data from studies, books, journals, and online media was observed to provide more information.

To obtain data, interviews, observations, and documentation results were sorted, selected, and processed qualitatively using triangulation. Data analysis was done after double and triple-checking the data to ensure that they are accountable and valid so they could support authentic and innovative findings.

Result And Discussion

Reserve Forces Formation

Following the mandate of Law Number 23 of 2019 concerning the Management of National Resources for State Defense, the Ministry of Defense has started the first phase of the recruitment of the land reserve troops in 2021 with a target of 25,000 personnel and forming 35 battalions that will be used as their headquarters. To do these, the Ministry of Defense has partnered with the TNI-AD, who has Regional Military Commands (Kodam, Komando Daerah

Militer), Military Region Command (Korem, Komando Resor Militer), and Military District Command (Kodim, Komando Distrik Militer) to reach all Indonesians.

These reserve force personnel are recruited, selected, trained, and nurtured for three months in Kodam and Korem to receive basic military training. The recruitment process is voluntary and those who are willing can register at Kodam or Korem to be selected and trained as a reserve force. This reserve force is formed without coercion, which is a significant difference from conscription. After three months of training, the reserve forces are sent back to their communities or places of employment. These reserve forces are occasionally called upon to participate in refresher training that could last to around three weeks that are designed to maintain their skills and competencies.

During the times when the state is at war, these reserve forces are called upon to assist the main component (TNI) in dealing with threats. Reserve forces will become combatants during basic military training, refresher training, and mobilization of war or emergency in which military law applies. Other than that, reserve forces are ordinary citizens, classified as non-combatants, and follow civil law just like ordinary people. Uniforms, headgear, shoes, ranks, and other reserve component features are provided to them.

Table 2: Reserve forces general overview

No	Element	Explanation
1	Group	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Land Reserve Components • Sea Reserve Components • Air Reserve Components
2	Formation Stages	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Registration • Selection • Basic military training • Results • Appointment Process
3	Management	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Training • Utilization and Sending Back
4	Military Basic Training Duration	3 (Three) Months
5	Age	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 18-35 years olds
6	Service Period	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Service period up to 48 years • Active period • Inactive period
7	Formed to fight against	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Military threats • Hybrid threats • Allowance
8	Rights during Basic Military Training	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Individual Field Equipment • Health Care • Working Accident Protection • Death Protection • Training allowance
9	Rights after being elected as reserve forces	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The operational allowance at the time of mobilization • Health Care • Working Accident Protection • Death Protection • Award

The recruitment of the reserve forces from the state civil apparatus or civil employees, laborers or workers, and students was the priority in 2021. The Ministry of Defense proposed a budget allocation of Rp1 trillion from the state budget to form a reserve force in 2021. The following table shows the plan for dislocating the selection of land reserve force throughout 15 Kodam:

Table 3: Land reserve components recruitment plan

No	Unit	Total
1	Military Area Command I/Bukit Barisan	3,500
2	Military Area Command II/Sriwijaya	3,700
3	Military Area Command III/Siliwangi	3,300
4	Military Area Command IV/Diponegoro	3,500
5	Military Area Command V/Brawijaya	3,400
6	Military Area Command VI/Mulawarman	1,500
7	Military Area Command IX/Udayana	1,300
8	Military Area Command XII/Tanjungpura	1,100
9	Military Area Command XIII/Merdeka	1,000
10	Military Area Command XIV/Hasanudin	1,600
11	Military Area Command XIV/Patimura	600
12	Military Area Command XVIII/Cenderawasih	500
	Total	25,000

However, in consideration of the COVID-19 pandemic, which necessitated a substantial budget, the government approved the Rp125 billion budget for the formation of reserve forces in 2021. Eventually, the Ministry of Defense only recruited 3,103 reserve force personnel, in which 500 in Kodam Jaya, 500 in Kodam III/Siliwangi, 500 in Kodam IV/Diponegoro, 500 in Kodam V/Brawijaya, 499 in Kodam XII/Tanjungpura, and 604 in Universitas Pertahanan Indonesia.

The formation of the reserve forces in 2021 started from the voluntary registration process on 17 - 31 May 2021, the selection process on 1 - 17 June 2021, basic military training on 21 June - 18 September 2021, and the inauguration of the reserve forces on 7 October 2021 at the Batu Jajar Kopasus Education and Training Center, West Bandung Regency by President Joko Widodo.

Reserve Forces Formation Opportunities

Reserve force formation is a historical event considering Indonesia has never had a reserve force since its independence. The attempt to form a reserve force has often run into impediments and failure. The year 2021 has marked a turning point in the country's defense structure with the formation of a reserve force. There are a variety of options for accelerating the formation of reserve forces.

Philosophically, reserve forces are a necessity and a consequence of the universal defense system. It means Indonesia conforms to a defense strategy in which the people serve as a reserve component (Muradi, 2012). This is embodied in the Indonesian constitution, stipulating that every citizen has the right and responsibility to defend the country, one of which is accomplished by citizens who participate in basic military training to become reserve troops (Sudirman & Fadly, 2018). The reserve forces are voluntarily deployed to assist the TNI as a primary component in dealing with enemy threats when needed. Reserve forces must be trained, educated, and nurtured to be prepared and competent in war or emergencies.

This is supported by the interview result with the Representative of Jenderal Achmad

Yani University Student Regiment, Karim Indra Kurniawan:

“As members of the student regiment, we all support the formation of a reserve force. Many of the student regiment members want to become reserve forces personnel so that they could assist TNI in dealing with the enemy when needed or when the state is at war. Reserve forces are important to the national defense system. So, we hope that the government will give priority to students to be able to register and join them to defend the country.”

In law, the formation of the reserve forces has been regulated by Law Number 23 of 2019 concerning Management of National Resources for State Defense, Government Regulation Number 3 of 2021 concerning Regulations for Implementing Law Number 23 of 2019, and Regulation of the Minister of Defense Number 3 of 2021 concerning Establishment, Determination, and Development of Reserve Components. This law provides a possibility for the formation of a reserve force and can be utilized to counteract numerous critiques and rejections of such force.

According to the interview with the Head of the National Unity and Politics of Cimahi, Mardi Santoso, the local administration supports the formation of reserve forces.

“As government officials, we support the formation of reserve troops because it is legally regulated in the laws and regulations so that they have a strong legal basis. Of course, the state civil apparatus in the regions will be informed and those who are interested may join them. If a member of the state civil service wishes to join the reserve forces, the Regional Government will assist rather than impede them. It will be made easier because the law requires it.”

In the notion of human rights, citizens' involvement in the reserve force is voluntary without coercion. In this case, only those who are willing can register and participate in the selection process. Moreover, those who express their interest are not guaranteed to be selected because they must pass the screening process. It should be stressed that the formation of a reserve force is not the same as conscription. Citizens are practically forced to join the military in the conscription program, whereas participation in the reserve force is entirely voluntary. Only those who are interested to join may register and participate in the selection.

The Chairman of the West Java Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Cucu Sutara, also stated that business actors support the government and TNI's efforts to form reserve forces.

“As a business actor, we support the formation of a reserve force and if there are business actors, workers, or laborers who want to join a reserve force, they will be facilitated, assisted, and supported without any termination of employment. It means that the world of business supports those who want to join a reserve force and they are welcome without any reduction in their rights as laborers or workers.”

Many other countries in the world, including Malaysia, Singapore, South Korea, North Korea, Cuba, Russia, China, and Brazil, have reserve forces. Countries that are regarded as the beacon of democracy, such as the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Italy, Canada, and Australia also have reserve forces. The number of reserve forces in different countries varies based on their governments' policies, particularly in terms of doctrine, threat dynamics, financial allocations, and defense strategies. Indonesia, which is historically known as a nation

of fighters, gained its independence through struggle. Indonesia has the fighting spirit of expelling invaders and this is the time to form a reserve force. It is ironic that other countries regard Indonesia as a nation of warriors with impressive guerilla warfare and extended war strategy but have yet to form reserve forces. On the other hand, other countries have formed reserve forces without receiving any criticism or disapproval as shown in the table below as a comparison.

Table 4: Military reserve force by country

No	Country	Active Military	Reserve Military
1	United States	2,580,255	2,458,500
2	Russia	2,037,000	2,400,000
3	People's Republic of China	2,255,000	800,000
4	India	1,414,000	1,155,000
5	Brazil	327,710	1,340,000
6	South Africa	55,750	17,700
7	Philippines	106,000	131,000
8	Vietnam	384,000	4,000,000
9	Malaysia	110,000	41,600
10	Singapore	60,500	312,500

(Note: Wikipedia, 2021)

The Challenges of Reserve Force Formation

Despite laws and regulations authorizing the formation of a reserve force, the Ministry of Defense confronts several challenges in preparing for its formation. This challenge must be a primary concern for all involved parties, particularly the Ministry of Defense, which needs to be more cautious in forming reserve forces. Several challenges have to be dealt with.

First, reserve troops are formed when the welfare of TNI soldiers as the primary component/main force is still relatively poor. For many TNI soldiers, especially at the enlisted and non-commissioned levels, welfare is still poor considering their salary and income are not enough to cover their daily necessities. Their basic needs, such as food, clothing, and housing, are still a concern. Taking this into account, several parties prefer to spend the budget to solve this poor welfare issue on the TNI soldiers rather than to form a reserve force.

Second, the reserve force formation was conducted when the main equipment and weapon systems of TNI were not fully modernized. The current main equipment and weapon systems of TNI have yet to reach the minimum essential force (MEF). As a result, mishaps often occur during training, patrols, and missions. One of the most recent examples is the Indonesian Navy's submarine, KRI Nanggala-402, which sank on April 22, 2021. The incident killed 53 Indonesian Navy soldiers. This necessitates the government, particularly the Ministry of Defense, to immediately modernize the main equipment and weapon systems of TNI. Therefore, several parties believed that reserve forces formation was not the main priority. They believed the top priority was to modernize TNI's old main equipment and weapon systems.

Third, the reserve troops formation was done without considering the budget that was insufficient at that time. The Ministry of Defense and TNI had a total defense budget of roughly Rp136 trillion, which was the second-highest ministry budget after the Ministry of Public Works and Public Housing. However, the budget was insufficient to cover all regular needs, operational needs, and weapons procurement. The ideal budget would be Rp300 trillion to

cover the main equipment and weapon systems and to support the personnel welfare. Taking those aspects into account, several parties believe the reserve forces formation was unachievable because it could not cover the military expenditures.

Fourth, the reserve force formation was considered by social organizations as a part of civilian militarization. Activists and social organizations believed that people's participation in fighting against the threat of the nation is a violation of human rights. People's participation in reserve forces was considered violating the universal defense doctrine because people are non-combatants who have to be protected by the military. They were concerned the reserve force would be used by TNI as a 'shield' during war or against the enemy. These criticisms are challenges that have to be answered by the government, especially by the Ministry of Defense and TNI.

Reserve Forces Formation Impacts

Reserve troops are citizens who participate in basic military training on a volunteer basis. They have military qualifications after being physically and spiritually trained. After such training, they are ready to assist TNI in dealing with enemies. Reserve forces are granted a rank and a stipend. If they are not mobilized, they are allowed to work like ordinary citizens.

There are positive and negative impacts concerning the existence of reserve forces. Several positive aspects of the formation of the reserve force are as follows.

First, they will strengthen TNI as the main component/main force in national defense against threats. In the universal defense system, it is assumed that the enemy will be faced by TNI-AU while they are still on the high seas, exclusive economic zone, or territorial sea. In the event, TNI-AU is unable to repel the enemy and if they enter Indonesian territorial seas and shores, they will be faced by TNI-AL. Furthermore, if the enemy manages to land on Indonesian soil, TNI-AD will meet them. If TNI-AD cannot repel them on Indonesian soil, guerrilla warfare is going to be commenced and the people will assist TNI. The reserve forces will assist TNI in guerrilla warfare by using all available resources. The explanation shows the significance of reserve force formation for Indonesia's universal defense system.

Director General of Defense Potential, Armed Forces Major General Dadang Hendra Yudha, also has a similar idea.

"Indonesia's defense system is universal so that people can be empowered for national defense in the event of enemy invasion so that TNI can be assisted by the people who have been prepared in the form of reserve forces. These forces will assist the major component, which is TNI, to deal with threats because TNI personnel are relatively limited while the dynamics of threats are very complex in the era of globalization and the industrial revolution 4.0."

Second, by forming a reserve force, Indonesia will be prepared to fight any country that wishes to attack and occupy Indonesian territory. If Indonesia has to face an enemy threat, regardless of the enemy capabilities in war, Indonesia has people's power that is already trained, prepared, and fostered as a reserve force to assist TNI. Unification of military forces with the people is one of the keys to victory in war. This is true, especially during guerrilla and counter-guerrilla warfare. In Indonesia, the army comes from the people, so the concept of "people's soldiers" has been embodied in reserve forces. This will be the key to victory against the enemy

at war.

Director of National Defense Resources, Armed Forces Brigadier General Fahrid Amran, explains that the core of Indonesian defense doctrine is guerrilla warfare that necessitates the formation of a reserve force:

“In its essence, the universal defense system is the enactment of guerrilla warfare to face enemies rather than enter Indonesian territory, so people's support and participation are required to deal with those enemies. One of the participants is to become personnel of a reserve force that can be deployed at any time to assist TNI according to their abilities and competencies. Reserve force is crucial at war against the enemy, so it is imperative to form it early.”

Third, the formation of reserve forces will have a deterrent effect on countries seeking to destabilize or invade Indonesia. The enemy will consider a reserve force when they are planning to invade Indonesia. Therefore, the quality and the number of reserve forces would be significant to deter the enemy. The better the quality and the number of the reserve forces, the better it would be to scare the enemy and vice versa. Reserve forces are one of the instruments of national strength that Indonesia can utilize in international forums, particularly in defense diplomacy.

In an interview, Military Area Command III/Siliwangi Commander in Chief, Armed Forces Major General Nugroho Budi Wiryanto, believes that people are a national resource that can be turned into a defense resource by forming reserve forces:

"In war, the enemy will always look at how many reserves forces a country has. They will do this in addition to taking into account the number of its main forces, such as the number of active military personnel. The reserve army will have a deterrence effect to fight against the enemy's threats. Those who are willing are welcome to register as reserve force personnel to be trained with military skills so that one day they can be mobilized to help TNI ward off enemy threats.”

Fourth, the formation of reserve soldiers will enhance the state defense program (bela negara). Members of the reserve forces will be swift and ready to be deployed in the event of a war or an emergency that requires immediate formation. When TNI's main equipment and weapon systems, budget, and welfare are still poor, a trained reserve force can be deployed, mobilized, and stationed at all sites of defense in the face of enemy threats. Integration of the main and reserve forces will be critical to maintaining the country's sovereignty and territorial integrity.

All parties must be aware that the main force has a limited number of personnel and resources that necessitates civilians to serve as reserve forces. The Army Headquarter Operations Staff Medium-Grade Aide Officer, Infantry Colonel Andrian Susanto, also shared a similar idea.

“All parties must know TNI strength is severely limited, both in terms of personnel, budget, and weaponry. To fight an enemy, the people are required to assist TNI. The people are a national resource that must be converted into a defensive resource by forming a reserve force ready to fight an adversary at war.”

On the other hand, the negative impacts of reserve forces formation were found as follows:

First, the reserve forces are trained personnel with general military qualities. When they return to their respective locations, it is feared that they may abuse their authority. Psychologically, reserve force personnel can be arrogant, emotional, temperamental, and impeccable. In addition, they may be affiliated with certain social or youth organizations, making them vulnerable to be a backup for a specific business unit, acting outside their authority, or acting as a member of TNI or police.

Second, reserve force personnel are trained using the military method, instilling strict discipline and high morale so that profound solidarity is expected between them. Although it is desirable, it must not be misapplied in the field. One of the concerns is that if one of them is involved in a conflict with a community, other reserve force personnel may help them due to solidarity, regardless of which side is right or wrong. If they are not anticipated, these values may cause trouble in the future.

Third, reserve force personnel are recruited from the general public such as state civil apparatus, laborers, workers, and students. It would be unfortunate if these reserve forces personnel cannot get employment in the future. Similarly, if they had a job but got terminated and cannot get a job with many family expenses to bear. Such situations could be dangerous as these trained military personnel may turn into criminals to make a living for their families, which can tarnish the reputation of the reserve forces.

Fourth, reserve forces personnel who return to their respective communities are vulnerable to clashes with certain social or youth organizations. In addition, a conflict may arise between the force personnel for various reasons. It would be extremely dangerous if the conflict occurs considering they have been militarily trained to fight and shoot. In this situation, they should not use firearms carelessly due to the conflict in their community.

Fifth, the reserve force personnel are susceptible to political influence extended by certain individuals or groups, forcing them to do some political activities. For example, they may be involved in the regional head, legislative, and presidential elections. Reserve forces have political rights, including the power to vote and be elected to political positions in the government. Certain political elites may be able to mobilize them after offering them position and possession. In addition, if one of the reserve force personnel participates in a political campaign, they may mobilize other members because of solidarity.

Reserve Forces Formation Potentials

Reserve force formation is a good idea because it will support the national defense to assist TNI in protecting state sovereignty, safeguarding the nation's integrity, and repelling military threats. However, the formation of reserve forces must be conducted with caution, transparency, and accountability so that they can respond to criticism from those who are against the establishment of reserve forces. Taking that into consideration, the potential of forming a reserve force can be assessed in several manners.

First, Indonesia and the rest of the world are still dealing with the COVID-19 that has been raging since the end of 2019. In 2020 and 2021, the COVID-19 pandemic has decelerated the national economic growth and it is expected that the economy will continue to recover until 2022. The formation of reserve forces was conducted amid the fight against

COVID-19 where the state budget is mostly allocated on COVID-19 related issues, such as vaccination. The budget for the formation of a reserve force has been allocated. However, the issue is the "momentum" or "timing" of the formation because it would be considered inappropriate to create a reserve force amid the pandemic. Thus, as many have suggested, the formation of reserve troops should be delayed until 2023 when the economy is expected to have recovered.

Second, the formation of reserve forces will be important for defense interests, particularly for the government, the Ministry of Defense, and TNI because reserve forces that spread across all agencies, institutions, and communities can be utilized as "eyes" and "ears" for data collection, early detection, early prevention, and early deterrence against societal issues. Reserve forces in their respective workplaces can record every activity that could threaten the nation's security such as intolerance, radicalism, terrorism, or separatism. This issue can be communicated with law enforcement to anticipate the problem early.

Third, the formation of a reserve force is currently prioritizing state civil apparatus, laborers, and workers. They have clear professions and institutions so that if they commit acts against the law, it will be relatively easy to prosecute them. The concern of recruiting individuals who have yet to be employed or are currently unemployed is that they are more likely committing criminal activities or joining radical organizations.

Fourth, to avoid authority abuse, anticipate violation of law, and prevent anarchic acts, the mechanism for supervising the reserve force personnel has to be done extensively and thoroughly when they return to their communities and workplaces. The Ministry of Defense and TNI must establish a comprehensive surveillance and control system capable of detecting, controlling, and supervising every reserve force personnel behavior and activities wherever they are. Although supervision from the organization where they work is important, it is also necessary for TNI to establish a supervisory mechanism in various areas to prevent issues.

Fifth, the reserve force personnel's development must be considered, particularly in terms of career, rank, class, and other areas of personnel management. Furthermore, it is necessary to plan the hierarchy of positions, particularly the relationship between reserve force staff and commanding officers, the battalion management, and the coordination between the main and the reserve components. These aspects have to be thoroughly discussed and planned to prevent sectoral ego or other administrative issues. It is imperative to prevent the reserve force personnel from becoming out of control as it can lead to new social problems in the community.

Conclusion

Throughout the history of the nation, the policy of establishing reserve forces was implemented for the first time in 2021. Thus, this is a significant milestone for the universal defense system. Conceptually, the formation of a reserve force is necessary considering that the Indonesian defense system adheres to a universal defense system that involves all citizens to protect the state in the face of threats. However, it is necessary to consider the political, psychological, and sociological aspects of the state so that the process would go properly and effectively.

The newly formed reserve force could be used as a political tool for pragmatic interests in every political event. It would be concerning if these reserves become similar to a youth

organization or an arrogant social organization. In addition, there is also the fear that reserve forces will trigger a social conflict between the reserve force personnel and other community members, or even between the reserve forces.

System and procedure for supervision and control are required to monitor the attitudes, behavior, and activities of the reserve force in collaboration with the head of the agency in the location where the personnel is deployed. For example, it can be done by compulsory reports or by making daily, weekly, and monthly reports using available technology. Monthly or quarterly assemblies can also be held to give the personnel direction, advice, and information so they will adhere to the values of discipline and comply with applicable laws. If necessary, strict punishment can be given to the person who commits disciplinary violations, ethical violations, or criminal activity.

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