

Civil-Military Relation in the Land Border: A Case Study of West Kalimantan

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Abstract

The border area is particularly prone to disputes and conflicts, especially those affecting national security. We address this subject specifically from the standpoint of non-military defence, with its multiple threat dimensions. We identify the border area as a site where civil-military relations could be investigated, particularly how civilian-dominated authorities effectively supervise and accomplish complex goals in defence as a military domain. We focus our study on the Indonesia-Malaysia border region, particularly West Kalimantan-Sarawak, taking into account both historical and contemporary developments. We conclude that a collaborative institutional role following Concordance Theory is essential in managing border areas vulnerable to multidimensional threats. Similar research that discusses the role of institutions in a comprehensive and holistic manner can be put forward for future research.

Keywords: Civil-Military Relation, Border, West Kalimantan

Introduction

Due to the sheer globalized world's developments, the source of threat to what has been known as 'national security' has become broader, not only covering internal and/or external threats but also threats that are global and cannot be classified as external or internal. As a result, the threat's nature evolves to be complex. Threats are getting increasingly diversified and cannot be limited to military threats alone. Threats beyond that, commonly known as non-military threats, are aspects that must be addressed.

Non-military threats include ideological, political, economic, socio-cultural, technical, public safety, and legislative elements, according to the Indonesian Defense White Paper (2015). Non-military threats, like military threats, can take various forms. This non-military threat frequently manifests itself in border countries, including Indonesia which shares direct borders with 10 nations. Indonesia shares land borders with Papua New Guinea; maritime borders with Singapore, the Philippines, Australia, Vietnam, India, Thailand, and

the Republic of Palau; and both borders with Timor Leste and Malaysia (Ayuni 2018, Irawan 2019), all of which are still involved in bilateral territorial disputes (Gindarsah & Priamarizki 2021).

The borders separating Indonesia and Malaysia, particularly in the state of Kalimantan, is one of the longest and most porous, stretching for more than 2,000 kilometers. For instance, to avert border incidents with its neighboring nations, the Indonesian government employs soft power through diplomatic channels while simultaneously enhancing military might (Budiana, et al. 2019). However, the entity in charge of the border area in this situation is not a military or defense authority, but rather a civilian-subordinated agency. This scenario undoubtedly has implications for the need to address non-military threats as well as how civil-military relations in Indonesia's border areas with other nations are governed.

The objective of this research is to investigate the challenges of land borders between Indonesia and Malaysia and to connect them with the implementation of civil-military relations in their establishment. We select a case study in the border area of West Kalimantan Province, which shares a border to Malaysia's Sarawak region. We made this decision since both nations have invested much in the development of border areas in the region in recent years. Furthermore, we know that historically, the two regions have a compelling connection to examine. The study's conclusions are expected to give an overview of how civil-military relations are established at the border.

Literature Review

In this section, we will explain how border theory and civil-military relations theory developed over time. We elaborate on several schools of thought and the approaches used to examine them. Furthermore, we will also relate each theory to the context of the border between West Kalimantan and Sarawak.

Borders & Sovereignty

Throughout the framework of national security, while assuming that the country no longer confronts challenges to its legitimacy, the state must have three components: territorial sovereignty, a functioning government, and the ability to maintain safety, order, and welfare. In border areas, arguments over regional sovereignty and community welfare are frequently intertwined. The border context has various perspectives, as Elden (2010) separates it into three aspects: land, terrain, and territory. The land is centered on a political-economic framework that is closely tied to property in that it is a constrained resource that may be distributed, allocated, and possessed through competition. The terrain is built on a political-strategic environment tied to the military and power that enables the establishment and maintenance of order. Meanwhile, territory includes both.

The border between West Kalimantan and Sarawak includes a 966-km line with 50 spaths connecting 55 villages in West Kalimantan with 32 villages in Sarawak (Karim 2015), which Mee (2019) constitutes as borderscope. The use of terminology borderscope is intended as an effort to capture that the West Kalimantan and Sarawak borders are not only physical boundaries but also to recognize the multi-scalar economic, political, and cultural processes that shape these borders as border zones. Borders are not only physical barriers, but also a cultural, social, territorial, geographical, political, sexual, racial, and physiographic variation (seas, mountains, deserts) that influence human lives and representations, thereby affecting

people's daily routines (Lunden, 2004; Houtum, 2005; Ullah & Kumpoh, 2018; Vollmer, 2019). Furthermore, by acknowledging that the boundary in West Kalimantan-Sarawak is essentially permeable or porous.

As Mee (2019) characterized that the territorial borders between the regions tend to be 'low profile' of minimal inter-state conflict and impenetrable borders that provide relatively safe cross-border for people and goods, including forms of cross-border traffic which are illegal in this country but enabled and considered acceptable by local norms, perspectives, and distance. In comparison, Between the two, residents on the Indonesian border have a lower standard of living than those in Malaysia. Four of the eight administrative regencies/cities immediately next to Malaysia's territory, notably Sambas, Bengkayang, Sintang, and Kapuas Mulu, are categorized as impoverished. The increased appeal of the Sarawak area is also reflected in a large number of personnel and resources transported from West Kalimantan to the region. Using the gravity model technique, Bariyah & Lau (2019) discovered that more than 98% of West Kalimantan's total export are mostly consumed in Sarawak and more than 200.000 labours in Sarawak came from Indonesia. This situation is based on an increasing number of employees, along with the competitive wages of cross-border migrant labourers who originated from Indonesia, as it has been the case for a long time.

This tendency has been around for a long time, dating back to the nineteenth century. According to Ishikawa (2010), the population of the area around Sambas, which is now part of West Kalimantan, has relocated to the territory of northwest Sarawak to work in the coconut plantation, timber-logging, and boat-building industries since the late 1800s. This condition persisted even after the two nations gained independence, and eventually culminated in the Indonesia-Malaysia conflict in 1963-1966. The expansion in military forces in the region has transformed the commerce pattern between the two nations' borders into a new phase. According to Mee (2019), the rise of concessions in forestry and timber sectors, which are subsequently sold to Sarawak, boosts trade exchanges as well as labour migration from West Kalimantan to Sarawak.

However, the commerce that takes place is not restricted to legitimate trade, but also to illegal trade. According to Obidzinski, Andrianto, and Wijaya (2007), illegal trade in the timber sector promotes illicit trade and labour migration, even involving bribery of police or security officials and border guards. This circumstance is still feasible due to the enormous amount of rough routes, sometimes known as 'jalur tikus' by locals. Unregulated traffic in high-value or illicit items such as wood, oil palm fruit, diesel fuel, and food commodities is permitted through this number of rough routes. The increasing number of transnational crimes necessitates response by both nations.

The National Border Management Agency (Badan Nasional Pengelola Perbatasan/BNPP) is the leading authority having responsibilities for border management in Indonesia. Widiartana (2020) emphasised that the BNPP's position and jurisdiction encompasses a wide range of areas, including security, education, infrastructure, economy, social, and cultural issues, among others. Some of these areas of authority correspond to non-military threats listed in the Defense White Paper. BNPP, being a civilian entity, supervises more than 20 ministries and institutions, was founded in response to the conditions and requirements to speed the treatment of backwardness in Indonesia's border areas and was granted significant power in carrying out development in border areas. How BNPP manages borders from the perspective of non-military threats is the focus of civil-military relations, especially in border areas.

Civil-Military Relations

The complexities of the civilian-military relation have long been the topic of a nuanced dialectic. The balance of the two can be a factor of a country's growth and development or stagnation, particularly in emerging nations. The military is crucial in establishing the political route in many emerging nations since it may serve as a government or a junior partner of civilian government and can control, dominate, or heavily influence the country for years (Ringgi Wangge, 2017). As Murdie (2013) elaborates, excessive civil–military conflict leads to military ineffectiveness, plenty of internal issues, and even an increased likelihood of military coup. On the other hand, at the opposite end of the spectrum, a type of dysfunctional civil–military relationship might limit military performance and, by extension, the possibility of crisis victory: overdeference problem.

Theories that analyze the relationship between civilian and the military have progressed through numerous stages, which Baciu (2021), categorised into several categories:

1. Divergence-based logics;
2. Sociological (convergence-based) approaches;
3. Rationalistic frameworks;
4. Neo-institutionalism; and
5. Pluralistic rationales

Huntington (1957) developed the theory of divergence-based logics, which is often known as the classical theory. The classic theories of civil-military transformation aim to explain how to attain civilian control of the military while maintaining the optimum balance of power between military and civilian institutions. Huntington distinguishes two layers of civil-military relations: power and ideology. Power denotes the military's official and informal influence on community groups, particularly civilians who possess power in institutions or agencies connected to policies that are directly or indirectly tied to military structures. Ideology, meanwhile, refers to a system of beliefs that form the hold of society, military professional ethics are consistent with it.

Professionalism in the armed services, according to Huntington, is the essential to a well-functioning military. When the armed forces are permitted and encouraged to create a unique military culture from civilian authority, it helps them function as a unit and removes military commanders from the political process, reducing the potential of military coups or insubordination. This sort of civilian control, according to Huntington, is "objective" in nature, as opposed to "subjective" civilian control, which arises when civilians politicise and control all areas of military decision making. Under subjective control, civilians attempt to exert influence over the military at all levels and integrate it into the faction attempting to dominate political authority, including active involvement in administration, meanwhile objective control, on the other hand, grants the military greater institutional autonomy in the technical arena in exchange for full political subordination (Sebastian & Gindarsah 2013)

The second hypothesis is sociological (convergence-based), and it mostly corresponds to Janowitz's views (1960). He disagrees and emphasises the necessity for the military to reflect civilian society as a whole; civil–military interactions more closely resemble an interest group model in which the military competes for resources and attention with other organisations. Janowitz, in contrast to Huntington, advocates a far-reaching kind of civilian supervision at various levels inside the organisation.

Rationalistic frameworks refers Feaver (1996, 1999) proposition that civil–military interactions follow a conventional principal–agent model, with civilian leaders functioning as principals and military officials operating as agents. As a result, Feaver contends that the military has a tendency to "shirk" from its assigned obligations, and that a system of monitoring agent conduct is required to penalise the military when civilian directives are not followed. As Feaver tend to focuses on the political science component of the subfield, he considers the relation as a simple paradox or problematique, which was created to protect the polity is given sufficient power to become a threat to the polity.

Feaver viewpoint from political science is divided into three categories: normative, empirical/descriptive, and theoretical. Each component contributes significantly to the analysis of civil-military relations. What should be done, how much civilian control would be enough, and what can be done to strengthen civil-military relations are all questions addressed by normative analysis. Since civilian authority of the military is so important in policy, the normative approach is extensively used in the study of civil-military interactions. The empirical/descriptive lens, which strives to accurately depict occurrences. The empirical/descriptive lens, when applied to the topic of civil-military relations, entails constructing typologies of various types of civilian control or lack thereof. Conclusions gained from the third mode of analysis, the theoretical lens, are also implied in the normative lens.

Furthermore, the fourth theory is related to the view of neo-institutionalism. Pion-Berlin (1992) sees military autonomy as more successful when extended to primary or 'core' professional activities rather than non-primary or 'periphery' responsibilities. Military autonomy is stronger when functions are seen to be clearly internal to the profession; levels are lower where functions are located either in the gray zone between professional and political spheres of influence or inside the political sphere itself. Gibson (1999), on the other hand, offers a theoretical approach that examines history to understand how diverse concerns and policy options enter the policy agenda and then how the major or leading actors are decided. This approach also considers how institutions or agencies have a policy-making process with direct vertical support, so that as the structure, norms, and/or rules change, so do the expectations of the subsequent policies.

Lastly, Schiff's perspectives (1995, 2012) on pluralistic rationales, commonly known as Concordance Theory, is addressed. The concordance theory focuses on discussion, accommodation, and common values or aims among the military, political leaders, and society in order to achieve two goals: to examines whether institutional and cultural conditions—such as separation, integration, or some other alternative—prevent or favor domestic military action and to predicts when the three parties reach an agreement, so that domestic military involvement will be less likely. Concordance also promotes the ways of reaching an agreement, such as collaboration and partnership among the military, political institutions, and society as a whole. The sign of targeted partnership within the political decision-making process permits the broader national decision-making framework to be flexible in specific circumstances for clearly defined goals.

The five approaches outlined above roughly describe how the dynamics of civil-military interactions play out in the actual world. According to Baciu (2021), there are six factors that can influence existing theoretical aspect in international military governance in respect to the border setting: 1) endogenous military change; 2) transformation of military roles; 3) informality and institutionalisation; 4) checking power and transparency; 5) role of non-state actors in building power and will for change; and 6) limitation of local actors' approach.

The context of civil-military relations in Indonesia can be analyzed in several ways. Along with the transition of power from independence to the reform era before the turn of the millennium, military doctrine in Indonesia underwent several changes. Furthermore, military reform and its relation to civilians are still vulnerable due to the low level of civilian control in the context of democracy, as well as the void in the legal framework for national defense, and the gap in capabilities in the context of the defense economy (Sebastian & Gindarsah, 2013).

The presence of a privilege feature also indicates a low amount of civil authority. According to Croissant & Kuehn (2017), there are three levels of civilian control in military organizations: high, medium, and low. A high degree indicates that the military does not oppose civilian authority through military privileges and contestations, a medium degree indicates the existence of privileges that include political power even if they are not based on the power of applicable regulatory frameworks, and a low degree indicates the military's dominance in the decision-making process and implementation within civilian institutions.

According to Aditya Gunawan in Croissant and Kuehn (2017), civil-military relations in Indonesia are classified as medium. This argument is based on the evolution of a defensive posture embodied in Minimum Essential Forces (MEFs), which limits the involvement of civilians in decision-making, particularly in the formulation and implementation of defense policies. The MEF is also seen as lacking in substantial doctrinal and operational frameworks, making modifications difficult in the event of changes in the strategic environment or geopolitical background conditions that continue to adhere to the territorial-warfare strategy.

The lack of a legal framework, as indicated previously by Sebastian and Gindarsah (2013), enhances the prospect or probability of military authorities controlling civilians through government institutions and policies aligned with defense and security interests (Sebastian, Syailendra, & Marzuki 2018). These intersecting policies are primarily related to the policy framework that regulates the military's role in intervening and reshaping policies that adjust the military's strategic view in Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW), which can increase the mentality of dependence and reduce the capacity of civil institutions, according to Sebastian, Syailendra, and Marzuki (2018). In response to these factors, Laksmana (2019) thinks that the context of civil-military interactions in Indonesia is also impacted by the military's internal dynamics. The context includes intra-military, inter-agency, and civil-military contacts, with the aim of expanding the structure to a territorial command that can support intra-generational and stable civil-military relations in the long run.

MOOTW is a strategic necessity, which Indonesian Armed Forces (TNI) is expected can perform multitasking roles beyond conventional warfare against foreign enemies and counter-insurgency missions. However, such missions could not provide a concrete and measurable outcome which is why the institution of representative democracy civil authority within parliament should be useful in establishing a ground base to monitor and evaluate mission implementation (Haripin 2019). According to Article 7 of the Indonesian Armed Forces Act, the military's responsibility pertaining to MOOTW includes: (1) combating trained and equipped separatist movements, (2) combating armed insurgent groups and rebellion, (3) responding to violent organizations, (4) securing border areas, (5) securing vital strategic objects, (6) participating in peacekeeping operations in compliance with the country's foreign policy, (7) protecting the president and vice president, as well as their family members, (8) enabling defense regions in conformance with the total defense system, and (9) supporting local and regional governments, (10) supporting the police in restoring order and security in adherence to the rule of law, (11) protecting essential foreign visitors, (12) delivering

humanitarian assistance and disaster aid, (13) providing assistance search and rescue operations, and (14) assisting the government in combating piracy, smuggling, and hijacking.

This dynamic must also be considered by the BNPP as the civil authority in charge of regulating borders against non-military threats, which is also connected to MOOTW as previously explained. In particular, the fourth aspect, where the military also plays a significant role in securing the border. The BNPP's ambiguous role in predicting numerous national defense and security challenges must also be addressed. At the same time, how the BNPP delegated its key responsibilities and powers to the ministries/agencies under its management reflects the necessity to preserve civil-military cooperation and relation.

Methods

We implement qualitative approach and conducted in-depth semi-structured interviews with over 60 questions on 12 informants and a series of group Focus Group Discussions and Round Table Discussions. We identified and selected the informants purposively from relevant government institutions.

Results & Discussion

This section will go through the findings of our research, which were generated from a review of documents and scientific journals, as well as the results of interviews and a series of group discussions with our informants. This section is separated into two sections that analyze the circumstances and limits on the West Kalimantan border and their relationship to non-military defense, as well as the role of the BNPP as the leading authority to deal with non-military threats.

West Kalimantan Borders: Issues & Threats

West Kalimantan Province is known as the 'Thousand Rivers Province' due to the landscape's abundance of major and small rivers. The primary important rivers include the Kapuas River, which is also Indonesia's longest river (1,086 km, 942 km length and passable), and seven other large rivers, each of which is more than a hundred kilometers long and accessible. West Kalimantan province also features extensive plains and low-altitude, inactive mountains. Mount Baturaya in Serawai District, Sintang Regency, has the highest altitude of 2,278 meters above sea level. The majority of the land in West Kalimantan (42.32 percent) is forest, with the remainder being farmland, bushes, or reeds (34.11 percent). The largest forest area, with an area of 1.9 million hectares, is in Kapuas Hulu Regency, whereas the largest grassland or scrub area is in Ketapang Regency, with an area of around 1,374,145 hectares. The plantation area reached almost 1.6 million hectares, or 10.73 percent of the total. Only around 0.83 percent of West Kalimantan's 14.68 thousand hectares is suitable for habitation.

Because of such terrain circumstances, the border between West Kalimantan and Sarawak, which is nearly a thousand kilometers long, is quite simple to cross via illicit pathways. According to our findings from this study's interviews, there were 6,664 illegal migrant workers from Indonesia detained and deported from Malaysian territory between 2017 and 2020. Border threats often entail sovereignty, illicit activity, and the moving of boundary markers. The same applies to the misuse of firearms and explosives by the public. Natural catastrophes such as floods, landslides, and fires continue to be the most serious non-military hazards along the West Kalimantan-Malaysia land boundary. The data gathered from the

border security operations relating to violations that occurred revealed that of the 29 border security posts, unauthorized entrance was the most common violation, accounted for 95 occurrences, 70 of which happened in Entikong.

Since 1989, there has been a disagreement regarding the designation of the land boundary between West Kalimantan and Sarawak (as well as between East Kalimantan and Sabah). There is a perception difference in which the Indonesian side believes there are ten Outstanding Boundary Problems (OBP), whereas the Malaysian side believes there are nine OBP, which stem from problems perception of colonial heritage agreements, specifically the Anglo-Dutch Treaties of 1891 and 1915. In 2019, the two countries' Technical Teams agreed on land borders, having concluded four of nine OBPs with Malaysia that had been outstanding since 1989. From Indonesia's point of view, in the eastern region, there are five OBPs between North Kalimantan and Sabah which have been considered completed, three points have entered the process of demarcating or marking national boundaries, and thus the remaining five OBPs are in the western sector. This effort is classified as preventive and diplomacy, on the other hand a protective strategy as a deterrence effort is still required.

Non-military defense is employed in the face of non-military threats. There is an item on mobilization in the Management of National Resources for National Defense Act, but it only addresses the main component and reserve component; it does not address mobilization of the non-military defense component at all. On a practical level, non-military defense may make use of reserve components and supporting components since the reserve components and supporting components are mostly made up of civilians. Once reserve components and supporting components are initiated, they are counted as combatants, so if they are used to counter non-military threats that are not included in the OMSP category or are otherwise used when they are not activated as reserve components, they will necessitate changes, particularly to the National Defense Act and the Management of National Resources for National Defense Act.

In general, non-military defensive preparation in West Kalimantan-Malaysia land border areas is largely conceptual. The involvement of relevant ministries and institutions in dealing with border threats remains within the context of each ministry's and related institutions' principal functions, rather than within a non-military defense framework. In the West Kalimantan border region, community engagement in the form of reserve components and supporting components, as well as state defense, has not been recognized as an effective activity. State defense education in border areas has not been able to completely address the difficulties of non-military border threats, which according to data from the Directorate General of Defense Potential, Ministry of Defense of Republic of Indonesia, is still below the optimum number.

Strategies to raise community defense resources are still ongoing. According to Laksmana (2019), between 2014 and 2017, the TNI and Ministry of Defense signed 133 deals with dozens of civilian ministries, civil society organisations and universities on programmes ranging from basic military training to rural development projects. These activities can also be categorized as efforts to broaden the scope of civil-military cooperation, which following Barany (2012), the military can support civilian leadership as long as it meets the military's requirements. These circumstances include four essential functions. First, sharing of tasks and responsibilities between executive and legislative authorities in supervising the military sector, including personnel, organization, procurement and acquisition of defense equipment and technology, and financial decisions. Second, the constitutionally mandated relation between the executive, both state leaders and defense ministries, and the military chain of command.

Third, internal military reform that responds to the dynamics of the democratic system. Finally, personnel recruitment and composition that represents society's socio-cultural diversity.

BNPP Roles and Responsibilities

BNPP is responsible in two directions, according to the regulations that govern its establishment. The first dimension is the boundary dimension, which includes the administration of state borders on land, sea, and air, followed by cross-border management and national border security. The second level is the frontier dimension, which aims to develop border areas.

Along porous border, Indonesia and Malaysia have agreed on official crossing points consisting of 12 conventional cross-border posts (PLB) and three national cross-border posts (PLBN). Traditional PLB is controlled by the Directorate General of Immigration, Ministry of Law and Human Rights of the Republic of Indonesia, and services are given for individuals crossing the border using cross-border passes in accordance with the "border cross agreement." Meanwhile, BNPP manages the three PLBNs as gateways or state verandas to service the crossing of persons and products with proper travel papers such as passports and cross-border permits. West Kalimantan currently has three PLBNs: 1) Aruk PLBN, which is located in Sajingan Besar District, Sambas Regency, West Kalimantan; 2) Entikong PLBN, which is located on Jalan Lintas Malindo, Sanggau Regency, West Kalimantan, and is bordered by Tebedu, which is part of Malaysia. The post was Indonesia's first land border crossing point, opening on October 1, 1989; and 3) Badau PLBN, which opened in March 2018, is located in Kapuas Hulu Regency, West Kalimantan.

BNPP is also in charge of building the Border Patrol Inspection Line (JIPP), which is 60 kilometers of pioneering track and 50 kilometers of pavement, until 2020. JIPP is used to secure state border regions along key areas of state defense and security. JIPP is a land border security inspection and patrol line established parallel to the national boundary line roughly 50 meters from the state line. JIPP was developed by entering the bush in Kalimantan's land border area. The route chosen is really challenging. JIPP is being built in seven segments with a total length of 722.88 km of pioneering track and 240 km of pavement. From the skies, the region crossed by JIPP appears to be rather large in the shape of hills and valleys covered with vegetation or even peat soil that is neither thick or soft. This is one of the issues encountered during the construction of the JIPP in West Kalimantan. It is frequently impractical to build roads in a straight path to connect two points. According to a survey completed by a team of specialists, the steep topography and contours lead JIPP to be suited to the prevailing circumstances in the field. There are at least 4 types of areas that must be passed by the development team as follows:

Pioneering Paths in Excavations and Stockpiles

The construction of this path is carried out by carrying out excavations in the form of breathing on the slopes so as to form walls with a slope of 45° at a height of every 3 m, equipped with a 1 m wide terrace which can be continued with walls and terraces with the same height and width repeatedly so as to form a terraced wall. While on the other side of a steep road, filling and wall formation is carried out to support the road with the same stratified technique as the other side with the difference that the slope is lower than the road body.

Pioneering Paths in the Flatlands

To build a trail on flat terrain is generally easier than other types of trailing. The JIPP team still has to clear the forest and clear the disturbing vegetation and its presence is in

the road plan. Each of these roads is equipped with earth channel excavation to drain water so as not to damage the road.

Pioneering Paths in the Excavation Area

There are also excavated areas that require the JIPP team to excavate an area containing both peat and rocky soil so that a more consistent layer of density is obtained.

Pioneering Paths in Stockpile Areas

For lanes in the stockpile area, make the road area higher by at least 1 m. This height increase is carried out as a preventive measure to prevent damage to the road being built. This damage can occur, including through water infiltration due to weather factors.

Nevertheless, the BNPP's continual physical development efforts, as detailed above, have not been matched by a common awareness of non-military threats. According to the findings of multiple informant interviews, the phrase "non-military defense" was not yet generally recognized among Ministries/Agencies outside the defense industry, as well as municipal and subnational administrations. According to a senior BNPP official:

"There is no term 'non-military threat' and 'non-military defense' in BNPP planning documents, such as Grand Design for Management of State Boundaries and Border Areas 2011-2025; National Border Management Master Plan 2015-2019. Defense, security, and the rule of law are always mentioned in these documents."

Further, our informant elaborates that:

"Thus far, 'non-military defense' has been defined as any entity 'other than the deployment of armed soldiers,' so what the BNPP (together with all of its members, including the TNI Commander-in-Chief) is doing is part of the process of developing a 'non-military' defensive force. The biggest issue at the border today is the lack of socioeconomic welfare and infrastructure across all elements of society. As a result, all types of 'non-military' development have become an important matter that must be addressed. Since its inception in 2010, BNPP has defined the border area, with all of its limits, as the state's 'front yard,' rather than the 'backyard,' as it was previously. BNPP does not use the term 'military' or 'non-military' in the context of constructing a very complicated border area."

Another informant stated that the Ministry of Defense's regulatory framework regarding the Strategic Guidelines for Non-Military Defense were not implemented and were poorly understood by Ministries and Agencies outside the defense sector, owing to the product's weak legality to be complied with by Ministries/Agencies outside the defense sector and a lack of socialization being the main reasons for misunderstanding the policy's product. In contrast to the previous informant, another informant from the Ministry of Defense stated that several obstacles and challenges in the process of coordinating and socializing the National Defense Act and other defense policy products, among others, were that during coordination or socialization, personnel from other ministries and agencies involved were always fluctuating, so it was never exactly on target. There is a misunderstanding because they believe that the military sector is solely the responsibility of the Ministry of Defense and the TNI.

There is still a lack of knowledge and coordination across ministries and agencies responsible for the border, particularly in West Kalimantan and Sarawak, necessitating specific attention from stakeholders. In this scenario, Schiff's Concordance Theory is a best alternative to apply to the case of BNPP and associated ministries. This approach involves discussion,

accommodation, and developing an understanding of common aims, with the goal of decreasing military engagement, particularly in the context of MOOTW.

Conclusion

Non-military threats of multiple dimensions must first be recognized and comprehended before attempting to design countermeasures. The border between West Kalimantan, Indonesia, and Sarawak, Malaysia, is one of the borders in the border region with a high degree of transnational crime. Cross-dimensional losses cannot be overcome just by hard power; alternative techniques, such as soft power and policies dealing with non-military threats, particularly those directly tied to civilians, are considered necessary. In Indonesia, the BNPP is the leading authority in terms of border management and discontent. We analyze whether the BNPP is successful in regulating borders, including the organization of military forces inside it, as part of Indonesia's dynamic process of civil-military interactions.

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