

The March 1991 Uprising in Iraq is a Study of its Causes and Factors of Failure

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Abstract

The study examines an important historical event in the contemporary history of Iraq, which is the uprising of March 1991, and to clarify the reasons that led to the outbreak of the uprising, the most important of which is Iraq's occupation of Kuwait and the subsequent events that helped cause the uprising. The study explained how the events in the uprising proceeded. As a consequence of the revolt, many of the constants in the regions in which the insurrection was launched were altered, as was detailed in the research, which looked at the effects of the uprising on a national, regional, and worldwide scale.

Keywords: March Uprising, The People's Uprising, Gulf War 1991 - Saddam Hussein - History of Iraq

Introduction

The March 1991 uprising is an important historical event in the contemporary history of Iraq, as it represents a stage that led to great results that directly affected the events that followed in Iraq, both internal and external

It is important to identify the real natural causes that led to the uprising, as it is well known that any historical event is the result of the interaction of multiple causes, whether they are internal or external, resulting from the influence of the government's internal policy or the economic, political, and social conditions that the country is experiencing, or its externality, which is represented by regional and international developments and their impact. On the trajectory of internal events that led to the uprising's emergence.

It is necessary to shed light on the forces that participated in the uprising, and it is divided into two parts. The first is an ideological one that interacted for a long period and created a state of hostility and preparedness for a certain class of the people or political forces that worked on preparing and preparing public opinion for the revolution to rule in Iraq.

There are no independent and moderate historical sources that dealt with the uprising. Rather, it was divided into two parts. The first with it described the ruling in the strongest terms and the second against it and placed it in descriptions far from neutral. Therefore, when the researcher tries to study the March Uprising, he finds the writings about it are media writings in which many terms that do not describe the truth are thrown into it. And do not tire of an independent or academic method of study because more than one wrote about it motivated by the reaction after the occupation of Iraq by the American forces.

Aims of the Study

The current study aims at:

To know the real reasons that led to the outbreak of the uprising of March (Shaaban) 1991 and how things went in Iraq and the provinces that participated in the uprising.

To clarify the position of the regional countries towards it and the influence of the United States and its allies on the course of events, and to explain the results of the uprising and the factors that led to its failure.

Problem of the Study

The study an important and controversial historical event among many historians in Iraq, that event that appeared at a critical period in the history of Iraq, the researchers were not able to document and write about it sufficiently to show all its political, intellectual and military dimensions, clarify the facts of the intifada realistically, because all those who wrote about it are exaggerated, whether they support the event or oppose it, writing impartially to clarify the facts in a useful way for those who read the history of Iraq in that period.

Importance of the Study

The study of the 1991 uprising is of great importance, as it represents a stage in the contemporary history of Iraq. It greatly influenced the course of events that followed, this uprising did not receive sufficient study to clarify the real causes that combined to launch it, the course of its events, the reasons for its failure and the consequences that resulted from it. The importance of the study lies in the fact that it examines the stages of the uprising without siding with any of the parties that played the main role in the course of events, whether the Iraqi government, the uprising or other countries, whether regional or international forces.

Internal and external reasons of the uprising

The reaction of the Iraqi army to the withdrawal from Kuwait

In the second Gulf War, Iraq invaded Kuwait on August 2, 1990. All the states of Iraq opposed the annexation of Kuwait and asked him to withdraw from it without restrictions or conditions. The United Nations issued UN Security Council resolutions and Iraq refused to comply with them, and the Arab League intervened to resolve the issue in a proper manner and demanded that Iraq withdraw From Kuwait, however, its request was rejected by the Iraqi side. Meetings were also held for the foreign ministers of Arab countries, and the aim of these meetings was the immediate and rapid withdrawal from Kuwait without restriction or condition. However, Iraq insisted on its position to annex Kuwait and its nineteenth governorate promised that the war on Kuwait would end on February 28, 1991 Saddam Hussein issued his orders for an immediate withdrawal from Kuwait. This withdrawal promised a surprise to the Iraqi soldiers. Chaos prevailed among the soldiers as plans were not made to withdraw in emergency. Delicate circumstances (Saheb,2014), especially after the destruction of the Iraqi army by the international coalition forces (Abd Al-Nabi,2015) the Iraqi soldiers returned exhausted to the city of Basra. They were startled by the degree of the damage and devastation that had occurred to their infrastructure, lands, and possessions (Sahib, 2014) of the wretched and deplorable state in which the Iraqi forces returned. As they traversed the desert and passed the bodies of

their fallen friends, they marched in a state of anxiety and dreaded being bombed at any time. This matter formed a state of complacency for them and boil against the ruling political system (Al-Rikabi,2012). One of the soldiers fired a shell at a huge picture of Saddam Hussein in Saad Square in Basra, to be considered a reason for the defeat suffered by the army and the consequences of this defeat and loss for the Iraqi government, which led them to carry out the uprising against the ruling authority on March 2, 1991 and broke the barrier of fear and silence, and most of the provinces participated in this uprising. Al-Iraqiya, which seems to have a date with it, with the exception of the governorates of Baghdad, Salah al-Din, Anbar and Diyala (al-Amir,2004).

It was a quick expression of the complete rejection of the cases of frustration that led to a definite desire to tear apart the restrictions that crippled the people and was not an event planned or interfered with by international parties but rather stemmed from the people's suffering against injustice, abuse, and persecution. It was a totalitarian revolution that included everyone, both civilians and military officers from the southern, central, and northern governorates (Al-Majid,1991). It must be noted that the uprising was a massive mass revolutionary event in which the majority of the people participated. It was a spontaneous event as it was not planned or carried out by a specific party or sect, so it started itself from within the Iraqis from their suffering without the interference of international parties in moving it directing or influencing it (Al-Majma'i,2006).

The Iraqi government was aware of the miserable situation the soldiers had reached while they were indignant with the government system due to the deterioration of their conditions, so he was ready to take all measures in the event of any coup or revolution against it (Sahib,2014). Officers and soldiers led it, and the Iraqi regime was not the only one who saw this vision. Rather, experts in international affairs believed that the return of the Iraqi forces in a miserable and exhausting state would lead them to a military coup against the ruling authority (Heikal,1992).

The bombing of Iraq continued for forty-two days during this period. The infrastructure of Iraq was almost completely destroyed until Iraq described the severity of the destruction it suffered as being brought back to the pre-industrial era. Entire cities, bridges, roads, factories and factories were destroyed in addition to human losses. Which was estimated at (100,000) dead and (300,000) wounded as a result of the horrific destruction that Iraq was subjected to, in addition to the condition of the soldiers who returned to Iraq, smashed and killed many of their comrades, and the depth of suffering and tragedy they lived made them reach a state of boiling against the ruling regime They rose up against the ruling authority on March 2, 1991 (Sahib,2014). The destruction included everything, which led to power cuts, the destruction of audiovisual media institutions, reaching a degree of zero in the media, the destruction of telephone communication stations, and the spread of fires to all departments and various institutions (Al-Majed,1991). The spark of the uprising was an individual reaction of the Iraqi soldiers who withdrew from Kuwait in poor conditions and felt that their leadership had thrown them into a losing battle and promised them victory. Nonetheless, they were surprised by their inability to fight the Allies and resorted to trench warfare and open withdrawal in the face of the advanced Allied air force. In response, they were joined by civilians who had lived through the tragedy of the bombing, which destroyed everything and deprived them of the most basic services.

Inviting the Regional and International Media

Among the reasons that led to the uprising was the large and widespread support (which was practiced by the flags of the allied countries as part of the psychological war against Iraq) by the United States of America and the Arab countries as US President George Bush addressed a statement to the Iraqi people on October 11, 1991 in which he said, "We are all we want Saddam to go, and I hope that the Iraqi people will do something to achieve it" in addition to the calls made by General Norman Schwarzkopf, commander of the international coalition forces in the Gulf, to incite the people to the uprising against Saddam Hussein. The frequent demands by US President George Bush at public gatherings for the people to rise up against Saddam Hussein's tyranny, as well as the large number of leaflets dropped by American planes urging the people to join the revolution, all contributed to the success of the revolution (Deeb,2013).

The United States developed a plan to remove Saddam Hussein from power, in cooperation with Saudi Arabia, which agreed with the opposition parties from the opposition factions and some leaders of the opposition Baath Party to overthrow Saddam 'Hussein's rule to establish a new government led by the opposition. These assurances reach the name of the prime minister, who is a former Sunni and Baathist officer, and of Tikrit lineage and ancestry, and with these specifications, he can deal immediately with the ruling institution in Baghdad and employ its resources without waiting for a new government in Iraq)) The American plan and statements promised to invite Iraqis to The revolution and the presence of an action plan with the American leadership that will be implemented after the end of the Second Gulf War. George Bush continued with the statements he addressed to the Iraqis to carry out the revolution, calling on the army and police officers and the people to take control of matters. To take matters into their own hands now, and to force Saddam Hussein to disappear)) (Heikal,1992).

With the support of the United States, the opposition established a newspaper bearing the name of (Baghdad newspaper) and a radio station was established called (Voice of Free Iraq). This radio station was broadcasting under the supervision of the US Central Intelligence Agency and was supporting the Iraqi people to carry out the revolution and topple Saddam 'Hussein's regime and gain freedom and safety And stability and salvation (Saheb,2014).

George Bush declared in his speeches the call of the Iraqi people from two camps to overthrow Saddam Hussein's regime, saying on January 9, 1991, "The Iraqi army must work to remove Saddam Hussein from power", which is a direct and explicit call for a military coup, in addition to the statement of US Secretary of State James Baker. On March 11, 1991 ((that US-Iraqi relations could not improve as long as Saddam Hussein was in power)) then George Bush returned and again repeated his call to the Iraqi people to get rid of Saddam 'Hussein's rule when he said ((Saddam Hussein must be removed)) (Al-Amir,2004) In the eyes of the Iraqis, Bush was considered a revolutionary leader, especially since the people alone cannot bring down the regime. Therefore, 'America's display of incitement and support by US President George Bush encouraged the Iraqis who saw that America itself was the one inciting them to disobey and go out against the regime and overthrow it (ibid).

The Shiite opposition, which adopted sectarian rhetoric and took control of the regime that persecuted the Shiites, confiscated their religious rights, and forbade them from performing religious rituals, as well as described the Baath Party ideology as infidel and hostile to religion, could not play the major role of the media in inciting Iraqis against the Iraqi political system that existed at the time. It was directed by radio stations affiliated with the Iraqi opposition in Iran and from Iranian radio stations speaking in the Arabic language and promised that the alternative to Saddam Hussein's regime would be an Islamic regime that would achieve justice and a decent life.

Perhaps one of the most important causes of the movement is the complete absence of state authority in several areas:

- 1 Militarily, chaos was controlled, there was no presence of the security forces or the regular forces except for the return of the soldiers who had randomly withdrawn from Kuwait with their full arms and without order at a time when all the military bases and places of military units were destroyed, and the soldiers gathered in Iraq and were evacuated after it became a daily target for the international coalition aircraft.
- 2 Administratively, the disappearance of all employees, whether they were from the local or central administration. There was a little authority for the governors, the qaimaqam, or district directors in organizing matters and controlling the situation in the south in general and Basra in particular. This kind of system laps created a vacuum that invoked many peoples and freed them from fear of the law in the status of the feet on any opposition work.
- 3 The media represented the absence of any media outlet representing the Iraqi state as a result of the bombing of the coalition forces. So all Iraqi media outlets were silenced, including radio, television, and the press, with the blackout and the activity of anti-state radio stations, calling for a revolution against the regime and spreading false news about the killing of Saddam Hussein and many members of the government Al-Iraqiya and the leadership of the Baath Party. Rumors have become the master of the media situation in Iraq in general.

The Outbreak Of The Intifada

On March 2, 1991, Basra Governorate was the one that sparked the first spark of the uprising (Al-Halfi,2015), so the uprising began to spread very quickly in all areas of Basra, its districts, suburbs and villages (Al-Hamdani,2003) because the re' 'gime's regime's policy strangled the revolutionary masses and the barrier of fear was broken and the volcano of anger erupted in them from the retreating civilians and soldiers and their crowds joined together, and it began to push into violent and armed demonstrations that had not been witnessed in Basra before (ibid)

The flame of the uprising spread like wildfire, and the revolutionary masses began to rush in huge demonstrations, as one of the participants mentioned that the revolutionaries were risking their lives with all confidence and determination (Al Majid,1991). Those who led the uprising were the Iraqi soldiers they withdrew from Kuwait without foreign intervention, after which the revolutionaries headed to attack the partisan and security headquarters in the city (in which there were only an explosion and the majority of its members withdrew) and clashes took place between civilians and government forces that enabled the up risers to seize their weapons and control the city. (Al-Hamdani,2003) After many expected it to happen, as they saw that the torn and exhausted Iraqi army, upon its return to Iraq, in this miserable image, would stage a coup against the government in addition to overthrowing the ruling Baath Party leadership and bringing another leadership loyal to it (Saheb, 2014).

The revolutionaries attacked the security directorates, the headquarters of the party apparatus, and the police stations seized them, took their weapons, and assassinated many Baath Party members who were present in the headquarters. Then the revolutionaries went to Basra prison and released all the prisoners who were being held there (ibid)

Then the uprising spread in the southern governorates at such a rapid speed that the government forces were unable to confront it ([Al-Halfi,2015](#)), especially in the governorates of Maysan and Dhi Qar, and many opponents stationed in the marshes participated in it after they were able to control the city of Maysan after violent clashes with the regime forces and the uprising extended to include The city of Wasit, where they attacked police stations and party headquarters, but after a relatively short period of time, the Republican Guard was able to regain control of it because it is located to the west of the Iraqi-Iranian border and the government fears that Iran will control it (*ibid*).

The uprising reached Baghdad, especially in the cities of Al-Thawra (now Sadr City) and Al-Shula tried to participate in the uprising, but failed due to the presence of the security forces and the ' leadership's interest in tightening control over the capital Baghdad and dealt with the situation firmly, making everyone not think of a move to repel the government and that it tried as much as possible to protect the capital without The uprising reached it, and many forces were stationed there ([Al-Amir,2004](#))

As for the Qadisiyah governorate, the uprising was taking place very quickly, and the clans led the movement, and only a few hours passed until they managed to take control of the city and they released prisoners from its prisons, whose numbers were estimated (1000) prisoners, and this city did not witness clashes with the security services ([Al-Hamdani,2003](#)) After the governor joined the ranks of the up risers ([Al Majid,1991](#)). Many religious figures who tried to lead the movement regularly joined ([Al-Hamdani,2003](#)).

In the Middle Euphrates region, the uprising were able to control the city of Babylon. After intense clashes with the security forces, they were able to control many areas of the city of Babylon, control police stations and party headquarters, seize weapons therein and release prisoners. Many government officials there were arrested ([Al-Waeli,2017](#)) .

As for the city of Karbala, the spark of the uprising shifted it like lightning, as on that day, the funeral of two brothers who had been martyred during the outbreak of the battles in Kuwait coincided with them and brought them to Karbala, and the mourners went to the shrine of Imam Hussein chanting religious slogans. When they went to the shrine of Imam Al-Abbas violent clashes occurred between The security men and the police on one side and the mourners on the other side, and with the mourners leaving the shrine of Imam al-Abbas, one of the mourners chanted for the fall of the regime, so the security men aimed the weapon at the person on the phone, killing him and one of the citizens killed one of the security men, and this incident marked the start of the uprising in Karbala ([Al Majid,1991](#)).

In the city of Karbala, the uprising revolutionaries attacked state institutions and arrested many of its officials, and the revolutionaries took the shrine of Imam Hussein (peace be upon him) and his brother Imam Al-Abbas (peace be upon him) as the main headquarters of the uprising. The uprising in Karbala was less central than the city of Najaf. A few days later, the Republican Guard managed to attack the city was destroyed, destroyed, and bombed with missiles. Battles and clashes occurred between the up risers and the regime forces, but the up risers could not achieve victory due to the depletion of weapons and military equipment. At the same time, the Iraqi forces obtained approval to use military aircraft under the pretext of transporting the wounded from Kuwait to Iraq, so they used aircraft and attacked and bombed the up risers who fled to Iraq. Orchards to hide in them (*ibid*).

During the march of the uprising, there was no media or journalistic activity, television channels, or journalists reporting what was happening on the ground, or newspapers and magazines reporting events, as there were only some pictures taken by government media that were accompanying the government forces when the uprising broke out and a few months later. The uprising and its elimination by the regime entered the neutral international media such as Reuters news agency and BBC (Al-Majid,1991).

In Najaf, security men harassed citizens and prevented them from gathering, as they arrested a group of young men who were meeting in the Haidari courtyard on the day (15 Shaban 1411 AH) (March 2, 1991 AD) in order to prepare and urge citizens to participate in the demonstration, which led to postponing the date of the demonstration to the next day and the next day March 3, 1991 The uprising began in Najaf and the authority knew of the possibility of a movement against it, so it put all its military and security forces and a state of great alert for fear of a revolution against it, especially since the city of Najaf is the center of religious opposition and the outbreak of the uprising in the governorates of Basra and Maysan and Dhi Qar and its spread quickly gave a defense And an incentive for the people of Najaf to carry out the uprising (Saheb, 2014).

It was announced that a large demonstration would take place out from all areas of Najaf, and the meeting would take place at the Haidari Shrine; and when the demonstrators arrived at the Haidari Shrine, the security forces and the Guardians of the Holy Sepulcher prevented them from entering the Haidari Sanctuary. The revolutionaries sent calls to the city's people and called on them to join and participate in the uprising. The revolutionaries attacked police stations, party and security centers, seized their weapons, and released the prisoners and political detainees in prisons. Still despite that the revolutionaries were unable to control all of Najaf, so the Security Directorate remained under after the security forces took control, a confrontation occurred between the two sides that continued and was not resolved until after they hit the directorate with missiles from a tank, they took control of it, and thus they took control of the entire city (ibid).

The city was exposed to large cases of theft and looting of commercial stores and public properties due to their poor economic conditions, poor living conditions, and the poverty that this class was suffering from, and the government did not provide them with a means of living with a decent life (Saheb, 2014). This act of robbery and looting accompanied the uprising in all the cities that I witnessed by murder, the spread of weapons, the seizure of government headquarters, and burning them, which led to the change of public opinion towards it from supporter to an opponent. People are not safe for their lives.

Opponent parties provided weapons and military equipment to the border areas with the distribution of pictures of Iranian symbols such as Khomeini and Khamenei and others with leaflets calling for the establishment of an Islamic republic, which gave the idea that the groups loyal to Iran are in control of the uprisings, and in the event that the uprisings manage to topple the ruling regime in Iraq, matters will be under the control of Iran. Thus, the Arab countries withdrew their assistance and support for the uprising as a result of this issue, which posed a threat to the fate of the uprising and sparked fears that it would be similar to the Islamic revolution that took place in Iran. This issue also drew the ire of the United States and the Gulf countries and gave the impression that the revolutionaries desire an Iranian-style government. (Heikal,1992). As for the uprising in the northern regions was led by Jalal Talabani (the leader of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan) and Masoud Barzani (the leader of the Kurdistan

Democratic Party). During the war with the international coalition forces, all Iraqi forces withdrew with a pledge by the Kurds not to exploit the situation and break with the ruling power or carry out a revolution and maintain the security, but with the city being empty of Iraqi forces and the United States' encouragement to topple Saddam Hussein's regime, the Kurdish party forces left the mountains with civilians and clashed with those who remained from the security forces inside the northern governorates and managed to control it (ibid)

The uprising that started from the southern provinces and took on a Shiite character, which means the formation of a Shiite government, outwardly, but it is managed in Tehran and this matter was not palatable by the United States of America, which was afraid of Shiite control, which means Iranian control of Iraq and the threat of its interests in the Arab Gulf region, so I preferred Preserving Saddam Hussein's rule while destroying his military and economic power (Al-Shuwaili,2018).

The position of the coalition forces

The American position took another path, especially after the agreement was concluded between the Iraqi sides and the coalition forces to cease fire and disengage between the two parties; and at the same time, the uprising was at its most intense inside Iraq as the internal course of events in Iraq began to contradict the policy of the United States of America, after it was urging Iraq. Through the statements of US President Bush on toppling the regime, it took a position opposing the uprising and did not provide the revolutionaries with any support, but the agreement allowed the Republican Guard forces to use all weapons and brutally suppress the uprising (ibid).

The American administration has also been working to reduce it, stand up to it, and weaken it because it promised the people's desire to change the ruling regime does not match its strategic policy towards Iraq and the region because it is well aware that in the event of the success of the popular uprising and the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, all its plans that succeeded in implementing it by declaring war officially and with approval The United Nations, its decisions, and Iraq's compliance with all decisions, so it bargained with Saddam Hussein by remaining in power and giving him the green light to suppress the uprising, as the American administration preferred Saddam Hussein to remain and support him rather than the Iranian-backed revolutionaries taking control of Iraq and this is inconsistent with its interests in the region and has called (fanatics and extremists) To those who mobilize and direct the revolutionaries, and they have good relations with Iran and Syria (Hammoud,1993).

The Safwan Agreement (Chase,2012) enabled Iraq to use helicopters to transport forces and other activities, especially after the destruction of the bridges due to strikes by the coalition forces; and this matter made it difficult for the Iraqi forces to move and this coincided with the events of the uprising in the center and the south and the fear and fear of The overthrow of the Iraqi regime.. Therefore, they promised a firm approval by the American administration of the regime, using force and brutally suppressing the uprising (Hammoud,1993).

It is worth noting that the goal of the USA in waging the war against Iraq for several reasons, including the multiplication and destruction of Iraq's military and economic power, in addition to increasing tension in relations between Iraq and the Arab Gulf states, and the most important reason is the elimination of Iraq as the strongest and controlling power in the Middle East region and limiting its role. This is through what General Schwartzkopf said, ""The USA

is keen to weaken the Iraqi army as a regional power, not as an internal force""." He also stressed that ""the strategic objective of the war has been achieved and that the Iraqi army has been completely torn apart, and that Iraq's industrial and technological capacity has been destroyed""." It was completely destroyed)) (Tuzkov,1999).

the failure of the uprising and the takeover of the Iraqi forces

When the Iraqi government learned that the United States of America had abandoned support for the uprising and allowed Iraqi forces to use helicopter gunships in accordance with the Safwan agreement that was concluded between General Swartuzkov and Lieutenant General Sultan Hashem Ahmed and Lieutenant General Salah Aboud Mahmoud, the Iraqi leadership appointed Ali Hassan Al-Majid as Minister of Interior and gave him powers to suppress the uprising. In the southern regions, as for the central Euphrates, he gave the leadership to Hussein Kamel and Taha Yassin Ramadan. As for the armaments employed during the fights between the two sides, they were unequal, as the government troops deployed sophisticated weapons against the rising rebels, who ran out of ammo or battled with basic weapons and were able to exterminate them. Many revolutionaries were slain during the rebellion, physicians and nurses were punished for treating rebels, and many officers who supported, participated in, and joined the insurrection on the ground were killed (Saheb, 2014).

The Republican Guard was able to put an end to the uprising very quickly (Heikal,1992) At the same time, the regime gave the regime an opportunity to assemble the diaspora of its forces (Al-Majma'i,2006) and the same method and speed took place in the northern regions, so the Republican Guard forces headed and eliminated the uprising with rumors spreading that the regime forces were using chemical weapons and poisonous weapons. It led people to flee to the border areas between it and Turkey, whose numbers were estimated at two million refugees (al-Rikabi,2012).

The military operations to end the uprising were taking place in full view of the American leadership. Rather, it provided them with information about where the rebels moved. The evidence for that is the statement of General Shawar Tuzkov, who said in an interview with an American television channel that his leadership helped the Baghdad regime suppress the popular uprising in The South by conveying very important information about the movement of this uprising, and Shuar Tuzkov highlighted its actions with the fear that the American administration possesses when it saw the Shiite Islamic character of the uprising in southern Iraq (Saheb, 2014).

It must be pointed out that army did not participate in the elimination of uprising for several reasons, including that when the soldiers were ordered to withdraw from Kuwait, they left their equipment and destroyed weapons in Kuwait, especially since the army was in an exhausted state, in addition to the fact that most of the soldiers and officers are from the rebellious governorates, as some have reserved. Officers to refrain from implementing orders to indiscriminate bombing, justifying this by the lack of adequate weapons (Ahmad,2005).

The Iraqi government accused Iran of supporting the uprising by entering elements of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard alongside the revolutionaries and participating in the uprising. (It will not be healthy)) (Al-Rikabi,2012).

Among the reasons for the failure of the uprising is the absence of an effective central leadership capable of planning, facing developments and managing the conflict in all areas in a manner that positively affects the interest of the uprising. This absence was also accompanied by the lack of a field leadership cadre that represents the joints of movement in the various areas of the uprising and its affairs (Al-Halfi,2015) as the opposition factions were not working within An organized political unit that takes its orientations from it, as each faction was fighting a war on its own, and at the same time there was no coordination between these factions, and you did not expect the widespread spread that the uprising witnessed for several reasons, including that the people were exhausted as a result of the wars they fought and their fear of the policy that the regime was going through. The list is based on oppression and abuse. Groups of the Islamic Dawa Party wanted to join the revolutionaries and participate in the uprising, but the Iranian government prevented them from crossing the border because it was afraid of being bombed by the US forces, but despite this many of them were able to enter Iraq and participate in the uprising (ibid).

Amnesty International reports recorded flagrant violations of human rights in Iraq in the manner in which the previous government practiced eliminating the uprising from arrests of people who participated in the uprising and others who did not participate in the uprising. Citizens were not found or anything indicating their whereabouts and mass graves, as people were buried alive while the political detainees were subjected to torture and ill-treatment, even the wounded were not delivered. Phospholipids (Al-Rikabi,2012).

Conclusion and conclusions

It was a spontaneous and unplanned uprising by the people inside Iraq, since the authority had disappeared or weakened to a very large extent. Many believed that it had ended as a result of the ferocity of the Allied attack on Iraq.

Causes of the internal uprising

The emptiness and weakness of the authority and the arrival of many rumors, including the killing of Saddam Hussein because the media was very weak, and the Iraqi radio and television reached silence as a result of his targeting by the American authorities.

The Iraqi army reacted as a result of the losses and its disorganized withdrawal from Kuwait on foot, the first spark of the Basra uprising, and it spread to the rest of Iraq.

The uprising began spontaneously with the attack on police and security stations after their members withdrew and left them empty after hearing the news of the revolution in the rest of Iraq.

The people have complained about poor living conditions, such as food shortages due to the economic blockade, fuel shortages, and power cuts resulting from the bombing of the international coalition warplanes.

It was rumored among the public that the state had collapsed after the army withdrew from Kuwait and rumors arrived that a number of leaders had moved to stage a military coup.

Causes of the foreign Uprising

The American President and others from the US government called on the Iraqi people to overthrow the rule of Iraqi President Saddam Hussein to open a page of Iraqi relations with the world.

The pressure and media campaigns directed at the Iraqi people by groups of radio stations and channels played a significant role in directing Iraqi public opinion toward the revolution, the most significant of which was possibly directed by Iran, which addressed the Shiites with the revolution against the government and promised them victory and assistance.³ The psychological war launched by the countries of the International Coalition that affected the Iraqi people, including the exaggeration of filming the losses and broadcasting false news about the killing or wounding of many of the symbols of the Iraqi leadership.

Factors of failure of the uprising

The reluctance of the American forces to assist the uprisers, as well as their non-interference on the side of any party in Iraq, while the uprisers were building their hopes for the intervention of the American forces in their favor.

The lack of a unified leadership. Rather, it was a spontaneous uprising initiated by the soldiers withdrawing from Kuwait and spreading among civilians.

The uprising was accompanied by acts of violence against members of the security forces, robbery of citizens' private property, burning, and vandalism of public property.

The revolutionaries' disappointed at the arrival of Iranian aid to their victory after the massive and inciting media campaigns by Iran to urge the Shiites to revolt against the government in Iraq, describing it to the Ba'ath Party in Iraq as confiscating the rights of the 'Shi'ites in Iraq.

The outbreak of the revolution after the cease-fire, which made it easier for the government to assemble its forces and the ease of movement of the reserve forces that it kept and attacked the rebellious provinces and eliminated them at record speed.

The uprising started moving quickly towards chaos, as many attacked and burned public facilities such as schools and other state institutions, which led to the creation of a hostile public opinion.

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