Amendments to the Constitution and the extent to which the constitutional judiciary has power over them
The research objective is to examine the idea of constitutional amendments, constitutional jurisprudence, and comparative constitutional judiciary from the perspective of the legal value of constitutional restrictions placed on the authority of the constitutional amendment, and to consider these restrictions as a legal basis for imposing the constitutional judge's control over the constitutionality of constitutional amendments. The study focused on the most significant legal arguments made before the constitutional courts of the Federal Republic of Germany, the Arab Republic of Egypt, and the United States of America about the legality of constitutional amendments. In the portions of this study where we used the comparison and analysis approach, these nations were likely chosen as a topic for comparison because of their extensive constitutional and legal systems, as well as their sound judicial practices that deepened the experience in the area of judicial control of the constitutionality of laws in general and the judicial control of constitutional amendments in particular. This experience can be used to improve Iraq's early experience in this area. We concluded that the principle of constitutional inflexibility and supremacy requires that constitutional amendments be subject to the control of the constitutional judiciary as a result of our study of the applications of the comparative constitutional judiciary and our analysis of the texts of the Iraqi constitution for the year 2005.