

The Kanjuruhan Stadium's Stampede Tragedy: Disaster Management Perspective

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Abstract

The tragedy at the Kanjuruhan Stadium in Malang has attracted worldwide attention, especially in Indonesia. Mistakes in the handling of the period have become a chore for Indonesia in responding to an emergency response situation. In addition, planning in overcoming the worst risks that occur needs to be implemented. The purpose of this paper is to examine the tragedy at the Kanjuruhan Stadium, Malang from the perspective of disaster management. The flow is carried out from disaster risk assessment, emergency response to post-disaster management itself. The approach used in this paper is a qualitative approach with a phenomenological technique. Data collection techniques used are document studies and literature studies. The results obtained from the risk assessment, that the capacity possessed cannot overcome the existing vulnerabilities so that the risk becomes large. In addition, the absence of a worst case scenario resulted in the emergence of inappropriate efforts in handling extraordinary events. So that many victims cannot be dammed.

Keywords: Disaster Management, Risk, Kanjuruhan Stadium, Stampede

Introduction

Kanjuruhan Stadium is a football stadium located in Kepanjen District, Malang Regency, East Java, Indonesia. Inaugurated in 2004, the stadium has a capacity of approximately 30,000 spectators. Located in Malang, this stadium is also the 'home' of the local football club, Arema FC. On October 1, 2022, the sporting world was shocked by the extraordinary events that took place at this Stadium. Starting from the East Java derby match Arema FC against Persebaya Surabaya. The match that took place could be said to be quite smooth, but until the end of the match Arema FC were unable to catch up and made the final result of the match 2-3 over Persebaya Surabaya. Arema FC's defeat at home ignited the

emotions of the Arema FC supporters who were nicknamed Aremania. Not a few Aremania who took to the field to express their disappointment.

Chaos Situation began to break out after the match and made the stadium atmosphere tense due to the use of excessive force under the pretext of conditioning the crowd. The Minister of Political, felony, and protection Affairs explained that approximately 2000 people took to the field solely for chasing football players (Mahfud, 2022). However, what is very unfortunate is the response of the authorities in suppressing the crowd by using tear gas. The south stand of the stadium is an area that is the target of shooting and leads directly to spectators who are not involved in the chaos on the field. The data shows that at least 80 tear gas projectiles were fired that night (Team Narration News, 2022). What makes it even more sad is that the police acknowledged the fact that the tear gas used by the apparatus to suppress this period had expired in 2019 and some were found to have expired in 2021 (Kadivhumas Polri, 2022).

The effects of firing tear gas include irritation. The irritation threshold was greatest for CN (1.0 mg m³), followed by CS (0.004 mg m³) and OC (0.002 mg m³). The eyes and respiratory system are the main targets of tear gas exposure, with irritation of the eyes and breathing tract going on in about 20–60 seconds. Some experts argue that it is the content of tear gas that may contribute to corneal abrasions. As for respiratory, after inhalation, the effects can be in the shape of a stinging or burning sensation inside the nostril, tightness and ache within the chest, sore throat, shortness of breath, coughing, sneezing, and trouble breathing. Contaminated and ingested saliva can cause epigastric discomfort (pain in the pit of the stomach), nausea, vomiting and/or diarrhea (Shcep, 2015).

Tear gas fired at the stands caused panic among the spectators who were not involved in the chaos on the field. The panicked crowd then scattered and tried to save themselves as fast as possible towards the exit of the stadium. According to the information from Inspector General of Police Dedi Prasetyo, spectators who were hit by tear gas, there was a stampede, piled up causing a lack of oxygen at door 13, door 11, door 14, and door 3. 714 people, consisting of the number of victims who died as many as 131 people and 583 people were injured. Until October 10, 2022, based on data collected by the East Java Provincial Health Service, there were 33 people still undergoing treatment at the hospital with the average victim complaining of irritation to the eyes and skin as well as pneumonia (Detik, 2022). This incident was later recorded in history as one of the greatest tragedies that ever happened in the world of Indonesian sports and even became one of the biggest events in the world.

The many speculations about the cause of the many fatalities in this incident caught the attention of the world's people, one of which was the use of tear gas which turned out to be in violation of FIFA rules. Based on FIFA Stadium Safety and Security Regulation article 19 letter b, it is written that field officers and/or police are prohibited from using or even carrying weapons and crowd control gas at the Stadium. On the other hand, the police denied the allegations by providing information that the use of tear gas in the incident was in accordance with applicable procedures. The public also questioned the reason for the rejection of the proposal to change the match time to the afternoon.

Citing a statement from the Minister of Political, felony, and protection Affairs, the organizing committee didn't following the recommendation from the security forces to change the match schedule from night to evening and limit the number of spectators. PT. LIB and PSSI by continuing to run matches at night. The decision was taken after coordination made by PSSI with broadcasting rights holders. Until many amateur videos circulated related to locked exits,

causing crowds to build up. So, as a shape of the authorities' seriousness in handling this situation this case, an Independent Joint Fact Finding Team (TGIPF) was formed which was led directly by the Coordinating Minister of Political, felony, and protection Affairs (Menkopolhukam) Mr. Mahfud MD with the hope that formation of TGIPF should assist find the actual purpose of this incident.

Based on the facts described above, the incident at the Kanjuruhan stadium on October 1, 2022, can be classified as a disaster event. This is in accordance with the definition of disaster according to Law no. 24 of 2007 concerning disaster management is an occasion or series of activities that threaten and disrupt humans' lives and livelihoods because of herbal, non-natural, and human factors ensuing in casualties, environmental harm, property losses, and psychological impacts. Furthermore, from several classifications of disasters, these events are classified as social disasters. Based on the definition of disaster according to the National Disaster Management Agency (BNPB), social disaster itself is a disaster as a result of an event or series of occasions as a result of human beings which incorporates social struggle among organizations or between communities and terror (BNPB, 2007).

Furthermore, the events that occurred at the Kanjuruhan stadium could not be separated from the implementation of less than optimal management from the organizations that oversee the league. Lack of risk assessment causes no preparation for worst case scenarios in analyzing the probability of events. Based on this explanation, this paper will examine the tragedy of the chaos that occurred at the Kanjuruhan stadium from the perspective of disaster management.

Research Methodology

The approach used in this observe is a qualitative approach with a phenomenological method. Records collection strategies used are file studies and literature research. As a qualitative research, checking the validity of the facts can be done to prove the understanding of the research the usage of interval validity, external validity, reliability and objectivity exams (Sugiyono, 2017). Even as the facts analysis strategies on this observe began from data collection, information condensation, records presentation, to drawing conclusions (Miles, M. B., Huberman, A. M., & Saldana, J., 2014). This examine makes use of content material analysis strategies and library research. Content evaluation approach is a studies method used to attract conclusions from a textual content. In other phrases, content analysis is a studies approach that seeks to uncover the public and hidden thoughts of the writer. Whilst the literature research makes use of the sorts and resources of secondary records. Secondary assets are resources that don't at once provide records to statistics creditors, as an example via different people or through documents (Sugiyono,2011). The search was centered on literature published until 2022.

Results and Discussion

Disaster Risk Assessment

A disaster risk assessment is an approach that presents the potential adverse consequences that may arise from existing potential disasters. Potential negative impacts are also calculated to taking into account local vulnerabilities and capacities.. These potential adverse effects represent the potential number of casualties, property damage, and environmental damage unleashed by the potential disaster itself. When conducting disaster risk assessments, a functional approach of the three parameters that constitute disaster risk is implemented, including threats, vulnerabilities, and capacities related to disasters. If you want

to reduce the hazard then prevention can be done, if you want to reduce vulnerability then it can be done with mitigation and diversion, if you want to increase capacity it can be done with preparedness. Thus, in carrying out the risk assessment, the general formula is as follows:

Several principles from the disaster risk assessment process that are also considered in the analysis process include:

Using data and all forms of existing incident records, by prioritizing official data from the authorized institution;

Conduct integrated analysis of potential threat occurrences by experts with local knowledge of the community;

The analytical process performed must be able to calculate the potential number of human lives, property damage, and environmental damage;

The results of the risk assessment can be translated into general policies for disaster risk reduction (RBI, 2016).

The benefits of public sector risk management include being able to help assess the impact of risk to ensure that risk has been managed, and management is directed to reduce risk. Then help prioritize, for example in areas where public sector agencies have a big risk in achieving program outcomes, so that resources can be directed especially to areas with high risk. Risk assessment can help minimize waste, fraud and error. Finally, risk assessment helps assess options regarding opportunities for better services and outcomes, as well as what needs to be done to manage the risks that arise in relation to these options (Fariani, 2020).

Kanjuruhan Stadium Disaster Risk Analysis Hazard

According to groups, types and types of threats/hazards, the events that occurred at the Malang Kanjuruhan Stadium were included in the social hazard group with the types of riots and conflicts. The scale of the probability of rioting in the match reaches a scale of 4, or almost certainly (10-100% occurs in 10 years). Meanwhile, the impact of the damage caused reached a scale of 4 or very severe with almost certain (50-75% of the area was paralyzed). So the hazard level matrix becomes high.

Vulnerability

Evacuation route

Please refer to Public Works and Public Housing (PUPR) Minister Regulation No. 26 of 2008 for the infrastructure readiness of stadium competition facilities. The manager is asked to review the risk of the number and evacuation routes with the ideal-sized width of the grandstand entrance. In this incident, only 2 out of 8 doors were open, which means this is not in accordance with the provisions. In a normal position, this becomes a vulnerability factor where there will be a buildup of mass when it comes out. So you can imagine when there is panic, the people who are scrambling to get out and save themselves actually fight and end up stuck at the exit.

Schedule of matches held at night

Previously, the police intelligence had carried out mapping and provided options for revising the match schedule from night to evening with the consideration of disturbing comfort and security. In addition, learning from previous cases that occurred at night which often led to riots fanatisme This is a threat in itself because the match that takes place is a match that brings together the East Java derby which has a score not much different in the league standings. In addition, the psychological factor of fanatical fans can also trigger provocative actions by age groups and ender

Capacity

Stadium Capacity

Kanjuruhan Stadium is known as many as 38,000 people, but ticket sales data in the evening reached 42,000 tickets. In simple terms, the capacity of the stadium at the time of the incident exceeded the amount it should have or over capacity.

Policies and Preparedness

Stadium Safety and Security Regulations of FIFA Regulation chapter 28, also stipulates that if there is a riot in the stadium, security officers can separate the perpetrators who are considered provocateurs from the crowd and take them to a safer place. In addition, other security officers can have diplomacy with the crowd of supporters so that the atmosphere is conducive again. However, in practice, tear gas, which was not supposed to be used to disperse crowds at the stadium, actually triggered panic among the spectators, who were not involved in the chaos on the pitch.

Risk Scenario

Considering that each event has different risk characteristics, to carry out this risk assessment, several agreements must be made as a common guideline. The determination of this agreement includes the following:

- a. Build Risk Scenario;
- b. Develop quantitative analysis;
- c. Determinaton of Risk types and Scenario;
- d. Determination of time period (Triutomo, 2012)

Kanjuruhan Stadium Disaster Management

Basically, disaster management is a process that includes aspects of planning, control and supervision. Broadly speaking, the stages of disaster management are divided into three, namely the pre-disaster stage which includes the principles of disaster risk management, during a disaster with the principles of emergency management and the post-disaster stage which includes the principles of recovery management.

In the previous sub-chapter, researchers have analyzed the risk of disasters that occur at the Malang Kanjuruhan Stadium. In the next step, the timing of the disaster is considered according to the principles of emergency management. An emergency response is a set of activities carried out by governmental or non-governmental organizations in the immediate aftermath of a disaster. Therefore, rapid and accurate assessments are needed to identify immediate needs and develop strategies for lifesaving and early recovery (BNPB, 2015). In this case, the post-disaster emergency response process was carried out, among others, by conducting search, rescue and evacuation (PPE). Victims who were still trapped in the stadium were evacuated, identified and then classified according to their life expectancy. This is done to ensure the safety of as many victims as possible, as well as accurate data updates so that they can determine the next steps.

However, the number of victims who fell was not matched by the readiness of the officers to face the worst-case scenario. This is evidenced by the lack of maximum evacuation routes. According to the information received, the number of victims was due to the evacuation route to the hospital, which only had one route, namely the main gate (Widiastuti, 2022). In addition, the evacuation process to the health service was hampered by riots that occurred outside the stadium, which made it difficult for ambulances to pass. According to Article 7 of this regulation, FIFA also regulates evacuation routes, namely:

1. Emergency evacuation routes, consisting of one route inside and one outside the stadium, must be agreed upon by local security forces, including police, stewards, fire services, volunteers and medical teams.
2. Sufficient area is required around the stadium to allow for accommodation of spectators after evacuation without overcrowding. It also includes that the access is free from police, fire, and ambulance services.
3. The playing field within the stadium must be accessible from at least one vehicle entry point.

Kanjuruhan Stadium Post-Disaster Recovery Management

With reference to the instructions of the President of the Republic of Indonesia at the Cabinet Plenary Meeting on November 25, 2010, the implementation of restoration and reconstruction after the Kanjuruhan Stadium disaster should be implemented with consideration of the following basic principles:

1. Implemented considering the UU number. 24 of 2007 on disaster management in implementing disaster management in the post-disaster phase;
2. Implemented in accordance with UU No. 32 Tahun 2004 on Local Government and Government Decree No. 38 of 2007 on Division of Government Work between Government, State Government and Regency/Municipal Government.

In the post-disaster recovery phase, recovery and reconstruction cannot be separated. Recovery is the improvement and restoration to adequate levels of all aspects of public or local government services in a post-disaster area, while reconstruction is the formulation of policies and initiatives and the implementation of well-planned and consistent Rebuild all infrastructure, facilities and systems to be resilient, sustainable and permanent. Both governmental and community levels, with the main goal of expanding economic, social and cultural activities, maintaining law and order, and enhancing the role and participation of civil society in all aspects of social life in post-disaster communities, institutions (BNPB, 2015).

The Rehabilitation and Reconstruction (Rehab-Rekon) process carried out after the Kanjuruhan Stadium disaster, among others, took into account the scope of rehabilitation, such as:

1. Repair of damaged public facilities and infrastructure in the stadium and in the surroundings of the stadium;
2. Compensation for the family of the deceased;
3. Psychological social recovery for survivors and families of victims who died carried out with trauma support mobility activities by psychologists in the city of Malang;
4. Conflict resolution by reconciling the supporters (Aremania and Bonek), as well as the National Police with the Indonesian people;
5. Restoration of Security and Order by eliminating leagues 1 and 2 until conditions are conducive again and the formation of the Joint Independent Fact Finding Team (TGIPF) to maintain neutrality in the investigation of this case.

Conclusion

The disaster that occurred at the Kanjuruhan Stadium in Malang was a very valuable lesson for all parties. It can be seen from the results of disaster risk analysis, where vulnerability is greater than capacity, thus causing threats/hazards to be unstoppable. In addition, the absence of a worst case scenario has made it difficult for the authorities to stem the protests of supporters who have taken to the field. So that preventive measures emerged as a response to the provocative actions taken by the supporters in the form of shooting tear gas.

According to FIFA regulations, tear gas is not allowed to be used in mass conditioning inside stadiums. The effect caused by the tear gas attack was the panic of the supporters in the stands who then irregularly each tried to find a way out to save themselves.

Data obtained by TGIPF stated that property damage to the stadium was found at the exit doors, even the wall in front of the exit door was broken down due to the locked door. The attack of tear gas caused shortness of breath and allergies on the skin and eyes, leaving the supporters exhausted and weak. As more and more supporters piled up at the exit, the air was getting less and less resulting in many people unable to survive until they fainted and were trampled on by each other. This is a factor

Therefore, disaster risk assessment is to anticipate unwanted events such as what happened at the Malang Kanjuruhan Stadium. By knowing the risks that may arise, in the future the authorities can determine which policies and actions are allowed or not allowed in dealing with similar cases. Because no life is worth football.

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