The State in the Thought of Political Islamist Movements in Morocco after 2011

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Abstract

This research paper seeks to shed light on the political Islamist movements in Morocco (on the issue of the state). It addresses the cases of Al Adl wal Ihsane 'Justice and Charity Association and (Justice and Development Party) and adopt the (Islam is the solution) and the (The Qur'an is our constitution). The discourse of these movements on the subject of the state and the rule of God and succession was based on the percepts of the prophethood. However, after 2011, there were intellectual revisions and developments, based on the predominance of the jurisprudence of Makassed on human jurisprudence, and the criticism of previous ideas and the pursuit of the modern state. The research reached the conclusion that the movements of political Islam in Morocco did not achieve their vision of the modern Islamic state due to the material nature of the state and its modernist foundations, which contradict what was seen by Islamic thought and the fundamentalist religious and moral discourse that dominates their thinking despite their acceptance to participate in the aspects of the modern state.

Keywords: State, Morocco, Al Adl wal Ihsane, Justice and Development Party.

Introduction

This research addresses the issue of the State in the ideology of political Islamist movements in Morocco, as it is a central issue in political circles. It has also been the subject of intellectual debate and political conflict between the components of political movement in Morocco since the independence of the country in 1956 until now.

One of the reasons for the emergence of political Islamist movements in Morocco is the fall of the Islamic Caliphate State in 1924, which led to the escalation of ideas to restore the second Caliphate State on the Prophetic path to build the Islamic State and raise the slogan "Islam is the solution" and "Quran is our Constitution". Its discourse on the subject of the State was based on the "Holy Quran and the Sunnah" on the one hand and historical experience on the other.

After 2011, the political Islamist movements in Morocco were characterized by the diversity of ideas. However, there are two movements that have played a prominent role in their spread in Moroccan society: the Movement for Unity and Reform represented by the Justice and Development Party, and the Al Adl wal Ihsane.

The Justice and Development Party was established as a result of the social, economic, and political crises and was a strong motive to change the Moroccan reality and promote the Islamic identity, based on religious and Islamic concepts and authority. In 1975, the

assassination of the leftist leader (Omar Ibn Jelloun) caused a great decline in the movement's members and led to the arrest of Kamal Ibrahim, the deputy leader (Abd Al-Karim Muti), the latter's departure from Morocco, and the sentencing of him in absentia to life imprisonment. This stage led to the split of the movement and the dispersal of its members. Thus, there were revisions and self-criticism of the movement that led to the arrival of a number of members (Mohamed Yateem, Saadeddine El Othmani, Abdullah Beha, Mohamed Ezzedine Tawfik) and the formation of a movement called (Jemaah Islamiyah) led by (Abdelilah Benkirane) in 1981. It turned to legal work openly, moving away from secrecy and violent action, recognizing the king as emir of the faithful and improving the relationship with the components of society. In 1994 the head of the movement, Abdelilah Benkirane, submitted to the authority a request to establish a political party in the name of (National Renewal Party). The name of the movement was changed to the "Movement for Reform and Renewal" led by (Mohamed Yetim) to obtain legitimate recognition. In 1996, the Movement for Reform and Renewal joined forces with with the Muslim Future League, which was led by Ahmed Raissouni, a splinter movement of Islamic youth, to establish a movement called the Movement for Unity and Reform. In 1998, this phase marked the transition from proselytizing to political action and the merger of the Movement for Unity and Reform (MUJAO) with the Popular Democratic Constitutional Movement Party led by Abdul Karim Khatib to change its name to the Justice and Development Party (AKP).

Despite their participation in the same Islamic authority, their radical differences in thought and practice led us to examine and understand this discourse. This is in order to find out the representations it adopted on the subject of the modern state, which it opposed in the past, and how some political Islamist movements in Morocco have shifted and reconciled with the modern political experience. Emphasis was placed on the Unity and Reform Movement, because it was recognized as an evolutionary path in the matter of the state after it had been hostile in the past. This was done only through review and its attempt to adapt to the foundations of the modern state and guide it to adapt to the purposes of the Islamic Sharia. This development was reflected in the blogs of the pioneers of this movement, such as Ahmed Raysouni, Saad Eddine Al-Uthmani, Mohamed Yetim and others), as well as having had a governance experience after 2011. More discussion on this topic can be found in Banen's (2008, pp. 47-50) treatise The State in the Thought of Contemporary Islamic Groups in Morocco: A Case Study as well as in Talidi's (2008, pp. 11-12) study titled Memory of the Moroccan Islamic Movement.

The largest opposition political component in Morocco was founded by Abdesslam Yassine in 1983. It is distinguished by its closeness to the Sufi orders. Its appearance was linked to the Iranian Islamic Revolution led by Khomeini in 1979. The theory of Wilayat al-Faqih had an echo in Sunni circles, and (Abdesslam Yassine) worked and adopted a formulation about the form of the Islamic state to be built. However, the (Islamist) is the one who rules, not the (faqih). This movement tried to establish a political party, but was rejected by the regime. This movement has always been subject to siege and the imposition of house arrest of its founder after he had sent a message (Islam or the flood) to King Hassan II in 1974 blaming him for the bad conditions that Morocco was experiencing.

After King Mohammed VI came to power in 1999, Abdesslam Yassine sent him a letter (To Whom It May Concern) and demanded radical reforms for Morocco, and in 2000, the house arrest of Abdesslam Yassine was lifted.

Darif's (1992, p. 315) study (Political Islam in Morocco, a Documentary Approach sheds more light on this issue.

Other studies also shed light on this issue such as (Al-Mustafa, 2008, p. 71) Islamists in Morocco, and (Hammoud 2017, pp. 76-77) Islamic movements in the Arab Maghreb.

Research Problem

The problem of the research revolves around the following question, was the attitude of the movements of political Islam in Morocco towards the modern state merely a historical necessity and a matter of pragmatic utilitarianism or was it a radical change in their ideas for total acceptance of the system and foundations of the modern state?

Research hypotheses

In order to answer the problem and questions of this research, we proceed from the premise that the movements of political Islam in Morocco have not achieved their vision of the modern Islamic state due to the material nature of the state and its modernist foundations that contradict what Islamic thought and the fundamentalist religious and moral discourse that dominates their thinking despite their acceptance to participate in the aspects of the civil state.

Research Method

In this research, we adopted the descriptive and analytical approach to monitor the phenomenon studied from all angles and analyze the discourse of political Islamist movements in Morocco represented by the modern state. We also adopted the historical approach and the comparative approach to come up with scientific results to compare their ideas with the past and the revisions and intellectual developments in the present.

Research Structure

This research includes an introduction and conclusion and we divided the research into

The first section: the concept of the state (linguistically) and (terminologically).
The second section: the state in the thought of the Al Adl wal Ihsane.
The third section: The State in the Thought of the Justice and Development Part.

The concept of the state (linguistically) and (terminologically)

The meaning of the state (linguistically)

The word state, derived from the verb "dala", i.e. a shift from its position and then returned to it, and its present tense "Yidol" and the source duwal "states" State "dawla".(Al-Hanafi, 1994, p. 247). The plural is duwal' (Maaluf, 2007, p. 230).

The meaning in Arabic was associated with predominance and domination, meaning Stato in Italian or Stuat in German, while in French etate and status in Latin, and is the origin of the word state in English. The word status in Latin means stability and standing on a stable position (Al-Shehah, 2011, p. 23).

The meaning of the state (terminologically):

As for the contextual meaning of the state, the concepts of the state have varied, according to the different doctrines of the thinkers who belong to it. Philosophers present a different definition of the state from that by historians. In addition, many definitions were issued by philosophers, thinkers and writers who are not from a single scientific environment (Darwish, 1969, p. 163).

The state is defined contextually as an authoritarian structure established by an organized political group in a society composed of many population groups. (Saafi, 1998, p. 119). The state is "a human group living on a given territory under a ruling political authority, it is a kind of social and political organization that surrounds the human group and regulates its behavior and relationship within the framework of future goals".(Salim, 2014, p. 214). The Political Encyclopedia defines the state as "an organized social force that possesses greater power that is legally superior to any group within that society and over any of its members (Al-kayali & Al-Zuhairi, 1974, p. 269).

After clarifying the concept of the state we come to clarify the state in the thought of political Islamist movements in Morocco (Al Adl wal Ihsane) and (The Unity and Reform Movement represented by the Justice and Development Party).

The State in the Thought of the Al Adl wal Ihsane

The state, for Abdesslam Yassine, the leader of the Al Adl wal Ihsane, consists of two battalions, "Da'wah (call) represented by institutions and men whose task is to raise the nation and monitor the application and have control over the fate of things, and a state represented by institutions, men, organs and departments that conduct material, systemic and economic affairs under the control and guidance of the preachers (Yassine, 1989a, p. 410)

The Da'wah of Abd al-Salam Yassineis based on the men of demand who are the bearers of the nation who seek to establish the religion of God in the earth and to respond to the call of the Qur'an "O ye who have believed" entrusted with achieving the demands of Islam (Yassine, 1989b, p. 82).

The thought of the Al Adl wal Ihsane to build the second caliphate state was crystallized on the percepts of the prophethood, where it was founded for this construction through the legitimate and historical foundations. We will explain them as follows:

The legal basis

This means the caliphate is linked to the Islamic heritage of the Islamic State on the basis that the caliph is the ruler of the state. This was expressed by al-Baqtazani by saying "a general presidency in the command of religion and the world is a caliphate from the Prophet Muhammad (peace and blessings of Allaah be upon him)"(Okasha, 2002, p. 207).

In a similar vein, Muhammad Rashid Reda said that "The Caliphate, the Great Imamate, and the Emirate of the Believers are three words the meaning of which is the same, which is the head of the Islamic government that is inclusive of the interests of religion and the world", Thus, the religious and political character of the Caliphate has been reduced to the Caliphate where the Caliph and the Imam represent the Commander of the Faithful and are the Deputy of the Prophet who is a Deputy of God (Belkeziz, 2016, p. 206).

While Al-Mawardi sees that "the subject of the Imamate is the Caliphate of Prophethood in the protection of religion and the politics of the world," because disagreement, guardianship, dominance, leadership, and victory all indicate who possesses power.(Okasha, 2002, p. 207).

The concept of the second caliphate on the Prophetic method crystallized in the thought of the Al Adl wal Ihsane, with certainty from the saying of the Messenger Muhammad (may God bless him and his family and grant them peace), what Ahmad, may God have mercy on him, narrated with an authentic chain of narrators on the authority of al-Nu'man bin Bashir (may God be pleased with him) "Prophecy will be among you, God willing that it be, then God will lift it if He wills to lift it, then there will be a caliphate on the method of prophecy, so it will be as God wills it to be, then He will lift it if He wills to lift it, then it will be an alternate king, and it will be as God wills it to be, then He will lift it if God wills to lift it, then it will be a compulsory possession, so it will be what God wills it to be. Then he lifts it if he wants to lift it, then there will be a caliphate on the method of prophethood, then he remained silent."(Yassine, 2000, p. 27).

The leader of the Al Adl wal Ihsane, Abd al-Salam Yassine, tried to reverse the experiences of the political regimes that led the government since the killing of Imam Ali bin Abi Talib (peace be upon him), with the exception of the era of Omar bin Abdul Aziz to this day, when he included it in the category of biting and reparation. Based on Sharia and history, he concluded to preach the establishment of the Second Caliphate on the percepts of Prophethood based on some of the Prophet's hadiths, while the Islamic State as a religious necessity on the basis that Islam does not accept that man declares his faith in Allah, the Lord of the Worlds, and then entrusts the affairs of his life for a non-divine law (Al-Mawdoudi, 1971, p. 125).

The system of the Qur'an, the most prominent manifestations of which is the duality of the da'wah and the state, must be enshrined in what religion and politics have witnessed, and the subordination of statesmen to men of da'wah, according to the Prophet's saying (may God bless him and his family and grant them peace) that prophethood will be among you....etc talk.

With these hadiths, on which the leader of the Al Adl wal Ihsane is based, he has employed the concept of governance for Allah and attributed everything to the Holy Qur'an and the Prophet's Sunnah, i.e. singling out Allah for ruling and legislating on the basis that the Rashidah Caliphate represents Islamic rule (Sadat, 2013, p. 336).

Historical basis

Abdesslam Yassine invokes the historical events and facts that happened to the Islamic Ummah to prove the inevitability of the second caliphate on the percepts of Prophethood: "Shura went with the departure of the Rashidah Caliphate. Justice and charity also went and tyranny came with the sons of Umayyad. Over the centuries, it became rampant and occupied the land and occupied minds and people used to hear about the Umayyad and Abbasid caliphate. It lived on the mirage of names without a critical examination of the names of the Prophet Muhammad (peace and blessings of Allaah be upon him) as a bitter and coercive king and official historians called it a caliphate. The lie was launched to subsequent generations (Yassine, 1989a, p. 10).

It is on this historical basis of the phase of growth and the Rashidun Caliphs and the period of Umar ibn Abd al-'Aziz which Abdesslam Yassine considers the bright stage of Muslim history after the Rashidun Caliphs. Thus, he established the state on the basis of

legitimacy according to the Prophet's hadiths and the historical basis according to the historical events and facts of the time of the Righteous Caliphs after Abdesslam Yassine established the second caliphate on the Prophet's curriculum saying that several conditions should be met for this caliphate, namely (the formation of a group of Country-based Muslims and the upbringing and organization of their men). It is (the formation of a group of nation-based Muslims and the upbringing and organization of their men, the establishment of the national Islamic State, the Unity of Islamic countries, and the succession of inheritance) which is the election of a successor to the Messenger of Allah (peace and blessings of Allaah be upon him). This is the promised system that we talked about earlier in the narrated hadith about the Prophet (peace and blessings of Allaah be upon him) and which is the legitimate system established in every liberated country (Yassine, 1989b, pp. 16-18).

Abdesslam Yassine states that the promised second caliphate means that there is a group of influential Muslims in every Islamic country that is formed according to a geographical scope of the country and liberates it and establishes an imam in it. After the liberation of the Islamic countries, the men of Da'wah and the state install a caliph of the Messenger of Allah (peace and blessings of Allaah be upon him) to which all countries are subjected. Abdesslam Yassine did not specify the nature of the political organization that distinguishes the caliphate from the existing institutions in the Arab-Islamic countries, nor did he specify the form of the relationship between the authorities and therefore between the rulers and the governed and how to download the principle of shura or the system of allegiance on the ground (Hami Al-Din, 2002, p. 390).

However, he identified the means by which the second caliphate is built, which he calls "uprising" and not "revolution". The 'uprising' aims to change man's motivations, personality, perceptions and ideas. Thus, it changes their psyche and behavior in a way that precedes political change in which the extreme force if need be (Yassine, 2001, p. 7).

Abdesslam Yassine notes in this regard, "Violence and revolution are considered by Karl Marx and Lenin and applied by Stalin, and that Muslims in their history use the word revolution to denote the illegal violent exodus, violence and approach. Historians use the word "uprising" to refer to those who defy injustice suggesting steadfastness and confidence. Therefore, we use it to criticize the method of violence that occurs in societies. (Yassine, 2000, p. 261). The 'uprising' needs the most important thing, which is "prophetic Quranic men from the nation and its guardians, along with the state in the Qur'an and the uprising in the Qur'an (Yassine, 2001, p. 32).

Yassine (2001, p. 34) identified two basic conditions for the uprising

1   Islamic awakening and the degree of vigilance and broad renewal.
2   The peak of popular discontent.

In the same context, Abdesslam Yassine said, "The Islamic nation will only be founded by the soldiers of Allah, whom we must establish to seek martyrdom and organize their penetration into the people in sympathy with them, education, evangelism and incitement so that the massive Islamic wave that we should lead to be an Islamic people and not a blind revolution to be formed (Yassine, 1989b, p. 10).

And after the popular discontent and mass disobedience occurs and going down to the street so that God will shame those who corrupt the earth and do not reform (Yassine, 1989b, p. 11).

After Abdesslam Yassine looked at the second caliphate state on a legitimate basis and its history and specified for it the conditions for the establishment of the nation-based Islamic State and called for the people to take the right from the tyrannical rule and not the revolution that calls for violence. He believes that the link between religion and the state must be restored because it is a legitimate necessity and that separating them is one of the characteristics of the ignorant society. Therefore, the state must perform the functions of preaching and jihad and then protect religion. In order to overcome the issue of tyranny that may result from the combination of religion and the state, Abdesslam Yassine proposes a functional separation between preachers and statesmen, so that instead of politicizing religion, politics must be Islamized, which leads to the subordination of statesmen to the clerics (da'wah) represented by the state of the Qur'an (Zeghal, 2005, pp. 133-134).

Yassin's speech was at times talking about the state of the Qur'an and sometimes about the country-based Islamic state, and at other times he talked about the state of the caliphate. However, the dominant in his speech is the duality of men of da'wah and statesmen as they are the main determinants of the state of the Qur'an. "By the duality of da'wa and statehood, I mean the standing of the people of the Qur'an among the scholars of the nation by the demands of justice, integrity, morality and religion, with a watchful eye from the place of the glory of the Qur'an and its sovereignty over the sultan, so that the people of the sultan, the rulers, the managers of the wheels of the state, are carried out and the management of its institutions are carried out under the supervision practiced by the people and pronounced by the da'wa and monitored and held accountable.(Yassine, 2000, p. 673).

Yassine asserts that the correct relationship is not the one that exists today where the da'wah is sponsored by the state, but I mean that the state is included in the da'wah and that scholars are the only ones capable of interpreting the religious text in their capacity as the inheritors of the prophets and they are the ones who must direct the state men (Geertz, 1992, pp. 47-48).

Based on the foregoing, Yassine concludes that there are two types of leadership, a leadership that practices da'wah, and a leadership that exercises the functions of the state but with the state's subordination to the da'wah (Amin, 2005, p. 230). He also concludes that the political system is based on the principle of dualism between the religious institution that is supervised by the clergy "the people of the Qur'an" and whose function is to monitor the political institution that is supervised by the statesmen "the people of the sultan" so that it does not compromise in the demands of integrity, morals, justice and religion.

It is clear from the above that Abdesslam Yassine gives the important role in the issue of bringing the da'wa to the state and society to the men of political Islam movements and that he makes the latter decision makers instead of the traditional scholars who occupied this position in the past at least in the traditional political and Islamic literature. On the other hand, the preachers retain a secondary role supporting the men of these movements who embody the da'wah in practically all aspects of social and political life (Banen, 2016, p. 136).

Thus, Abdesslam Yassine views (a totalitarian religious state) through the broad powers he gives to the men of Da'wah, headed by the Country-based Caliph, who combines in his hands the issue of Da'wah and the state together. This issue reminds us of what existed in the European Middle Ages where the ruler combined spiritual and temporal authority and was above control and accountability because he rules in the name of the theory of "divine mandate. (Hami Al-Din, 2002, p. 380).

After Abdesslam Yassine established the establishment of the second caliphate and established it legitimately and historically and mixed leadership with the Imamate and the establishment of the state of the Qur'an by subjecting the state to the call of which the people represent the bearer and then the establishment of the Country state to unite the Islamic countries in the form of a single state in the form of a federation to be headed by a caliph by the men of Da'wah and the state, this vision quickly changed dramatically after the statement made by the official spokesman of the Al Adl wal Ihsane (Fathallah Arslan) at the height of (February 20 Movement). This is a youth movement that first came out on 20 February 2011 in protests involving hundreds of thousands of Moroccan youths in 54 cities and towns spontaneously without trade union or partisan mobilization. Signs of dignity, social justice, freedom and democracy have been proclaimed. Banners called for holding the corrupt accountable, ending the exploitation of influence and plunder of the wealth of the country. The demands included independence of the judiciary, holding fair elections and the drafting of a new constitution (Arbi & Abbash, 2020, p 208).

Regarding the caliphate modelled on the percepts of Prophethood, he said, "The Al Adl wal Insane has not put forward a specific form of governance in Morocco, and that the concept of the caliphate included in its discourse does not mean Morocco. Rather, it includes the Islamic world, that is, the Islamic State is formed within a federal framework such as the European Union or the United States of America. This is because the second caliphate cannot be established in one state, but is a framework from which all Islamic countries are formed and it is one of the modern unions developed by mankind over the centuries. Its spirit is the principles and values that reflect the supreme prophetic model (Arslan, 2001).

He also stressed that "the group has never demanded a religious state, but rather is with a civil state" (ibid).

It is clear from the foregoing that the promised second caliphate in the ideology of the Al Adl wal Ihsane is a strategic horizon, not a transitional one. Omar Amakasu states "We believe this Prophet's promise, i.e. the second caliphate, and we believe that it will be fulfilled, God willing, for what Allah the Almighty facilitates with His grace. However, we, at the same time consider this a strategic horizon for our call and our nation, and we are not trapped in a historical or stereotypical form, but what is meant for us is the Islamic Ummah alone, based on the many ties between its countries to form a political and economic bloc and a force of solidarity in parallel with the supporting global blocs and for the Ummah to strive in the form and name appropriate to this bloc, politically and economically.

We are in solidarity with the supporting world blocs and the nation to strive in the form and name appropriate to this bloc and link the achievement of this to the horizon of Islamic unity, which will only be achieved by liberating its countries from tyranny. At the national level, our proposal is clear, which is a modern civil state in which the people have the right to choose their rulers and hold them accountable, and in which the right to rotate power is guaranteed, and there is no place for tyranny for any political, economic or religious authority (Amakasu, 2011).

The State in the Thought of the Justice and Development Party

In contrast to the almost absolute victory of the concept of the caliphate over the percepts of Prophethood and the State of the Quran and its presumed conditions emanating

from (the Holy Quran and the Sunna of the Prophet), which we have noticed in the thinking of the leader of the Al Adl wal Ihsane (Abdesslam Yassine), we come to another vision that recognizes the relativism of this pattern. This is the opinion of the Unity and Reform Movement, represented by the Justice and Development Party. This needs to develop and strive, as it is just a general elementary principle lacking specificity and precision. The Caliphate and the Islamic State are a civil matter to be decided upon by the nation, as long as it is not stipulated in the Holy Quran and the Sunna and that And that the Prophet's Caliphate is just a historical experience and a human practice that does not express a single system that can be talked about at all times and places. The proof of this is that even the four eras of the Rashidun Caliphate have known clear organizational and political differences.

As for the concept of the Islamic State, it also remains within the scope of the legitimate politics, which is characterized by its holistic nature and its general and worldly content. These concepts must be criticized, reshaped and developed in accordance with what serves the public interest and the requirements of the times (Banen, 2008, p. 140).

Former leader of the Unity and Reform movement, Ahmed Al-Raysouni, notes, "The caliphate is not a legitimate duty and an original ruler in Islam, as we do not have in Islam a fixed and specific political system since Islam is valid for all time and place. It is the greatness of Islam and its renewed authority that brought about fixed and detailed rulings on the fundamental issues in human life and I am content with the set of purposes and general principles in diversity, change and susceptibility in more than one way" (Al-Raysouni, 2014, pp. 16.18).

Ahmad Al-Raysouni also states that the Caliphate does not exist in the Holy Quran and the Prophet's Sunna, a system Muslims have unanimously agreed on its necessity and legitimacy and not a fixed regime. The term "Caliph" is a title that expresses the leader that can be replaced by the Imam, the President or the Leader (Al-Raysouni, 2015, p. 85).

The same thing was confirmed by Former Prime Minister of Morocco (2017-2021) Saad Eddine Al Uthmani, when he said that "the succession system is not considered a specific political system, but is merely a historical political experiment and not a model to be measured upon because its political terms are not part of the Islamic Sharia. This opens the door to creativity, which is appropriate for the Islamic religion, which refuses to impose one rigid pattern for the state and the political practice" (Al Uthmani, 2014).

The same is denounced by Member of the General Secretariat of the Justice and Development Party ,Muhammad Yetim, by criticizing contemporary Islamic political thought dreaming of repeating the experience of the Rashidun Caliphs, where he remained oscillating between the ideal model, i.e. the Rashidun Caliphate, and the realistic model, i.e., justifying the legitimacy of the overpowering sultan, preventing strife and weighting in the interest of stability without turning to thinking about the controls and mechanisms of rationalizing the caliphate (Yetim, 2013, p. 46).

He also criticized the Islamic State, saying that it is not one of the five pillars of Islam, where Mohammed Amara says that "talking about these five pillars of Islam is related to the Islam of the individual and not the group. This is because it is unreasonable to tell the Muslim individual that he is one of the pillars of your Islam as an individual who established the state, this is something that is only addressed to the group.".(Belkziz, 2016, p. 129).

In the same context, another researcher adds that political rulings are not presented in the Quran with a text and detail. We have to make the judgments on them, and that the criterion and goal is the general interest of the nation and to defend what is detrimental about them. All of this is within the general commandments and rules set by the Quran when it called for good, consultation and justice and warned against harm and reciprocating harm (Al-Saeed, 2005, p 147).

The above is the conclusion of Saadeddine El Otmani that the State in Islam is a civil State. This is the result of the Prophet's behavior in the Imamate, which shows how Islam takes away all sanctity and determination from the practices and decisions of rulers, as well as from the means by which the State seeks to manage the affairs of the nation. In addition, the religious State is linked to knowledge stemming from inspiration and determination. The State in Islam is a secular State the decisions and duty of which are human is to be more realistic and objective in serving the public (Al-Uthmani, 2013, p. 151).

Based on the foregoing, the political discourse of the Justice and Development Party (PJD), which expresses the Movement for Unity and Reform (MUR), was founded on the issue of the State. The State is defined as "the product of multiple relations and a geographical, historical and human affiliation." The State is a legal institution and a legislative and executive authority whose existence derives from a constitutional rule that defines its identity and supreme authority, regardless of the actual relationship between that constitutional reference and the political, economic and social reality of that State, as long as the people have a history, values, heritage and creed. This in turn forms the ground on which that constitutional base is built insofar as it is a people with history, values, heritage and beliefs, which in turn constitute the basis on which that constitutional rule is based (Yetim, 2013, pp. 50-51). The Unity and Reform movement considered the rule of the caliphate a legitimate duty that must be restored. Since it saw in the Islamic State a possible alternative to the rule of the caliphate, it can contain two different and sometimes contradictory systems, namely (the caliphate system and the modern state system). This is because the modern state takes the modern political form and adopts in its principles and essence the provisions of the caliphate system, a process called (Islamization of the state) (Talha, 2020, p. 22).

In this way, these movements have succeeded in their thinking towards the modern state, which in their opinion is a political development that they do not mind accepting and agreeing with as a historical fact that has proven its worth on the one hand and as an imperative on the other. With the passage of time and the political developments that took place after 2011, these movements established a review of their political positions in accordance with the doctrine of purposes and reconciled significantly with the foundations of the modern state and defended it as a victim of misunderstanding and thanks to it for protecting religion from the hegemony of the state. After the ideological revisions of the Unity and Reform Movement, they refused to adopt the succession system as a human act and not a fixed text and a political system to be followed by Muslims.

Al-Raysouni (2014, p. 84) notes that ""The caliphate is just a name, a term that is neither a duty to use, nor a duty to avoid, that we can express or other, and that we can drop or forget," says Ahmed Al-Raysouni. "The purposes of the sharia are considered and are in effect".

Among the intellectual developments were the adoption of measures to draw a distance between advocacy and politics, in line with the nature of the modern state. This took place at

the beginning of integration into political work and awareness of this Moroccan movement in two main issues:

1   Awareness of the peculiarities of the modern Moroccan state that is subject to the system of the Emirate of the Believers, where religious matters are included in tasks and are considered trustees in the Moroccan constitution, and therefore there is no room for competition in this regard by any party, even if it bears a religious authority.

2   Awareness of the nature of political practice within the modern state and setting boundaries between the political and the religious to avoid the difficulties and obstacles imposed by the nature of this state, which believes only in achievement, giving, and achieving the interests of citizens away from any religious ideology. In political participation (Talha, 2020, pp. 15-16)

The reason for this separation between the da'wa preacher and the politician was to ensure the continuation of the political participation of these movements and because it also lifted them from accusing their opponents of exploiting religion to achieve political goals (ibid).

It was these revisions that distinguished the Unity and Reform Movement from other movements in Morocco and was the reason for its success and participation in power for the first time in the history of political Islam movements in Morocco (Al-Hamdawi, 2016, p. 101).

It is on this ground that the discourse of the PJD on the modern Islamic State was established. However, this orientation towards the modern state does not mean not to recognize the importance of the Rashidun Caliphate as a historical experience that has full appreciation but at the same time does not make it an experience that goes beyond the place, time and circumstances that it has worked as long as the Prophet's political practice was relative. The Caliphate is also a relative experience that highlights a way of interacting with the changing Islamic reality and not part of the religion (Al- Uthmani, 2013, p. 34).

Therefore, this contradiction in the ideas of the political Islam movement in Morocco between rejecting the term Islamic da'awa and calling for it at the same time by demanding that the modern state proceed according to the purposes of the Sharia. This contradiction in ideas and discourse reflects to us the absence of deep awareness in the modern state, which does not accept religious directives because its nature is secular and separates religion from politics Al-Uthmani, 2014).

Conclusion

The research concluded with several issues, including knowledge of the concept of the state, the position of political Islam movements in Morocco on the Islamic State that they sought to achieve in the past, the extent to which their review and intellectual development were achieved to adapt to the changes of political reality after 2011, and the goal of achieving the modern Islamic state.

There has been a clear response to these movements to adapt and reconcile with the modern state. This was evident through the separation between the preacher and the politician of the Movement for Unity and Reform and its political party Justice and Development as a response to support the modern state and to support this reconciliation and to re-read these movements and review religious texts in accordance with the jurisprudence of purposes to achieve harmony between the religious state and the civil state.

This confusion has created some contradictions in the discourse of these movements as well as their absence from the creative approach based on authentic and deep jurisprudence. From the above, we prove the validity of the hypothesis of the study, which reached the conclusion that the modern Islamic state did not achieve the nature of the material state and its modernist foundations that contradict what was seen by Islamic thought and the religious and moral discourse that dominates the thinking of these movements.

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