

Causes Of Flight, Boko Haram Induced-Displacement. A Case Study Of Linea Settlement In The Fringe Of Lake Chad Basin, Nigeria.

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Abstract

Forced migration is a commonly overlooked but very important any of people to abandoned their original places of abode, placing a heavy responsibility on both domestic and international governments to deal with the predicament of these forgotten communities. However, for every person who quits a violent scenario, there are numerous others who stay, posing significant issues for both researchers and decision-makers. This paper will study or investigate variations in individual-level behaviour toward the habit of fleeing in reaction to the insurgency caused by the Boko Haram along the Lake Chad Basin's periphery. Multivariate analysis was used to explain variation in forced migration across three Local Government Areas; Abadam, Kukawa and Monguno that were severely impacted by the mayhem that affect significant number of social fabric such as economic opportunity, physical infrastructure, geographical terrain, and social networks using secondary and primary data collected through fieldwork in the Lake Chad Basin. Additionally, information was obtained about how people behaved when faced with security risks in their houses and whether they used any potential coping techniques. Without also comprehending the actions of those who are adamant about fleeing, a study of the reasons why individuals escape amid war will fall short. The study offers fresh perspectives on variance and individual-level behaviour that are missing from many previous studies which is thought to be the gap that inspired the empirical shift to emphasise. The current analysis shows that variations in forced migration at the individual level are influenced by both the circumstances people find themselves in and the opportunities those circumstances present to them.

Keywords: Boko Haram, conflict, displacement, inducement, crisis

Introduction

This study considers the factors that influence people's whether to leave their homes during a civil conflict like the recent Boko Haram Insurgency. Forced migration is one of the integral effects of such warfare. According to research, forced migration is not the only byproduct of conflict that people can make decisions even in highly risky circumstances like war. It should come as no surprise that for every person who chooses to run during a conflict, another person chooses to risk their life by sticking there. This shows that choices are still possible even in exceedingly odd and demanding situations. While conflicts worldwide continue to uproot people every year, areas like Afghanistan and Somalia, where hostilities have raged for decades, have not completely seen their inhabitants flee, posing intriguing and

important questions. There is no much studies conducted in relation this phenomenon that influence some people's to stay in conflict-ridden areas while others choose to leave, either at the subnational or individual level. The inspiration for the current research came from these puzzles. What causes some people to remain where they are in the face of horrific violence and risk their lives while other people flee? When their lives are in danger, how do those who choose to stay handle conflict? How do those decisions affect the gravity of staying or flee? And what determine the decisions of flight?

Studies on conflicts reveal that individuals alternatively may decide to leave or stay even in the most difficult circumstances (Davenport, Moore, and Poe 2003; Moore and Shellman 2004; 2006; 2007; Melander and berg 2006; 2007). This "choice-centered" method greatly contributes to laying the groundwork for investigating forced migration within a theoretical framework by utilising theoretical ideas from the utility maximisation literature in microeconomics. However, this research does not investigate the reasons influencing people's decisions or the coping techniques they employ in difficult circumstances; it just acknowledges the presence of such possibilities. Melander and Berg (2006, 2007) or Edwards (2009), this research reveals that people are equally impacted by conflict. Additionally, cross-national aggregate statistics are used in current research to predict behaviour at the individual and subnational levels.

What are the reasons people choice to leave or stay in a place? What coping mechanisms people adopt in a horrified situation to stay? In order to research choice at a more micro and individual level and to address current constraints, this paper goes beyond previous literature in examining the the degree of flight. War affects everyone universally, but depending on the type of violence committed by whom, there may be mix feeling in how people considered the outcome of war. In addition, due to family, economic, cultural, religious, and other factors, some people may be more devoted to their homes than others. While social networks that function as neighbourhood associations may change how threats are perceived or really experienced that motivate some people to remain while others threaten to leave. The abundance of available data disproved this claim. The choice-centered model of forced migration is put to fresh and improved testing by the analysis at micro level. The findings of this study vehemently improve upon the previous researches (aggregate cross-national analyses of forced) migration, corroborating some of the current empirical findings and offering fresh perspectives on the reasons for displacement.

To understand why some people, decide to stay in a conflict situation while others decide to leave is obviously not only a matter of academic curiosity. Many people are compelled to flee their homes annually worldwide. Over 43 million people had been "forcibly evicted" from their homes by the end of 2009, of which 27.1 million were domestically displaced (UNHCR 2010). There were 25 prolonged refugee situations around the world as of the end of 2009, refugees have been living in exile for more than five years. These figures are mind-boggling, but shocking to see that despite person who flees their home during a civil war, many more choose to take significant risks by remaining there, making individual level decisions an important phenomenon.

Literature Review

People may make decisions even in "extraordinary circumstances," according to a core premise of current research on forced migration (Moore and Shellman 2006: 59). The literature has made significant contribution in a number of ways, but two stand out in particular: (I) it

has attempted to highlight the the problems facing refugees and internally displaced people (IDPs) by contrasting voluntary and forced migration, and (ii) it has laid the foundation for the sparse theory of forced migration. Even if the prior research is limited by its dependence on national level data, the study offers one such opportunity to improve the macro-micro relationship. More theoretical work is needed to build the rational choice model. While it would be practically impossible to evaluate all the literature that has been written about forced migration, Mason (2000) remarked that the relevant literature is organised by the subjects studied and is summarised below.

Armed conflict and forced migration

However, the majority of scholars agreed that all forms of violence (or war in general) create threat that whether or not to leave their homes, there is some disagreement among them as to the type of conflict that instigate displacement. Country's involvement in foreign conflicts had a negligibly positive impact on refugee flows Schmeidl (1997). Another school of thought disagree with the notion that a country's engagement in a global conflict has a positive effect on net forced migration Davenport et al (2003). However, Moore and Shellman (2004) found that the number of forced migrants dramatically rises when foreign troops are present in a country. According to their conclusions from a cross-national examination from 1976 to 1996, migration catastrophes associated with international armed conflict are extremely rare. With the exception of the years 1990 to 1994, when it peaked, the post-Cold War era has not generally led to an increase in forced migration Melander, berg, and Hall (2009). The spatial distribution of conflict significantly predicts forced migration, in contrast to the severity of violence as assessed by battle dead Melander and Berg (2007). Researchers have discovered a number of connections between ethnic strife and forced migration. Despite the fact that ethnic conflict is a significant factor in forcing people to migrate, the authors consider the threats posed by the state in the form of genocide and politicide, dissidents' violent behaviour, and a joint threat posed by counterattacks resulting from a civil war. It was shown that each of the three types of political violence has a substantial role in explaining net migration (Davenport et al 2003: 43). Others contend that while official repression is a stronger predictor of forced migration than genocide (Melander and berg 2006). The nations that experience state-sponsored violence, such as genocide or politization, create more refugees than those that are experiencing civil wars, while countries that are bordered by authoritarian and impoverished neighbours produce less refugees than IDPs Moore and Shellman (2006). Their contrasting expectations of victimisation and the economic opportunities at their destinations impact forced migrants' decisions to become internally displaced persons (IDPs) as opposed to refugees, and refugees' decisions to pick a destination state (Moore and Shellman 2006, 2007). Researchers have looked into how human rights breaches affect forced migration (Aga Khan 1981; Hakovirta 1986; Gibney et al. 1996; Apodaca 1998; Davenport et al. 2003; Moore and Shellman 2004). While Schmeidl (1997), who utilises the Freedom House Index as a predictor and finds no discernible link between forced displacement and violations of political and human rights, When Moore and Shellman (2004) use the Political Fear Scale (PTS) created by Gibney and Dalton (1996) as an independent variable, they find a substantial correlation between the level of political terror and the likelihood and size of forced migration. Despite minor variances in results, the majority of research concludes that states that do not uphold human rights create more forced migrants than those that do, and that a lack of both political freedoms and the rule of law cause forced migration.

Academics have looked at the effects of regime change in addition to violence and violations of human rights. Regime change is a significant predictor. (2003), although Melander and berg (2006) indicate that "While forced migration increases during regime

collapse, it decreases during regime transition" (144). According to Moore and Shellman (2004), a lower likelihood of forced migration is associated with a greater level of democracy as measured by the Polity dataset. The gap in these results could be due to how "transition" is defined in conflict literature.

In conclusion, the corpus of data shows that when faced with violence or the possibility of violence, people are more likely to leave their villages in search of protection. However, there is no correlation in the research between a broad measure of violence at the national level and the scenarios that people might face and their behaviour in such scenarios. According to the current study, people will likely flee at different rates and at different periods since there are variances in the levels of violence and variations in how people perceive the harm that violence poses to their adoptive power

Economic opportunity and forced migration

Economic opportunity is the most crucial element in that determine whether people will evacuate or stay in the face of violence. Large-n analysis experts have long argued that forced migration is responsible linked to economic opportunity based of poverty and economic development in the origin and destination nations (Zolberg et al. 1989; Schmeidl 1997; Wood 1994; Davenport et al. 2003; Moore and Shellman 2004, 2006, 2007).

GNP and GDP per capita are microcosm of economic opportunity used by Melander and berg and Davenport et al. (2003)). Hoever, they do not reliably predict forced migration. Nations with higher GNP per capita produce considerably fewer forced migrants than those with lower per capita GNP Moore and Shellman (2006). Economic prospects at home are detrimental and substantial in explaining forced migration after analysing both the push and pull components, indicating that fewer people are inclined to leave areas with prospect economic growth. Moreover, they draw the conclusion that "The number of refugees tends to be lower in countries with better economic prospects, and they do prefer to relocate in those with higher average incomes (Moore and Shellman 2007: 828). Overall, these findings suggest that economic possibilities are likely to have a major impact on people's decisions to move or stay, as well as where they relocate if they decide to move.

According to studies done at the micro scale, individuals' decisions to escape or stay put are influenced by key socioeconomic aspects in addition to violence (Engel and Ibáez 2007; Czaika and Kis-Katos 2009). According to Engel and Ibáez's 2007 research on Columbia, those who owned land were less likely to emigrate than those who had "lack of economic options in the community of origin" (p.357). Czaika and Kis-Katos (2009) analyse the instance of Aceh and conclude that during times of conflict, people shift from rural to urban regions where there are more opportunities for employment (p. 411). They only used basic metrics like GNP or GDP per capita and per capita energy consumption when they discovered a negative relationship between the economic incentives of the country of origin and the number of forced migrants (Davenport et al. 2003; Moore and Shellman 2004, 2006, 2007; Neumayer 2005; Melander and berg 2006). (Schemeidl 1997). The two studies on Aceh and Colombia that were previously highlighted are the sole exceptions.

In conclusion, the research mentioned above demonstrate that When a physical threat to their lives outweighs the opportunity cost of running away, which is calculated as the amount of missed economic opportunity in the place of origin, people tend to stay.. However, there are issues with the economic wealth measurements used in cross-national assessments. Energy consumption per capita, GNP per capita, and GDP per capita are all fairly unreliable indicators of a person's financial situation. We can learn very little about a person's or household's

economic situation from such aggregate indicators. What is additionally lacking from the existing literature is a more thorough examination of the role that personal wealth plays in assisting individuals in coping. The relationship between people's capacity to cope and persist and the availability of economic opportunity or fortune is little understood. The current study makes use of more precise economic indicators in order to capture individual choices regarding whether to remain in a civil war and the role that wealth plays in enabling people to do so.

Social networks and forced migration

Two theories are frequently used in current forced migration research to elucidate how social networks and forced migration are related. One group of academics contends that previous displacement results in further displacement in the present or the future (Schmeidl 1997; Davenport et al. 2003; Moore and Shellman 2004). The people who leave and the people who stay put form a network. This network helps new migrants communicate and reduces the expense of moving, which stimulates more decisions about relocating. The reason behind this is simple: Individuals who have moved before tell their friends and families back home about their adventure and their new location. When determining whether to stay or leave, these friends and families take this knowledge into account. If the associated risk of leaving is lower than that of staying, they flee. Using a cross-border network measure between ethnic groups from the Minorities at Risk Schmeidl (1997) tests the network theory (Gurr 1993). The results are irrelevant to flight prediction. The net stock of forced migrants from prior years, according to Davenport et al. (2003), is a significant indicator of forced migration in the current year. Historical migration, according to Moore and Shellman (2004), upends civilizations and raises costs. Edwards (2009) builds a computer model to describe how information is shared among people who are moving around and how the flow of information influences people's judgments. He asserts that, despite the fact that displacement is almost always brought on by violence, "more specifically, it is knowledge of the conflict that generates displacement" (Edwards 2009: 40). Certain situations provide people with hints, which are then communicated to others. After analysing the data, these individuals choose whether or not to flee and where to go. It is claimed that the act of transmitting and processing information about threat at the social level is crucial for understanding judgments regarding forced migration. (Edwards 2009: 41). The data from the model can be used to investigate how social networks influence people to stay in their homes, which is a different application of the study's major contributions to our understanding of how flight behaviour is explained. Social media can have a significant impact on people's decisions about whether to escape or remain put by disseminating information about risks as well as potential community activities.

The second argument in favour of the relationship between networks and forced migration is that because individuals value their homes and possessions, they find other ways to cope with their situation rather than choose to leave. One such alternate strategy is networking through social and local organisations. This paper holds that civil conflict reorganises civilizations, altering the functions of events while simultaneously creating new ones, maintain the current social networks (Wood 2008; Colletta et al. 2000). This enables some people to remain where they are. Building on the choice-centric thesis, Melander and Berg (2006) claim that there is a range in a person's attachment to home and that those who remained behind during the initial shock were those who were less likely to escape in the first place. According to Edwards (2009), the diversity in attachment is influenced by a number of variables, including the level of violence, economic possibilities, and "pre-existing societal foundations." When the value of staying at home falls below a certain threshold, or "reservation point," people leave." - the level at which they would prefer to leave (Edwards 2009, p. 55). When "perceived risk exceeds attachment to home," this happens. This "self-selection effect"

mitigates network (Schmeidl 1997) and social disruption by reducing forced migration over time (Moore and Shellman 2004). This logic is very helpful in understanding why some people stay while others leave, what prompted this study is what makes those that stay put able to do so.

Wood (2008) identified six "wartime social processes" that alter social networks in a variety of ways, including the creation of new ones and modifications to the operations of those that already exist. Existing social networks may occasionally take on a more significant role during civil disturbance, allowing some people to make do and remain put while forcing others to leave. In their investigation of emigration to Columbia, Engel and Ibáez (2007) quantify a household's social networks by tallying the number of organisations the family is a member of and how long they have lived there. Both of these elements are effective movement predictors, as you will discover. They interpret this finding to mean that families that belong to more organisations and have lived in their homes for a longer period of time are predisposed to being uprooted because they have extensive social networks and can rely on neighbours to take care of their property while they are away. (p.357). Ibáez and Velez (2008) predicted two outcomes using the same dataset and identical characteristics, including membership, years of residence, and the chance of victimisation and eviction. It was shown that the likelihood of both attributes is positively connected with displacement but negatively correlated with the danger of victimisation (with membership being statistically significant). The authors predict that leaders will be picked out and exiled because they use organisational membership as a variable for leadership. The authors acknowledge that their empirical findings don't quite support their theory: Participation appears to offer protection and lower the likelihood of being attacked or fleeing, which is more in line with the idea that belonging to an organisation is a sign of social connectedness than leadership (and associated vulnerability to additional threats). Because they don't want to subject themselves to "a higher risk of victimisation" by leaving behind a "web of social networks," households that have lived there for a longer period of time are considerably less likely to leave, according to the same study (Ibáez & Vélez 2008: 670). Conflict may be resolved, and individuals may remain. Case studies demonstrate that during times of war, when the state and its institutions frequently disintegrate or turn against its inhabitants, informal networks become more vital (Harpviken 2009: 1). It has been demonstrated that these networks, which are well-established in communities, are crucial for enduring a battle as acrimonious as the sectarian bloodshed between Hindus and Muslims in India (Varshney 2002). Academicians are not the only ones who emphasise the value of neighborhood-level coordination in assisting society in dealing with violence and its impacts. As was already indicated, none of the literature to yet, with the exception of Harpviken (2009), explores the significance of a wider variety of coping methods that might be adversely connected with forced migration. Social unrest, the "displacement network" (Edwards 2009), and the "migration network" (Schmeidl 1997) are all viewed as pull forces. There hasn't been much research on how civilians can stay put and avoid being displaced in the midst of a civil conflict. The ability to manage disagreement and remain in one's current location may depend on pre-existing organisations at the community level. Sociologists, anthropologists, and demographers have long claimed that people with strong links to their communities of origin and deep familial ties are reluctant to leave home when evaluating migratory behaviour (Uhlenberg 1973, Irwin et al. 1999). Therefore, it is crucial to comprehend the "social and cultural context" in which migration decisions are created in order to better understand migratory processes (Hugo 1981: 187). Community characteristics are excellent indicators of the decision to stay because social and communal links have a significant influence on people's decision-making processes. (Petersen 1958; Morrison 1971; Uhlenberg 1973; Speare 1974). These relationships at the local level are intertwined with the social and cultural characteristics

of a particular culture (Uhlenberg 1973; Kasarda and Janowitz 1974; Irwin et al. 1999). People with stronger ties to their homes are those who live in "closely knit neighbourhoods with large local social networks" (Irwin et al. 2004). Graves & Graves argue that man is "neither entirely active nor passive but interactive," which is more important (1974). In an effort to "try to tackle the challenges confronting him by choosing among perceived accessible choices," he will deal with all the limitations imposed on him by his physical and social environment (p. 117). There may be a variety of strategies one can employ to deal with a problem in a time of conflict.

Physical factors and forced migration

Mountainous topography and the existence of physical infrastructure like roads and bridges have a significant impact on people's decisions to move. For instance, lack of route information, financial difficulties purchasing tickets, insufficient security throughout the journey, unfavourable weather, challenging terrain, and blocked borders (UNHCR 1996). Even when they do not result in forced migration, these ongoing causes have an impact on those who exhibit flight behaviour. (Edwards 2009).

Schmeidl (1997) focuses on the effects of barriers in a time series analysis, as indicated by the presence or absence of mountains, forests, deserts, and islands. The number of nations sharing borders as well as the percentage of shared land borders compared to all of a nation's borders are used to determine flight facilitators (p. 296). It was discovered that neither group of facilitators placed much importance on their ability to foresee refugee movements (p. 304). Moore and Shellman claim that the decision to relocate was not adversely affected by transaction costs based on topography and distance (2006). That people won't go because of transaction costs is disputed.

Kis-Katos and Czaika (2009) One can estimate transportation costs by determining whether or not the the conflict scenario has a "bus or train station, airport, or seaport" (p. 408). They discovered conflicting data to support the idea that transportation costs have an impact on relocation choices (Czaika and Kis-Katos 2009: 412-413). Murshed and Gates (2005) use the number of roads and the mountainous terrain to anticipate the severity of combat throughout the nation in their research of the civil strife in Nepal. They discovered that road density was a better predictor of decreased conflict intensity than challenging terrain, while being unable to provide data to back up this claim. This might be as a result of people being able to evacuate or stay put because roads were conveniently accessible.

Rebel participation and forced migration

Different motivations may drive male and female rebellious behaviour. According to a body of literature, opportunities for rent-seeking, natural resources are stolen, which causes insurrections (Collier and Hoeffler 2004). For those who decide to remain in place and support a rebel movement, this "greed" narrative is equally believable. If someone thinks there is a chance to profit from a war, they may decide to stay and take part in it. Others contend that the capacity to challenge the biased and discriminatory policies of ineffective governments leads to civil wars. (Fearon and Laintin 2003). This assertion is expanded upon by saying that people with "grievances" won't flee, but rather stay and fight in the civil war. The most effective way for civilians to avoid violence is to enlist in a military force that will act as their defender (Humphreys and Weinstein 2008; Kalyvas and Kocher 2007; Goodwin 2001; Mason and Krane 1989). Instead of taking a chance on their life and may be becoming targets of a rebel movement, people who care about their community may choose to simply comply with rebel demands or assist their cause. There are several reasons someone can decide to help rebels. According to social revolution literature, people from a social class are more inclined to overthrow the government if they feel like they have been unfairly denied access to economic

opportunities since rebel groups give them a voice to express their grievances. For instance, because of the relative poverty, wage earners battle landlords (Paige 1975). Additionally, peasants who are forced off their land by landed gentry are more prone to revolt (Wickham-Crowley 1992). People may also join an insurgency because they feel frustrated that they cannot express their issues in a normal, non-violent way. (2008): 440 (Humphreys and Weinstein). According to Richards (1996), those who feel increasingly cut off from political decision-making and from traditional politics may join the rebels in addition to becoming irate. If the government starts to treat civilians with indiscriminate brutality, people may start looking to the rebels for security.

Humphreys and Weinstein (2008) assert the alternative to a grievance-based justification for rebel activity offered by Olson's theory of collective action. (Olson 1965). According to this theory, people will only participate if they can gain personal benefits in return. These benefits could include money, land, loot, and other things (Lichbach 1995). However, the most significant private benefit that fighting organisations can offer may be defence against violence (sometimes known as a "push" factor) (Humphreys).

Other factors and forced migration

Many earlier studies have included population as a variable to account for the impact of a country's population size on forced migration (Schmeidl 1997; Davenport et al. 2003; Moore and Shellman 2004; Melander and berg 2006). The hypothesis holds that a large population puts a pressure on the resources, leading some individuals to relocate in search of better economic opportunities. Schmeidl (1997) asserts that increased forced migration results from population pressure, however her analysis disproves this assertion. Moore and Shellman (2004) did not find population to be a significant factor affecting the extent of forced migration, contrary to Melander and Berg (2006) who claimed that population has a considerable impact on forced migration. In this study, information about a variety of demographic traits is utilised to assess

Principal causes of displacement.

Response	Frequency	Percentage
Lack of economic opportunities	15	27
Job loss	10	18
Forced donation	09	16.2
Seizure of crop	11	11.8
Seizure of cattle	15	27
Political coercion	07	12.6
Forced recruitment in army	15	27
Destruction of home	15	27
Murder of family member	15	27
Physical and mental torture	06	10.8
Sexual harassment	15	27
Lack of economic opportunities	15	27
Land seizure	05	9
Excessive demand for food & shelter	06	10.8
Difficult terrain	02	3.6
Insurgent conscription	05	9
Physical threat	05	9
Stereotyping	05	9
Abduction	09	16.2
Total	180	100

People experiencing actual violence or perceiving a greater tendency are likely to flee quicker than those with relative peace. The results indicate that those who experienced violence of sexual harassment was 27%. Political violence 27%. Individuals always weigh threat to physical integrity (9) against threat to economic security (27) before leaving their homes. Relocating to a new and unknown location involves a great deal of risk, especially for people living near the margin of subsistence (10.8). It can be the start of a never-ending cycle of financial misery for some people. People tend to stay there and incur personal risks as long as economic prospects are still present because they are aware that migrating to a new place entails risk and uncertainty.

People become adamant to take risks when economic opportunities are destroyed (27%) or they are forced to contribute beyond what they can afford like seizure of crop (27%). Destruction of existing economic opportunities and personal property like home (9%) is more prone to relinquish.

the elements crop loss 3.9% of respondents agreed that a lack of resources causes coping to fail. Because land is so important in keeping people in their villages, the findings for the variable land loss show that over (70%) of the population lives on subsistence farming on the outskirts of the Lake Chad Basin. Additionally, the 9% forced contribution from crops and animals increases the risk of being unable to cope. The villagers were required to pay a "seasonal tax" of crops and livestock to the Boko Haram insurgents in order to support their army. While some villagers might have given these donations voluntarily, others might have viewed them as an infringement on their personal property. Both scenarios result in a loss of wealth for the inhabitant particularly those who chosen to stay behind. People have been threatened to flee because of rampant abduction of individual to pay ransom so that the insurgents pay their army.

Reasons for remain behind

Response	Frequency	Percentage
Did not want to be called a refugee	19	34.2
Did not have acquaintances	10	18
Could not afford to pay transport fare	01	1.8
Thought situation would improve soon	15	27
worried about finding a job	09	16.2
For fear of physical safety	06	10.8
Decided to stay behind and seek help from government	10	18
Hope Improvement in security	15	27
Hope Improvement in economic opportunities	15	27
Return of land	07	12.6
Ability to meet demand for food & shelter	15	27
Bumper harvest (Abundant production of crop)	15	27
Plenty of cattle (cattle farm)	15	27
Physical security	05	9
Lack of political coercion	06	10.8
Absence of forced recruitment in army	02	3.6
Non destruction of home	05	9
No physical and mental torture	05	9
No sexual harassment	05	9
Total	180	100

The measurements of economic potential offer compelling evidence in favour of the claim that economic considerations play a significant role in flight decisions. 27%. A person's ability to manage and endure a civil war longer is influenced by the availability of work options brought about by the availability of farmland in their village. Ability to satisfy demand for food and shelter, which indicates 27% that there are farming activities present. bumper crop (abundant agricultural production) 27%, When compared to villages without such a facility, a cow farm with a large number of cattle reduces the hazard times, delaying the time before takeoff. This shows that people will remain in their houses longer in communities where there are more economic opportunities. If individuals believe there is a chance of financial security and job chances, they are more likely to tolerate higher personal risks. Opportunities for employment may also offer a source of revenue that people could use to pay for a forced contribution as a coping mechanism.

The findings regarding land ownership could indicate that people who possessed more land (27% of them) were either compelled to give up their possessions and evacuate or fled because they were aware that they could be targeted. Perhaps the decision to stay in the community to stop the usurpation of their land is overruled by the dread of being attacked. In order to understand how long people can endure conflict and remain in their communities, other considerations are just as crucial as the physical threat to life. Economic opportunity, wealth, and the costs of losing those opportunities were found to be significant predictors of how long people could endure civil war, particularly in the absence of forced military conscription (3.6%), political coercion (10.8%), physical and mental torture (9%) and sexual harassment (9%) Supporting the rebels by paying rent appears to be a crucial technique people can employ to cope and stay longer, demonstrating that survival can be bought during a civil war. Social networks have a significant role in extending the period until flight. Last but not least, individuals may use backing the combatants as a key tactic in their choice to remain in place.

Finally, even in the same context when people are strategic in their conduct and in their means of coping with exceptional events like civil war, there is a large variance in the time of when they escape. People who have a strong connection to their homeland will organise their resources and act in ways that let them handle conflict while remaining in their villages. Unlike with aggregate-level data, the primary data used in this study offers significant insights into the survival strategies chosen by those who choose to remain behind during violence. The empirical findings offer convincing evidence in favour of the claim that people are rational and act strategically even when faced with challenging situations.

Theoretical framework

People are emotionally tied to their houses, rational, and strategic in how they engage with their physical and social settings, as well as in conflict situations, building on the rational choice account of human behaviour. When faced with a civil war, they will act in a way that will keep them in their houses while reducing the risk to their physical safety. When people are forced to migrate, they must make some decisions, weighing the relative advantages and disadvantages of relocating versus staying put. The choice to run or stay put depends on how likely one is to become a victim and People who have a strong connection to their homeland will organise their resources and act in ways that let them handle conflict while remaining in their villages. Unlike with aggregate-level data, the primary data used in this study offers significant insights into the survival strategies chosen by those who choose to remain behind during violence. The empirical findings offer convincing evidence in favour of the claim that people are rational and act strategically even when faced with challenging situations. Conflict in the wider environment and the availability of socioeconomic opportunities influence how people make decisions leading some to leave and others to stay. Roadlessness and rocky terrain

are two further hindrances that can influence a person's decision to flee. Additionally, social networks like neighbourhood associations play a significant part in the decision to depart, assisting some individuals in handling conflict and remaining behind while others flee. There is a gap in the literature's examination of this potent social connection mechanism. If a person is forced to choose between leaving a conflict zone and staying behind, and if their assessment of the costs of remaining in one location versus moving to another will be a factor in their decision to stay or go, then the choice of whether to stay or go depends on both the intensity of the conflict exposure and the perceived costs involved. Although the rationalist explanation has much of the research being done today concentrates on large-n analyses of data at the national level, which has considerably enhanced our understanding of the causes of forced migration. This rational choice model merits further theoretical refinement, and a within-case analysis presents one such opportunity to improve the macro-micro link.

Recent studies on forced migration have specifically noted that there is "variation" in how people evaluate threats arising from the overall conflict environment and their level of connection to home. (Edwards 2009). The decision to stay put has a price, and once attachment to home is outweighed by the perceived cost of staying, the person would rather leave than stay. The literature does not attempt to explain how to reduce these expenses; it simply accepts that staying put has a cost. Some people remain above their "reservation points" due to variables like social networks or economic opportunities that reduce the perceived costs of staying. Existing literature is silent on how long people survive in war since it is unable to identify the factors that allow people to cope and stay in their homes. People make deliberate decisions when acting. People will come into contact with the combatants once a civil war has begun, and they will assess and reassess the threats posed by the conflict in light of the resources at their disposal to handle the threat. Before determining whether or not to assist the rebels or to give in to their demands by participating in the movement physically or by contributing financial resources, they will weigh their own circumstances, the strength of their social networks, and their level of community investment. They will go when the risks of staying put or the cost of taking care of themselves outweighs the value of their attachment to home. The majority of research on forced migration to far has focused on national-level displacement and has not considered the possibility that behaviour and capacity may differ on a subnational and individual level. People respond strategically, and those who can and are willing to take risks are more likely to use all of the resources at their disposal in order to stay in their cities or homes. Whether voluntarily or involuntarily, participation and compliance may be necessary for one to survive. Individuals' capacity and readiness to act or make the necessary changes in their lives, as well as the resources at their disposal, all have an impact on their strategic behaviour. The greater their means, the more options they have, and the more likely they are to withstand a conflict. People would use every means at their disposal to adjust to their new situation since they were attached to their homes. They will wait until they are attacked and forced to flee. Once people opt to use coping techniques, these behaviours are likely to persist, which is consistent with the findings of Melander and Berg (2006), who discovered that people who choose to stay during the initial time of shock become progressively unwilling to relocate in later years. They can be apprehensive about moving since they are used to a new way of life that involves coping with conflict. A wide variety of coping techniques may be present in conflict situations. The following three tactics are: providing financial resources, providing concrete support, and utilising local social networks to look for safety. As an alternative to navigating and surviving in a fractured social world, some villagers may cooperate with requests, take part in activities, or erect protective walls through the mobilisation of social networks like traditional community organisations that have been overshadowed by the war. People may use a single one of these approaches, or a combination of them, to solve an issue

while falling behind. People's decisions may be influenced by a variety of elements, including the level of threat they experience or perceive, their financial situation, their political views, their social connections, and their capacity to flee. These factors will affect people's capacity to withstand and persist in a hazardous environment.

Research Design, Data and Methodology

This study makes use of secondary information as well as primary information gathered via extended fieldwork in the Lake Chad Basin in order to more thoroughly examine the rationalist model of forced migration. When Boko Haram started using violence in many Local Government Areas bordering the Lake Chad Basin in 2009, a decade of civil war began. By 2016, about 2.5 million people had to flee their homes for safety and became Internally Displaced Persons (IDMC), while many more were dispersed among numerous host communities. IDPs increased more quickly from 5,000 in 2009 to about 2.5 million in 2016. (Alobo & Obaji, 2016). With the express purpose of overthrowing the monarchy and creating an Islamic Republic, in the northeastern part of Nigeria. Nigeria in sub-Saharan Africa a number of variables, including political and geographic potential for rebellion, poverty and social isolation, income disparity, communities, police stations, schools, state-owned banks, and government infrastructures, are blamed for the biggest number of internally displaced people. (Murshed and Gates, 2006). (Humanitarian Response Plan, 2019)

Both domestic and foreign administrations continue to experience issues as a result of the misery of the displaced. For the benefit of academics and the global community, there are important empirical questions. Social scientists and policy makers alike continue to struggle with issues like why some individuals deal with extreme violence by staying while others run, and how effectively those who stay deal with it and survive. Only subnational and individual-level analysis, especially when combined with data on individuals who never left can provide answers to such issues. This study shifts from a cross-national to a regional and individual-level analyses of displacement in order to get clear cut understanding of why some people flee while others remain in the same environment. Most scholars have focused on cross-national analyses of forced migration, and they use aggregate-level data to draw conclusions about individual-level decisions that are the fundamental shift from heterogeneity to homogeneity. In contrast, the current study creates a multivariate account of forced migration along the Lake Chad Basin at the local and personal levels. Qualitative data gathered through field research is used to supplement quantitative studies. Nepal is an ideal test case for the rational choice concept of forced migration for two main reasons.

The rational choice model applied to forced migration, a model that was initially developed by using aggregate data at the regional level, theoretically gives a wonderful opportunity to be evaluated in a study with such a small unit size. Along with allowing for additional observations to be made inside a single case (King, Keohane and Verba 1994:219), One can employ variables that are more precisely assessed in a regional and individual analysis to come at a more trustworthy causal conclusion (Snyder 2001: 94). For instance, factors like the quantity of fatalities and missing persons, the economic empowerment index, and the general accessibility of roads in various districts and at the local government level offer more accurate measurements of the correlates of forced migration. To examine factors missed by large-n analysis using a single case. Lake Chad Basin is a very well-suited instance to study the potential significance of social networks in relocation analysis as explained in the following proceeding pages. This variable has generally been excluded in prior large-n analyses due to the nature of the data. The Lake Basin instance is perfect for assessing how social networks

affect how much it costs for people to stay at home during times of violence. By moving to a "lower level of analysis," the current study avoids the problem of the rational choice analysis relying on national level aggregate factors to estimate individual-level relocation behaviour. (Snyder 2001).

Finally, without knowing why some people choose not to flee, the study of why people flee during violence cannot be completed. Empirical support for these theoretical statements using primary data for both those who leave and those who are ready to stay put, at the individual level. Both secondary and primary data are used in the empirical analysis. The three Local Government Areas, including Abadam, Kukawa, and Monguno, provide the primary data. Over 180 randomly chosen both displaced and the ones who resists were polled in order to gather the basic data. A probit analysis is then used to analyse the relationship between variables such as violence, individual economic conditions, economic opportunities in the respondent's village, social networks, and geographic terrain and their impact on people's decisions to stay or leave. The conclusions are continuously given depth by qualitative data from fieldwork and in-depth interviews.

Results and Discussion of Findings

The empirical findings show that, in addition to violence, there are significant economic, social, and geographic elements that affect flight behaviour. Additionally, the results imply that people's experiences and perceptions of the threat of war vary. Contrary to popular belief, forced migration does not often occur at the same time as violence. The wide range in departure times shows that people will try to manage their circumstances. They won't flee until every defence against flight has been used. The results show that while the threat of violence forces some people to leave before they should, others can manage the battle and stay longer because of opportunities and social networks. Additionally, during a civil war, backing the opposing side is a crucial survival strategy for staying behind.

The study offers prospective areas for additional research in the field, in addition to adding to the body of knowledge already available on forced migration. First, it is discovered that social networks are essential for reducing the effects of violence on civilian populations. Our knowledge of civilians' interactions with rebel organisations is likely to be significantly improved by a more thorough investigation of the function that community-level organisations serve. Second, the results imply that deciding to leave one's home is not always related to when conflict breaks out. Instead, before deciding to evacuate people strategically mobilise their resources to deal with the fight. Finally, the empirical findings demonstrate the significance of economic resources in predicting forced migration.

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