

## **Gaining Millennial and Generation Z Vote: Social Media Optimization by Islamic Political Parties**

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### **Abstract**

Millennial and Gen Z voters dominate the use of social media. This generation is undeniably the most active in using the internet for social media. This study aims to determine the political communication strategy of the PKS, PKB, and PPP parties in winning the votes of young people in the 2024 election. This qualitative research uses a descriptive analysis approach—data obtained from interviews and literature searches. The results of this study indicate that it is not easy to win votes from the younger generation because this generation is relatively allergic to political parties, a less ideological and critical generation; however, parties will struggle to get the votes of that generation. Burhanuddin Muhtadi, Executive Director of Indonesian Political Indicators, said that this generation has the most severe concern for various strategic issues, such as corruption, environmental damage, health, pollution, and employment. However, of the three parties, PKS seems most vocal in rejecting the issue. Their regular and factual attitudes need to emerge to support their popularity and remain part of the strategy of political struggle. Today, young people have become the people who control the vote in the upcoming parliamentary elections and have become intelligent people who see and evaluate Indonesian politics.

**Keywords:** Islamic Political Parties, Millennials & Generation Z, Social Media, General Election, Voter Behavior.

### **Introduction**

The internet and social media have now become an inseparable part of the lives of most of the world's people, especially for the middle to upper economic class and the younger

generation who are categorized as millennials (McMillan & Morrison, 2006; Kaplan & Haenlein, 2009; Kilian et al., 2012). The massive use of the internet and internet-based social media has immediately shifted the role of conventional media or social media, which still have a primary role in disseminating various information, including knowledge, for citizens. Print or electronic-based mass media such as newspapers, magazines, radio or television are increasingly being abandoned by residents for several reasons, including print media being inefficient in terms of price as well as content that is not always updated like online-based media (Assaad & Gomez, 2011; Harlow, 2012; Enli & Moe, 2013).

The millennial generation is defined as the generation born between the 1980s to the late 1990s (Nimon, 2007; Lyon et al., 2015; Ebeling et al., 2020). On the other hand, Generation Z is commonly referred to as the Internet Generation or i-Generation (Linnes & Metcalf, 2017; Dimock, 2019; Ameen & Anand, 2020). This generation was born between 1995 and 2010 (Iorgulescu, 2016; Seemiller & Grace, 2018). This generation is the part or segment of society that uses internet-based social media the most. The intensity of this millennial generation and generation Z in using internet-based information technology has become a trend and a routine that sometimes takes up most of their productive time (Dobre et al., 2021; Kilber et al., 2014). This generation is undeniably the most active in using the internet for social media (Mangold & Smith, 2012; Turner, 2015). Based on the global web Index (2021) survey results, social media is the most actively accessed platform, with an average of 2.5 hours per day. Music and video streaming services are used for 1.7 hours and 1.6 hours per day. The use of Instagram with the age classification of 18-24 years is 33.90 million (female 19.8% and male 17.5%), age 25-34 years old (16.9 per cent female and 15.3 male) and as many as (6 per cent of women and 5.5 per cent of men) aged 35-44 years. Then the use of YouTube has a percentage of access by internet users aged 16-64 years in Indonesia 94 per cent.

Internet-based social media that are often used and attached to the lives of millennials and generation Z are mainly Facebook, Twitter, Whatsapp, Instagram and Blogs. This social media is quickly and cheaply accessible via mobile phones with android facilities (Kumar et al., 2018; Jose et al., 2022). On the one hand, this media can be used positively by the millennial generation in developing their knowledge and capabilities in various sectors of life and on the other hand, it can have a negative impact when the content displayed does not educate or provide new knowledge for the community (Sago, 2010; Muk, 2013). The social media content that we hear today also contains a lot of fake news (hoaxes) and hate speech (hate speech); it contains harmful elements such as pornography, Sara-based provocation, the spread of radicalism, gambling to prostitution (Zhang & Ghorbani, 2020; Ozbay & Alatas, 2020). In the context of holding elections, social media content sometimes contains elements of black campaigns or negative campaigns against specific candidates (Kushin & Yamamoto, 2013; Xenos et al., 2017)). With the widespread use of social media and the low cost of access to different places, millennials and generation Z are easily in two positions according to their individual choices, namely as users of social media and in the other position as creators of news, information or content. The media (Hershatter & Epstein, 2010; Vitelar, 2019).

The high intensity of the millennial generation towards the use of social media is immediately glimpsed by political actors as a new forum that is easy, cheap and effective to serve as a platform as well as a tool or means of political communication in order to disseminate political programs to campaigns aimed at achieving its political goals (Kruse et al., 2018; Hamid et al., 2022). This is in line with the opinion of Meadow (1985), which states that political communication refers to all forms of exchange of messages or symbols that have a significant impact that has been predetermined or has had an impact on the political system. At political and democratic events such as elections, social media is also present on two

dichotomous sides, namely appearing in a positive sense, such as building awareness and political participation of millennial groups and not infrequently appearing in a negative meaning, such as being used to incite netizens with racial issues. As well as the delivery of false news (hoax) (Hanggli & Kriesi, 2010)

Social media is currently an excellent campaign tool to win the votes of millennials and generation z in the general election, so political parties are competing to gain votes for this group (Milkman, 2017). Political parties can take advantage of the convenience of social media, Instagram and Youtube as communication tools through audiovisuals. This can reduce political costs such as printing brochures, erecting billboards and even circulating party flags that drain large budgets (Casero-Ripolles et al., 2016). Advances in technology and the abundance of social media provide a campaign option that is inexpensive and effective as well as easy to mobilize (Auvinen, 2012).

Millennial and Generation Z voters in the general election contestation will determine the victory of a political party. The number of millennial constituencies in the simultaneous elections in 2019 was more than 42 million. The Permanent Voters List is 17,501,278 aged 20 years and 42,843,792 aged 21-30 years and 31-40, totalling 43,407,156. (SindoNews.com, 2020). Then the Central Statistics Agency released in January 2021 in its survey revealing the number of people aged (0-14 years) as many as 63.03 million people (23.33 per cent), the number of people aged (15-64 years) as many as 191.08 million. People (70.72 per cent) and the number of older adults (65 years and over) amounted to 16.07 million people (9.78 per cent). Reinforced according to the Kompas Research and Development Survey published in October 2021, young groups dominate other groups with details Generation Z (8-23 years) as much as 27.94 per cent and Millennials (24-39 years) as much as 25.87 per cent (CBS, 2021).

The defeat of Islamic political parties in political activities in Indonesia continues to experience defeat, seen from the post-reform elections until the last election. Based on sources from the general election commission, the percentage of votes for the National Awakening Party in the 1999 election was 12.16 per cent, followed by the United Development Party at 10.72 per cent. In the 2004 election, the percentage of the justice and welfare parties was 7.34 per cent, the national awakening party was 10.57 per cent, and the unity development party was 8.15 per cent. In the 2009 elections, the three parties, PKS, PKB and PPP, each received a vote of (7.88), (4.98), (5.32) per cent, continued to the 2014 election to get a percentage of (6.79), (9, 04) and (6.53) per cent and jumped to the 2019 election the votes for the three parties were (8.27), (9.69), (4.52) per cent (Lestari & Ilhamsyah, 2019).

In politics, Millennials and Generation Z need political participation in political parties, including Islamic political parties. The potential of this group is enormous in political matters. The second generation is significant in contributing to the future political direction. Therefore, it is essential to increase the political participation of this age group (Utami, 2020). Nevertheless, it is undeniable that some young people today are politically sceptical. According to (Suryo & Aji, 2020) revealed in his research. The reasons range from being lazy and not being interested in politics to apathy towards politics and elections. Political parties must quickly realize that their interest in politics is certainly not only due to media exposure, in this context, YouTube and Instagram, but also because of the reputation of the event organizers (Damayanti & Dunan, 2021). It can be interpreted that millennial and generation z voters cannot quickly get their votes stolen; political figures and their parties must work extra hard to convince this group because the image and credibility of political party figures and their media platforms will determine success in the upcoming general election.

Of course, to smoothen the steps towards elections and win the democratic arena, each Islamic political party needs to develop a strategy and focus on issues related to its most important goals. The impact of social media on political parties is one indicator and indirectly plays a strategic role in forming political participation (Utami, 2020). Using social media makes it easier for politicians and political parties to convey their ideas, ideas and political agenda (Hayat et al., 2021). Political parties must, of course, have a strategy for gaining votes to win elections; campaigns are a form of political communication application that is carried out to form and promote a positive image (Alfiyani, 2018). Then how political parties socialize their faces, influence audiences and reduce hostility in politics (Susanto, 2017). The strategy of political parties in optimizing social media is certainly not easy and becomes a challenge, as stated (Perangin-angin & Zainal, 2018); digital residents fill public spaces with comments that are fast, sharp, firm and seem rude, making it easier to move from topic to topic more interesting.

## Method

This research method is qualitative. The qualitative method is a research method that produces a series of descriptive data, both written and oral, from people and observed behaviour, with the condition that individuals and organizations of political parties must be considered part of the whole (Rosyidin & Heryanto, 2016). The method used is Social Network Analysis (SNA), which is one of the most commonly used methods on social networks (Santoso & Veliyanti, 2021). The use of Social Network Analysis aims to determine the strategy of Islamic political parties, especially the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), United Development Party (PPP), and National Awakening Party (PKB), in managing Instagram and YouTube social media. Data collection was carried out through several steps, namely in-depth interviews. Then, observations search for Instagram social media accounts and mass media news within the last year. Because the last year is approaching democratic performances, political parties are competing to prepare strategies and campaigns to win the votes of young voters. Other data collection, journal source tracking on Google Scholar. Data analysis was carried out through several stages, including data collection, data reduction, data presentation and conclusion. Data analysis techniques in social media account capture research to review PKS, PPP and PKB strategies on Instagram and social media as campaign and political communication tools.

## Result and discussion

### 1. *Party Identity (PKS, PKB, PPP)*

In mapping Indonesia's political ideology, the ideology of political parties can be categorized into three significant ideologies; in the past, they were grouped into nationalists, religious and communists, or could be referred to as groups (Central, Right and Left). The Nationalists were represented by the PNI, the Religion by Masjumi and NU, and the Communists were represented by the PKI. Today, the Prosperous Justice Party represents religious or Islamic ideological parties. This fact is following the words of Nabil Ahmad Fauzi (Chairman of the Political Department of the PKS DPP) in the results of the interview on June 23, 2022, and as stipulated in article 2 of the Party's AD/ART, which reads "Party Based on Islam".

The ideology of an Islamic party is reflected in the party logo with the symbol of the Kaaba. Ahead of the 2024 election, PKS changed its logo drastically, where the Kaaba symbol was removed to become an orange circle framing the crescent and rice symbols. The abolition

of religious icons is claimed as a refresher and a new passion in Islamic politics. "The logo change is only a form of refreshment, not a change in party ideology" (interview result, 2022). At the National Deliberation on November 29, 2020, PKS Secretary General Aboe Bakar Alhabsy said that the announcement of the symbols, marches and hymns would become the new spirit of PKS and PKS's close and heartfelt commitment to all groups without exception (1) Various internet media reported various reactions, including the new logo even though it looks modern (2) Attractive (3) Significant changes (4) On the other hand, Tempo.com media is aware of the missing Kaaba element in the previous logo (Muhammad, 2021). This aims to attract young voters who will dominate the 2024 election and show that PKS is more open to all groups—listed in Article 10 of the party's AD/ART.



**Figure 1.** Old and New PKS Logo

The end of Suharto's presidency marked a turning point for Indonesian democracy, including the National Awakening Party (PKB). The formation of the PKB was due to the proposal of Nahdliyin residents from the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) organization to form a political party that was able to answer Nahdliyin's ambitions (Dewi & Sholahuddin, 2020). Finally, the National Awakening Party (PKB) was formed on July 23, 1998, as an effort by Nahdlatul Ulama residents. PKB was founded on a militant, open, national and democratic basis. Since its inception, PKB has upheld democratic values and supported nationalism and the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia. The NU Executive Board stated that NU would not form a political party; it would be maintained as *jam'iyyah diniyah ijtima'iyyah*. Therefore, the relationship between NU and PKB is historical, cultural and ambitious. Historically, the formation of the PKB is closely related to NU. The culture of struggle must pay attention to the characteristics of the culture adopted by NU, namely the cultural environment formed by the Islamic religious values of Ahlussunnah Wal Jama'ah (Mayrudin, 2019).

The National Awakening Party, abbreviated PKB based on Pancasila, is listed in Chapter II Article 4 of the party's AD/ART. Even though it is based on Pancasila, the PKB party does not eliminate the Islamic principles stated in Article 5 "The principle of the party's struggle is a dedication to Allah Subhanahu wa Ta'ala, upholding honesty and truth, upholding justice, maintaining unity, fostering brotherhood and togetherness following values. Islamic values of Ahlusunnah Waljama'ah.



**Figure 2.** PKB Party Logo

The United Development Party (PPP) is an Indonesian political party which was officially established on January 5, 1973, as a result of the political fusion of four Islamic parties, namely: the Indonesian Muslim Party, the United Tarbiyah Islamiyah Islamic Party, the Indonesian Islamic Union Party and the Nahdlatul Ulama Party. PPP was founded by K.H Idham Chalid, H. Mohammad Syafaat Mintaredja, S.H, H. Anwar Tjokrominoto, H. Rusli Halil and H. Masykur (Rahman et al., 2022). The United Development Party is based and based on Islam with the features of Ahlussunnah Wal Jama'ah. The principles of PPP's struggle are (1) the principle of worship, (2) the principle of ma'ruf nahi munkar, (3) the principle of truth, justice and honesty, (4) the principle of deliberation, (5) the principle of friendship, togetherness and unity (6) the principle of istiqamah. Aims to create a just, prosperous, physically and spiritually democratic civil society within the corridors of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia based on Pancasila, under the grace of Allah Subhanahu Wata'ala as stated in Articles 4 and 5 of the AD/ART.

At one time, the United Development Party (PPP) was considered the old traditional party. However, with the development of religious nationalist parties, previously religion-based parties began to change and adapt to the existing political dynamics. PPP has also turned not only Islamic but also nationalist. PPP seeks to change the stigma that is considered to be an old and traditional party into a modern young party without abandoning traditional values.

In starting the struggle and uniting with young and modern groups, PPP changed its old logo. Secretary General of the United Development Party Arwani Tomafi said his party had a new logo. "We have a logo for the 2024 struggle," he said when met by reporters at the Transmedia Complex, South Jakarta, Thursday (28/1) night. Quoting from the official PPP page, there are some additional elements from the previous logo. Behind the Kaaba are a red and white headband emblem, a yellow stripe along the red curve and the slogan "Stay United with Progress" on a green background. Previously, the party's logo was the Kaaba with the words PPP under it. Not just symbols, but quotes from the PPP website, there are four philosophies in adding symbols: The various green colours that blend into the white circle symbolize the brotherhood of fellow human beings (ukhuwah insaniyah and ukhuwah basyariyah). The red and white headband symbolizes ukhuwah wathoniyah (Brotherhood of nations who love and fight for the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia). The Kaaba symbolizes Islamic brotherhood or brotherhood among Muslims. The best humans are those who uphold the truth, reject falsehood and believe in Allah. Moreover, the slogan "Maintaining Unity with Development" is a sublimation of the principles of struggle and the five visions of this oldest Islamic political party (CNN Indonesia, 2021).



**Figure 3.** Old and new PPP logo

## 2. *Seizing Youth Voices*

Political participation is an essential issue in contemporary political analysis and has recently been studied, especially concerning developing countries. Many new community groups also want to influence the decision-making process related to public policy. The role of youth in Indonesian politics in the context of youth political participation has experienced a dialectic with various socio-cultural contexts that they faced long before Indonesia's independence; young people have taken a high-level approach as an expression of their desire to be free from the shackles of colonialism and western imperialism (Antonio et al., 2021).

In the political arena in the upcoming general election, every political party voices the importance of the dominant voice of young people. Ahmad Nabil Fauzi, Chairman of the Political Division of the PKS DPP, in a meeting with the author, revealed that the younger generation's voice is significant. "In the 2024 election, more than 50 per cent of the constituents will come from this generation," he said. However, he added. It is not easy to win votes from the younger generation because this generation is relatively allergic to political parties, less ideological generation and critical; however, the PKS party will struggle to get the votes of this generation. To smooth out the party's steps at the upcoming event, the Head of the Political Department of the PKS DPP, in a conversation with the author, said that he would follow the issues rolling in this circle. He said that the issues of this generation are about anti-corruption, democracy, technology, creative industries and the environment. The 2024 electoral democracy battle requires a lot of ammunition and bullets. This is triggered by increasingly intense competition from strong jumbo parties, combined with new parties trying their luck in this big five-year event. During the referendum war, one of the political parties that is sure to leap forward is the National Awakening Party (PKB). PKB Branch Executive Board Secretary Ahmad Farah Sulaiman, Tuesday (16/8/2022), "In addition to caring for all segments, we focus on cooperation and communication with young people." The man who is also the chairman of the PKB faction of the Malang City DPRD explained the winning strategy. "We build real communication and communication (teapot, muni, love) and friendship," he said. He revealed what he did to capture the voices of the younger generation, namely by describing a scaled and sustainable youth program ([bacamalang.com](http://bacamalang.com)).

These potential youth voters (Gen Z and Millennials) are easy targets for many political parties in the 2024 general election. The head of the PPP DPP said the number of young voters is expected to win 60 per cent of the total votes in the upcoming elections. "In the 2024 election, around 60 per cent of voters will be young 24 percent consisting of millennials and millennials. Generation Z voted for the first time and millennials voted for the second time," said Suharto, quoted from Antara on Friday (March 12 2021). To capture young votes, the PPP established ten divisions within the party consisting of young people over the age of 25. Suharto gave an example of the Gen Z Creative Department and the Millennial Work Department, each of which has ambassadors who meet the "5G" criteria. "Ambassadors must have 5G criteria, namely good looking, slang, google student, gen z and genah or true."

On that occasion, Suharto reminded officials to increase their pride in the party and encourage political activity in the future. He equated PPP with airlines. If public trust is high, people will choose that airline over others. The PPP I Rapimnas was opened by the Chairperson of the PPP Honorary Board, Zarkasih Nur, who included Suharso Monoarfa as the General Chair of the PPP DPP. In addition, the PPP DPP board, DPW management, the Autonomous Body (Banom), PPP faction in the DPR and MPR were also present. PPP holds Rapimnas I live and virtual at Pullman Hotel Friday and Saturday (12-13 March 2021).

### 3. *Political Strategy*

Political communication is someone's tactics that significantly contribute to winning elections directly. A successful political communication strategy makes a significant contribution to using and planning the candidate or partner party strategy that is not only prepared before the election but also after the election. Strategy is planning and management to achieve goals. However, in the context of strategies to achieve these goals, it does not work like a map but only shows directions and must be able to show how operational tactics work (Irnanda & Fuady, 2020). Strategy in the narrow and broad sense consists of three elements: goals (purposes), means and methods. So, what is strategy? Using the available facilities to achieve the goals set and, therefore, the goals require a strategy so that these goals can be realized; a strategy called a communication strategy is needed in the context of a political campaign.

Currently, Generation Z and Millennials (young people) are most affected by corruption and environmental damage in terms of strategic issues. This is reflected in the findings of a survey by Indonesian Political Indicators (IPI) and Yayasan Indonesia CERAH, which was released (Wednesday afternoon, 27/10) with the title "Perceptions of Young and Beginner Voters" on the issue of the climate crisis in Indonesia. Burhanuddin Muhtadi, Executive Director of Indonesian Political Indicators, said that this generation has the highest level of concern for strategic issues such as corruption, environmental damage, health, pollution, and employment issues (politic.rmol.id, 2021). Judging from the survey results, political parties are now competing to attract the votes of young voters by addressing the issues they are interested in. PKS, PKB, and PPP are trying to capture the votes of young and inexperienced voters with party strategies in responding to issues and answering questions on their respective digital platforms.

Political parties are now pioneering party strategies with various packages on their respective digital platforms. The Prosperous Justice Party led by Ahmad Nabil Fauzi, the Head of the Political Department of the PKS DPP, revealed that PKS, as a modern Islamic party, rests on party management that opens up space for the participation of the younger generation. In the guidelines for implementing the recruitment of political positions, the PKS DPP has determined that there should be affirmative action or policy alignments to fill the combat posts for PKS young cadres in the 2024 election contestation. The guidelines have also set a quota of 30 per cent for young people, 15 per cent for youth, and 15 per cent for young women. "As an Islamic party, PKS tends to be considered exclusive. However, with consistent resistance and various changes that have occurred, including our consistent opposition and breakthroughs in our service actions, we are optimistic that the younger generation will believe in PKS," he said. In @pk\_sejahtera's Instagram post, the political communication of this party is targeting young people and not a few PKS talent in its digital platform using young people, namely, Z shows one generation, Gen Z gets a guess from baby boomers "what cake cakes make people queue" he replied to the public telephone (29-8-22). Then in post-August 26, 2022, PKS criticized the current content when responding to the increase in subsidized fuel prices played by young people.

In its digital footprint on Instagram, August 24, 2022, the Prosperous Justice Party reacted to the increase in the price of subsidized fuel oil delivered by Anis Byarwati as Chair of the PKS DPP for Economics and Finance, criticizing the government's intention to increase the price of fuel, either Pertalite or Solar. The increase in the price of petalite and subsidized diesel fuel will, directly and indirectly, affect the increase in commodity prices. "If there is an increase in the price of subsidized fuel, it is feared that it will suppress people's purchasing



power and consumption, which will impact further economic recovery." "Even economic growth will slow down again until the poverty rate rises again," she added, said the woman from DKI Jakarta. This increase will also significantly impact the business world, especially MSMEs, which are often not touched by government social assistance. According to Anis, with the various current conditions, it is better to apply policies specifically to specific groups, especially when the government says the economy is complex and gloomy. PKS, as a result of this, declares that the party rejects the increase in subsidized fuel.

Responding to the problems of poverty and unemployment, PKS highlighted the increasingly difficult situation in the fisheries sector. Chairman of the DPP PKS for Farmers and Fishermen, Riyono revealed new hopes for fishermen and the fisheries sector to become levers of the national economy are hampered by various regulations and conditions that burden fishermen. The price of diesel, which has now reached 23 thousand rupiahs, adds to the suffering of fishermen and the fishing industry. "We have almost three thousand ships that cannot sail because fuel costs are 60 per cent above normal. With this increase, there will be more supply, making fishermen critical," Riyono continued. This increase in fuel has a severe impact; about seven thousand ships with a 30 GT permit from the centre are threatened with bankruptcy due to the increase in diesel prices. The Minister of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries Regulations Number 85 and 86 concerning Fish Benchmark Prices (HPI) and PHP (Fishing Product Fees) prove that KKP does not have a sense of crisis and fails to communicate with fishermen. "When fishermen are in trouble, there is no vision of the ocean axis. When the situation is difficult, the state does not exist," said Riyono (August 3, 2022).

Responding to the issue of corruption in Indonesia, PKS responded with a post on Instagram on August 9, 2022. PKS submitted a Special Questionnaire Committee to investigate the Jakarta-Bandung high-speed rail project scandal. As is known, the China Ministry of Finance (CDB) has asked the Indonesian government to cover the project. PKS spokesman Muhammad Khalid said costs had increased from an initial \$6.07 billion (86.5 trillion) to \$8 billion (114.24 trillion). President Joko Widodo has repeatedly promised since 2015 not to burden the state budget and the state but instead. This shows that the KCJB project is not well planned, does not follow the rules of good governance, is slow in implementation, is not transparent, and is not accountable. This shows that this project is only a trust project and is full of "interests". This will also have geopolitical implications for Indonesia. This means that national interests are sacrificed for particular interests. To that end, the DPR RI F-PKS has established a special inquiry-appropriate committee to clarify the facts in the KCJB project, so there are no allegations of corruption.

To attract the attention of the younger generation of the National Awakening Party, the General Chair of the PKB DPP, Gus Muhaimin, recommended allocating 20 per cent of the APBN specifically to develop millennial potential. "Millennials across Indonesia have extraordinary creativity, high energy and extraordinary enthusiasm. Give them enough space, opportunity, and facilities to continue their discoveries and productive steps in our arts, culture, and life," DPP PKB's Instagram post on August 26, 2022, about education about the MSME Association. Ella Siti Nuryamah, a member of the F-PKB Commission XI, promotes MSMEs that have escaped the government's attention. So far, MSME associations are still considered taboo by MSME actors, and many do not understand that associations are essential and serve as bridges for perpetrators.

The UMKM Association is an association of business or business actors with the same interests. Creating a relationship or linkage between ideas, memories or activities involving the five senses is necessary. The problems faced by SMEs are as follows:

- a. MSME actors cannot directly access MSME support programs from the government.
- b. MSME actors lack knowledge about marketing, organizational systems, quality control, and human resources.
- c. SMEs do not know the relevant government policies.
- d. MSME actors have difficulty obtaining business permits (Findings of SB-ITB and BTPN).

The leader of the National Awakening Party (PKB), Abdul Muhaimin Iskandar, expressed his deepest condolences to all victims of the Armed Crime Group (KKB) attack in Nduga Regency, Papua. He also condemned the attack that killed ten civilians and left two others in critical condition. According to him, KKB's brutal behaviour cannot be left alone. Therefore, he asked the authorities to investigate thoroughly. "My deepest condolences to the brothers who were victims in Nduga. Moreover, it claimed many lives; the bandage of violence cannot be justified," said his nickname, Cak Imin, Monday in a written statement, July 8, 2022.

"On behalf of the PKB family, I condemn and strongly condemn the KKB attack, which resulted in the deaths of civilians and our brothers and sisters," he added. The deputy chairman of the DPR RI said that Papua needed additional proactive actions from the security forces to overcome various vulnerabilities. He continued that the impact of the attack had an impact on the safety of the residents and the souls of those constantly terrorized. Therefore, Cak Imin ordered the TNI and Polri to arrest all KKB members involved in the incident. This is done to account for crimes following applicable laws and regulations. He also appealed to the security forces to strengthen security in other virtual objects or residential areas to anticipate further attacks that threaten the safety and security of residents. "The central government, regional government and security forces in Papua must have one command, and we must find a breakthrough to stop this violence," he said. Then "The government needs to seriously deal with this problem before more victims come from both Papuan civil society and the officers who work there," he concluded in summary (detik.com, 2022). Concerned about the issue of corruption, PKB, in its Instagram post on July 27, 2022, obliges all its legislative candidates to attend KPK anti-corruption training first. "Smart politics and integrity are one of the prerequisites for nominations for members of the legislature and elections. We appreciate all of this and would like to see this happen not only at the central level but also at the local level. Therefore, we oblige all legislative candidates to attend KPK anti-corruption training," added the Secretary General of the PKB DPP, M. Hasanuddin Wahid.

Focusing on violence, the United Development Party also stated the case of Brigadier J's murder by the Head of the Propane Police Division. The United Development Party proposed to amend the Police Act. Secretary of the DPR RI PPP faction, Achmad Baidowi, said in the party's Instagram account upload. Therefore, in this year's Revised Priority Prolegnas, we propose a limited revision of Law Number 2 of 2002 concerning the Police. Then, regarding fuel oil which is being discussed in all circles, PPP, represented by Achmad Baidowi, also said that the people should not be sacrificed. "The plan to increase fuel prices is the same as cutting fuel subsidies. It even must be considered carefully. We have to make sure the good and the bad in making decisions, do not let the little people be sacrificed," said Achmad Baidowi to reporters Tuesday, August 27, 2022 (detiknews).

The corruption case is a challenge for all political parties in Indonesia; the General Chair of the United Development Party, Suharso Monoarfa, will support and sign a commitment to build political party coherence in order to reject money politics and other corrupt practices. Suharto and 60 other PPP officials received a direct anti-corruption briefing from the Deputy Chairperson of the KPK, Nurul Ghufon. This commitment relates to the

integrity of political parties against the rejection of money politics, conflicts of interest, bribery, extortion, gratification, and other criminal acts of corruption (rmol.id).

## Conclusion

Based on the interviews and survey results on various digital media platforms, researchers found that the strategy of Islamic Political Parties within the framework of PKS, PKB, and PPP is very concerned about the voices of young people (Generation Z and Millennials). This is evidenced by uploads and opinions on topics that young people like, such as issues of corruption, issues of poverty and unemployment, issues of entrepreneurship and issues of terrorism or violence. However, of the three parties, PKS seems most vocal in rejecting the issue. Their regular and factual attitudes need to emerge to support their popularity and remain part of the strategy of political struggle. The strategy used by the party is to rely on young figures or talents; the use of campaign tools, social media and so on are essential factors for the party's success in the upcoming general election. In this way, party political communications and campaigns can be directly evaluated by the general public, especially young people, who are the leading target group. Today, young people have become the people who control the vote in the upcoming parliamentary elections and have become intelligent people who see and evaluate Indonesian politics.

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