

The Balance Between Civil and Military Authorities in Indonesia

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Abstract

The civil and military relation in responding to the development of the strategic environment needs to get an attention, especially in Indonesia. The pattern of cooperative relations needs to be built in a unique Indonesian culture to address various challenges that are closely related to the state of defense. The findings show that synergies between elements of the nation are needed in building a nation or state that accommodates the wisdom of how to harmonize the two civil and military forces into a reality to realize national power. Efforts to establish a new format to achieve a balance between civil and military authority in a democratic environment and society requires a more basic foundation. Important prerequisites are adequate legal support, public accountability in relation to the delicate balance of military autonomy in personnel policies, determination of the level of power, issues of soldier welfare, and military doctrine. In order to seek and formulate a balance of civil and military authority, there must be a will from all components of the nation based on moral values and mental attitudes that respect and appreciate each other, work together to create a resilient Indonesia based on the principles set by the decision-making authority.

Keywords: Civil and military relation, synergies, authority, balanced power

Introduction

The development of the current strategic environment demands a combination of civil-military efforts in dealing with various challenges and threats that are present in a country. However, Hilal, S. et.al (2022) argues that the tide of civil-military relations that occurred in Indonesia has become a civil-military dichotomy phenomenon that needs to be ended, by improving the basic relations of national interests and national goals. Almost all over the world understand the harmonization of Civil-Military relations to be the key word for the stability and survival of a country, as Huntington in Agency Theory states that: objective control is that the military elite will be more effective with a record of minimizing its influence in national decision-making. For this reason, it is necessary to have a more concrete civil-military automation calibration in a democratic country by considering the interests of the nation and above all else, including the main purpose of achieving national goals and its independence.

Looking at threats that nowadays can occur from the real or virtual world, such as cyber-attacks, or espionage and other threats based on technology, certain parties can lead to open conflicts, which have been mentioned in the form of real and unreal threats by the Indonesian Defense White Paper (Kemhan RI, 2015). For that purpose, the Law of the Republic of Indonesia No. 3 of 2002 concerning Indonesian National Defense mandates the defense system is a universal defense system that includes all citizens, territories, and other national resources, and is prepared early by the government and managed regularly, in total, integrated, directed, and continuous to ensure state ownership, territorial integrity, and the safety of the nation from all threats. This means that in facing all existing threats, the role of the civilian and military becomes crucial as a form of universal defense.

To build collaboration between civil and military authorities for the purpose mentioned above, it is important to build certain level of trust between the civilian and the military elites. Therefore, trust building is very critical, especially at the beginning of reformation period in Indonesia. However, currently the definition of civilian supremacy in Indonesia has been deviated so that it seems that there is no balance between the civilian elites and the military elites. Whereas in fact civil supremacy is based on civil rights and this does not only apply to civilians, but also to the Indonesian National Armed Forces (TNI) as soldiers who come from civil society as well. This indicates that, without trust, the definition of civil control or civil supremacy is difficult to be applied. Therefore, the balance of power factor between military and non-military instruments needs to be underlined so that there is a balance without dominant force in the strategic national decision-making process or national decision-making process.

The issue of the civil and military dichotomy (division of two opposing groups) from the past has often surfaced since the Old Order era, the New Order era until the Reformation era as it is today. Although this issue has not received any recognition from some circles, one must be aware that the issue is still happening today. Whether we realize it or not, this issue can become an obstacle and even become a threat to the integration of the nation and state, which could turn into an opportunity for foreign parties to take advantage of this situation by running asymmetry and proxies (Hilal, S., et.al, 2022).

For countries that have passed the crisis stage and are already enjoying democracy, writing about democracy will focus on how the control is implemented. On the other hand, the new state will begin to focus on how the object of democracy can be achieved through Civil-Military Relations (HSM). It is rare to look at the roles, duties of the military elite, and other security forces and how effectively they carry out the democratic transition process. Setiawan, D., et.al. (2013) explained that at the beginning of the transition to the democratic process in the US, officers often forgot that there was a dichotomy in the way of thinking of the military and the general public. There are even indications of efforts to reduce the frustration often felt by the military elite in the manifestation of its involvement with civilian elites in day-to-day national decision-making. What happened in Indonesia, after the dual function of ABRI, the military elite did not have definite political power in the civilian government, so some adjustments needed to be made.

Based on the explanation above, it can be understood that to achieve a balance of power between civilian and military authorities is not an easy matter. Therefore, this paper will provide an overview of efforts to balance the roles of civil and military authorities, especially in the context of realizing national defense and security for the benefit of the nation.

Research Method

This study used a qualitative method with a phenomenological approach. Data collection techniques applied are interviews, document studies and literature studies. As qualitative research the validation of data is required and the checking of the data validation is conducted to prove the certainty of the research using interval validity, external validity, reliability and objectivity tests (Sugiyono, 2017). The data analysis technique in this study starts from data collection, data condensation, data presentation, to drawing conclusions (Miles, M. B., Huberman, A. M., & Saldana, J., 2014). The subjects in this study are several parties who have competence, both experience and knowledge, in reviewing civil and military relations that have occurred in Indonesia.

Result And Discussion

1. *Civil and Military Relation*

The pattern of civil-military relations in a liberal democratic system adheres to civil supremacy. The civil-military relationship in a democratic state is demonstrated by Samuel P. Huntington (1957:80-99) in two ways, namely:

1. Subjective civilian control, this control is carried out by minimizing military power and maximizing civilian power. The essence of subjective civilian control is the denial of military independence.
2. Objective civilian control, this control method is carried out by maximizing military professionalism, military power will be reduced but given power within certain limits needed to carry out its profession. Objective civilian control is not only carried out with efforts to minimize military intervention, but also requires the superiority of elected civilian authorities (elected politicians) in all political fields including in determining military budgets, national defense concepts and strategies, military weapons equipment, and formulation of military curricula and doctrines.

According to Bruneau and Croissant (2019) the decision-making in civil-military relations is distinguished in five areas, namely elite recruitment, public policy, internal security, national defense, and military organization. This segregation of decision-making in civil-military relations areas is meant for different and specific assessments, as well as a comprehensive evaluation of all patterns of civilian control. It is basically dividing the controls by the civilians and military, where the civilian has power control in 5 (five) regions, and at the other hand the military regime in which the military leader dominates the entire region. In details, the 5 (five) regions of civil power have the following boundaries:

1. Elite Recruitment: it is the definition of the rules, criteria, and processes for the recruitment, selection, and legitimacy of political officials.
2. Public policy: it describes the rules and procedures for the policy making process (agenda setting, policy formulation, policy adoption) and implementing policies regarding all national policies, except the micro aspects of domestic defense and security policies which are only conducted and understood by the defense sector.
3. Internal Security: it describes the requirements of concrete decisions and actions related to the preservation and restoration of domestic law and order, including counter-insurgency operations, counter-terrorism, implementation of domestic intelligence, law enforcement and border control.

4. National Defense: it covers all aspects of defense policy, starting from the development of security doctrine to the deployment of troops abroad and the conduct of war.
5. Military Organization: it consists all issues of decisions regarding all aspects of the organization of military institutions, among others, institutional resources, finance, and military technology. In addition, decisions on military doctrine, education, and personnel selection.

In order to achieve and maintain the civilian control, it is needed that the civilian (or political) institutions develop and run based on formal or informal procedures, routines, norms, and conventions that are embedded in the organizational structure of government (Hall & Taylor, 1996). That is necessary to define the level of civilian control over the military in each of those five regions mentioned above in the form of dependency of the institutions existence that allow civilians to exercise real power to regulate, control, and monitor the military.

Subjective civilian control places civilian and military positions on an equal footing and does not have clear boundaries and authority. The absence of clear boundaries allows the military to carry out functions and roles outside the applicable authority, especially in the political field. In this position, there is a process of maximizing civilian power against the military. In this context, civil power is fragmented so that only one dominant civilian power will emerge. As a result, these civilian groups will use the military for their own interests (Ringgi, HY, 2014). This model differs from objective civil control.

Objective civilian control requires a clear division of authority and expertise, so that there is no conflict in running the government. Furthermore, in this model there is a militarization of the military, in which the military becomes more professional and exercises its authority in accordance with the applicable constitution. In this model the military is a legal instrument under the state. The military will only focus on professional development and institutional expertise and will not be involved in the country's political process. Objective civil control is mostly carried out in developed countries, where the prevailing civil control is based on democratic values that are jointly developed by all components of the state. As for developing countries, efforts to build objective civilian control are constrained by understanding the values of democratic governance that are embraced and enforced. Civil supremacy places the military under democratically elected civilian authority and uses the military as a manager of violence, not as an actor of violence. Under the great support of national law and certain policy, this idea would be a promising thing to be implemented in Indonesia.

As a manager of violence, military institutions have a responsibility to the community as a form of compliance with professional values, where the community is the giver of legitimacy for the use of violence under state consensus. But on the other hand, Huntington views the social structure of society as a source of civil and military conflict, namely when there is an imbalance of authority in the pattern of civil and military relations. Certain civilian groups can mobilize the military to support their interests.

The bottom line is that military personnel must stay within the bounds of the Constitution and the laws of the country, which protect them from the freedom to abuse their powers. The judiciary will not prevent the enforcement of unlawful acts by the armed forces, but they can demand a judicial review of unlawful acts by the military, if such acts constitute a violation of the Constitution. The government must not forget its responsibility to protect and respect the rights of the Indonesian people. Although militaries operate on behalf of civilian forces, they still have a civilian role to play. If they take action against peaceful civilians or

authoritarian leaders, they must ensure that the action has sufficient justification to be held accountable.

2. *The Efforts in Balancing the Civil and Military Authority in Indonesia*

There are two levels in civil-military relations that need to be considered to maximize military professionalism and the objectives of civilian control, namely the level of power and the level of ideology. Power has two forms, namely as formal authority and informal influence (Huntington, 2000). The higher the level of authority of a group, the higher the level of unity of its structure and the wider the scope of its authority, the stronger it will be in terms of the power it has. The level of authority refers to the position occupied by the two groups (civil and military) in the hierarchy of governmental authority. That is, with higher authority positions being able to control those lower in the government authority hierarchy, civilians can exercise control over the military and vice versa.

Edta & Sudirman (2018) added that in the informal level of influence there are four things to note, namely the affiliation of civilian groups with the officer corps and military leadership, the subject of human and economic resources to the authority of the officer corps and military leadership, hierarchical interpenetration of the officer corps and military leadership, and the prestige and popularity of the officer corps and military leadership (Huntington, 2000). Civil and military relations are also influenced at the ideological level, namely a majority ideology adopted will affect the ethics or behavior of the military in a country. For example, the ideology of liberalism in general will reject the provision of weapons and standing armies, the ideology of fascism encourages the ownership of a strong armed force, the ideology of Marxism does not see the military as something that is indispensable but focuses more on the power generated by the economy, while the ideology of conservatism is more or less have similarities with existing military ethics (Huntington, 2000).

For the Indonesian case, it is necessary to look at the civil and military discourse that are mainly separated into two issues, namely the civil-military condition and militarism. The discourse on civil and military relations seems to find the most functionally appropriate positioning of the relationship between civilian and military, to prevent the emergence of militarism, considering that changing the military to a civilian form may be difficult to occur. To get a proper understanding of this discourse, it is necessary to firstly understand the nature of the meaning of civil-military relations. The civil-military relations in a democratic political system need to be understood in terms of the distribution of authority and political power. Democracy rests on the sovereignty of the people, which then through general elections, the people make their choice to exercise power, to exercise executive power, and to jointly agree on laws building and carry out the function of control over the executive in the legislative power.

As of today, the actual civil-military relations in Indonesia are still facing some obstacles, such as the indecision and lack of agreement between the militarist parties in interpreting the standard civil-military concept that will clearly have implications for the model of civil-military relations which in turn will lead to conflicts of interest between civilians and the military. To answer the questions that arise from civil-military relations generally lie in the models and descriptions of these models where harmonization is needed in the "proportional" equality agreed upon through the civilian authorities, and where the military must be professional in their fields and civilian participation is involved in managing defense and jointly build a model of harmonious civil-military relations in Indonesia for the benefit of Indonesia in the future and build a New Indonesia with a democratic format as well as recognition by the international community (Setiawan D., et.al, 2013).

In the conditions of reality in Indonesia, that the military needed by the civilian government in a democratic relationship is a military that is professional in its field, not a military that interferes in the affairs of power and political interests. The TNI's internal reforms should be maintained, and civilian leaders should prove that they can also create security and order, and become a strong civilian leader personally. Hilal, S., et.al. (2022) emphasized that other things could also influence Civil-Military Relation in the reform era in supporting military professionalism because until now, the civilian side has not been able to realize the ideal TNI posture due to the lack of military budget support approved by the House of Representative (*DPR*). The budget constraint causes the development of defense equipment to be disrupted, the portion of training is lacking, the welfare of soldiers is still low, so that it leads to the lack of professionalism of the military in Indonesia which can become an attitude of praetorianism.

Civil supremacy or objective civilian control which states that civilian supremacy means minimizing military intervention in political activities or in other words recognizing civilian authorities in formulating and supervising the implementation of policies in the defense sector. Reducing military intervention in politics can also be interpreted as an effort to return the military to barracks which in a broad sense return and leads to military professionalism. In countries whose democracies have been firmly consolidated, the military is completely subordinate to the civilians. Experience in Indonesia shows that civil-military relations characterized by military dominance during the New Order proved to be a major obstacle to democracy. The military's rejection of this view will not only disrupt civil-military relations, but will also create a perception among civilians that the military is one part of the threat to democratic government.

The military (for Indonesian case it is the TNI) as part of Indonesian society or part of citizens is an instrument of the state, therefore the military's position must depend on the decisions of political leaders. As a reflection of people's sovereignty, military autonomy from civilians will provide an opportunity to be irresponsible, let alone to submit to civilian leadership. While the military reasoned that the military must submit to civilian leaders, what happened was the politicization of the military (contra subjective) which would interfere with its status as the guardian of the state. Therefore, the military prefers a relationship that is equal in nature, no one dominates and is controlled, there is no ordinate and subordinate.

In addition, the higher the level of professionalism of the military is expected to be further away from political affairs because it is preoccupied with various expertise in national defense affairs. A professional military must always be ready to carry out political decisions made by civilian governments and have political legitimacy. For the Indonesian state, Huntington's opinion on military professionalism is still valid. This statement needs a broader study given the political and military history in Indonesia.

The two factors that strongly characterize the professionalism of the military in Indonesia, namely political will and the internal dynamics of the TNI have pushed the process towards professionalism. However, the obstacles faced in realizing a professional TNI are still quite a lot, including:

1. Defensive policies and strategies are still fading. The understanding of national security which is interpreted differently by actors in the field even often has an impact on the potential for conflict between interested agencies and fellow implementers or security forces in the field. On the other hand, historical facts that give the role of the military in the war of independence and war between the regions and the center have resulted in

the understanding of national security being strongly influenced by military doctrine, the perception of the military as the savior of the nation and state dominates the interpretation and concept of state security.

2. The budget for the defense sector is not yet optimal compared to other countries in the region. The limited budget for the defense sector also affects the professionalism of the military, this can be seen from the condition of the defense and security system that the Indonesian Ministry of Defense is currently trying to fulfill.

Efforts to establish a new format of civil-military relations in a democratic society require a more fundamental foundation. An important prerequisite is the formation of a democratic government that includes the rule of law, public accountability in relation to the delicate balance of military autonomy in personnel policies, determination of the level of power, education issues, and military doctrine. In order to seek and formulate a new harmonious civil-military relationship, there must be a will from all components of the nation that are based on moral values and mental attitudes that respect and appreciate each other and work together to create a New Indonesia based on the principles set by the authorities. decision-making.

Therefore, political control over the military becomes very important. Without this control, the transformation from a non-democratic regime to a more democratic regime cannot be accompanied by changes in the military environment. The question that initially appeared as who guards the guardian eventually turned into how to control the guardian. Moreover, this is necessary because regime change, especially due to certain political constellations, does not guarantee the continuity of democratic values (Sarvas 1998), for example when democratic government is replaced by undemocratic government. The question "how to control the guards" requires a more concrete answer, both in terms of the scope and the instruments needed to maintain democratic control. These instruments can be at the constitutional (including legislation), institutional, to operational levels. Of course, various supporting factors or prerequisites are needed to be able to support the principles stated above. These prerequisites include the existence of a proper constitutional framework, a functioning parliament, a civil government that can regulate, judicial power, military organizations, a mature civil society, an educated public, professional military and political elites, and confident public officials. and have sufficient competence (Vlachová 2002:3).

Furthermore, control or supremacy is not defined as equivalent to command, but control is defined closer to policy. This means that the policy products of the civilian elite (government), especially those with an interest in the national defense strategy that have been regulated in the civilian elite "policy", will consequently be carried out by the military. Civil control implies a desire to guarantee a national defense strategy, therefore all agencies related to national defense are subordinated to national traditions, values, customs, government policies and social and economic institutions. A case study of Civil-Military Relation that can be used as a learning model for this nation is when the Paris Terror Action occurred in France on November 13, 2015, rapid cooperation between civilians and military in overcoming the crisis as a form of joint response: working hand in hand between civilians and the military in protecting their country. Sjamsoeddin, S. (2015) explained that France applied professional civilian technocrats to cooperate with military personnel in a joint mission to respond to the crisis. Parliament's role and control as well as strategic direction in regulatory matters are needed to legitimize this cooperation. The deployment of military forces becomes the authority of the political decision of the sovereign civilian authority, the scope of which is the military assignment in the area of crisis stabilization and reconstruction. Civil and military interactions recognize three elements: 1. exchange of capacity information, 2. build work teams and joint

training across civil and military sectors, 3. develop joint programs. They realize that an important factor in crisis management is the ability to make quick decisions to resolve a crisis using the first available resources and capabilities of all available forces. All emergency support units must be quickly mobilized to crisis areas.

Another additional opinion expressed by Sjamssoeddin, S. is that collaboration between civilians and the military has indeed become a necessity today. This can be realized in a cooperation scheme where the TNI has experience in building an area full of food crops as a source of logistics in the region. The culture of discipline and hard work is the key to the success of the TNI in building an area to create a food barn which will then be jointly managed by the civilian and military forces as a logistical reserve for national defense. This shows that the form of authority from the civilian and military will get a forum for collaboration in the form of activities that will be realized for the benefit of the nation and state.

Conclusion

The State Defense and Security System is a system based on state policy to carry out defense and security through a system of defense and security rules that are set to carry out national efforts in an integrated and continuous manner, by involving all national resources that are fostered into a state defense and security force in the context of maintain the territorial integrity of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia. Therefore, it is time for Civil-Military Relation to be managed and regulated properly according to scientific principles because Civil-Military Relation is a very important key in maintaining the stability and sustainability of the life and death of a nation, therefore all components of the nation must place the interests of the nation and state above personal and group.

Every effort to act by the nation's elite must always refer to the national interest, national goals and objectives. All elements of the nation, not only the TNI, have the same responsibility in maintaining the integrity of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia. Synergy between elements of the nation is needed in building a nation or state that accommodates the wisdom of how to harmonize the two civil and military forces into a reality to realize national power.

Efforts to establish a new format to achieve a balance between civilian and military authority in a democratic society require a more basic foundation. Important prerequisites are adequate legal support, public accountability in relation to the delicate balance of military autonomy in personnel policies, determination of the level of power, issues of soldier welfare, and military doctrine. In order to seek and formulate a balance of civil and military authority, there must be a will from all components of the nation based on moral values and mental attitudes that respect and appreciate each other, work together to create a resilient Indonesia based on the principles set by the decision-making authority.

The democratic arrangement of civilian and military authorities must involve civilians in thinking about and formulating and determining policies in the field of defense where the military is the main force. This will add to the overall components of the nation that are involved, both civilian and military, must coexist and respect each other in their respective professions in a democratic forum. Although civilians are more influential in government, there is discussion about civil-military cooperation in realizing a strong national defense.

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