

Unfulfilled Candidacy Policy: A Long Road to A Legislative Seat

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Abstract

This study reveals the flaws in the candidacy policy against women that have yet to be addressed. On the other side, this policy allows candidates to fulfill the 30% quota quickly. In the 2014 and 2019 general elections, Indonesia's women's nomination policy was introduced, with a 30% plan for female legislative candidates. However, according to the final results, legislative seats for women are still unfilled. This study was described using an exploratory qualitative methodology, and a literature review looked into the findings and practices of the 30% women's quota policy. The statistics reveal that the sanctioned nomination policy has increased the number of women running for legislative seats. On the other hand, this policy attempts to change the bad perception of Indonesia's patriarchal culture. Furthermore, a greater emphasis is being placed on encouraging and ensuring that female parliamentary candidates can win in the general election contest. On the other hand, some political parties still regard this policy as only a formality in order to attain gender equality among legislative candidates. This policy never met the aim in the practice of political contestation between 2014 and 2019.

Keywords: General Election, Female Candidacy Policy, Legislative, Indonesia

1.0 Introduction and Background

Men and women are uneven in political practice; in America, women make up 20% of Congress, 24% of state legislators, 12% of governors, and 17% of mayors (Rahman, 2020). Women are underrepresented in the Republican Party, accounting for 16.5 percent of the party's congressional delegation (Cole, 2016). In other circumstances, whether in the national legislature or **other** representative institutions, women's representation in developed and developing democracies is limited. Equalization initiatives were done at international conferences to give a space for women to engage, compete, and earn seats in regional or national leadership. However, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) has determined to: Establish a framework for advancing legal equality, and initiate specific steps aimed at short-term 30 percent as decision-makers at the national level and 50 percent in the long term; and mobilize national and international efforts to facilitate greater access for women, particularly in political spheres (Iancu, 2021; Sundström & Stockemer, 2022).

This convention aims to develop an affirmative action policy that will equalize men's and women's political positions and strengthen women's legislative activities. They are elected to the legislature in order to have a significant presence in institutions controlled by men. Affirmative action rules are significant because they allow women to acquire legislative seats on a "fast track" (Euchner & Frech, 2022; Restrepo Sanín, 2022). The nomination strategy also serves as affirmative action to guarantee that men and women are represented equally in

politics, with women having equal access to decision-making as males. A quota system agreed upon by the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women/CEDAW was used to carry out the affirmative action policy (Basabe-Serrano & Perez, 2022; Bjarnegård & Kenny, 2016). According to this agreement, every country that has signed CEDAW has promised to establish an affirmative action strategy with a quota of 30% women. This agreement has the potential to influence decision-making as well (Braga & Scervini, 2017; Commercio, 2021).

Following the ratification of the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), all countries began to promote gender equality and justice policies in their political systems. This method has been used in various ways in various countries. The first is the voluntary party quota of political parties. Using this technique, political parties are unable to set a percentage for women. Political parties in several countries have adopted the practice of nominating a large number of female candidates for election (Ghosh, 2017). The statutory candidate quota, which mandates political parties to reserve a certain percentage of their seats for female candidates, is the second. This is reflected in the constitution, election laws, and political party legislation (Devroe & Wauters, 2018; Restrepo Sanín, 2022). Although there is no gender quota system in the Indian parliament or state legislatures, women are given 33 percent of the seats in each house. These are either constitutionally mandated or governed by electoral law (Krook, 2016; Lovenduski, 2016). The status of women's positions is indicated on various ballots. For example, the condition of alternate gender registration on the list automatically gives seats to women. Nationally, Belgium and Nepal have implemented this method, and France and India are considering a similar approach. The third type is reserved seats, which represent women and minorities. Ironically, women constitute a 'political minority,' not a 'numerical minority' (Devroe & Wauters, 2018). Reserved seats are utilized in many countries as a more direct method of ensuring women's elected positions.

In Uganda, 56 seats are reserved for women, with one woman chosen by a special electorate in each district, whereas in Rwanda, 30 percent of women are elected through a unique system (Euchner & Frech, 2022). As a female candidacy policy, Indonesia has accepted affirmative action. According to some analysts, this law has an impact on the electability of female candidates (Baker, 2018; Hughes & Paxton, 2019; Profeta & Woodhouse, 2022). Female candidacy is a policy that allows female candidates to run for legislative offices on a "fast track" (Chuki & Turner, 2017). In Indonesia, however, just 17.2 percent of female parliamentary candidates were elected in 2014, compared to 20.5 percent in 2019. Women legislators made up fewer than one-third of the total. Female Legislators make up a minor part of the legislature as compared to male legislators, who account for more than 70% of the legislature. Male lawmakers outweigh female legislators in the legislature as a result of this pattern. Therefore as outcome, the purpose of this study is to contribute to the study of general elections, specifically the nomination and representation of women in the legislature..

2.0 Literature Review

2.1 Political Parties and The Female Candidacy Policy

There are various party standards that must be completed in order to recruit women. The requirements are separated into three groups. (a) Begin by assessing the history of a country's political system, which includes political culture, electoral system, legislative competition, and internal party competition, which represent the dimensions of party power (in numbers) in parliament and party identity; (b) the party's internal structure includes organization, institutionalization (formal or informal), internal party decision-making

mechanisms (centralized or decentralized), and party philosophy; and (c) cand (Anderson, Williams, Long, Carter, & Volckens, 2020; Lees-Marshment, 2020; Tildesley, Lombardo, & Verge, 2021). These are the elements that influence the availability of qualified candidates.

One of the most important functions of parties in a representative democracy is to recruit women as candidates (Gauja, 2016; Matloob, Shabbir, & Saher, 2021). Political parties will use this function to judge whether or not a person possesses the attributes required to serve as a people's representative and whether or not he or she successfully fulfills his or her duties (Lovenduski, 2016). It is entirely up to them whether they will successfully implement the female candidacy policy. They have interpreted electoral policy rules and created the framework for the party's internal procedures. The execution of the female candidacy policy is dependent on two factors: local capability and willingness. a powerful "will" as a "motivation" influenced by factors other than environmental policy stability; alternative centers of authority, conflicting agendas or pressures, and other socio-political milieu components can all profoundly influence an implementer's willingness" (Commercio, 2021).

The party elite's policy execution has been impacted by socio political factors. This viewpoint is comparable to Spillane's, who says that organizational and community history, professional skill, and formal and informal networks all impact policy interpretation. According to Spillane, the perception of the party elite is founded on their prejudices (Restrepo Sanín, 2022). Organizational and community history, professional experience, and formal and informal networks are all elements that influence the outcome. On the other hand, believes that the party elite's approach toward policy implementation is comparable to that of political parties. The "will of political parties determines the election procedure, ballot method, or female lawmaker quota." The electoral system, ballot system, or female legislature quota are all controlled by the "will of political parties." The party recruits, chooses, and elects candidates, encouraging and enabling individuals who run for the nomination and giving them with the tools they need to execute their campaign (Iancu, 2021; E. Kim, 2020). Political parties can draft legislation that allows women to be recruited and assigned numbers as prospective legislative members based on their electoral districts. The "will of political parties" influences how political parties build candidate lists, how many women are included on those lists, and whether women are put in crucial positions, all of which affect women's legislative participation (Devroe & Wauters, 2018). As seen by the dedication of party employees, the concept of a political party primarily reflects organizational behaviour. "Of course, there would be no organizational behaviour if there were no human behaviour." Intelligent actors are essential components of any organization." That is, a) actors exist within organizations, and b) organizations exist within actors (Aspers & Corte, 2019; Bjarnegård & Kenny, 2016; Euchner & Frech, 2022)

The first nesting says that an organization is always made up of a group or multiple players. As a result, an organization is changed into a multi-actor system. The second argues that a group of participants can form an organization, but only if one can think about and reason about what the other actors can do. In turn, the other actors have perceptions or representations of the first actor. This implies that an organization is a construct formed by the overlap and sharing of individual representations (Cole, 2016; Sundström & Stockemer, 2022). The main concepts here are representations and 'interpretation.' In the eyes of intelligent interacting agents, an organization is a representation and a 'interpretation.' Sorge's claim that "actors within organizations and organizations within performers" demonstrates the close interaction between actors and organizations. This is due to the actor's power and, of course, influence (Angin & Patriadi, 2016; Krook, 2016). The implementing actor serves a strategic role; he

represents the organization while also interpreting policy with administrative discretion, resulting in new policies (policy tools) that supplement macro policies. Policy tools, according to Schneider and Ingram, are "components in policy design that cause agents or targets to do something they would not do otherwise or to alter behaviour to solve public problems or achieve policy goals" (Braga & Scervini, 2017; Hughes & Paxton, 2019)

According to Michael Lipsky's thesis, policy tools developed by political party leaders who implement policies differ from policy tools developed by street-level officials (Lees-Marshment, 2020; Lovenduski, 2016). Policy instruments are created not just to implement policies, but also to accommodate the interests of the target population. In this case, the policy tools also benefit the target group. Female candidacy policy instruments have been designed and implemented within political parties (Bjarnegård & Kenny, 2016). The goal of these policy instruments is for women to become cadres or supporters. In this setting, the party not only administers election participants but also achieves its political objectives (Baker, 2018; Tildesley et al., 2021). When the party reaches a quota of 30% female candidates in each electoral district, it has met the election administration's goal.

2.2 The Female Candidacy Policy

The procedure by which a party decides to run a woman as an election candidate is how the female candidacy policy is implemented. Female legislative candidate recruiting is a tactic for attracting potential candidates to run for political office. In contrast, candidate selection is defined as picking applicants from a pool of applications (Purwaningsih & Rubiyati, 2019). Parties use a specific process for selecting candidates for a variety of reasons, including: 1) it is required by law, 2) the party seeks to increase its vote totals, 3) it is part of the party's philosophy, and 4) the size of the party (Aspers & Corte, 2019; E. Kim, 2020).

Parties employ a variety of procedures to nominate their candidates in practice. The female candidacy policy governs the selection of female candidates for legislative seats. This technique leads people from meeting legal requirements to becoming candidates. In most nations, political parties play a major role in this process, discovering suitable candidates, selecting them as their official candidates, and presenting them to the voters for election (Celis & Lovenduski, 2018; D. Kim, 2018). To be elected, women must first choose themselves, then be chosen as candidates by political parties, and finally by voters. While most political systems have mechanisms in place to advance from eligible to aspirant to candidate, the details vary widely from country to country. The country's social culture, electoral system, and party rules and procedures all have an impact on the recruiting process and the degree of receptivity to female candidates (Angin & Patriadi, 2016; Iancu, 2021)

Women are more likely to be nominated and elected in proportional electoral systems than in mixed or majoritarian systems (Krook, 2016; Sundström & Stockemer, 2022). According to the current study, the impact of electoral norms on women's representation is determined by the cultural or historical context in which elections are place (Caravantes, 2021). Other researchers discovered that election limitations have no influence on the female model in areas where traditional gender norms prevail (Profeta & Woodhouse, 2022). Patriarchal political culture has hampered women's political participation (Lovenduski, 2016). However, why hasn't the goal of implementing the female candidacy policy been realized, despite the fact that researchers rarely look into it?

3.0 Method

This study examines the unaddressed flaws in the candidacy policy towards women. This is a qualitative study with an exploratory strategy. The exploratory technique is used in this study to examine and describe the state of the phenomena that occurs and is directly related to the scenario or place (Aspers & Corte, 2019). This study will use qualitative methodologies to evaluate how Indonesian political parties use nomination policies to attract female candidates. Researchers employed primary and secondary data in this study to support the findings and outcomes of the research investigation. In-depth interviews with leaders of Indonesian political parties were used to acquire primary data. Simultaneously, secondary data was gathered from prior research and literature via journal articles, books, and other sources.

Furthermore, the acquired data, notably data on women's nomination policies in Indonesian politics, is being investigated in greater depth, particularly the policy of 30% women's candidacy in legislative seats. The data is then examined to evaluate the importance of each party's participation and contribution to the policy, as well as the defects in meeting the quota. The study's findings were implemented in the form of a nomination policy that was authorized in order to enhance the number of women vying for legislative seats. This policy, on the other hand, changed the negative view of Indonesia's patriarchal culture.




Figure 1: Data Collection Process

The following strategies were employed in the stages of the research used in this study to analyze linked to women's nomination policies: 1) data collection from secondary and primary sources; 2) data gathered from numerous sources and assessed by the author based on research indicators; 3) The following stage is data visualization as material for study and discussion; 4) then proceed to the results and discussion stage.

4.0 Results

4.1 The Role of Leading Boards in Determining The Percentage of Women Candidates In The Legislative Chairs

Affirmative action or female representation refers to the policy of encouraging and supporting women to run for public office in Indonesia. This method has been used since the 2004 election, in 2009, 2014, and most recently in 2019. As an example of the implementation of international human rights treaties, the female candidacy policy includes the following provisions: In Articles 7 and 8 of CEDAW's sixteenth session, 1997, the Committee on Political and Public Life made the following general recommendation: a "To ensure that articles 7 and 8 are effectively implemented, the convention welcomes temporary special measures in Article 4. Recruiting, financially supporting, and training female candidates, altering electoral procedures, designing campaigns aimed at equal participation, and setting target numbers and quotas, are just some of the measures implemented in countries with effective interim strategies to achieve equal participation. In the 30th session of CEDAW in 2004, Article 4 paragraph (1) stated, "Expressly recognizes the act's temporary nature." This was reiterated in General

Recommendation No. 25 of the UN CEDAW Committee on Transitory Special Measures. In light of this, it is clear that the performance of such acts cannot be mandated indefinitely, even though the term "temporary" might be used to refer to the performance of such acts over a prolonged period. Temporary activities undertaken in response to specific problems should have their life set only by the value they add, rather than being set in stone ". The 39th Session of the CEDAW General Assembly, specifically its 799th and 800th meetings, took place on 27 July 2007 in New York, United States of America. The CEDAW Committee submitted concluding comments on Indonesia's fourth and fifth reports at these sessions (Cole, 2016).

The other international rules are as follows: (1) Line 26: "While the committee applauds the passage of General Elections Law No. 12 of 2003, which establishes a 30% quota for female legislative candidates and political parties, it is concerned that the law does not provide fines or enforcement procedures to ensure quota compliance. The committee is deeply concerned that little progress has been made in increasing women's political party participation since the law's introduction. The committee was concerned about women's underrepresentation in public and political life, as well as decision-making positions, in Indonesia, particularly in the foreign service, judiciary, local government, education, and business sectors. (2) The Committee proposes that the State Party reinforce the 30 percent quota system for female parliamentary candidates in the General Election Law by making it a necessity and implementing consequences for noncompliance, as well as enforcing methods to assure compliance. These are not met, and steps must be put in place to guarantee that these fundamental conditions are met. Furthermore, the committee encourages all political parties to implement and strengthen temporary special measures under Article 4 paragraph (1) of the Committee's General Conventions and Recommendations 23 and 25 in order to accelerate the promotion of women's full and equal participation in all sectors and at all levels with men, including foreign service, judicial, local government, education, and commercial sectors.

The gender gap in political participation has not diminished as a result of UN legislation. As a result, the United Nations issued the Beijing Platform for Action (BPFA) at the Fourth United Nations Conference on Women in 1995, which stated that "achieving equal opportunities and access for women and men to participate in the state's decision-making and policymaking processes is a prerequisite for democracy to function." The United Nations adopted the Millennium Development Goals in 2000. (MDGs). "Encouraging gender equality and women's empowerment is a critical component of achieving development goals, with preliminary data from the United Nations' launch program indicating an increase in the proportion of women serving in national parliamentary institutions" (Nanda, 2016). Several laws have been issued by the Indonesian government: (1) The convention on the Rights of the Woman was approved by Act No. 68 of 1958. This legislation is a result of the 1952 Convention on the Rights of the Woman, which grants women the same rights as men in terms of voting, standing for and being elected to public office, and holding public office. (2) Act No. 7/84 ratifies the Convention Against Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). However, the principles of political equality between men and women are specified in Indonesian Constitution article 1 paragraph (2): "The constitution ensures the sovereignty of the people.

Everyone has a right to fair opportunity in government, according to Article 28 D paragraph (3). "Every five years, direct, general, free, confidential, honest, and fair general elections are held." paragraph 22 E of Article 22 (1). "Everyone has the right to get superior facilities and treatment in order to promote equality and justice." According to Article 28 H paragraph, "everyone has the right to exceptional facilities and treatment in order to achieve

equality and justice" (2). Article 28 I paragraph states, "Everyone has the right to exceptional facilities and treatment in order to achieve equality and justice" (2). "The state, especially the government, is responsible for the preservation, promotion, enforcement, and fulfilment of human rights," according to Article 28, first paragraph (4). "The democratic rule of law principles guarantee, control, and outline the application of human rights legislation and regulations to safeguard and defend human rights." According to these articles, the Indonesian government has implemented the CEDAW standard.

4.2 The Unfulfilled Policy Of The Fast-Track Solutions

The 2004 Election Law, No. 31/ 2002, was the first sign of the government's determination to equalize men and women. However, the governing parts of the 2004 Election Law did not require political parties to meet the 30% female candidate quota. Five years later, in the 2009 elections, Election Law No. 2/2008 established the clause on gender equality in politics. Political parties registered to run in the election are not required to meet the 30 percent female candidate quota (Angin & Patriadi, 2016; Gauja, 2016). Gender equality policy clauses were altered in the 2014 election. Political parties were forbidden from contesting in an electoral district if their female candidates did not meet the 30% minimum. These penalties are outlined in Election Law No. 8/2012. These items of penalty are included in KPU rule No. 7/2013. Sanction measures have been maintained in the run-up to the 2019 elections.

Table 1: The Election Law

No	Issue Management	Constitution No 31/2002	Constitution No 2/ 2008	Constitution No 8/ 2012	Constitution No 7/ 2017
1.	Policy Target	No sanction	30% of election candidates are female	In each electoral district, each party places a quota of 30% female candidates	In each electoral district, each party places a quota of 30% female candidates
2.	Party recruitment	Female candidates are not required to reach the 30% quota	Female candidates are not required to reach the 30% quota	Political parties must reach the 30% quota of female candidates	Political parties must reach the 30% quota of female candidates
3.	Party management	The party ignores the regulations	The party ignores the regulations	Parties recruits female candidates with high electability in potential electoral districts	Parties recruits female candidates with high Electability in potential electoral districts

4. Supervision by the government	No sanction	No sanction	The Election Commission will cancel a political party as an election participant in an electoral district that does not reach the 30% quota	The Election Commission will cancel a political party as an election participant in an electoral district that does not reach the 30% quota

Indonesia instituted candidacy policy regulations with punishments during the 2014 and 2019 elections. It was difficult for the party to achieve the regulation's 30 percent quota requirement. The problem arose because not all political parties had a significant proportion of female cadres. Even though political parties have women's wing organizations, these organizations are rarely active. Since then, the number of female candidates has been filled by enlisting the help of party activists' families. The party also got a female candidate among their sympathizers (Angin & Patriadi, 2016)

Table 2: The Internal Party's Policy

Name of party	The internal policy	Party's Target	Selector
National Democratic Party (Partai Nasdem)	SKEP005/DPPNasd em/II/2013 Bab V, Pasal 10	cadres and sympathizers	Party's management
National Awakening Party (PKB)	Party's statute	NU cadres who become popular and professional figures	Must be cadres and selected by the Shuro Board
Prosperous Justice Party (PKS)	PKS's statute of Chapter XIX on recruitment of political office, Article 31 paragraph (2)	90% party's cadre	Determined by the Shura Council and the party functionaries to, the candidates who have been elected from the internal elections
Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDIP)	Decree No.061/TAP/DPP /PDIP/III/2013	Candidates are cadres who have been selected by the functionaries through a scoring system. But the party will also recruit non-cadres and sympathizers	Chairman of the party, scoring and deciding
Party of the Functional Group (Golkar Party)	Decree of DPP Golkar No. Kep-227/DPP/Golkar/2013	95% party's cadre	Determination in stages starting from the chairman, secretary general and Bappilu (Election Winning Body)
Great Indonesian Movement Party (Gerindra)	Party's statute	cadres and sympathizers	Party's fungsionaries
Democratic Party (Partai Demokrat)	Party's instruction No.04/Juklak/DP P.PD/VIII/2013	educated cadres and non-cadres	Through a formal mechanism, however, in reality it is determined by the General Chairperson and Secretary General of the party

National Mandate Party (PAN)	PAN's statute, Chapter XIII, Article 27 (paragraph 1) and Article 28 (paragraph 1)	cadres and sympathizers	Determined by the board meeting at each party level, from the party's central executive board to the branches
United Development Party (PPP)	PPP's statute	There are criteria and a scoring system for cadres and non-cadres	The final selection is a team, with nine members whose members are no women.
People's Conscience Party (Hanura)	Decree No. 264/DPP-Hanura/IV/2012	cadres and sympathizers	Party's management

Internal party regulations have mandated a 30% quota. These institutional policies have influenced how political parties recruit female candidates. This policy is developed in response to the needs of political parties. Party functionaries are in charge of putting the party's internal policies into action. The election-winning team works closely with party leaders to find and attract women who apply as female candidates based on their electability. Female candidates for political parties were also recruited from the party's base of mass groups. National Awakening Party (PKB) is one political party that has attracted female candidates through mass mobilization. Table 2 shows that political parties have complete control over the implementation of candidacy policies. Female candidates' policy targets are cadets, non-cadets, and supporters. Cadres are formally registered as members of the party's cadre. Even while most political parties include female cadres, they are rarely chosen as candidates. Parties have generally met the election law's qualifications, but they also have specific conditions set by the party leader and the party's election-winning team. However, not every woman who sought for office was elected.

Table 3: The percentage of female candidates' nomination and their electability

Political Party	2004		2009		2014		2019	
	Nominated	Elected	Nominated	Elected	Nominated	Elected	Nominated	Elected
Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDIP)	35,4	11	35,4	18	35,7	19,3	37,4	21
Party of the Functional Group (Golkar Party)	28,3	14	30,3	18	36,1	17,6	38	21,2
Great Indonesian Movement Party (Gerindra)	0	0	29,3	19	35,4	15	37	15,4
Democratic Partai (Partai Demokrat)	27	10,5	32,9	24	36,6	21,3	39,7	18,5
National Mandate Party (PAN)	35	13,4	29,7	15	37	18,4	37,9	16
National Awakening Party (PKB)	37,6	13,4	33,7	25	37,6	21,3	38,8	20,7
Prosperous Justice Party (PKS)	40,3	6,6	36,6	13	38,8	2,5	39,4	16
United Development Party (PPP)	22,3	5,2	26,9	13	39	25,6	41,3	26,3
National Democratic Party (Nasdem Party)	0	0	0	0	40,4	11,4	38,3	32,2
People's Conscience Party (Hanura)	0	0	30,7	22	36,4	12,5	41,7	0
Averages	31,3	11	31,7	18,5	37,3	16,5	38,9	14

Table 3 depicts the parliamentary seat attainment patterns among political parties in the 2014 and 2019 elections. Sanctions imposed under the female candidacy policy have intensified political parties' efforts to meet the quota requirement. However, not all female candidates have been elected to the legislature. The female candidacy policy only recruits

women to run for office and does not guarantee that candidates will be elected. According to Golder et al (2017) this female candidacy strategy expedites electoral victory. Golder's argument is valid, but only in terms of the female candidacy procedure. This study's conclusions differ from those of Baujard, Gavrel, Igersheim, Laslier, & Lebon (2018). They argue that election regulations have less sway in countries where traditional gender norms predominate. Indonesia is a patriarchal country that has executed the candidacy policy efficiently. According to Golder et al (2017) and D. Kim (2018), patriarchal society is a hindrance to women's political engagement. Our research, however, refutes their statements. The electoral parties were all able to reach the 30% quota requirement. This suggests that female political participation has increased during the election season. In contrast, the implementation of the candidacy rules has failed to accommodate all female candidates elected to the legislature.

5.0 Conclusion

In both the 2014 and 2019 election cycles, all parties met the quota target of 30 percent female candidates. This 30% quota aim is classified as a policy output achievement in the framework of policy analysis. According to academics, the policy output objective is a quick way to gain legislative seats. According to election results from 2014 and 2019, not all female candidates won legislative seats. It means that, while the female candidacy policy was successful in terms of output, it was not successful in terms of outcome.

There are obvious limitations to this study, but they also give directions for further research. On the one hand, this study solely examines women's candidacy policies through qualitative research. We investigated how women are portrayed in numerous laws and regulations. Based on these findings, additional research might be conducted to highlight the influence of women's representation policy by presenting representative situations. It could help us better grasp the nuances of information transfer interactions in elections. Furthermore, quantitative data approaches can be used to generate empirical findings. Given that each political party in Indonesia has only one leader, future study should include people from diverse backgrounds.

Finally, the study's findings are expected to contribute to the study of general elections, notably the nomination of women. This study can be used to evaluate affiliated parties and encourage more women to participate in the legislature. We acknowledge that quotas for women's representation have not been totally successful. Because the resulting policies are still only outputs and have not been able to give outputs in the form of targets for women's representation achieved in political contests, they can provide input for lawmakers and ensure that those female candidates can win the election.

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