

The Gulf Qatari Crisis and the positions of the Neighboring countries : The Turkey and Iran model

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Abstract

This Qatari Gulf crisis, which took place in June 2017, deals with the Gulf countries led by Saudi Arabia to cut off their diplomatic relations with Qatar and impose strict measures in the direction of imposing an air, sea and land blockade on them in order to subject them to and force them to adopt a policy consistent with the Gulf policy and the positions of the regional countries represented in Turkey and Iran, which was a supportive position of the Qatari position in the face of the besieged Gulf countries by supporting Qatar politically, economically and militarily to stand in the face of the besieging countries based on their interests in the region.

Key words: Gulf Crisis, Turkish Position, Iranian Position.

Preamble

The Gulf-Qatari crisis waged on June 5, 2017, after Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain and Egypt cut off their diplomatic relations with Qatar under the pretext of Qatar's support for terrorism and terrorist groups, represented in the Muslim Brotherhood, Al-Qaeda, ISIS and armed militias in Syria and Libya, as well as supporting the Houthi militia in Yemen and harnessing its flags to these groups, especially The Muslim Brotherhood group to spread their ideology and attack the ruling regimes in the region, which posed a real threat to these regimes, as well as accusing them of violating the 2013 Riyadh Agreement and the 2014 Supplementary Agreement, which created a suitable ground for the siege of Qatar through the holding of the Islamic-American summit held in Riyadh in the presence of US President Trump, which was one of its outputs Agreement to fight terrorism and the countries that support it. This summit was considered an American green light for Saudi Arabia and the participating Gulf states to besiege Qatar and force it to abandon its policy of support for Islamic movements in the region, especially in the countries of the Arab Spring. The Iranian position initially called for a solution to the crisis through dialogue to change After that, the situation turned to Qatar's political, economic and military support, as it supported Qatar by providing foodstuffs to it, opening its airspace to Qatari planes, and sending members of the Revolutionary Guards to Qatar to protect the Emiri Palace in order to support Qatar to withstand the Gulf blockade led by Saudi Arabia and the continued survival of Qatar outside the Gulf flock, and this Iranian position was launched From the standpoint of the Iranian interest in the region, which is to weaken the members of Gulf States.

As for the Turkish position, it has been summarized by standing by the side of Qatar because Qatar enjoys a strong relationship with Turkey to match its policy with regional issues in the region by supporting the Muslim Brotherhood movement and their identical positions on the Arab Spring revolutions, especially in Syria, Egypt and Libya, through their support for the

Islamist movements close to them. This relationship has been further strengthened after the signing of several important political, economic and military agreements between the two countries. Therefore, the Turkish position is summarized by calling for dialogue to resolve the crisis on the one hand and on the other hand strongly supporting it by opening an air bridge between Turkey and Qatar to provide it with foodstuffs and sending Turkish military forces to the military base in Qatar, which was opened under previous agreements in order to support Qatar militarily and prevent any military invasion from the besieged countries and help it to withstand the countries besieging it. These Turkish and Iranian regional positions started from the crisis from purely political and economic interests towards these countries in the Middle East region and implement its policy. The problem of the study focuses on the Gulf crisis and the positions of the countries and Turkey (

The study aims to identify the Gulf crisis in Qatar in 2017, the positions of the Gulf countries towards Qatar, the Qatari position on the crisis, and the positions of regional countries, including Turkey and Iran, towards the crisis .

Gulf Crisis_ Qatar 2017

The Gulf and Qatari crisis represented a dangerous turning point in striking the Gulf regime politically, economically and securityly for the Arab Gulf countries (Aziz, 2015), as this crisis returned as one of a long series of political, economic and social upheavals and repercussions that greatly affected all parts of the region. It occurred as a result of the escalating tensions between the parties resulting from clear differences in Saudi and Qatari foreign policy towards regional developments and the pursuit of each party to shape the future of the Middle East (Troudi, 2019), and the exciting Qatari role after the Arab Spring revolutions of 2011 and its support for these revolutions, in which it found an opportunity for the emergence of its regional and influential role in the region and its support for the Muslim Brotherhood, in which it found a real opportunity to invest after their arrival in power in their countries (Nasser, 2013).

The rejection of Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries, especially the UAE, for this policy, which Saudi Arabia considered as a threat and a danger to the security of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states, and its desire to maintain the current situation, so that the relationship between Saudi Arabia and Qatar became more tense after 2013, as the conflict took an upward trend that reached its peak this year, especially after Saudi Arabia's support for the Egyptian army to overthrow the Brotherhood rule under the presidency of Muhammad Morsi and Qatar's rejection of this coup and providing a safe haven for the Brotherhood leaders, so Qatar for Saudi Arabia and the Gulf countries became a source of threat and a real danger to its security, which led it to sever its relations and withdraw the ambassadors from Doha in 2014, which ended with the signing of the Riyadh Agreement 2014 (Morsi, 2018).

This is what Lina Al-Khatib, Director of the Carnegie Center for the Middle East, pointed out to him by saying that "Qatar has committed many mistakes related to the strategic assessment of its status and strength, which provoked the indignation of its Gulf neighbors. At the same time, Qatar's contradictory policy led to a threat to the stability and unity of the Arab countries. Perhaps the first of these mistakes was Qatar's desire to chart a path independent of the rest of the GCC countries, which provoked a confrontation between it and Saudi Arabia, especially in policies towards Egypt and Syria, where this greatly affected the resolution of matters in favor of the Kingdom and at the same time increased instability" (Mesum, 2017).

Direct causes that led to the crisis:

- 1 The Saudi accusation against Qatar for not implementing the Riyadh Agreement 2014 and accusing it of playing a double role in the Yemeni file, as its role was double for the benefit of the parties hostile to the Defensive Storm Coalition, which led to the end of Qatar's mission in this coalition, especially since it had concluded the "Document of Defense Cooperation" with Iran in 2010 and then turned into a framework of military cooperation in 2015, in addition to not changing Qatari behavior with Egypt and its role hostile to the Egyptian regime because of its position towards the Muslim Brotherhood (Morsi, 2017).
- 2 King Salman's arrival to power and the assumption of the Covenant's mandate of his son in 2015 and seeking to re-establish the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia as the leader and leader of the Gulf and the Arab world (Troudi, 2019) and his adoption of an offensive policy towards Qatar to deter it and return it to under the Saudi cloak (Mesum, 2017).
- 3 The close rapprochement between Muhammad bin Salman and Muhammad bin Zayed and the feeling of bin Salman that Muhammad bin Zayed has a network of influence in the United States, especially in improving the image of Saudi Arabia with the US administration, which strengthened the status of Saudi Arabia and removed the risks of (Justa) law, especially in convincing Washington to adopt the Saudi agenda.
- 4 Inviting Prince Tamim bin Hamad in a speech before the General Assembly of the United Nations, in which he called on the Arab countries and the GCC countries to hold a dialogue with Iran to improve relations with it and offer to host Doha for this dialogue (Troudi, 2019) and Prince Tamim's contact with President Hassan Rouhani and his emphasis on the depth of relations between the two countries, which raised Saudi Arabia's rejection of any kind of relations with Iran, which it considered a challenge to it (Muhammad, 2020).
- 5 The kidnapping of a number of members of the ruling family in Qatar in southern Iraq in 2015 by the Hezbollah militia close to Iran and Qatar's negotiating role in dealing with this problem, in which Saudi Arabia saw a departure from its political consensus in April 2017, with Qatar concluding a deal to release the kidnapped in April 2017. The deal included the payment of a ransom of approximately \$1 billion by Qatar to release the kidnapped. The bulk of the ransom went to Iran and to Syrian groups fighting 120 to 140 million dollars for HTS, 80 million dollars for Ahrar al-Sham, and 70 million dollars for the Iraqi Hezbollah militia close to Iran, the release of detainees from the Lebanese Hezbollah militia in the Syrian opposition, the release of at least 200 civilian detainees from Madaya alone, and the delivery of humanitarian aid, which Saudi Arabia considered to be support to terrorist groups because of the huge amount of ransom provided (Awad ,201).
- 6 Saudi-Emirati consensus to subdue Qatar because of its independent policies and its relations with Iran, which both sides reject the relationship with Iran. Therefore, the Saudi and Emirati leadership agreed to tighten the noose on Qatar, besiege it economically and isolate it regionally for regional purposes in order to subject it to the Saudi and Emirati will (Faraj, 2021).
- 7 May 2017: Leakage of messages from the e-mail account of the Emirati ambassador in Washington, Youssef Al-Otaiba with an Israeli institution called the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies and the coverage of Al-Jazeera channel for these leaks, which caused embarrassment to the UAE, which I considered as a provocation and deepening the dispute between the two sides (Muhammad, 2020).
- 8 Trump's visit to Saudi Arabia in 2017 and the return of the US alliance to its old alliance with Saudi Arabia as a major ally of the United States in the region, which constituted a major motivation for Saudi Arabia to liquidate its opponent in the region, especially

- Qatar, Iran and its allies from Islamic groups, so this visit returned as a green light from Trump to Saudi Arabia to blockade Qatar (Awad, 2021).
- 9 Breaking the website of the Qatar News Agency " Qena " in June 2017 and publishing statements to the Emir of Qatar about the support of Iran, Hamas and Hezbollah by saying that "Iran represents a regional and Islamic weight that cannot be ignored and it is not wise to escalate with it, stressing that it is a major force that guarantees stability in the region." Qatar denied these statements, as it mentioned in Al Jazeera that pirates published fake statements on the Qatar News Agency, and despite the Qatari denial, the Saudi and UAE media widely reported statements attributed to the Emir of Qatar in their media such as Al Arabiya and Sky News.

All of these reasons led to the Qatari Gulf crisis, which posed a threat to the Gulf Cooperation Council in general and to Saudi-Qatari relations in particular because it was the most serious dispute throughout the period of disagreements between the two sides (Aloush, 2017). The crisis began with the convening of the US Islamic Summit in the Saudi capital, Riyadh, on May 20, 2017, with the participation of the new US President, Donald Trump. King Salman bin Abdulaziz stressed in his speech the need to combat terrorism and hold accountable those who finance terrorism on his part. Egyptian President Abdelfattah ElSisi confirmed in his speech that there are countries in the region that support, arm, and provide political cover for terrorists. He stressed the need to confront terrorism and confront terrorist organizations without discrimination between them. Although these statements did not explicitly mention Qatar, they were indications about the beginning of the crisis, especially after the accusations directed against Qatar to support and shelter terrorist movements, which indicated the existence of a crisis with Qatar (Al-Wadiya, 2019).

This visit comes within the framework of Trump's restoration of the old alliance of the United States with its former allies as a main pillar in the region. This visit has returned as a green light to punish Qatar for its support of Islamic groups that Saudi Arabia considers terrorist groups. Trump has declared his support for Riyadh in its policy to combat terrorism (Taroudi, 2019).

Saudization sought to marginalize the Qatari presence and focus on the Emirati and Egyptian presence at the summit in reference to the crisis of the relationship between Qatar, Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries. Therefore, Prince Tamim was absent from attending the opening ceremony of the Global Center for Combating Extremism, which was opened in the presence of Trump (Muhammad, 2019). At the conclusion of the summit, there was a signal that cannot be overlooked that Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad pushed his shoulder back and took his place alongside President Trump to take commemorative photos in clear violation of the official protocol, which is an act that reflects the extent of disagreement and hostility between Qatar and the UAE and the cradle of a strong need to storm the Gulf region (Abu Zaid, 2018) On May 23, 2017, the website of the Qatar News Agency "Qena" was hacked and statements were published by the Emir of Qatar, Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad (Al Raya Newspaper, 2018), while attending the graduation ceremony of the eighth batch of officers affiliated with the National Service, in which he pointed out that "the rule of many, although representing an immunity for Qatar from the ambitions of some neighboring countries, is the only opportunity for America to have military influence in the region in a tangle of interests that exceeds the ability of any administration to change it." Sheikh Tamim also pointed out that Qatar has succeeded in building strong relations with America and Iran at the same time. Given the regional and Islamic weight that Iran represents, it cannot be ignored and it is not wise to escalate with it, especially since it is a major force that guarantees Stability in the region when cooperating with it, which Qatar instigates for the stability of neighboring countries (Muhammad, 2019). He also

praised the role of Hamas, which was promised by the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. He added that no one has the right to accuse us of terrorism because he classified the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist group or rejected the role of resistance in Hamas and Hezbollah (Al-Arabiya Net, 2017).

On May 24, QNA announced the hacking of its Twitter account as well as the hacking of the Qatari Foreign Minister's Twitter account and the publication of Qatari decisions to sever relations with Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Egypt. Qatar quickly denied the statements attributed to its emir and announced the hacking of the agency's website and its affiliated sites (Al-Jazeera Studies Center, 2017). Despite the Qatari exile, Qatar was subjected to a major media campaign and the Saudi and UAE media (Al-Arabiya Channel and Sky News) continued to broadcast urgent news about the Qatari Emir's statements and to host analysts to criticize the Qatari leadership and call on the people to pounce it with the publication of news and reports accusing Qatar of supporting terrorism and destabilizing the region. This media campaign continued towards Qatar continuously throughout the period preceding the crisis (Muhammad, 2019).

On June 3, letters were leaked to Emirati Ambassador Yousef Al-Otaiba after hacking his account by a group of pirates, which revealed part of the correspondence between the ambassador and American officials in the Obama administration and prominent researchers in research centers (Al-Jazeera Center for Studies, 2017) to publish articles against the State of Qatar and try to link them to terrorism (Jibril, 2017), and also revealed correspondence with an Israeli institution called the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies, which caused embarrassment to the UAE by covering Qatar Al Jazeera for these correspondence (Awad, 2011).

On June 5, 2017, the media campaign turned into political decisions by Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain and Egypt by issuing separate statements on the severance of relations with Qatar, withdrawing its ambassadors, taking other measures against Qatar, and removing Qatari diplomatic missions from their countries (Zain al-Din, 2018). On June 5, the Saudi Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced the severance of its relations with Qatar, considering this measure due to reasons related to Saudi national security to protect its national security from the dangers of terrorism and extremism. In the statement, it stated that the severance of relations came as a result of the grave violations practiced by the authorities in Doha, secretly and publicly, throughout the past years with the aim of To split the internal Saudi ranks, incite out of the state, violate its sovereignty, embrace multiple terrorist and sectarian groups aimed at striking stability in the region, including (the Muslim Brotherhood, ISIS and Al-Qaeda), promote the literature and plans of these groups through their media permanently, support terrorist activities supported by Iran in Qatif Governorate and Bahrain, and harbor extremists who seek to strike the stability and unity of the homeland at home and abroad, as well as Qatar's support for the Houthi militia coup even after the announcement of the Coalition to Support Legitimacy in Yemen. It also announced its solidarity with Bahrain, which is subjected to terrorist campaigns and operations supported by Qatar. It also accused it of reneging on its obligations and repudiating its agreements signed with Saudi Arabia and the Gulf countries (the Riyadh Agreement and the Supplementary Riyadh Agreement). Saudi Arabia has confirmed that it has been patient for a long time despite The authorities in Doha continue to evade their obligations and conspire against them in their desire for the Qatari people, which is a natural and authentic extension of the brothers in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (Middle East newspaper, 2017).

As for the statement of the Bahraini Foreign Ministry, Bahrain accused Qatar of destabilizing its security and stability, interfering in its affairs, supporting terrorist activities

and financing terrorist groups linked to Iran, and spreading sabotage and chaos in Bahrain (Aloush, 2017).

As for the statement of the State of the United Arab Emirates, the UAE accused Qatar of Qatar's non-compliance with the Riyadh Agreement and the supplementary agreement in 2014, incubating terrorist and sectarian groups, primarily the Muslim Brotherhood, and spreading the ideas of terrorist groups through its media. It also accused Qatar of violating what was agreed upon at the American-Islamic Summit to combat terrorism, which considered Iran a state sponsor of terrorism in the region, in addition to harbouring the wanted Emirati who threaten the security of the UAE (Sky News, 2022). As for the statement of the Egyptian Foreign Ministry, Egypt announced the severance of its relationship with Qatar as a result of Qatar's insistence on following a stance hostile to Egypt and supporting terrorist organizations, foremost of which is the Muslim Brotherhood, and harboring its leadership issued against them by judicial rulings (Aloush, 2017), and promoting the ideology of Al-Qaida and ISIS and supporting terrorist operations in Sinai and interference in the internal affairs of the Arab Republic of Egypt (Al-Sadi, 2018).

These statements led to a decision by the Gulf States and Egypt to withdraw ambassadors from Doha, sever diplomatic relations with them, close the airspace facing Qatar, give Qatari diplomats and citizens 14 days to leave the Gulf States and ban the travel of their citizens to Qatar.

It is the goal of the besieged countries to isolate Qatar to force it to change its policy, stop interfering in the internal affairs of countries, stop embracing terrorist organizations, primarily the Muslim Brotherhood movement, and force it to focus on its internal affairs, which was reflected in the vision of the United Arab Emirates, which considered that the crisis forced Qatar to focus on its economy, not to interfere in the axes of the conflict in Libya and Syria, and not to interfere in the affairs of its neighbors (Al-Fassi, 2022). Therefore, Saudi Arabia and the besieged countries submitted demands to Qatar to end the Gulf crisis through Kuwait on June 22, 2017 and gave Qatar ten days to implement them, including the following demands:

- 1 Qatar's official announcement the reduction of diplomatic representation with Iran, the closure of attachments, the departure of affiliated elements associated with the Iranian Revolutionary Guard from Qatari territory, and the restriction of commercial cooperation to the extent that it does not prejudice the sanctions imposed internationally and by the United States.
- 2 The announcement of Qatar to cut off its relations with all terrorist, sectarian and ideological organizations, especially the Muslim Brotherhood, ISIS, Al-Qaeda, Fatah Al-Sham (Al-Nusra Front) and Hezbollah, and to include them as entities (Al-Watan Newspaper, 2017).
- 3 Qatar's immediate closure of the Turkish military base currently being established and the cessation of any military cooperation with Turkey within the Qatari territories (Al-'Arabi al-Jadid, 2017).
- 4 Stopping all forms of Qatari funding for any terrorist or extremist individuals, entities or organizations, as well as the announced US and international lists
- 5 Qatar handing over all the terrorist elements listed and the elements required by the four countries, as well as the terrorist elements listed on the declared US and international lists and seizing them and their movable and immovable properties (Al-Jazeera Net, 2017).

- 6 Closing Al-Jazeera and its affiliated channels, which are accused of provoking unrest in the region
- 7 Closing all media supported by Qatar directly or indirectly
- 8 Stop interfering in the internal and external affairs of the four countries, and not naturalizing citizens of these countries, expelling those who have previously been naturalized, and extraditing wanted persons accused of terrorism cases who are on Qatari territory
- 9 Qatar undertakes to pay compensation to these countries for any damage suffered during the previous years due to its policy (Researchers Group, 2018).
- 10 Qatar is committed to be in harmony with its Gulf and Arab surroundings at all levels to ensure the national security of the Gulf and Arab countries and to activate the Riyadh Agreement of 2013 and the Riyadh Supplementary Agreement of 2014
- 11 Delivering Qatar all databases of the opponents it supported, as well as clarifying all types of support provided to them
- 12 Periodic follow-up reports should be prepared once a month for the first year, once every three months for the second year and once every year for a period of ten years.
- 13 This student is approved within (10) days from the date of submission and will not be considered null and void (Al-Shammari, 2018), and Saudi Arabia classified 59 individuals and 12 entities on the lists of terrorism prohibited in a statement for besieged countries on June 8, 2017 (Al-Sharq al-Awsat newspaper, 2017). The statement indicated that this decision came as a result of the continued violation by Doha of the obligations and agreements signed with it, which include not harbouring and supporting the elements and organizations that threaten the security of countries. These measures come within the framework of the commitment of countries to dry up the sources of terrorism. The list included (Sheikh Youssef Al-Qaradawi, Ali bin Mohammed Al-Salabi, Abdul Hakim Balah, Muhammad Ahmad al-Islambouli, Khalifah Mohammed Turki al-Subai, Salim Hassan Khalifah al-Kuwari ...) Their nationalities are divided between Egyptian, Qatari, Saudi Arabian, Emirati, Libyan, Bahraini and Kuwaiti, all belonging to the Brotherhood (Al Ain Al-Ikhbariya, 2018). The list also included associations and entities, the most prominent of which are (Qatar Center for Volunteering, Qatar Charity, Sheikh Thani Foundation for Humanitarian Services, Benghazi Defense Company, Bahraini February 14 Coalition...) (CNN, 2017).

On 5 July, the foreign ministers of the besieged countries of Qatar met in Cairo to discuss the position of Qatar's rejectionist to try to resolve the crisis and present six principles to Qatar for implementation :

- 1 Commitment to combating extremism and terrorism in all their forms and preventing their financing or providing safe havens
- 2 Stopping all acts of incitement and hate speech or violence
- 3 Full compliance with the Riyadh Agreement of 2013 and the supplementary agreement and its executive mechanisms of 2014 within the framework of the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf
- 4 Commitment to all the outcomes of the American Islamic Summit held in Riyadh in May 2017 (Russian RT, 2017).
- 5 Refrain from interfering in the internal affairs of States or supporting entities outside the law
- 6 The responsibility of all countries of the international community in facing all forms of extremism and terrorism as a threat to international peace and security.

The Permanent Representative of Saudi Arabia to the United Nations, Abdullah Al-Mouallimi, said that the Foreign Ministers of the four countries agreed on six principles on June 5, 2017 in Cairo " and that it will be easy for Qatar to abide by them " and these principles are complementary to the thirteen demands that were previously raised (Al-Quds Al-Arabi Newspaper, 2017).

The Qatari position on the crisis

The crisis was a shock for Qatar, which began with the publication of statements by the Emir of Qatar about Iran and the launch of the Saudi and Emirati media through my channel (Al-Arabiya and Sky News), a fierce media attack against Qatar, which quickly denied those statements attributed to its Emir. The State of Qatar confirmed, through the Qatari foreign media official, the statements and said that the Qatar News Agency's website " Qana " had been hacked on one hand and that the statements attributed to the Emir of Qatar were unfounded and unfounded, while the Qatari Foreign Ministry promised to take all legal measures to prosecute the perpetrators of piracy. The Foreign Ministry confirmed in its statement that the media continued to publish false statements to the Emir of Qatar despite a statement denying their validity (Al-Quds Al-Arabi newspaper, 2017).

The media attack against Qatar continued indifferent to the Qatari exile (Hassan, 2018), and the Qatari Foreign Ministry replied that the accusations directed against Qatar are mere different reasons that have no legitimate reasons aimed at imposing guardianship on the sovereignty of Qatar and that these accusations are unfounded and based on fabrications that have reached the point of complete fabrication, which indicates the existence of intentions to harm the state (Muhammad, 2019), and Qatar accused the countries besieging it that they have chosen to invest their time and resources in a baseless propaganda campaign and that all the accusations directed against Qatar are sent without evidence and represent a blatant interference in its policy and put the measures imposed on it by Saudi Arabia and the countries besieging it as constituting a blockade, especially as they included the closure of its only land outlet with Saudi Arabia (Morsi, 2017). Qatar confirmed that the goal of Saudi Arabia and its besieging countries comes within the framework of punishing Qatar for following an independent policy and departing from the political line of Saudi Arabia (Al-Shayji, 2018), and this is what researchers Ilan Manor and Marcus Holmes pointed out that one of the controversial points between Saudi Arabia and the UAE on the one hand and Qatar on the other hand since 2014 until the current crisis of 2017 is the Qatari refusal to agree with Saudi Arabia and the UAE against Iran, which is considered by Saudi Arabia and the UAE as a hostile state to the Gulf Cooperation Council countries. Researcher Pascal Krusaz confirmed this reason for the crisis in his study on the Gulf crisis of Qatar that the reason behind the Saudi escalation against Qatar can be the desire of King Salman and Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman to contain and confront Iran by forming a front that includes the Sunni Arab countries in the Arabian Gulf, and Qatar's rejection of this front and severing its relations with Iran, which prompted Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries to force Qatar to abandon its policy and sever its relations with Tarodian (2019).

The 13 demands submitted by Saudi Arabia and its allied countries constituted dictates that completely contradict the principles of relations between independent and sovereign countries. These demands promised complete compliance under the threat of invasion and the implementation of these points by force if they were not implemented within a period of 10

days. The Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Sultan bin Said Al-Muraiki, stated at the meeting of the Council of the League at the level of Foreign Ministers at its 148th session that Saudi Arabia and its three allies had put before the Qatari authorities unenforceable demands in what he described Iran as "an honorable state". The Qatari response through Kuwait on 3 July 2017 (Hassan, 2019) may be summarized as follows:

- 1 With regard to the reduction of diplomatic representation with Iran, Qatar will commit to this if all Gulf countries commit to it. Rather, Qatar demands the severance of all relations with Iran, including economic relations and cooperation, especially the UAE, which has an Iranian community of 800 thousand Iranians residing in it, and it enjoys economic relations and great trade exchange with Iran, and there are no elements of the Revolutionary Guard in Qatar.
- 2 With regard to the Turkish military base in Qatar, all the Gulf countries have foreign bases, and there is nothing in the GCC charter that prevents the existence of this base, and Qatar is ready to close it if the GCC countries close the foreign bases in it.
- 3 Qatar has nothing to do with any of the terrorist organizations designated by the United Nations and is an active member of the international coalition to fight these organizations. Whoever claims otherwise and has evidence to say otherwise, let him come to the Muslim Brotherhood, a group that the United Nations has not classified as a terrorist group.
- 4 destabilizing the GCC countries. This is a slander and a claim that is not supported by reality, but rather that there is a state that has spent billions to undermine peace and security in the Gulf (Adam, 2018).
- 5 Qatar does not finance terrorism in any form. This is a simile fabricated by the countries besieging Qatar. It has no evidence. Moreover, Qatar is a member of the international coalition to combat terrorism.
- 6 The State of Qatar will not respond to the requests of the besieged countries in what it classifies as terrorism because of hatreds and ideological and political differences and will not extradite or take any measures against politicians
- 7 Formal and unofficial media institutions in any country are subject to local laws. None of the countries may object to them or prevent them as long as they are operating within an objective methodology.
- 8 Qatar has not and will not interfere in the internal affairs of any of the countries (Researchers Group, 2018).
- 9 Every State in the world has a sovereign State, a constitution to which it is bound and legislation in addition to its obligations with regard to political asylum and the protection of human rights. Therefore, Qatar refuses to extradite anyone because of ideological and political differences.
- 10 Qatar has complied with the Riyadh Agreements 2013 and 2014 and whoever claims that it did not commit to provide evidence and not statements sent.
- 11 Requesting compensation from Qatar for the victims, losses and lost profits of the besieged countries. This is an unfounded claim and not if there is any
- 12 The lists of terrorism that contain the names of wanted persons contain names that do not exist in Qatar originally, according to the Qatari Foreign Minister, who stated that "the list of terrorism sent contains some names that have nothing to do with Qatar and do not reside in it originally. In addition, the lists contain journalists and prestigious charities in the international community and have consultative qualities in the United Nations, such as Qatar Charity. We do not know the criteria on which the list that was published was based, but it is clear that it is an integration of the sent chain of accusations that are not based on clear and unfounded things (Jibril, 2017), and in a

letter to the Qatari Emir on July 21, he praised the positions of the Qatari people towards the crisis and pointed out that Saudi Arabia and the besieged countries wanted to violate two principles for which they sacrificed their humanity: the principle of the sovereignty of States and their independent will, and the second : freedom of expression and the right to access to information, and that Qatar broke the media revolution of the monopoly of information. The Emir called for dialogue to resolve the crisis within the framework of respect for the sovereignty of the state, so that the Foreign Minister confirmed what Prince Tamim called for by saying that "Qatar wants to solve this issue through diplomatic means and through dialogue based on principles that do not violate sovereignty and respect international law and lead to an agreement that results in collective commitments in which there are no dictates from any party" for Qatar to speed up the process of taking Steps to move international and regional actors to their side to strengthen their position through:

- 1 Resorting to Washington and urging it to find a way out of the crisis, as Secretary of State Tillerson visited Doha and signed a memorandum of understanding between Qatar and the United States to finance the fight against terrorism. Amendments were also made to its law on combating terrorism, in which Saudi Arabia and allied countries demanded it, but it preferred to sign it with Washington to be a witness to this step, which Qatar counted to confirm Qatar's commitment not to support the financing of terrorism (Aloush, 2017).
- 2 Communication with Iran, which confirmed support for its relationship with Qatar and opened three ports (Linga, Bushehr and Bandarbas) for the export of foodstuffs to Qatar in addition to Turkey's support for it by sending Turkish soldiers and conducting military exercises with the Qatari army
- 3 Resorting to international organizations by submitting a complaint against Saudi Arabia and the UAE to blockade it, such as the International Aviation Organization and the World Trade Organization, through an invitation submitted to them about the blockade of these countries and violating international laws (Aloush, 2017).

Influential regional positions

Turkish position

Turkey's relationship with Qatar is a distinct relationship at all political, economic and military levels as a result of the convergence of the two countries' views on the policies in the region, especially the Arab Spring revolutions, the position of Hamas and the position of ElSisi's coup against the Brotherhood's rule in Egypt in 2013. This relationship increased after the participation of the Emir of Qatar in the decrees and the inauguration of Erdogan as President of the country in 2014 and the visit of Erdogan to Qatar to clarify the importance of Qatar in Turkish policy and the signing of an agreement stipulating the establishment of a Turkish military base in Qatar, which was one of the causes of the crisis (Al-Noaimi, 2020). The Turkish position on the crisis came from the first day of the crisis on 5 June 2017, through the words of its Prime Minister, Ben Ali Yildurm, and Foreign Minister, Mouloud Javishoglu, who expressed his regret at the Gulf States' severance of relations with Qatar, calling for the resolution of issues among them through dialogue and negotiations, stressing Turkey's readiness to contribute to the resolution of the crisis and its keenness on the stability of the Gulf region. Then, Turkish President Erdogan contacted a number of heads of state in an effort to defuse the crisis. Erdogan also expressed his solidarity with Qatar in light of this crisis and expressed his country's readiness to mediate and provide everything necessary to reduce tension and resolve the crisis (Wadiya, 2019), and pursuant to that, Erdogan sent his Minister of Transportation, Birat Al-Bairak, and his official spokesman, Ibrahim Kalin, in early June

2017, to the region to meet with Saudi and Qatari officials. However, this attempt did not yield positive results (Al-Jazeera Center for Studies, 2017). However, all the attempts made by Turkey, including Erdogan's visit to the region for mediation, failed to settle between the parties to the crisis, so that the Turkish position would turn to support Qatar after the escalation of Saudi Arabia against Qatar, so that this escalating position from Saudi Arabia would be a reason for aligning Turkey to its ally, Qatar, and its fear that its interests are in danger. Qatar welcomed the Turkish entry into the crisis line and relied on it as a primary ally. Turkey returned the main supporter to Qatar in its crisis, and Erdogan described the list of demands submitted to Qatar as a violation of international laws and norms and between Erdogan that Turkey will do everything in its power to save Qatar from its crisis and that the list is an interference in Qatar's internal affairs, and this is contrary to international law (Abdullah, 2019). Turkey took advantage of the crisis to establish a military base in Qatar. It requested the Turkish Parliament to hold an extraordinary session to ratify the strategic cooperation agreement that allows it to deploy Turkish forces in Qatar, which was ratified on June 7, 2017, and which prevented the military escalation against Qatar by Saudi Arabia and its allies (Oglu, 2017). This is considered a strong message to Saudi Arabia, which is leading the siege, Turkey is concerned with this crisis to a large extent and it will not stand idly by in case things deteriorate (Wadiya, 2019). The Turkish role was not limited to diplomatic and military support, but went beyond it to the economic side, as Turkey prevented the collapse of Qatar economically due to the siege imposed on it and established an airlift to transport foodstuffs and sent ships loaded with goods to help it face the siege imposed on it (Muhammad, 2022) This was triggered by Saudi Arabia, which demanded Turkey not to interfere through the words of its Foreign Minister, Adel al-Jubayr, who called on Turkey to remain neutral and emphasized the Gulf of Crisis. Then Turkey tried to reassure Saudi Arabia by maintaining contact with it. This was what happened when contacts occurred between the Saudi and Turkish defense ministers, Fikri Ishaq and Mohammed bin Salman. Turkey's efforts continued to support the Kuwaiti mediation. Turkey was trying to adopt a balanced approach between supporting Qatar and supporting it on the one hand and making diplomatic efforts with the other parties on the other hand. This appeared in its speeches about the crisis as the parties to the crisis. They are the brothers of Turkey and Turkey's gathering with them have strategic relations. Erdogan described Saudi Arabia as the eldest brother of the Arabian Gulf region. There is a great role for Turkey in solving the Gulf crisis and King Salman is at the forefront of personalities capable of resolving the dispute (Rantisi, 2020), so The Turkish position in dealing with the crisis is based on:

- 1 Continuing to work with the boycotting countries, primarily Saudi Arabia
- 2 Keeping Qatar away from Iran, which constituted a regional competition with Iran about the crisis
- 3 Maintaining a military presence in Turkey in exchange for not provoking Saudi Arabia (Abdullah, 2019)

As for the reasons for the Turkish position on the crisis

Economic factor: Turkey has strong economic relations with the Gulf countries (Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the UAE), especially Qatar, with which it has significant economic relations. The volume of Turkish exports to Qatar in 2018 reached \$1 billion, an increase of 70% compared to 2017. In 2019, the volume of trade exchange reached \$1.2 billion, and an exhibition was opened.

" Expo Turkey " in Doha in 2018 specialized in promoting investments between the two countries and Qatar is one of the countries that have significant investments in Turkey, where its investments in 2019 reached 22 billion dollars, and in 2020 a commercial center in Istanbul was purchased in addition to the signing of a memorandum of understanding between Qatar Investment and Halbak Alton for investment in the mental century project (Sheikh, 2021), and the participation of Turkish companies in infrastructure projects in Qatar worth 35 billion dollars (New, 2014), and Turkey benefited from Qatar in supplying gas after Russia imposed economic sanctions on it due to the incident of shooting down the Russian plane in 2015 and Turkey's attempt to get rid of the restrictions imposed on it by Russia and Iran, so the economic factor stands out as an important reason for Turkey standing by Qatar's side (Gorkan, 2017).

The political factor: Turkey has strategic relations with Qatar, and this relationship has developed to the highest levels, including coordination in the positions between them on the issues in the region in the Arab Spring revolutions, support for the Muslim Brotherhood, coordination on the Syrian and Libyan crisis and the Palestinian issue through support for Hamas, in addition to its fear of Qatar's rapprochement with Iran as a result of Iranian support to Qatar in the crisis, as well as the positive Qatari position on the coup that took place in Turkey in 2016 and its stand with the Erdogan government, which prompted the Turkish government to support Qatar in Azma (Wadiya, 2019).

Turkey's fear of subjugating Qatar and imposing the policies of the Saudi-Egyptian-Emirati axis on it and its fear of being the second target, especially in light of its deteriorating relations with the United States and Europe. These fears come in light of the writings of Turkish journalists, including Syrdar Turgut in the newspaper " Khair Turk " in the United States, with an article entitled " Is Turkey the next goal of Washington? "Today is Qatar, tomorrow is Turkey," tweeted American researcher Michael Robin (Hajj, 2017). In addition to Turkey's fear of the success of Saudi Arabia in its siege and subjugation of Qatar, Qatar will be forced to consider reviewing its relations with Ankara according to the satisfaction of Saudi Arabia and the UAE, which leads to changing Doha's attitude towards Ankara and its loss of a key ally in favor of the Saudi-Egyptian Saudi-Emirati axis (Wadiya, 2019).

Iranian position:

The cause of the crisis was the broadcasting of the statements of the Emir of Qatar, Tamim bin Hamad, through the Qatari News Agency, in which he criticized the hostile sentiments towards Iran. President Hassan Rouhani, in defiance of the Qatari Emir, was prepared by Saudi Arabia. Therefore, the crisis, of which Iran was a major cause, erupted in June 2017. Iranian TV stated that Iran called on Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries to resolve the crisis through diplomatic means. Its Foreign Minister, Muhammad Jawad Zarif, rushed to visit Ankara and meet with Turkish President Erdogan and its Foreign Minister, Oglu. Zarif expressed his concern about the crisis and asked Turkey to exploit its good relations with the parties to the crisis to enter into mediation and find a solution to it (Amberi, 2017). The Iranian official position on the crisis came from Bahram Qasemi, the official spokesman of the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which included several points:

- 1 The tension in relations between neighboring countries in the current circumstances of the region does not serve the interests of the countries and peoples of the region that suffer from crises caused by terrorism and extremism

- 2 Iran calls on neighboring countries to take the lessons of the bitter experiences that the region has gone through to move away from emotions and arbitrate rationality, logic and self-control to reduce the intensity of the conflict and calm the situation
- 3 The way to resolve the differences between the Gulf countries and Qatar comes through political and peaceful methods and transparent and frank dialogue (Al-Samadi, 2017).
- 4 The use of sanctions as a tool is reprehensible, rejected and unacceptable
- 5 Everyone must respect national sovereignty, territorial integrity and independent governments and not interfere in their affairs. This is a fundamental and fundamental asset in rights and international relations (Aloush, 2017).

However, the calm Iranian position and the call for dialogue to resolve the crisis changed after the disclosure of demands 13 by Saudi Arabia and its allies to Qatar and the strong Iranian presence at the top of the list of demands, which includes calling on Qatar to reduce its diplomatic representation with Iran, the closure of attachments, the expulsion of elements of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard from Qatar, and the restriction to commercial cooperation with Iran, without prejudice to the economic sanctions imposed on it internationally and the United States, and in a way that does not prejudice the security of the Gulf Cooperation Council, as well as cutting off any intelligence, military or security cooperation with Iran (Wadiya, 2019).

Iran realized that the crisis is complex and dangerous and showed a Saudi desire to introduce a pattern of guardianship and hegemony in regional relations at the expense of the sovereignty of countries and its decisions, as Tehran considered that Saudi success in establishing this anomalous principle in regional relations constitutes a threat to it and countries that have good relations with it such as (Kuwait and Oman) that may become subject to siege and estrangement to achieve the wishes of Saudi Arabia, so Iran decided to stand up to these policies by supporting Qatar in its crisis despite the great differences with it on the regional scene, especially in the Syrian crisis and the withdrawal of the Qatari ambassador from Tehran in 2016 after the crisis that occurred between it and Saudi Arabia and standing by Saudi Arabia, but Iran put aside its differences and decided to support them (Amber, 2017), and opened its airspace to Qatari aircraft to face the measures of imposing the siege imposed on its airspace. It also announced its assistance in filling the shortage of foodstuffs and compensating them for Saudi products (Al-Jazeera Center for Studies, 2017), and the Association of Exporters of Iranian Agricultural Products announced that "there is no problem. We can provide Qatar with what it needs within twelve hours." Then Iran sent five planes loaded with 90 tons of foodstuffs, especially fruits and vegetables, to Qatar in the face of a siege and opened the port of Bushehr, Langa and Bandar Abbas for use in importing foodstuffs from other countries and trade in an attempt to rebel On the Saudi policies (DW News website, 2017) and the Iranian deal was based on dealing with the crisis in rejecting the sanctions and the siege and called for the need to resolve the crisis by diplomatic means. This crisis approached with great caution on Qatar's support base because it is besieged, not on the base of sharing with it in a political axis, because Iranian-Qatari relations are complex and thorny (Al-Wadiya, 2019). This Iranian position was clear through the statements of Iranian officials supporting Qatar by Hamid Abu Talibi, the political adviser to the Iranian President, in his tweeting to him on Twitter, in which he attacked Saudi Arabia and said that "the time of alliances and great sisterly guardianship is over and political authoritarianism and tribal manipulation of security through occupation and aggression will only have a result of more instability." He also pointed out that the time of banning, cutting off diplomatic relations and closing borders and removing them from alliances will not be a way out of crises. "

Ali Khorram, the former representative of Iran at the European headquarters of the United Nations, stressed that the step taken by some Gulf countries against Qatar is an uncommon act of diplomacy and will constitute a new crisis in international relations, especially as it comes against a member state of the Gulf Cooperation Council, while Mohsen Rezaie, head of the diagnostic complex of the regime's interest and former leader in the Revolutionary Guard, pointed out that the cause of the crisis is due to Saudi policies in the region and that Riyadh seeks to swallow Bahrain and Qatar (Al-Samadi, 2017).

The Iranian attack on Saudi Arabia continued. This time, Ali Larijani, a member of the Shura Council, strongly criticized Saudi Arabia, stressing that Riyadh "has no weight in the region to impose its conditions on Qatar and that the time for imposing conditions and interfering with the sovereignty of countries has ended." Iran focused its attack on Saudi Arabia due to:

First: The Nature of Saudi-Iranian Litigation and Competition in Regional Files

Second: Iran understands that Saudi Arabia is the one that leads the three besieged countries to Qatar

Third: The UAE and Bahrain are less politically weighted in managing a pivotal role in the crisis if not for the Saudi presence

Therefore, focusing on Riyadh is an indication of the weakness of other players and questioning their ability to play a role without Saudi support (Al-Zuwayri, 2017).

Iran took advantage of the crisis to achieve its interests. The Iranian newspaper Al-Sharq, which is close to the Iranian government, mentioned in a report entitled "In the Gulf War, all roads lead to Iran" a reference to the crisis, in which it considered "all these Gulf and Arab disputes are in favor of Iran and its influence and interests in the region" (Al-Hawazi, 2017), as for the reasons that prompted Iran to support Qatar in the crisis:

1- Political reasons: Where Iran Qatar is a strategic ally that can be used as a paper to put pressure on Saudi Arabia and the Gulf countries, which gives it an influential force, and thus it is the influential regional force in the Middle East (Abdullah, 2019), and Iran seeks to coordinate with Qatar on influential regional issues, especially the Syrian crisis and its most prominent goal is to dismantle the Gulf Cooperation Council, which makes it easier for it to extend its influence to the Gulf countries (Majali, 2019).

2- Economic reasons, as Iran seeks to increase the volume of trade exchange from 250 million dollars before the crisis and try to invest the crisis to increase it in addition to Iran's exploitation of the 2022 World Cup projects and its offer to help it establish sports projects for the World Cup and offer them to Qatar to help host fans in its nearby islands after the besieging countries refused to receive fans in their hotels in addition to signing a tripartite agreement (Turkish_Iranian_Qatari) for joint transport to promote trade exchange, provided that Iran is the intermediate state for the transfer of foodstuffs to Qatar from Azerbaijan (Abdel-Al, 2018). The Minister of Economy of Qatar, Ahmed bin Jassim bin Mohammed Al-Thani, confirmed that Iran plays an important role in the arrival of goods from Turkey and Azerbaijan to Qatar by land (DW News site, 2017).

3-For military reasons, where the two parties signed a military cooperation agreement that includes allowing the elements of the Revolutionary Guards to train on their lands and protect the common borders between them, in addition to joint meetings between the military

leaders of the two countries. Qatar used the trainings of the Revolutionary Guards as part of the psychological war that it used against Saudi Arabia. After the crisis, Iran rushed to send a force of the Revolutionary Guards to protect the Amiri Palace. Through this, Iran has worked to send a message that Iran will not allow the overthrow of the Qatari regime, as well as its emphasis on the Iranian military presence in Qatar (Abdel-Al, 2018).

Therefore, the Gulf Qatari crisis contributed to the service of the Iranian strategy in the region because of the repercussions of the crisis and the accompanying differences on the Arab position in the face of the Iranian expansion in the region, in addition to the geopolitical gains resulting from this crisis, especially with regard to Saudi Arabia and its regional role towards the region (Wadiya, 2019).

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