

Subcultures Terrorism in Pegunungan Tengah Papua

By

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Abstract

Contemporary studies on terrorism in Pegunungan Tengah Papua identified injustice, marginalization, and subculture as the causes of crime. One possible trigger of marginalization of Papuan Indigenous People (OAP) is unfair development which creates conditions of anomie and collectively forms a new culture or subculture different from the dominant one. The Indonesian government's statement regarding *Kelompok Kriminal Bersenjata* (KKB) as a terrorist organization brings a new perspective on understanding radicalism, intolerance and terror acts in Papua. Therefore, this research examines terrorism from the perspective of socio-criminology, anthropology, and green criminology. Data were collected through field research and interviews with OAP and Papuan activists. The finding showed that the root cause of terrorism in this region is the failure of the government to understand the OAP radicalism on the value of the sanctity of the land and the sacredness of nature conservation since its declaration in 1963. When the government forced a Jakarta version of development contradicting the values of the sanctity of the land and the sacredness of nature conservation, the OAP responded in two ways: retreating and rebelling by the KTB in six counties. Therefore, a new ethnic-development model perspective is needed to end such protracted terrorism.

Keywords: Papua, KTB, terrorism, radicalism, development, subculture

Introduction

The massive killings and violence was the main reason the Indonesian government declared *Kelompok Kriminal Bersenjata* (KKB) in Papua as a *Kelompok Teroris Bersenjata* (KTB) or armed terrorist group. The Coordinating-Minister for Political, Legal, and Security Affairs, Mahfud MD, on April 29th, 2021, stated that this was in line with Bambang Susatyo's statement, the chairman of Supreme Senate Assembly, and those made by the leaders of other state institutions. The report that *Organisasi Papua Merdeka* (OPM) or Free Papua Movement as a terrorist group is subsequently centered on a new perspective of terrorism scientifically analyzed (Free Papua Movement (OPM), n.d.). As Bambang Darmono once stated, "*In the context of security, it was reported that those who opposed the unification of Papua into the Republic of Indonesia were OPM, presently, referred to as the KKB (the name before KTB, ed), a political group whose interests are not clear*" (Indonesia Mandiri, 2021). Therefore, this research argues that the government's effort to keep Papua within the framework of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia and prevent international intervention under the pretext of countering terrorism is ironic.

The emergence of radicalism and terrorism in this region originated from the history of its integration into Indonesia in the late 1960s, which later evolved after the government, especially during the New Order Era, started a development program advancing the concept of economic growth (Gobai, 2016; Rumansara). Additionally, the transmigration program was

implemented to promote acculturation in society. Papuans were forced to adopt the Indonesians' culture, which further provoked such radicalism (Araf et al., 2011; Singh, 2005; Suryawan & Fahriza, 2020). Although eventually, they accepted the political integration concept through a referendum in 1969, irrespective of the fact that not all were happy to receive the economic development boosted by the Indonesian government. Unfortunately, such a disappointment was particularly felt by the Papuan Indigenous People (OAP) who resided in Pegunungan Tengah Papua. Moreover, of the 14 districts in Pegunungan Tengah, including Dogiyai, Paniai, Deiyai, Intan Jaya, Puncak, Puncak Jaya, Tolikara, Lanny Jaya, Jayawijaya, Mamberamo Tengah, Yalimo, Nduga, Yahukimo, and Pegunungan Bintang that took a radical stance against the Indonesian government's policies, 6 of them developed into a separatist movement, later labelled as an armed terrorist group in 2021.

This study mainly aims to uncover the radicalism triggered by subcultures that led to the dominance of the KTB action merely in 6 counties situated in Pegunungan Tengah Papua - Yahukimo, Pegunungan Bintang, Nduga, Puncak, Puncak Jaya, and Intan Jaya. Furthermore, it explains the reasons behind the OAP's acts which have been carried out for generations. The findings obtained were based on utilizing socio-criminology, green criminology, anthropology, and terrorism perspectives in a transdisciplinary approach. This qualitative research collected primary data through field observation and depth-interviews on *Orang Asli Papua* (OAP) or Papuan natives and secondary data from various literatures for triangulation.

Based on the various viewpoints, it was eventually concluded that the government's failure to understand OAP's closeness to their natural environment triggered the existence of radicalism and terrorism in 6 counties in Pegunungan Tengah Papua for generations. The Indonesian government's economic development program in accordance with a security approach coupled with the transmigration initiative implemented during the New Order era worsened their relations, hence it promoted terrorist attacks. Accordingly, it was recommended that the government need to understand the close relationship between OAP and their natural environment, including land, water, and livestock. The Indonesian government can minimize conflicts and even develop the area with the right approach.

Methodology

This is a qualitative-research, with data collected through field research and observation to understand why a radical subculture and acts of terror were conducted in six counties in Pegunungan Tengah Papua. It led to collecting data related to a particular community and their experiences. The qualitative methodology focuses on meanings, definitions, metaphors, symbols, and descriptions of certain phenomena, especially in this case related to OAP radicalism in Pegunungan Tengah Papua and the impact of its meaningful natural environment on the people (Neuman, 1997).

Field research and observations on OAP was carried out by the first author while served as Chief of the Integrated Police Service Center at the Nabire Police Station, Chief of Crime Investigation Unit, the Head of the Nabire Seaport Area Security, and the Head of the Nabire Airport Area Security from 2004 to 2010. Nabire Airport connects Paniai Regency, Intan Jaya, and Puncak which is part of the Pegunungan Tengah Papua. Such a position made it easier to interact and communicate with passengers departing and arriving in the 3 districts daily. Based on this, it was discovered that the OAP's appreciation and bound for land, water, and even pigs are strong. It is common to see a mother carrying and nursing a pig while the child walks behind. Meanwhile, a land dispute between OAP and migrants are not quickly resolved due to clan ownership.

Subsequently, the second person to carry out this research is a lecturer and dean of the Faculty of Social and Political Sciences from 2016 to 2021, at the Christian University of Indonesia, Jakarta, who interacts with all students, including Papuans. Based on the interactions with relatively 150 of them throughout the 12 years of experience as a lecturer, it was reported that they are generally open to cooperating with students from other provinces. Although they prefer to work with friends from Papua, they have never refused to work with those from other regions. They also enjoy playing sports, singing, and dancing, just like the others. However, they prefer to perform these activities with Papuans. Although it seems exclusive, it is a form of caution in socializing and choosing their friends since they are far from family. Based on observations, the cultural differences between OAP is discernable. Interestingly, those from coastal areas are generally more open-minded than those from mountainous regions; they are more reserved and introverted. However, these students remain hospitable.

To enrich the data in this research, interviews were held with OAP and Papuan activists who understood the socio-cultural conditions of the Pegunungan Tengah Papua. Several facts were emphasized, especially those related to culture, radical understanding, and proximity to nature and the animals around them. In addition, eight UKI undergraduates and alumni who actively participated in organizational activities, such as the Cendrawasih and Papuan Student Associations, were interviewed. They are Arman Wakum (30 years old), Charles Kossay (28 y/o), Lisa Wanembo (25 y/o), Henny Tabisu (28 y/o), Yosua Hiluka (26 y/o), Rudi Kogoya (22 y/o), Steven Kossay (25 y/o), and Matius Wonda (21 y/o) from Biak, Wamena, Tolikara, Jayapura, Wamena, Nduga, Wamena and Puncak, respectively.

History of Papua Integration and the Rise of OPM

The Papua integration and the OPM emergence are interrelated. The political contestation between Indonesia and the Netherlands after World War II roughly involved the intervention of the United States (US) and the United Nations (UN). Even though African and Asian Countries (Mackie, 2005) supported Indonesia, along with the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact member-states (Djiwandono, 1996). The Dutch desired to keep West Papua as part of its Commonwealth, which brought about a Victorian faction group opposed to the Papua Integration to Indonesia, later referred to as the self-proclaimed Free Papua Organization (OPM).

Papua and West Papua, initially known as the Province of Irian Jaya before 2003, were part of the Dutch East Indies until 1949 under the name Nederlands-Nieuw-Guinea (Dutch New Guinea). From 1949 to 1962, Nederlands-Nieuw-Guinea became an overseas territory of the Netherlands Kingdom. The Dutch action to seize the Indonesian territory during the war for independence (Indonesian Revolution) was internationally opposed. This shifted in favor of the Indonesia Republic. The recognition of its sovereignty by the Dutch East Indies on December 27th, 1949, triggered political problems in Papua, which the Dutch controlled. The conflict between the Netherlands and Indonesia ended after the Dutch handed over Papua to the United Nations Temporary Executive Authority (UNTEA) through the New York Agreement in 1962.

Despite recognizing Indonesian sovereignty, the Netherlands sought the separation of Dutch New Guinea from its territory through negotiations held in 1949, which was decided at the end of 1950. Afterwards, the Netherlands, through its arguments, was able to convince the United Nations that the original inhabitants of Dutch New Guinea were an ethnic group that is disparate from Indonesians (Singh, 2005), and it, therefore, need not be absorbed into the state. The Dutch government even had the intention to make Papua part of its Commonwealth by establishing several related service offices (Bhakti & Pigay, 2016).

In 1962, the Netherlands agreed to hand over the territory of Papua to the United Nations through the New York Agreement, which included a stipulation that Papuans had the right to decide their political status based on a referendum implemented before 1969. UNTEA handed the region over to Indonesia through this medium. Interestingly, relatively 1,025 representatives from Papua's main ethnic and tribal groups deliberately voted. However, some sources stated that the military elected them from July 14th to August 2nd, 1969 (Crocombe & Studies, 2007). This aligned with Charles Kossay's statement during an interview "they cheated during the *Pepera* (referendum), and the Indonesian government never really listened to Papuans, they just organized a ceremonial meeting which lasted for a short while, where they pretended to grant them an audience or listen to their demands."

The referendum's official results are the basis of legitimacy that the Papuans selected to join Indonesia rather than be independent. The voting process was similar to the last general election held in certain areas that contain a strong belief, in which the tribal chief expresses the entire community's opinion. Its legitimacy was debated by independence activists who protested the military invasion of Papua by Indonesia (Dunigan & Petersohn, 2015).

Since joining Indonesia, Papua, previously known as West New Guinea (Western New Guinea), was later changed to West Irian Province and Irian Jaya Province during the New Order government. Unfortunately, after the collapse of the New Order, on December 31, 1999, the government changed the name to Papua through Law number 45/1999. Then Presidential Instruction number 1/2003 was mandated and divided into 3 provinces, namely Papua, Central, and West Papua. However, this division is yet to be implemented entirely. Presently, the Indonesian government has formed only 2 provinces - Papua and West Papua - while the formation of Central Papua is still being discussed.

After the Netherlands agreed to hand over the territory of Papua to the United Nations through the New York Agreement in 1962, in December 1963, the Free Papua Movement stated that "We do not want modern life or any kind of development: religious groups, aid agencies, and governmental organizations just leave us alone!" Fortunately, 8 years later, Nicolaas Jouwe and 2 OPM commanders, Seth Jafeth Roemkorem and Jacob Hendrik Prai, planned to declare Papuan Independence in 1971. Nicolaas Jouwe was the Papuan leader appointed vice president, while Frits Sollewijn Gelpke was the President of the New Guinea Council, and they both managed the Dutch colony (Jouwe, 2013).

Furthermore, on July 1st, 1971, Roemkorem and Prai declared the "Republic of West Papua" and drafted a constitution. The strategic conflict between them triggered the OPM split into 2 factions; *Pembela Kebenaran* (PEMKA), *Tentara Pembebasan Nasional* (TPN) or Victoria group led by Prai and Roemkorem, respectively. It severely weakened their ability as a centralized fighting force, although it remained a standard tool used by contemporary fighters, including domestic and foreign political activists (Singh, 2005).

The OPM faction movement with political goals emerged in the early 80s. In 1982 the OPM Revolutionary Council (OPMRC) was established under the chairmanship of Moses Werror, who sought independence through a campaign of international diplomacy. OPMRC aims to obtain international recognition for West Papuan independence through international forums. The Free West Papua Campaign was founded in 2004 by a group of pro-Papuan activists in Oxford and appointed Benny Wenda as the spokesperson. On December 6th, 2014, United Liberation Movement for West Papua (ULMWP) was established, thereby uniting the 3 main political organizations struggling for the

independence of West Papua. These include the West Papua Nasional Authority-WPNA (established by Edison Waromi, Jacob Rumbiak, and Herman Wanggai in 2004), the West Papua National Coalition for Liberation-WPNCL (a Pemka faction established by Otto Ondowame in 2005), and the Komite Nasional Papua Barat-KNPB (established in 2008 and currently led by Victor Yeimo since 2012) (Webb-Gannon, 2021).

In 2017, Wenda was appointed as the chairman of the United Liberation Movement for West Papua-ULMWP, established in 2014 in Vanuatu. Subsequently, the ULMWP announced a new constitution and government-in-waiting for the Republic of West Papua, in 2020, with Wenda serving as interim President. However, this was disputed by some elements of *Tentara Pembebasan Nasional Papua Barat* (the West Papua National Liberation Army), claiming that Wenda's stay in the United Kingdom made the presidency illegitimate (Briantika, 2020). Moreover, the recent KTB is the 6th generation of OPM.

The Gap Perception between the Indigenous People of Papua (OAP) and the Indonesian Government

Radicalism is often associated with political activities usually engaged in by those who intend to make fundamental changes to their socio-political life (Damayanti, 2018). It often turns out to be the basis for terrorism, which manifests into intolerance and violent acts. Furthermore, intolerance is essentially an attitude of rejection and a representation of one's mindset. The more radical it is, the greater the rejection attitude and other contradictory actions. (Damayanti, 2018). Therefore, it is essential to understand the OAP's mindset, which is perceived as radical by the Indonesian government. It is necessary to comprehend this concept based on 2 different perspectives. Arman Wakum stated, "the Indonesian military needs to understand the Papuan's culture because the people are suffering from *gegar budaya* (cultural shock).

The first viewpoint employed a legalistic approach referring to the definition in Law 21 of 2001 regarding Special Autonomy (*Otonomi Khusus* or Otsus). Meanwhile, the second viewpoint analyses OAP from the ethnicity perspective. Article 1 letter "t" of the Special Autonomy Law says, "OAP are people from the Melanesian racial group consisting of indigenous tribes in Papua and peoples who are accepted and recognized as indigenous Papuans by the indigenous Papuan people." The West Papua Bappeda (Regional Development Agency) defined it based on the Special Autonomy Law in cooperation with the Central Statistics Bureau (BPS) Papua Province as a resident who: 1) both parents are Papuan, 2) Papuan father, non-Papuan mother, 3) non-Papuan father, Papuan mother, 4) non-Papuans who are married to Papuans, 5) non-Papuan residents who are traditionally appointed by the Papuan clan, 6) non-Papuans appointed by Papuan natives, and have lived in Papua for more than 35 years.

From the ethnicity perspective, the term OAP closely relates to customs and habits still inherent in everyday life. Each ethnic group has diverse views and perceptions relating to their respective cultures. Interestingly, Papuans employ a patrilineal, bi-lineal, and ambilineal kinship system. According to Gobai (2016), OAPs are genealogically related to the Melanesian race through their father or mother's lineage. Moreover, their identities are connected to the ownership of customary land rights. Tom Beanal, from the Amungme tribe, reported that they have never felt separated from their surrounding natural environment. It is believed that "*te aro neweak lako*" or "they are linked to nature" therefore, assuming any man destroys nature, it is presumed that they destroyed themselves. Similarly, the Kamoro tribe believes that the source of human life originated from a spring called *Bunyomane* (*Rumansara*).

For the OAP, land has a notable meaning with 3 attributes, including social, religious, and economic functions (Bauw & Sugiono, 2009). The social function is related to customary land ownership. Meanwhile, that of religion is related to the magical view that human relations with land are sacred. The economic function is based on land being regarded as the primary source of OAP livelihood. The OAP's magical or religious view of land associates soil with immortality. It is described as the *mama* or "mother" who gives birth, feeds, nurtures, educates, and raises them, creating their inner bond with the land. Interestingly, it is not the land that is considered sacred, rather the connection (Bauw & Sugiono, 2009; Deda & Mofu, 2014; Rumansara).

Moreover, for these OAPs, the social function of land is traditionally related to historical sources of tribal origins. Customary land ownership is rooted in historical, ancestral, and socio-economic factors (Bauw & Sugiono, 2009; Deda & Mofu, 2014; Rumansara). The historical factor transpires when a tribe or clan initially occupies an area or surrenders it from the losing party to the winner. The ancestral factor is related to the location used by the ancestors for gardening purposes and the inheritance system of customary land. Socio-economic factors are related to the use of land to pay for dowry, a sign of peace, and efforts to meet the needs of life in the ecological zone such as hunting, fishing, farming, and gathering.

The land tenure system in the Papuan customary law means that its ownership rights are both communal and individual. Communal ownership is based on a small or large clan, namely a particular *marga* (a village in the sense of ethnicity). Individual ownership does not mean that individuals own the land, rather it is possessed through lineage. Nevertheless, the traditional relationship between OAPs and their land is sacred as it is perceived as an economic resource and a historical source of tribal origins.

The importance of OAP rights in Pegunungan Tengah Papua makes it difficult to release the land, water, and natural resources to both their superiors and subordinates, irrespective of certain deliberations and consensus activities. As members of the traditional community, these are beneficial to them (Bauw & Sugiono, 2009). The situation tends to get complicated, especially when the government and the private sectors try to claim their land, water, and natural resources unilaterally through the deployment of military force based on the law.

Furthermore, the modernization that underlies the transmigration policy since the 60s has led to socio-cultural changes in Papua. The OAPs are then forced to consume rice as their staple food (Suryawan & Fahriza, 2020), abandoned their *koteka* (the OAP traditional clothes) or change it into pants (Araf et al., 2011). Additionally, even their local languages were discontinued in many formal institutions (Singh, 2005). Moreover, it was difficult for the OAP to resist the homogenization policy through robust political and military control.

The central government forced the Jakarta paradigm of development into the OAP's mind through racist constructions against Papuan cultures and peoples considered 'backwards' and 'primitive'. Therefore, they wanted to replace such customers with a more civilized and modern one. The expropriation of land and the destruction of nature frustrated the development program, which was solely for economic purposes, including the *memoria passionis* of oppression and military violence. Presently, the government's effort to develop Pegunungan Tengah Papua by accelerating infrastructural construction remained attached to Jakarta's paradigm, although the OAPs found it difficult to accept.

Equality and demarginalization efforts are worth trying. However, it was not the fundamental problem of Pegunungan Tengah OAP. As they are eco-populism people, the ethnic-development styles are preferred to modernization and industrialization. Moreover, through a development theory in the Pyramids of Sacrifice, Berger (1982) reported that this had caused problems between the policymakers (government) and local communities. Development based on a western societal model causes everything traditional to be modern. According to Berger's perspective, development is modernization, which is, in turn, referred to as industrialization. Besides, it is regarded as a "disease" spread worldwide. This development caused a problem in Papua, as OAP status contains political elements in the local head election and state civil apparatus acceptance (Gobai, 2016).

Table 1 shows some different perceptions of the government and the OAP, which led to the various problems in Papua and its lengthy history (table 1).

Table 1: Dimension, Context, and Contradiction of Perceptions

Dimension	Context	Contradiction of perception	
		Government	Indigenous peoples of Papua
Pros and cons of Papuan integration history, political status, and identity	The transition of power in Papua, from the Netherlands to Indonesia, and the rivalry of the cold war	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Historically, Papua is part of Indonesia. - Legal, political status according to international law. - Integration means being free from the grip of the Dutch. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Anthropologically Papua (Melanesia) is not part of Indonesia (Polynesia). - Act of Free choice is illegitimate, full of fraud. - Integration means the colonization of Indonesia.
Political violence and human rights violations	The New Order regime's authoritarianism and international intervention	Repressive measures are a way to maintain the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country	Repressive actions mean human rights violations
the failure of Papua's development	Industrialization and international capitalism	Development is a way to advance Papua	Development means migration of those outside Papua and marginalization of Papuans
Government policy inconsistency in Special Autonomy (Otsus)	Reformation and democratization	Special autonomy is a way to integrate and develop Papua	Special autonomy means rectification of history, protection of rights, and re-papuanization
Strategies for overcoming security disturbances, deprivation of rights, and oppression	Protecting the peoples, maintaining security stability, and suppressing separatist movements	Security forces are part of the state's responsibility to protect the people and maintain stable security.	The presence of security forces is synonymous with deprivation of rights and oppression.

Adapted from Widjojo et al. (2010) and (Suropati, 2019).

From the perspective of green criminology, the contradiction between the government's perception and the Pegunungan Tengah OAP's is similar to developmentalism versus eco-populism. On the one hand, many government officials believe that regions' autonomy is achieved and maintained by utilizing resources linearly from one stage to another. This process goes from traditional or primitive to modern or industrialized (Smith, 1985). Further, the government gauges economic success with capitalistic notions of a developed, autonomous, and legitimate country (Yu & Yü, 1996).

On the contrary, the Pegunungan Tengah OAP seeks to broaden solidarities against a dominant elite-based system governing resources and the surrounding environment to terminate destructive projects rather than derive benefits from them. The battle between developmentalism and the eco-populism are subject to promoting eco-centric or alternative local development models, reaffirming environmental and traditional, rural, or indigenous subjectivities, and pursuing a common goal among social justice movements that tend to challenge domination systems (Antal, 2017; Conde & Le Billon, 2017; Leonard, 2011; Szasz, 1994).

Anomie in Pegunungan Tengah Papua

Contemporary studies on the KTB in Papua stated that injustice, marginalization, and subculture are the major causes of crime. Irrational development led to anomie conditions that resulted in forming a new culture that is entirely different from the dominant one. Based on the cultural criminology perspective (Presdee et al., 2004), the differences in economy, education, employment, and culture causes the Pegunungan Tengah Papua OAP to distinguish their political discourse from Indonesians (Kivimäki & Thorning, 2002). The description of various social inequalities is a sign of anomie conditions. However, other factors also affect it, namely the difference between the OAPs' perceptions and expectations and those perceived by the government.

In the economy, education, and employment context, Papua is still categorized as the area with the highest poverty rate (World Bank, 2019). More than 27 percent of Papuans live below the poverty line. In 2020, it was reported that 26.43 percent of the people were poor (BPS Papua, 2021). The 5 regencies enlisted for the 2021 development program are all located in the Pegunungan Tengah Papua. The impoverished people were approximately 196,120 from 89,500 destitute households. Nevertheless, poverty is a complex and multidimensional problem. It is not limited to mere economic indicators but this is a multifaceted structural deprivation phenomenon (Wijaya & Purnawati, 2014), where crime, low educational background, unemployment rate, and poverty are interconnected (Huang, Laing, & Wang, 2004). The average economic growth of counties in the Pegunungan Tengah Papua in 2020 is entirely below average based on the Gross Regional Domestic Product (GRDP). In fact, 5 counties, namely Jayawijaya, Puncak Jaya, Pegunungan Bintang, Intan Jaya, and Deiyai experienced contractions (BPS Papua, 2021).

According to the Ministry of Education and Culture, the ideal teacher-student ratio for the elementary education level in Indonesia is 1:29 (Styawan, 2018). However, in the Pegunungan Tengah Papua, it is nearly ideal in only 4 counties, namely Jayawijaya, Puncak Jaya, Puncak, and Deiyai. In comparison, 10 others experienced a shortage of teaching staff. It was recorded that there is 41.79 percent of women from all ASN in Papua. Surprisingly, in the Pegunungan Tengah Papua counties, its (state *civil apparatus*) ratio is only 29.30 percent. In the legislative sector, the representation of women in the DPRP (*Papua legislative*) is 8.40 percent. Meanwhile, in the Pegunungan Tengah counties, there is only 3.95 percent of female senate members in DPRD (county legislative). Interestingly, 8 counties do not even have women's representatives in the DPRD (BPS Papua, 2021).

The Statistik (2020), proved that there are no registered job seekers in all counties. This data shows that there are no attractive employment opportunities in the Pegunungan Tengah Papua region. It is agriculturally-dominated, with a work participation rate that is greater than 95 percent compared to the labor force. However, Pegunungan Tengah Papua communities are traditional and satisfy their needs through the agricultural sector (including fishing, gathering, and hunting). Statistically, the unemployment rate in these counties is below its average in the Papua Province (the average unemployment rate in Papua is 4.28 percent), mainly from the non-industrial sectors.

The systematization of the New Order's centralized government program was used to control the traditional leaders by utilizing the Papua's natural wealth through economic policies that prioritized growth and relied on capital and technology strengths that were unfamiliar to the OAP. This resulted in large-scale exploitation of natural resources that ignored the people's fundamental rights to be in charge of their customary lands and forests.

Exploiting investors who marginalized the indigenous peoples worked on non-transparent legal provisions, centrally regulated by Jakarta and supported by military forces. Weak political and social control causes individuals and groups to get involved and create new business circles that deviate from the lines and procedures of institutional command tasks. Matus Kogoya, an informant from Puncak Jaya stated that:

"The current problem in Pegunungan Tengah is the Wabu gold mine area. The map shows that all surrounding regions were converted into a battlefield by the military and KKB. The main aim is to secure the Wabu gold mine area for some mining company with active military commandants and high-rank pensioners as stockholders, commissioners, and top-level management intending to start operations."

Public amenities in the form of good health, education, electricity, and clean water facilities in the Pegunungan Tengah Papua region are far below average, this proves that the OAPs are indeed a marginal group. Furthermore, some counties do not even have access to electricity and clean water provided by the government. As a result, the indigenous peoples of Pegunungan Tengah Papua are marginalized in their village (Kartika & Hamid, 2020).

The New Order government's program of *transmigration*, which also affects ethnic heterogeneity conditions, was significantly reduced since 1998 and eventually stopped in 2000 (McGibbon, 2004). Nevertheless, poor groups from various regions in Indonesia attracted by economic growth continue to move towards Papua. The mining industry and the explosion of construction projects due to special autonomy and regional expansion are the main drivers of transmigration. Based on Papua's historical growth, Elmslie (2010) estimates that in 2010, the OAP population was 52 percent, while the remaining 48 percent were migrants.

In OAP's view, transmigrants have failed to respect and adapt to the local culture, whereas OAP have difficulties competing with newcomers regarding employment opportunities (Anderson, 2015). Subsequently, Papua's demographics and economic statistics show that migration is a source of insecurity for OAP. The lengthy ideological history and cultural gap subsequently prove that the marginality of the indigenous people in collaboration with anti-development attitudes has led to the formation of Pegunungan Tengah Papua's (OAP's) subculture in the form of retreatism as a response to the anomie condition.

Furthermore, political violence and violations executed through nationalism and militaristic patriotism discourse *NKRI Harga Mati* (The Unitary State of The Republic

Indonesia is final) is the hegemonic official text during the New Order era (Suropati, 2019). Irrespective of the fact that the influence of the New Order has faded, its characteristics as a militaristic regime fond of adopting violent methods against the Papuans are robust, especially for those who served in the Military Operations Area (DOM) from 1978 to 1998 and are still on duty till present. In another perspective, violence during the Military Operations Area is also interpreted as being "maintained." TNI/Polri, in several incidents relating to the selling of weapons and ammunition, which the KTB used, confirmed this allegation (Suropati, 2019).

However, for more than 5 decades of Indonesian rule, especially during the New Order era, it was faced with many fierce obstacles that did not allow Jakarta's political legitimacy to grow and be strong in Papua. As a result, its presence was in the form of military posts, violence, injustice, marginalization, failure of development, and histories related to denial of the fundamental rights of indigenous Papuans (Surapati, 2019).

Intolerant Attitude of OAP in Pegunungan Tengah Papua

In MERTON (1938) anomie perspective, retreatism and rebellion are reactions and adaptations of OAP to such conditions, whether KTB or non-KTB. Retreatism refers to the resignation or abandonment of an original goal or the means of attaining it, as in political or cultural matters. Meanwhile, of the 14 counties within Pegunungan Tengah Papua Region, 8 chose to adopt this step. These include Dogiyai, Paniai, Deiyai, Tolikara, Lanny Jaya, Jayawijaya, Mamberamo Tengah, and Yalimo. Besides, they adopted the non-KTB subculture by avoiding direct interaction with government officials such as the police and military, neither friendly nor hostile.

On the other hand, rebellion is a way of adaptation that no longer recognizes the existing social structure and seeks to create a new one. Unfortunately, 6 counties - Yahukimo, Pegunungan Bintang, Nduga, Puncak, Puncak Jaya, and Intan Jaya adopted it as a reaction against anomie condition. Those counties adopting the KTB subculture are usually hostile to government officials such as police and military entering their tribal territory.

Differences in cultural perceptions of land and the environment are also highly contradictory between the OAP and the government. Boas (1887) shows that cultural elements need not be judged by the views of other customs but by the internal value system. A particular culture is discernible by understanding the values that exist exclusively in the community that owns the custom. Meanwhile, these ethics, norms, rules, and customary law regulate the social system and human relations with the creator, each other, and the environment.

The cultural values of the Pegunungan Tengah OAP are divided into 2, those of *La Pago* and *Mee Pago*. The traditional area of *La Pago* and *Mee Pago* includes the tribes that inhabit the eastern and western part of the Pegunungan Tengah Papua region. Each of these customary areas is certainly different from other Papuan regions.

The ethnic groups that inhabit the highland ecological zone include the Lani, Yali, Ngalun, Amungme, Nduga, Damal, Moni, and Ekari or Mee tribes. Their main means of livelihood is gardening, planting tubers, and raising pigs. Pegunungan Tengah Papua isolation is the main factor in maintaining soil sacredness by the OAP. In contrast to other ecological zones that have experienced a mix of cultures, the Pegunungan Tengah Papua OAP still observe customs that firmly uphold the land's sanctity. Moreover, their radicalism towards the land and its natural environment is a positive value amid the global warming phenomenon and environmental damage in the name of industrialization.

Based on Tajfel and Turner's formula, OAP's social identity is a portion of Papuan's self-concept derived from perceived membership in their social groups (Sassenberg & Vliek, 2019; Turner & Oakes, 1986). This explains and predicts the intergroup behaviour of these OAPs based on status differences and its stability, perceived legitimacy, and the ability to move from one group to another (Branscombe et al., 1999; H Tajfel & Turner, 1986; Henri Tajfel et al., 1979; Turner & Reynolds, 2010).

The Pegunungan Tengah OAP's and KTB's social identities relations towards the non-Papuans differ from the other groups due to the boundaries set, irrespective of the dynamics. They put a straight and stiff-line categorization of "us" and "them" towards non-Papuans. At the same time, the other OAP's social identity has a grey area of "us" with the non-Papuans' social identity due to the acculturation that allowed them to modify their identity accordingly to move between the groups from the knowledge of and emotional attachment to the group (Henri Tajfel et al., 1979). *Acculturation* is a social process that arises when a group of people with a particular culture confront other foreign customs elements and slowly accept and process them without losing their personality. (Koentjaraningrat, 1985).

It differs from the Pegunungan Tengah OAP that still upholds the sanctity of the land and environment, soil sacredness, particularly those who live in swamps, beaches, and along river basins, ecological zones at the foot of mountains and small valleys, including lowlands that have been degraded. Such degradation is a result of cultural interactions and assimilation with migrants. OAP's relationship with the land is no longer completely sacred, it is traded and even sold repeatedly. The internal pros and cons of land sanctity are shown by the high level of agrarian conflicts in beaches and river basins to lowland ecological zones where there is partial acculturation. In general, while the rest of the Papuans had accepted the Jakarta version of development, the Pegunungan Tengah Papua OAP inherited the values of the OPM declaration: anti governments and anti-development.

The implementation of several development programs failed due to the government's mindset (Rumansara). For example, the failure to implement the construction of standard houses and the Presidential Sheep program in the Baliem Valley, including the local transmigration process in Koya. Such failures show that the OAP is intolerant of the development of the Jakarta version. The radicalism background and the sanctity of the land and its natural environment are also against this development.

Moreover, the intolerance of the Pegunungan Tengah OAP is a form of resistance, which is against conditions that are disagreed upon either formally or informally (Ting-Toomey, 1999). These intolerant values are solidified and are passed down from one generation to another in this community. This circumstance leads to the occurrence of cultural transmission (subculture) (Cohen, 1955). The deviant behavior of the Pegunungan Tengah OAP (specifically the KTB) is only a representation of the government and development of the Jakarta version.

Aligned to the OPM declaration statement, on February 2, 2022, Seby Sambom as the KTB spokesperson from the Paniai region, stated, "We warned the Regent to reject the development process in Indonesia. Papuans do not need it, we only asked for the right to an independent self-determination". This statement confirmed that cultural transmissions occurred from the OPM declaration till the present. The OAP's intolerance is a socio-environmental movement reclaiming notions of indigeneity and traditional livelihoods (Borras, 2018). Populist eco-authoritarianism also takes the form of state-imposed obedience to strict environmental behavior and resource utilization and employs adverse strategies to handle scapegoats, either by retreat or rebel.

Subcultures in Pegunungan Tengah Papua

A subculture is a collection of people culturally differentiated from the more dominant custom. It unites like-minded individuals who feel neglected and rejected by social standards and lead them to develop a meaningful identity (Cohen, 1955). Prolonged marginalization tends to create subcultures, primarily characterized by deviant values and morals, which allows their members to gain prestige and recognition. The behavior displayed is different from the main custom (outside the subculture) because of the new norms (Cohen, 1955). To society as a whole, they appear deviant and criminal in some circumstances.

The condition of infrastructural development in Papua does not affect the Pegunungan Tengah OAP. However, the prolonged poverty - based on Miller's perspective of Gastil (1973) is a "culture of the poor" or "culture of poverty" (borrowing Gastil's term) which results in biosocial power interaction (Gastil, 1973) - perpetuates their living conditions with their traditional ways of life passed down from one generation to another. From a socio-criminological perspective, it is understandable that the values of Pegunungan Tengah OAP, who experienced poverty and encouraged economic and social frustration, play an essential role in perpetuating and maintaining this condition. However, the culture of poverty as the OAP subculture is not the leading cause of intolerance. The anomie conditions faced is as a result of injustice, social inequality, and prolonged marginalization that did not manifest into hostility towards other OAPs outside the Pegunungan Tengah Papua region. Rather, it tends to reject the superior value and action adopted and executed through retreatism.

Meanwhile, many forms of eco-populism mobilize non-violent forms of struggle, such as retreatism within 8 counties. Besides, some of these groups violently reject state authority, just like the OPM or KTB. Moreover, in some cases of right-wing environmental populism in the western United States, such as the Sagebrush Rebellion (McGregor, 1996), the Wise Use Movement (McCarthy, 2002), and the occupation of Oregon's Malheur National Wildlife Refuge by armed militia members rejected the U.S. federal government control of western lands (Gallaher, 2016). In Peru, self-defence peasant organizations (*rondas campesinas*) employed hierarchical, authoritarian, and at times violent internal practices (Gustafsson, Gustafsson, & Brian, 2017), although not as violent as the OPM or KTB in Indonesia.

Shaw and McKay (1942) stated that deviant behaviour persists for a long time in certain areas, irrespective of the different generations. Behavioural patterns are passed from one generation to the next, like in the case of the Pegunungan Tengah OAP. This pattern also illustrates that the sub-cultural transmission of KTB was indeed passed down across generations within the 6 counties. Unlike the rest of Pegunungan Tengah Papuans (non-KTB), the KTB aggressively rejects rebels' ideal values and actions, especially when it is to be implemented in their territory (Pegunungan Tengah). As an alternative status system, subcultures justify hostility and aggressive behaviour toward non-members, eliminating any possible guilt feelings. The contradiction of the non-hostile actions from the OAP subculture and aggressive actions shown by KTB brings a new question regarding the relationship between OAP intra-culture subcultures.

Terror Act as the Reaction of KTB Subculture

(Shaw & McKay, 1942) carried out a research in Juvenile Delinquency and Urban Areas and reported that there are 3 structural factors, namely economic status, ethnic heterogeneity, and population displacement. This led to the breakdown of social organization in local communities, manifested in criminality (Kartika & Hamid, 2020; Shaw & McKay, 1942). The acts of terrorism regarded as deviant behavior in the form of armed violence dominantly occurred in 6 of the 14

counties, indicating that there are 2 subcultures. This includes the Pegunungan Tengah OAP (non-violent) and the KTB subcultures (armed terrorism).

For OAP, the OPM Declaration closely relates to their value of the land and nature. Moreover, the radicalism exhibited is based on their attachment to the natural environment, regarded as their right. The Pegunungan Tengah OAP rejected the Jakarta version's modernization and development, synonymous with industrialization. The discrimination and injustice experienced by the Papuans also exacerbate their desires to separate from the sovereign territory of Indonesia, mainly interested in the welfare and prosperity of the community as well as its development. This condition further strengthened Papuan's desire to separate itself from Indonesia's sovereign territory (Muntaha, Kharisma, & Hanita, 2020).

Theoretically, ideology relatively assumes the stability of ideas and values. (Van Dijk, 1998) defines *it* as the basis of shared social representations of group members that allows them to organize a multitude of beliefs about what is good or bad, right or wrong, to act accordingly. Van Dijk argues that ideologies are relatively stable. However, their expressions and uses in discourses vary strategically and context-sensitive (Van Dijk, 1998). They are used to explain the reason behind the radical idea and values of the intact land sanctity among Pegunungan Tengah OAP. Unlike the mindset of lowland and coastal OAPs, whose ideas and values had been degraded due to the acculturation process brought about by the migrants.

(Smelser, 1963) stated that the migrants' (immigrants) interest, policy discrimination, and exploitation of Papuan's culture and natural resources are generalized beliefs that awaits precipitating factors to trigger vertical and horizontal conflicts. It was argued that the collective behavior of these movements is a side effect of the rapid social transformation. OAP feels a contradiction with the reality they face, leading to the exhibition of resistance (Smelser's collective behavior). Likewise, KTB's intolerance is an attitude described as a reaction to something that does not fit their values. This intolerance was shown to military officials, police, civil servants, construction workers, and others viewed as government representatives, including the infrastructural and developmental projects.

The KTB shows tolerance to any OAP that is a government official since they are viewed as Papuans. Some events even justified that they are still perceived as part of Pegunungan Tengah OAP rather than the government, even the military personnel. For example, the last 3 deserters of the military, namely privates Senat Soll AKA Annanias Yaluka, Lucius Y. Matuan and Yotam Bugiangge from Yahukimo, Wamena, and Nduga, respectively justified how Pegunungan Tengah OAP construct social identities under anomalous conditions (Henri Tajfel et al., 1979) or betwixt and between (borrowing Turner's terms). All 3 of them were Pegunungan Tengah OAP born and raised within the hotspot area of KTB activities.

The radical mindset of KTB members that put government representatives as "them" and the chosen attitudes towards them had been elaborated eloquently by Mitchell (1956). Mitchell classified the social distance stages into 7 categories, which are

- Admit somebody's kinship by marriage.
- Share a meal with somebody.
- Work together.
- Allow people to reside nearby or in neighbouring villages peacefully.
- Allow people to settle in their tribal area.
- Allow only visitors in their tribal area.
- Exclude people from their tribal area.

Based on this categorization, it was reported that KKB shows their distance to other OAP in stage 1, while their attitudes towards the government and development are represented in stage 7.

Some scholars such as Hajer have criticized, that actions and perceptions need to be understood based on deeply held belief systems Hajer (1995); Wittmer and Birner (2005) argues that interests are not given. Instead, they are inter-subjectively constituted through discourses. Interestingly, 6 counties in the Pegunungan Tengah Papua are hotspot areas. Throughout 2021, of the 14 counties in this region, the KTB action only took place in Yahukimo, Pegunungan Bintang, Nduga, Puncak, Puncak Jaya, and Intan Jaya. From January to April 2021, 23 acts of armed violence involving KKB were recorded. Additionally, 21 events occurred in the Pegunungan Tengah Papua, while 2 were outside this region.

The trend of armed violence by the KKB after being designated as an Armed Terrorist Group (KTB) by the government continued. From May to December 2021, 47 incidents involving KTB occurred in the Pegunungan Tengah Papua, and 2 were outside this region. All events involving KKB/KTB in 2021 are shown in table 2.

Table 2. Events related to the KTB in Papua (2021)

No	Date	Location	Event
1.	January 6, 2021	Intan Jaya	Aircraft burning at Pangamba Airport
2.	January 7, 2021	Intan Jaya	The rope cutting of the national flag
3.	January 7, 2021	Puncak	The burning of 2 BTS by KTB
4.	January 10, 2021	Intan Jaya	Armed conflict between KTB and TNI (Indonesian National Military)
5.	January 22, 2021	Intan Jaya	KKB attack military post
6.	February 3, 2021	Intan Jaya	Armed conflict between KTB and TNI
7.	February 8, 2021	Puncak	The burning of BTS by KTB
8.	February 8, 2021	Intan Jaya	The shooting of civilians by KTB
9.	February 12, 2021	Intan Jaya	The shooting of military officials by KTB
10.	February 15, 2021	Intan Jaya	The shooting of military officials by KTB
11.	February 15, 2021	Intan Jaya	Armed conflict between the joined counter-terrorism task force and KTB
12.	February 28, 2021	Mimika	Armed conflict between Nemangkawi task force and KTB
13.	March 22, 2021	Yahukimo	The shooting of civilians by KTB
14.	April 8, 2021	Puncak	The shooting of civilians and burning of some facilities by KTB
15.	April 9, 2021	Puncak	The shooting of civilians and burning of some facilities by KTB
16.	April 10, 2021	Puncak	The shooting of civilians by KTB
17.	April 11, 2021	Puncak	Helicopter burning at Illaga Airport
18.	April 14, 2021	Puncak	The shooting of civilians by KTB
19.	April 15, 2021	Puncak	A student killed by KTB
20.	April 18, 2021	Nabire	The arrest of the gun supplier to Intan Jaya KTB.
21.	April 25, 2021	Puncak	Armed conflict between KTB and the joined task force
22.	April 27, 2021	Puncak	Armed conflict between KTB and police

No	Date	Location	Event
23.	April 27, 2021	Puncak	Armed conflict between Nemangkawi task force and KTB
24.	May 2, 2021	Puncak	The burning of public facilities by the KKB
25.	May 6, 2021	Puncak	The shooting of the police by KTB
26.	May 8, 2021	Puncak	The burning of public facilities by the KKB
27.	May 12, 2021	Puncak	Armed conflict between Nemangkawi task force and KTB in Talagowa
28.	May 13, 2021	Puncak	Armed conflict between Nemangkawi task force and KTB
29.	May 16, 2021	Puncak	Armed conflict between the joined counter-terrorism task force and KTB
30.	May 18, 2021	Yahukimo	The attack on civilians by KTB
31.	Mei 18, 2021	Yahukimo	The attack on military personnel, suspected to be KTB
32.	May 18, 2021	Pegunungan Bintang	Armed conflict between KTB and TNI
33.	May 21, 2021	Puncak Jaya	Armed conflict between the joined counter-terrorism task force and KTB
34.	May 23, 2021	Puncak Jaya	KTB fugitive arrest
35.	June 3, 2021	Puncak	The burning of Illaga airport ATC by KTB
36.	June 24, 2021	Yahukimo	KTB killed construction workers
37.	Jun 29, 2021	Pegunungan Bintang	KTB burns corporate's vehicles
38.	July 6, 2021	Nduga	Armed conflict between the Pinang Sirih task force and KTB
39.	July 6, 2021	Nduga	The shooting of helicopter safeguard personnel by KTB
40.	July 10, 2021	Yahukimo	Taskforce ambushed KTB
41.	July 13, 2021	Nduga	Armed conflict between KTB and TNI
42.	July 22, 2021	Puncak Jaya	The arrest of KTB fugitive
43.	Augustus 3, 2021	Puncak Jaya	Law enforcement action on police post at Kulirik
44.	Augustus 15, 2021	Puncak	Armed conflict between KTB and TNI
45.	Augustus 22, 2021	Yahukimo	KTB killed construction workers
46.	Augustus 27, 2021	Yahukimo	The arrest of KTB members who killed construction workers
47.	September 1, 2021	Yahukimo	The arrest of KTB members by Nemangkawi Taskforce
48.	September 2, 2021	Maybe at	KTB attack military post
49.	September 3, 2021	Kab Jayapura	The arrest of KTB fugitives
50.	Sep 8, 2021	Pegunungan Bintang	KTB burns corporate's equipment
51.	Sep 13, 2021	Pegunungan Bintang	The shooting and burning of health personnel and facilities by KTB
52.	September 14, 2021	Intan Jaya	The shooting of civilians by KTB
53.	September 17, 2021	Pegunungan Bintang	Law enforcement on KTB

No	Date	Location	Event
54.	September 17, 2021	Intan Jaya	The shooting of military and civilians by KTB
55.	September 19, 2021	Intan Jaya	Armed conflict between KTB and TNI at Hitadipa
56.	September 21, 2021	Pegunungan Bintang	Assault by KTB on victim evacuation process at the airport
57.	September 26, 2021	Pegunungan Bintang	Armed conflict between Nemangkawi task force and KTB
58.	September 28, 2021	Pegunungan Bintang	Armed conflict between police and KTB
59.	October 26, 2021	Intan Jaya	The shooting of military post by KTB
60.	November 2, 2021	Intan Jaya	Arson by KTB
61.	November 14, 2021	Intan Jaya	Law enforcement on KTB by the joined task force
62.	November 16, 2021	Nduga	Shooting and arson by KTB
63.	November 20, 2021	Yahukimo	Armed conflict between the KTB and military
64.	November 28, 2021	Yahukimo	The arrest of KTB member by Satgas Nemangkawi
65.	November 29, 2021	Intan Jaya	Arson and facility destruction by KTB
66.	December 3, 2021	Yahukimo	Armed conflict between KTB and military in Suru-Suru
67.	December 5, 2021	Pegunungan Bintang	School burning
68.	December 7, 2021	Yahukimo	Armed conflict between KTB and military in Suru-Suru
69.	December 13, 2021	Pegunungan Bintang	Shooting of Brimob post
70.	December 14, 2021	Pegunungan Bintang	School burning

Collected from open-source data such as media reports and official publications

From table 2, it is evident that the violence in KTB specifically targeted government representatives. Furthermore, 32 events involved shootouts on civilians and gunfights versus TNI/Polri Personnel, 15 attacks were targeted at construction sites, public facilities such as airport or aircraft and telecommunication towers, while the remaining 5 were targeted at military and police posts. Alongside the sites and building, military and police officials, health and education personnel, construction workers, motorcycle, and taxi drivers were the main targets of KTB. The majority of the victims were members of the TNI, and incidents involving TNI were the highest (42 percent) compared to those with the police, civil servants (teachers and medical personnel), construction workers, and public facilities and physical development projects. TNI (military) is the main enemy of KTB because of the lengthy history of conflicts between them.

The physical, psychological, or structural violence forms a collective memory of prolonged suffering experienced by Papuans. This past residue in the form of collective memory is referred to as "*memoria passionis*," the term borrowed from (Espinosa Arce, 2016). Sulistyarningsih (2013) described resistance in a more concrete form as:

- (1) the action of opposing that is something disapproved or disagreed with;
- (2) a secret group organized to overthrow a government or occupation;
- (3) a group action in opposition to those powers.

Rudy Kogoya, an informant born in Lanny Jaya, although raised in Merauke reported that *memoria passionis* is transferred from one generation to the next. Rudy stated that:

"We never knew anything about the happenings in Pegunungan Tengah as we were brought up to and grew in Merauke, and my parents never mentioned it to me. However, when I enrolled on college, I met some Papuan students in Jakarta and received all the necessary information that made me query my parents, and they finally admitted the entire story. My *tete* (grandfather), *nene* (grandmother), and *Bapa ade* (uncle) were killed during the military bombing in Tiom. This made me angry, even when I never actually experienced the event."

The KTB action in the Pegunungan Tengah Papua was an act of resistance against the authorities caused by their rejection or disapproval of the government's activities. Understanding their radical mindset, intolerant attitude, and the terror activities executed by KTB makes them comparable to the *land defenders*. These are often described as members of the Indigenous communities who protect their land rights and land-based traditions (Bille Larsen et al., 2021). It is considered sacred by the indigenous people, and its care and protection are a duty to honor ancestors (see "Illegal protest or protection of land, an Indigenous woman gets ready to face a Canadian court" - APTN News). According to the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) land defenders are mostly exposed to risks (Bille Larsen et al., 2021).

Conclusion and Recommendation

Previous studies failed to explicitly explain the reason KTB is concentrated in 6 counties in the Pegunungan Tengah Papua. Generally, social inequality, marginalization, subculture, customary areas, demographic and development conditions are similar in all these regions. Nonetheless, this study discovered 2 different subcultures namely OAP Pegunungan Tengah and KKB subcultures. Both are simultaneously uncontested. However, they exhibit different attitudes towards government representatives and development initiatives. The OAP Pegunungan Tengah Papua subculture group chose retreatism, while the KKB preferred rebellion in response to government policy. Such behaviour creates radical mindsets passed down from one generation to the other till date.

Understanding the KTB's radical mindset is essential, especially when it concerns the sanctity of the land and the sacredness of preserving nature. This aids the government in carefully approaching this group, reducing its resistance in the form of terror acts, and developing the Pegunungan Tengah Papua. Discussions and dialogues are needed for development agents (government, corporations, and the military) to gain cultural understanding and trust from the OAP. Dialogue between the government and representatives of the Pegunungan Tengah Papua's indigenous people is needed to absorb the OAP's aspirations. Finally, the government need to adversely begin to adapt and participate in eco-development programs that promote local wisdom.

Reflecting on the failure of development programs in the past, the government needs to analyze it from a natural and environmental perspective. The success of *Kasuari* Program (*Kesejahteraan Untuk Anak Negeri*) or Welfare for State Children, also the name of a local

bird (Cassowary) through the farm, agriculture, and fishery to increase the economic development through optimization of local commodities according to the ecological zones that preferable to Pegunungan Tengah Papua people, or developing human resources through the *Polisi Pi Ajar*, contracted as *Si Ipar* (Police teaching schools) by Binmas Noken Indonesian Police. *Polisi Pi Ajar* aimed to educate the OAP's children, especially in areas with fewer teachers or no available educational facilities in some Pegunungan Tengah districts. This program which was started in 2018, is still functional to date in which the publication and report of Bimas Noken can be accessed on <https://www.binmasnokenpolri.com/>.

Economic development that prioritizes the transfer of appropriate knowledge and technology to increase the production and added value of local natural products is likely acceptable to the people compared to land conversion, utilization of timber forest products, and mining. The women may implement appropriate technology for superior local commodities towards protecting nature and the environment. Piglets distribution as one of the *Kasuari* program methods has become a community policing strategy to maintain social order in this region since 2018. Bimas Noken Polri continues and maintains this program as a priority of the current Carzrenz Operation by the Indonesian National Police. The piglets' distribution initiative is followed by raising pigs, pigpen building, and medication and vaccine programs.

Understanding the radicalism of KTB brings new enlightenment. Therefore, to stop armed terror acts by KTB, the Indonesian government needs to reduce the deployment of armed forces to this region gradually. The government need to concentrate more on the security perimeter at the borders of the Pegunungan Tengah Papua customary without initiating attacks on the KTB area. *Perimeter security* is defined as an effort to protect people, activities, and public facilities without disturbing the OAP's activities in their traditional territories.

Finally, the physical development and industrialization efforts of the Central Mountains needs to be reduced or postponed until the Pegunungan Tengah OAP has fully experienced acculturation with other ecological zones OAPs, and the migrants are ready for a transformation. Forcing the development of the Jakarta version created more cultural gaps. As Hajer (1995) pointed out, the struggle for discursive hegemony, in which actors try to secure support for their interpretation of reality, determines credibility, acceptability, and trust. Credibility depends not only on the plausibility of the argument rather on the author's authority. Acceptability implies that the position is considered attractive or necessary, and trust leads to the suppression of doubts by referring to the definition of reality.

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Interview

- Arman Wakum (30 years), Universitas Nasional Master Student, from Biak, 23 February 2022
- Charles Kossay (28 years), Universitas Nasional Master Student, from Wamena, 23 February 2022.
- Lisa Wanembo (25 years), Universitas Kristen Indonesia Master Student from Tolikara, 20 May 2021.
- Henny Tabisu (28 years), Universitas Kristen Indonesia Master Student, from Jayapura, 20 May 2021.
- Yosua Hiluka (26 years), Universitas Nasional Master Student, from Wamena, 20 May 2021.
- Rudi Kogoya (22 years old), Universitas Kristen Indonesia Undergraduate Student from Nduga, 23 February 2022.
- Steven Kossay (25 years), Universitas Kristen Indonesia Undergraduate Student, from Wamena, 23 February, 2022.
- Matius Wonda (21 years), Undergraduate Student from Universitas Nasional, from Puncak, 23 February 2022.