

Peacemaking and the Muslims' Outlooks: Problems in Three Southern Border Provinces of Thailand

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Abstract

This research aims to (1) study the expectation for peace of the Muslims and the factors to make peace in the Muslim populated areas, and (1) find out some possible guidelines for peace in the Malay-Muslims populated provinces. The framework of study is provided into independent factor 'Muslim Expectations' and dependent factor 'Peace Building'. The peace building is composed of (1) permanent peace, (2) reconciliation among ethnic groups, (3) integration, (4) mechanism of law and, (5) better understanding among cultures. The tool of this research is designed into 2 sets of questionnaires: closed-ended and open-ended questions. For the closed-ended questionnaire, the sampling groups are focusing on the leaders from the Three Southern Border Provinces, randomly 300 people from Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat and, the other open-ended ones, answered by 15 leaders through an interview process. It has found that the permanent peace is required in this Muslim populated area. First, majority of the people are supportive of peace and pray for peace to become true for their homeland. The means of requiring permanent peace stay at 3.74 and the ranking is at a high level. Second, the mechanism of law to protect the people is important. The Muslims often feel that they are treated unfairly by the state. Islamic schools are burned down and Muslim missionaries shot and killed many times without the government's ability to find out the culprit. The means of saving the people in the Muslim populated areas stay at 3.51 and the ranking is at a high level. Third, the reconciliation among ethnic groups should be done. The Muslims feel that sincerity to make peace from the state never be done fruitfully. Actions by the dominant officials always lack of responsibility and full with interest conflicts among themselves. The means of making a safety zone in the Muslim areas stay at 3.48 and the ranking is at a medium level. Fourth, the better understanding among the social cultures should be made. The state never try for any program to create a better understanding between the Buddhism and the Islamism. A center for cultural exchange to learn the community faith and the dialogue exchange for Muslim and Buddhist scholars never be done. Paranoia between cultures has never been resolved on the spot. This is one of the roots and the endless problems in the three southern border provinces of Thailand. The means of poor understanding among the cultures stay at 3.46 and the ranking is at a medium level. Fifth, the integration of civil society should be promoted. The sincerity of promoting any ethnic political party by the state is very poor. The Muslims feel that the government always look at any ethnic minority group who trying to upgrade their living standard as the culprit to against the state. This is the greatest point to push the civil society away from civilization. The means of ignoring the underprivileged citizen for their better livelihood stay at 3.36 and the ranking is at a medium level. In addition, this article has also found that the problem of peace building is engaged by the dominant power not the ethnic minority Malay-Muslims.

Keywords: Peacemaking, Problem, Three Southern Border Provinces

Introduction

In “Peacemaking: Practicing at the Intersection of Law and Human Conflict” (2003), Douglas Noll explains peacemaking is a changing conflict in practice. It focuses on building equal power relations that are strong enough to deter future conflicts. This often includes establishing a method for accepting ethical decision-making within the community or between parties who have previously participated in a response to abusive conflict such as violence as the example. Peacemaking seeks to achieve full reconciliation among adversaries and new mutual understanding among parties and stakeholders. It is the development of constructive personal, group, and political relationships across ethnic, religious, class, national, and racial boundaries. Peacemaking aims to resolve injustice in nonviolent ways and to transform the structural conditions that generate deadly conflict. It is also a process that brings together individuals who wish to engage in conflict resolution, healing, support, decision making or other activities in which honest communications, relationship development, and community building that are the core desired outcomes (Noll, 2003). In addition, according to Lucuta (2014), the more energy should be devoted to non-violent processes such as negotiation is the most probable to the case as the example. Peacebuilding and democratization is based on a proposed strategic framework which involves the link between social and economic development, reconciliation and post-conflict retributive justice, the development of political stability, and democratic governance (Lucuta, 2014).

For Southern Thailand, in “Thailand/Malay¹ Muslims (1948–present)” University of Central Arkansas (30 September 2015), the Crisis Phase (February 1, 1948-January 21, 1968), the Malay Muslims began a secessionist movement against the Thailand government in the southern provinces of Pattani, Yala, Narathiwat, and Setul in February 1948. Government police and Muslims clashed near Kampung Resab in February 1948, resulting in the deaths of eight government policemen. Some 400 Muslims and 30 Thai government policemen were killed during violent clashes in Kampung Dusun Nyor in Narathiwat province on April 26-27, 1948. Some 5,000 Muslim refugees fled to Malaya. The government declared a state-of-emergency in September 1948. Thai police killed Haji Sulong, a leader of the Muslim separatists in Songkhla in southern Thailand, on August 13, 1954. The Pattani National Liberation Front (PNLF) was established in 1959. The National Revolution Front (Barasi Revolusi Nasional-BRN) was established on March 13, 1960 (Haemindra, 1976).

Conflict Phase (January 22, 1968-December 31, 1975), the Pattani United Liberation Organization (PULO) was established by Tengku Bira Kotanila (Kabir Abdul Rahman) on January 22, 1968. Government troops conducted a military offensive against Muslim rebels from 1968 to 1975, resulting in the deaths of 329 Muslim rebels.

Post-Conflict Phase (January 1, 1976-January 2, 2004). PULO rebels unsuccessfully attempted to assassinate King Bhumibol and Queen Sirikit in Tambon Sateng in the Yala province on September 22, 1977, resulting in the deaths of five individuals. PULO rebels killed four civilians and three government soldiers in May 1980, and killed five individuals in the Mayo district on June 7, 1980 (Wan Mahmood, 2007).

¹ Malay is an Austronesian language officially spoken in Indonesia, Brunei, Malaysia, and Singapore and unofficially spoken in East Timor and parts of Thailand. It is spoken by 290 million people (around 260 million in Indonesia alone in its own literary standard named "Indonesian") across the Malay world.

Conflict Phase (January 3, 2004-present), Islamic militants resumed their insurgency against the government on January 3, 2004. Four government soldiers were killed by Islamic militants in Narathiwat province on January 3-4, 2004. More than 5,000 individuals, including more than 500 government soldiers and policemen, have been killed during the conflict. In addition, reported from this phase that some 350,000 individuals have been displaced during the conflict (Che Man, 1990). Peacemaking is very important, especially in Southern Thailand. The *Al-Wahdah*² Group of Muslim politicians founded in 1986 led by Den Tohmeena, backed by local residents and former parliament members in the three southernmost border provinces joined the government political parties between 1996-1997 (Wan Mahmood, 1998) and the National Party led by Wan Muhamad Noor Matha joined the opposition parties in the Government of Prayuth Chan Prayuth Chan-o-cha from 2019 to present.

Problem in Three Southern Border Provinces of Thailand

In the three southern border provinces, however, other than the Patani fighting and anti-government groups who have created unrests in the area, there are also other different two groups who seeking some benefits from the situation and that are problematic. Among those, the first are the people who influencing to conduct such illegal businesses in the area. And, the second are the ones who trying to take some advantages from the national budget.

It really looks like the never ending story of negative thinking between the two ethnic identities. The real incomprehensibility of two races between the Siamese Thais and the Patani Malays has been causing a deep prejudice against each other, the Patani Malays have a strong sense of pride in their identity, such as their way of life, religion, ethnicity, and history. For the Patani, it is a passionate force to protect their own identity which being passed on to the descendants of important historical areas, as the center of propagation including religion and culture of the region that flourishing in the past. Other than that, Patani was also the best educational center in the Malay region, where many people come in here to study Islam until it is said to be the "Torch shines all over Asia" (Maluleem & Charoenporn, 2012). However, this realization has been crushed down by such a prejudice and incomprehension from one of the government officials sometime also innocently showed his speech on an ignorance such as the Patani people are not the Malays. They are being of Thai nationality and born in Thailand, but they are to practice Islam. Thus, the authority was trying hard to find out how to make them admit the being of Thai race. What the authority did was that to understand the Muslim way of life, the culture such as what the people eat, what the people feed, and to be careful about carrying a dog into this community.

Moreover, Thai authorities also claimed that the insurgency in southern Thailand was not caused by a lack of political representation of the Muslim population. The Thais viewed that by the late 1990s, Muslims were holding unprecedented senior posts in Thai politics from 1996 to 2001 and from 2001 to 2005. Muslims were able to voice their political grievances openly and enjoy a much greater degree of religious freedom. However, consultation with local community leaders was abolished later on. Discontent over the abuses led to growing violence during 2004 and 2005. Muslim politicians and leaders remained silent out of fear of repression, thus it eroding their political legitimacy and support (Wattana, 2006).

² The word of "Al-Wahdah" means solidarity. The Al-Wahdah has played a pivotal role in protecting Muslim interests in the southern provinces since the mid-1980s. It was founded by Malay-Muslim politicians and religious leaders from Pattani, Yala, Narathiwat and Satun at a conference in Majlis Agama Islam Patani (the Islamic Council of Pattani) on May 3, 1986 that headed by Ustaz Sha-roning or Seni Madakakul, a former Member of Parliament from Narathiwat. Den Tohmeena (from Pattani province) and Wan Muhamad Noor Matha (from Yala province) also contributed to the establishment of Al-Wahdah. Al-Wahdah sought to achieve its objectives through working within the Thai system.

Coincidentally, human rights' violations by some government officials in the southernmost provinces have been normally practicing since the past and onwards. They were such as discriminations, torture operations, illegal means to arrest people, carrying people and killing people. The religious teacher Haji Sulong and the Muslim lawyer Mr. Somchai Nilaphaijit were disappeared. The suspicious people in Krue Se Mosque and the Muslims who protesting the government at Tak Bai Police Station were surrounded and brutally killed. And that, including the death of Imam Yapha Kaseng who was secretly killed. It has been a cumulative perception for local people. The villagers were very afraid and distrust of government officials. In some situations, they felt that no one could assure them for the safety of their lives.

This article is therefore, the new developments after 10 years of the conflict that clearly reflected towards the efforts to pull in the solutions through political means. In other words, on February 28, 2013, the Thai government, represented by the National Security Council (NSC) and the Malay Patani National Revolutionary Front (BRN) signed the agreement of general resolution on a peace dialogue process. The incidence took place with a strong support from Malaysian government who was acting as a facilitator, although some commenters say that this peace process looks likely "start from the wrong foundation" (Pāthān, 2014). It is because that peace process has been rickety and uncertain since the beginning. In addition, another criticism for the conflict in the southern border of Thailand is that "still a lack of political exit" (Burke, Tweedie, & Poocharoen, 2013).

Research Questions

Even though Bunthavee (2020) has pointed out the purpose model in peace that to be the guided path in developing the Peace Building Process in Thai Society which is the building of the wheel of peace; - the forming of circle with BTS.; -the intending to develop by adopting the 4D principles which were Wheel 1: To formulate the rooted soul of peace which is derived from the root of the teachings and principles in Buddhism, Wheel 2: to build the multi-cultural path to peace which means all participants starting from the religious leaders, religious organizations, scholars have to corporate hands in hands in building the path to cultural peace, Wheel 3: to produce the peace engineer which means the developing of individuals who will be in the peace building work. These people will be trained to acquire the specific quality which is called the peace engineer. In this regards, these 3 wheels can be driven by the forces of BAN (house), Temple, School that come together to form the circle and release the energy to drive these wheels with continuity and directionality; that is to conjoin these forces of BTS station (BAN – TAMPLE – SCHOOL) for peace and development. By doing so, there are 4 dimensions of development according to the principle which are physical development, social development, mental development and intellectual development and that the master plan in building the peace in Thai society to sustain permanently. However, for the Strengthening and Participation Program in Southern Thailand or Southern Thailand Empowerment and Participation (STEP) which cooperated between Office of the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and the Thai Government by Prince of Songkla University as the main unit in the project implementation from 2010-2014 found (1) factors conceptual framework of civil society organizations in the Muslim areas are that with different perspective frameworks, (2) the concept of community strength between the insiders (the Malay Muslims) and the outsiders (the Thai Buddhists) look at the formulation of strategies for solving the problems differently, (3) the weighting of different conflicts have affected the priorities of the short-term and long-term goals. In addition, (4) all parties who rely on the lens to look at the problem in a different way.

Therefore, the main question of this article is “how do the Malay-Muslims feel towards the problem in Three Southern Border Provinces of Thailand?” The following questions are that (1) what is the different conceptual framework in the Muslim populated areas? (2) When is the different community concept between the insiders and the outsiders happened? (3) How is the effective priority for the short-term and long-term goals occurred repeatedly? And, (4) Why do all parties look at the problem in a different way?

Research Objectives

The objectives of this research are (1) to study the outlooks of the Malay-Muslims towards the peacemaking in the three southern border provinces of Thailand, (2) to find out some factors that contributing to peacemaking in the three southern border provinces of Thailand and, (3) to present the direction of peacemaking that the Malay-Muslims expected in the three southern border provinces of Thailand.

Research Methodology

This article was trying to answer the research question “how do the Malay-Muslims feel towards the problem in Three Southern Border Provinces of Thailand?” In making the framework of questionnaires, it provided an independent factor “The Muslim Expectations towards Peace Building in Three Southern Border Provinces of Thailand” and the dependent factor is “Peace Building” and that composed of such as how it built an environment for permanent peace, how it created reconciliation among ethnic groups, how it promoted integration of civil society, how it established a mechanism of law, and how it made a better understanding among social cultures (Look at the diagram 1: the relation between independent and dependent factors).




Diagram 1: Relation between independent and dependent factors

This research has designed 2 sets of questionnaires: closed-ended questions and open-ended questions.

- (1) The population and the sampling groups were focusing on the leaders from the Three Southern Border Provinces and that selected the sampling groups through a ‘Purposive Method’. The fieldwork took place in 3 Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat provinces between January 2019 and January 2021.
- (2) For the groups totaling 100 people per province in Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat (randomly 300 people, however due to the problem of corona virus, the feedback of questionnaires only 220 sets) were to answer the closed-ended questionnaires. The fieldwork took place in the whole year of 2019.
- (3) The other open-ended questionnaire was answered by 15 leaders through an interview process.

The questions such as (3.1) “Is there any program to create a better understanding between the Buddhism and the Islamism? (3.2) Is there any center for cultural exchange to learn the community faith and the dialogue exchange for Muslim and Buddhist scholars? (3.3) What is the problem of paranoia between cultures in the Muslim populated areas? (3.4) What is the roots and the endless problems in the three southern border provinces of Thailand?

Research Result

Majority of the people are supportive of peace in the Three Southern Border Provinces of Thailand.

The result from Table 1, people perceived that the true peaceful work should be done from the people side ($X=4.58$, $S.D=0.64$) more than the government side. The people viewed that the current state efforts for having peace are rather far to meet a success. Judged from Question No. 1, the probability to occur peace in the Three Southern Border Provinces of Thailand is at a medium level.

This regard, majority of the people are supportive of peace and pray for peace to become true for their homeland.

Table 1. Peace in the Three Southern Border Provinces of Thailand N=220 (100%)

S/L	Level of Peace Outlooks (A)	X	S.D	Perception	Ranking
1.	Probability to occur peace		3.16	0.55	Medium
2.	Government involved with the peace	4.41	0.64	High	2
3.	Community involved with the peace	4.58	0.64	Highest	1
Total A1-A3		4.05	0.61	High	

Source: Researcher survey between February-June 2020

People believe that to build an environment for permanent peace is important.

The result from Table 2, people perceived that the most importance in building an environment for permanent peace is to respect the cultures of the people ($X=4.74$, $S.D=0.44$). The next are to help people for having more education and to improve the labor wages in the local area (Questions No. 3, 2). Importantly, government should not restrict the rights of the people nor to build up the peace without the people’s support (Question No. 1, 4).

This regard, the Muslims often feel that they are treated unfairly by the state. Islamic schools are burned down and Muslim missionaries shot and killed many times without the government's ability to find out the culprit.

Table 2. Build an environment for permanent peace N =220 (100%)

S/L	Level of Peace Outlooks (B)	X	S.D	Perception	Ranking
1.	Government must control the people	2.74	1.29	Medium	5
2.	Gov. improves the labor wage	3.80	1.29	High	3
3.	Gov. helps people for more education	4.39	0.96	High	2
4.	Gov. respects people’s culture	4.74	0.44	Highest	1
5.	Gov. built an environment for peace	3.05	1.33	Medium	4
Total B1-5		3.74	1.06	High	

People perceive that creating the reconciliation in all ethnic groups is a priority.

The result from Table 3, people viewed that the government never trust on the Malay-Muslims in the area ($X=4.60$, $S.D=0.72$). According to the people, the problems occurred in the Three Southern Border Provinces of Thailand are from the poverty and poor education of the people (Question No. 3, 2). The negative thinking towards the government that is from the using Emergency Decree and wrongly creating the reconciliation among different ethnic groups in the local area.

This regard, the mechanism of law to protect the people is important. the reconciliation among ethnic groups should be done. The Muslims feel that sincerity to make peace from the state never be done fruitfully. Actions by the dominant officials always lack of responsibility and full with interest conflicts among themselves.

Table 3. Create the reconciliation in all ethnic groups N =220 (100%)

S/L	Level of Peace Outlooks (C)	X	S.D	Perception	Ranking
1.	Gov. has more open minded	4.60	0.72	Highest	1
2.	More education more reconciliation	4.15	0.91	High	2
3.	Poverty causes reconciliation difficulty	3.67	0.85	High	3
4.	Emergency decree comforts the people	2.37	1.50	Low	5
5.	Gov. creates peace in different groups	2.61	1.34	Medium	4
Total C1-5		3.48	1.06	Medium	

Promoting the integration of civil society must be done

The result from Table 4, people is requiring to take part in the participation for the public security ($X=3.90$, $S.D=0.86$) and the people believe that the integration in this area that is to strengthen the community safety ($X=3.84$, $S.D=0.82$). The people look rather unhappy with the attempt of government in the matter of promoting the integration of civil society. Due to in past, the decision and the involvement in the public administration were mainly disturbed and interfered by the government (Question No. 5, 4, 3).

This regard, the better understanding among the social cultures should be made. According to the people, the state never try for any program to create a better understanding between the Buddhism and the Islamism. A center for cultural exchange to learn the community faith and the dialogue exchange for Muslim and Buddhist scholars never be done. Paranoia between cultures has never been resolved on the spot. This is one of the roots and the endless problems in the three southern border provinces of Thailand.

Table 4. Promote the integration of civil society N =220 (100%)

S/L	Level of Peace Outlooks (D)	X	S.D	Perception	Ranking
1.	Integration strengthening the community	3.84	0.82	High	2
2.	People participated in Gov. decision	2.98	1.15	Medium	4
3.	People involved in public administration	3.41	1.11	Medium	3
4.	People participated in public security	3.90	0.86	High	1
5.	Integration occurred in S. 3 provinces	2.69	0.62	Medium	5
Total D 1-5		3.36	0.91	Medium	

The establishment of mechanism of law must be reviewed

The result from Table 5, people perceived that unsuitable law which utilized in the area has affected the people's rights (X=4.33, S.D=0.47) even though some of the laws might meet the needs of some people (X=3.91, S.D=1.04). The people are also rather unhappy with the law enforcement (Question No. 2). The people are rather not satisfied with the mechanism of law (Question No. 5) and in that they believe the enforcement is not consistent with the solution in the area (Question No. 1).

This regard, the problem of peace building is engaged by the dominant power not the ethnic minority Malay-Muslims.

Table 5. The establishment of mechanism of law N =220 (100%)

S/L	Level of Peace Outlooks (E)	X	S.D	Perception	Ranking
1.	Law is consistent with the solution	3.02	1.01	Medium	4
2.	Law enforcement is acceptable to people	2.92	1.25	Medium	5
3.	Unsuitable law affected people's rights	4.33	0.47	High	1
4.	Present law met the needs of people	3.91	1.04	High	2
5.	People satisfied the mechanism of law	3.37	1.35	Medium	3
Total E 1-5		3.51	1.02	High	

Better understanding among the social cultures is poor

The result from Table 6, people perceived that the conflicts and violence have affected the social problem in the area (X=4.23, S.D=0.641 and X=3.90, S.D 0.642). The people looking to those who take responsibility in tackling the violence for peace process that were rather not sincere (Question No. 3). According to the people, as long as the drugs spreading everywhere (Question No. 4) and the resolution of cultures in the area has gone wrongly (Question No. 5), such as the using restrictions to stop expanding the people's private Islamic educational institutions from such Islamic outreach in the area, in that way a better understanding among the social cultures is not possible.

This regard, Thai government is such different from any democratic countries in the world. The problems of Muslim ethnic groups are likely occurred in the military regime more than the civilian government. That is as long as the soldiers use a high-clearance operation, the unrest becomes more violent. But when the government uses a mechanism of negotiation and views its citizens as the ones who need to be compassionate remedies, the violence from the opposition is coming to be calmed down.

Table 6. Better understanding among the social cultures N =220 (100%)

S/L	Level of Peace Outlooks (F)	X	S.D	Perception	Ranking
1.	Conflicts affected the social problem	4.23	0.641	High	1
2.	Violence affected the Malay-Muslims	3.90	0.642	High	2
3.	Those responsible tackling the violence	3.19	1.011	Medium	3
4.	Gov. solved the drug prob. successfully	3.00	1.326	Medium	4
5.	People satisfied the cultures resolution	2.96	1.164	Medium	5
Total F 1-5		3.46	0.95	Medium	
Total A1-F5		3.60	0.95	High	

Comparison of the Muslims' outlooks (classified by genders) towards peacemaking in overall.

The result from Table 7, according to the hypothesis on genders (male and female), they have their outlooks towards the peacemaking differently with the statistical significance at 0.05.

Table 7. Comparison of the Muslims' outlooks (classified by genders) towards peacemaking in overall.

Status	Number	Mean	S.D.	T	Sig.
Male	165	3.19	0.68	-16.10	0.00
Female	55	4.69	0.19		
Total	220				

*Level of Statistical Significance stay at 0.05

$H_0: \mu_1 = \mu_2$ Male and female have the outlooks towards peace in Three Southern Border Provinces without differences.

$H_1: \mu_1 \neq \mu_2$ Male and female have the outlooks towards peace in Three Southern Border Provinces with differences.

P (probability) = 0.00, α = (level of significance) = 0.05

Thus, Value P less than α (equal to Sig.) reject H_0 accept H_1

The result from Table 8, according to the hypothesis on different ages, they have their outlooks towards the peacemaking differently with the statistical significance at 0.05.

Comparison of the Muslims' outlooks (classified by ages) towards peacemaking in overall

Table 8. Comparison of the Muslims' outlooks (classified by ages) towards peacemaking in overall.

Source of variance	Df	SS	MS	F	Sig.
Between Groups	3	143.66	47.89	377.19	0.00
Within Groups	216	27.42	0.13		
Total	219	171.08			

*Level of Statistical Significance stay at 0.05

$H_0: \mu_1 = \mu_2$ Different ages have the outlooks towards peace in Three Southern Border Provinces without differences.

$H_1: \mu_1 \neq \mu_2$ Difference ages have the outlooks towards peace in Three Southern Border Provinces with differences.

P (probability) = 0.00, α = (level of significance) = 0.05

Thus, Value P less than α (equal to Sig.) reject H_0 accept H_1

The result from Table 9, according to the hypothesis on marital statuses (single and married), they have their outlooks towards the peacemaking differently with the statistical significance at 0.05.

Comparison of the Muslims' outlooks (classified by single and married) towards peacemaking in overall

Table 9. Comparison of the Muslims' outlooks (classified by single and married) towards peacemaking in overall.

Status	Number	Mean	S.D.	T	Sig.
Single	18	2.07	0.00	-8.68	0.00
Married	202	3.70	0.80		
Total	220				

*Level of Statistical Significance stay at 0.05

$H_0: \mu_1 = \mu_2$ Single and married have the outlooks towards peace in Three Southern Border Provinces without differences.

$H_1: \mu_1 \neq \mu_2$ Single and married have the outlooks towards peace in Three Southern Border Provinces with differences.

P (probability) = 0.00, α = (level of significance) = 0.05

Thus, Value P less than α (equal to Sig.) reject H_0 accept H_1

The result from Table 10, according to the hypothesis on different levels of education, they have their outlooks towards the peacemaking differently with the statistical significance at 0.05.

Comparison of the Muslims' outlooks (classified by levels of education) towards peacemaking in overall

Table 10. Comparison of the Muslims' outlooks (classified by levels of education) towards peacemaking in overall.

Source of variance	Df	SS	MS	F	Sig.
Between Groups	3	145.12	48.37	402.31	0.02
Within Groups	216	25.97	0.12		
Total	219	171.09			

*Level of Statistical Significance stay at 0.05

$H_0: \mu_1 = \mu_2$ Different levels of education have the outlooks towards peace in Three Southern Border Provinces without differences.

$H_1: \mu_1 \neq \mu_2$ Different level of education have the outlooks towards peace in Three Southern Border Provinces with differences.

P (probability) = 0.00, α = (level of significance) = 0.05

Thus, Value P less than α (equal to Sig.) reject H_0 accept H_1

The result from Table 11, according to the hypothesis on different occupations, they have their outlooks towards the peacemaking differently with the statistical significance at 0.05.

Comparison of the Muslims' outlooks (classified by occupations) towards peacemaking in overall

Table 11. Comparison of the Muslims' outlooks (classified by occupations) towards peacemaking in overall.

Source of variance	Df	SS	MS	F	Sig.
Between Groups	3	144.29	48.10	387.68	0.001
Within Groups	216	26.80	0.12		
Total	219	171.09			

*Level of Statistical Significance stay at 0.05

$H_0: \mu_1 = \mu_2$ Different occupations have the outlooks towards peace in Three Southern Border Provinces without differences.

$H_1: \mu_1 \neq \mu_2$ Different occupations have the outlooks towards peace in Three Southern Border Provinces with differences.

P (probability) = 0.00, α = (level of significance) = 0.05

Thus, Value P less than α (equal to Sig.) reject H_0 accept H_1

How can peace building take place in the southern border provinces?

Government should allow people for having their real rights and liberty. Avoiding such unfair behaviors to the people is important. Taking off such injustice laws from the Muslim areas is to be considered. To build up democratization of a system and improving laws which in line with an international standard are assumed to be necessary. Forming up the central government must be done by the people not the military. Independent organizations are important, the government should not interfere the missions of independent organizations, but to reduce the paranoia towards the people, to repeal the Emergency Decree in the three southern border provinces and, to give rights to the people for being more autonomous for instead.

Besides, the government should promote more education to the people and improve the quality of education to help people for jobs. Majority of the people are poor and jobless, no land for cropping, and their income is not enough for survival. A lot of people are suffered from the wide spreading of drugs. Ridding drugs out from the local area is very important.

Government should control the power of government officials for not bullying and harassment the villagers and stop the conflicts among the communities to save the people from the violence in the Three Southern Border Provinces.

Regarding the answers to answer the research questions:

- (1) The different conceptual framework of civil society organizations exists in the Muslim areas. The Muslims view that the problem is not come from the Muslim side, but it comes from the government itself. The Muslims feel that the dominant powers are worried about the losing of their interests.
- (2) The different concept of community strength between the Malay Muslims and the Thai Buddhists always emerges in the Muslims areas. The Muslims perceive that this problem happens because the Thai governments themselves who have never trusted the Malay Muslims. It may be because the power of the Muslims was there in the history. The Muslims believe that this Muslim land used to be independent for a long period of time in the past.
- (3) The effect of priority and different conflicts for short and long terms in the past and in the future. The Muslims feel that the government will never care about whatever problems both in short and in long term goals. The Muslims view that some of the government officials have realized that it's better press his head (the Muslim head) now than letting him lift it up in the future.
- (4) All parties even rely on the same lens but look at the problem in a different way. For the Muslim side, they believe that the rights of people should be equal under the law. However, what the Muslims view is that the dominant powers hold on the rail that if equality in the rights of ethnic minority groups taken place it means that the Thais have surrendered to the outsiders. Thus, they may lose their great benefits as what they have now.

Discussion and Conclusion

Regarding how does the Malay-Muslims feel towards the problem in Three Southern Border Provinces of Thailand, the result from Table 1, people perceived that the true peaceful work should be done from the people ($X=4.58$, $S.D=0.64$) more than the government. This is an important proposal. The people viewed that the current state efforts for having peace are rather far to meet a success. Judged from Question No. 1, the probability to occur peace in the Three Southern Border Provinces of Thailand is at a medium level. This answer really looks like a time bomb and that waiting to explode any time.

Now, let's come to the case of the southernmost provinces of Thailand. According to the local people, a lot of puzzles were thrown to the government, for example, if peace is a fact deal in the southernmost provinces of Thailand, we should learn why the peace processes in the Canadian province of Quebec (Neatby, 1966), the Crimean peninsula in Russia even though it turned over in 2022 (Gorizontov, 2012), the Aceh province in Indonesia (Walter, 2011) and the Mindanao Island in the Philippines have met a success (Rood, 2005). But in the opposite, if peace is only a fiction, it may be the same as what the villagers viewed on and said, "when the soldiers entered the village, the school was burned down, and the pondok was shot, and when they went out, it (the school) was never burned. And that it is the place where the military living in, the event is often there. It has made the villagers in some areas come to believe that in some situations, the soldiers created the problem by themselves to get a government budget and to kill the people they want to get rid of."

At the end of this article, we pray to Almighty God for His Mercy to protect the people, to invite more researchers to come to this area for seeking the truth and we may together working out to make peace in the Three Southern Border Provinces of Thailand.

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