

Hybrid Conflicts, Multiple Logics, and Organizational Transitions: Military Relations with Local Civilians*

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The concerns of this article are conceptual and theoretical. It analyzes the various arenas, contacts, and organizational forms through which the militaries of the industrial democracies interact with civilians in the areas and countries where they are deployed. As such our contribution is neither doctrinal nor directed at the fit between the tactical, operational and strategic levels of war. Our focus, rather, is social scientific and puts forward a new way of looking and understanding the actions of military units in specific situations and in the moves between such situations. In addition our focus is on the levels spanning the range between individual soldiers and the battalion (sometimes brigade) level where much of the action takes place. We *exemplify* our contentions through the case of the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) in the West Bank and Gaza.

We conceptualize the military as an organization that is characterized by multiple and *analytically* different logics of action. By institutional logics of action we refer, following Thornton and Ocasio¹ to the socially constructed, historical patterns of material practices, assumptions, values, beliefs, and rules by which individuals produce and reproduce their material subsistence, organize time and space, and provide meaning to their social reality within delimited domains. In areas where armed forces interact with civilians, these logics include high-intensity combat, internal policing, border policing, counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations, military administration, and humanitarian assistance. Each institutional logic of action predicates different sets of assumptions about civilians, understandings of the core of the mission, and concrete organizational arrangements and practices. In addition, while each such logic may have common elements with doctrinal tenets (or diverge from these), what is of importance for our analysis is the logics orienting the actual behavior of military forces. Moreover, these logics may be expressed simultaneously or linearly in space (in different sites) and time (in different periods) and may be complementary or contradictory.

Previous scholarship trying to come to terms with the multiple missions of armed forces in areas of conflict has tended to focus either on the structural-organizational specialization of specific units or the multiple functions that are fulfilled by defined units. Thus for example, specialized units have been established to police the population (forms

* The authors wish to thank Christopher Dandeker, Talya Green, Eitan Shamir, Patricia Shields, and two anonymous referees for comments on an earlier draft of this paper.

¹ Patricia Thornton & William Ocasio, "Institutional Logics", in Royston Greenwood *et al.* (eds.), *The Sage Handbook of Organizational Institutionalism*, Thousand Oaks, CA, Sage, 2008, pp.99-129.

of gendarmerie), administer territories (apparatuses of military administration), mediate between the military and civilian leaders (CIMIC officers) or to carry out antiterrorist activities (some special forces). Alternatively, analyses have focused on combat units and the manifold roles they are assigned to carry out (such as patrolling, manning checkpoints, or carrying out arrests). The disadvantage of such formulations is that they tend to neglect the emergence of hybrid logics (a policing watch that also includes a high-intensity patrol) and the kinds of individual and organizational problems attendant on these hybrids.

Instead of focusing on particular units, we propose to shift the analysis and ask about the different logics of action that the military undertakes in order to deal with civilians and within which any number of units may participate. Only after providing this kind of conceptualization can we ask what happens when a specific unit is faced with the problem of identifying and moving between different logics. Some observers have suggested that diverse logics hold for diverse situations, with the most common analysis positing a difference between policing and war-fighting² or the closely-related differentiation between what is necessitated in peacekeeping versus peace support operations.³ While fruitfully underscoring the different kinds of assumptions, images and practices involved in dissimilar kinds of missions, these analyses nevertheless still tend to see the armed forces as partaking in dichotomous logics. In our formulation, we not only underscore the multiplicity of logics involved in military action but also explain the organizational complexities that this multiplicity implies. Indeed, while there have been previous attempts to chart out all or some of the institutional logics we discuss, there has been no sustained attempt either to analyze them systematically or (more importantly) to conceptualize them in a manner that underscores the difficulties that their very multiplicity implies. In addition, we go beyond previous scholarship that has analyzed how armed forces operate in blurry or fuzzy conflicts and face problems of identifying appropriate action necessitated in situations to ask about the difficulties of *moving between* circumstances – say between internal policing and high-intensity combat.

Why the Israel Defence Forces (IDF)? During the past decade links between the military and Palestinian civilians have emerged as an issue of central concern for the IDF. This development is similar to the experience of other armed forces of the industrial democracies and is the outcome of changes such as the activities of human rights and humanitarian movements, the increasing juridification of military actions or reporting about armed activities by the media. As a consequence, whether Palestinians (in Gaza or the West Bank) or citizens of other countries working in these two areas (for example employees in NGOs), senior commanders see the ways in which civilians outside the national territory or across contested state boundaries are treated as an important item on their agenda since they realize that the actions of civilians limit the ability of forces to achieve missions. More widely, senior commanders of the IDF have come to understand

² K.Haltiner, *Do New Military Missions Require New Military Structures?*, Zurich, Militärakademie/ ETH, 2005.

³ Christopher Dandeker & James Gow, “Military Culture and Strategic Peacekeeping”, in Erwin A. Schmid (ed.), *Peace Operations Between War and Peace*, London, Frank Cass, 2000, pp.58-79.

that the ways in which civilians are managed bears direct implication for the legitimation and acceptance of any military action undertaken.⁴

The case of Israel is apt for *exemplifying* these issues because the variety of arenas in which the Israeli military deals with civilians offers a range of cases for our purposes. Yet our analysis has comparative implications since, while characterized by unique features, the IDF's behaviour and action are nevertheless part of, and framed by, developments that have taken place in the armed forces of other industrial democracies : the conceptual model we develop can usefully be applied to other contexts. To reiterate, as the thrust of our analysis is to suggest a new way of looking at fighting forces, we offer examples from the IDF in order to illustrate our various contentions.

Institutional Logics : A Conceptualization

In theoretical terms institutional logics refer to the kinds of assumptions, interpretive frameworks, prescriptions, and practices held together by an internal coherence (a “fit”) that is seen as reasonable and do-able by actors. Thus for instance, the logic of action of policing is very different from that of high intensity combat. These logics are *not usually* explicit as in scientific treatises or in formal military doctrine. Rather for actors they provide what can be called a common sense of action in terms of awareness about how to understand the world and act upon it.⁵ To follow Jackall⁶ we refer to those...

complicated, experientially constructed, and thereby contingent set of rules, premiums and sanctions that men and women in particular contexts create and recreate in such a way that their behavior and accompanying perspective are to some extent regularized and predictable. Put succinctly, an institutional logic is the way a particular social world works.

The plural in logics refers to the fact that administrating civilians, waging a battle or engaging in counterinsurgency entail different kinds of common sense of action. The logics are historically created and are related to the core expertise of the military (organized violence), to being a public institution (patterns of accountability), and to being like any other large-scale hierarchical organization. The point is that once logics emerge they have a “life of their own”, i.e., they have interests and identities attached to them and their carriers may often compete for status and power.

The concept of logics of action has been previously applied to military matters by Boëne⁷ and by Yden.⁸ They refer to the two master logics characterizing the armed forces :

⁴ Meytal Eran-Jona, *Military Operations in Civilian Environments: Sociological and Psychological Perspectives*, Tel Aviv, IDF Behavioural Sciences Center, 2013). In Hebrew.

⁵ Eyal Ben-Ari, *Mastering Soldiers*, Oxford, Berghahn Books, 1998.

⁶ Robert Jackall, *Moral Mazes*, New York, Oxford University Press, 1988, p.112.

⁷ Bernard Boëne, “How Unique is the Military Today ? How Unique Should It Be?”, in Bernard Boëne *et al.*, *Facing Uncertainty : Report n°2*, Karlstad, Swedish National Defence College, 2000), pp.7-39.

⁸ Karl Yden, *War and the Military Career*, Gothenburg, University of Gothenburg, 2008. A similar argument is made in regard to the ethical requisites of soldiers in Celestino Perez, Jr., “The Soldier as Lethal Warrior and Cooperative Political Agent : On the Soldier's Ethical and Political Obligations Towards the Indigenous Other”, *Armed Forces & Society*, vol.38, n°2, 2011, pp.177-24.

the administrative and the operational. The basic dichotomy of their framework is between the combat-oriented (operational) subsystem and the environment-oriented (administrative/technical) subsystem of each military: one oriented to conflict and the other to cooperation. The value of their analyses lies in underscoring the various tensions emerging out of the character of the military as both a large-scale organization and an organization charged with organized violence that has to be constantly controlled. Our formulation goes beyond Boëne and Yden in two respects : our analysis is more micro-scale and we identify more than two logics. In other words, even if we focus only on the operational subsystem we find that there are a host of institutional logics that characterize it. Accordingly, we suggest asking how the coherence of each logic is constructed to provide a map for understanding *and* acting upon reality. Thus the challenge is to show the components and internal “fit” of each logic, its concrete manifestations or expressions and the ways in which civilians or non-combatants appear within it. Of course, civilians react to the military’s action based on their own aims and resources and their own logics of action. For example, in Operation Cast Lead it was clear that the IDF’s humanitarian effort (one of the logics considered) was tightly related to the way the Hamas acted. Given the limits of this text, however, we can only provide examples but not a full-scale analysis of these interactions. The table presented below (see p.7) summarizes the ideal-types of logics, organized into four categories: core expertise, legitimation, main practices and the place of civilians.

High-intensity combat (HIC) is predicated on a clear differentiation between friend and foe, the use of lethal arms, and a criterion for success, victory.⁹ The core of this logic involves linking doctrine, operations, tactics, and weaponry aimed at subjugating the enemy. HIC itself changes in terms of weapons and doctrine but the basic logic continues. In HIC, civilians are seen as a hindrance to the real “battle” and where possible to be “cleansed” out of the combat arena. This logic is still the dominant one in regard to the planning and preparation of the IDF in regard to the civilians of *neighbouring* States. In a conventional conflict, the assumption is that civilians are subjects of a sovereign State, and as such that aggressive military activities are not directed at them but rather at the armed forces of the State itself. Hence civilians are directed to leave the battlefield. Accordingly, there is a decided preference for conflict to take place in non-urban areas and if it does occur in citified environments, then civilians are encouraged to leave those areas until the end of the fighting. Expressions of these ideas are practices instituted by the IDF during recent struggles of dropping flyers, using (where possible) phones and SMSs, or loudspeakers to tell Palestinian civilians to leave areas where fighting is taking or about to take place.¹⁰

Peacekeeping is based on ideas of neutrality and impartiality. The practices through which it is put into practice – such as patrols, look-outs or weapons monitoring –

⁹ Christopher Dandeker, “From Victory to Success”, in Jan Ångström & Isabelle Duyvesteyn (eds.), *Modern War and the Utility of Force*, London, Routledge, 2010, pp.16-38.

¹⁰ Kobi Michael & Eyal Ben-Ari, “Contemporary Peace Support Operations: The Primacy of the Military and Internal Contradictions”, *Armed Forces & Society*, vol.37, n°4, 2011, pp.657-679.

are based on creating a buffer between armed forces and supervising international agreements. Civilians are usually not part of the activities of traditional peacekeeping but following Dandeker and Gow,¹¹ contemporary peace support operations cover a wide array of actions based on a variety of logics of action, some of which involve civilians. This logic is less relevant for the IDF.

Internal policing is based on legal frameworks and practices centred on maintaining order so that everyday life is enabled. Civilians are the direct object of this logic through regulation and control. Civilians react to policing by military occupiers through legal means (like permissions to demonstrate) or illegal ones (unlawful displays) and essentially are of a political nature. For military units doing policing, the challenge is to move into action based on legal frames and strongly restraining their violent potential (protests must be handled through legal frameworks¹²). This logic often carries political implications because the arrest of someone may raise serious legitimacy issues. This logic pertains to different missions the Israeli military is assigned. For example, the IDF is charged with maintaining order between Jewish settlers and Palestinians in the West Bank (during times as the olive-picking season). In addition, it is charged with regulating demonstrations that are held by Palestinians alone or with human rights movements or with the removal of illegal Jewish settlements.

Border policing is based on monitoring the movement of people and goods across a country's borders (and thus is different from internal policing). It involves the verification of identification documents (passports or bills of lading) by officials. Along the borders of a State, policing involves screening the movement of such individuals as smugglers, unlawful immigrants or refugees. In principle, this logic of action is civilian in nature but in many parts of the world as in Israel or the United States it has been militarized.¹³ In Israel, it is military forces along with the police and Border Police (a type of gendarmerie) that are in charge of this kind of policing. In the past few years, the most problematic area has been the southern border with Egypt that includes criminal activities, but more importantly a passage for people from African countries that are looking for work or shelter in Israel. Civilians who try to enter through this boundary illegally are stopped by military units deployed along it and then passed to the police for formal arrest. Military units are used here primarily because of fears of armed Palestinians entering Israel and because this boundary is not yet fully fenced.

The **anti-terror logic** includes multiple actors – government offices, militaries, police, and occasionally corporations – and involves actions that are essentially preventive in response to threats of specific acts focused on creating terror. In this logic of action, militaries act within wider organizational frameworks. Civilians may harbour armed militants or be bystanders, and it is not possible to “cleanse” or “clear” them away since

¹¹ Dandeker & Gow, “Military Culture”, *op.cit.*, pp.58-79.

¹² Haltiner, *Do New Military...*, *op.cit.*, 2005.

¹³ Vida Bajc, “Introduction: Debating Surveillance in the Age of Security”, *American Behavioral Scientist*, vol.50, 2007, pp.1567-1591.

terror activists operate from among “the people”. The main practices entailed by this logic are armed activities against individuals or small cells and entail constantly differentiating or distinguishing between the “population” and the militants.¹⁴ In the case of Israel, units that carry out these activities include not only special forces but all of the combat units of the IDF. Given that these actions (assassinations or arrests) take place within civilian centres – cities, towns or villages – the emphasis has been very much on precise actions. One such example is the cooperation begun during the Second Palestinian Uprising between the Intelligence Corps, the Air Force and the ground forces.

The last three logics of action traced out are placed further away from the core expertise of the armed forces, but they are nevertheless central to what military forces are engaged with today. The logic of **counterinsurgency** is linked to State-making and focused on actions against an armed rebellion against a constituted authority. It therefore involves protection of this authority or a reduction of attempts to supplant or eliminate it. Success in counterinsurgency implies winning the support of the local population to deprive insurgents of assistance and gain intelligence on their movements. Since the focus is on a political authority and a population, civilians are very much the object of policies and actions within this logic. Epitomized in the American emphasis on “winning hearts and minds”, this logic of action is inherently associated with such activities as restoring infrastructure, assuring day-to-day security or building legal and financial institutions.¹⁵ This is not a leading logic of action in the IDF. While there are components of it that are found in Israeli actions in the West Bank, on the whole it stands in contradiction to the leading perception in the Israeli military’s that it is a fighting army defending the citizens of the State.

The logic of **military administration** entails actions such as allocating resources or providing services: in short governing in a way that facilitates or enables “normal” daily activities. Administration itself is carried directly by military officers or through local municipalities, or local and international NGOs. The military government is usually a replica of civilian government offices (infrastructure/land, finance, education) and often includes special political advisers and coordinators for local affairs.

Actually a subcomponent of military administration, the **humanitarian logic** refers to the supply of basic means for human survival: food, water, medicine and housing during times of conflict. Indeed, there is a burgeoning professional military literature on humanitarian assistance and disaster relief that reflects how seriously armed forces take the kinds of missions covered by this logic. Civilians are the object of these actions in situations assumed to be temporary. The military may be a direct actor in humanitarian efforts or rely on humanitarian groups (independent NGOs or the United Nations). In any case, it is a logic imported from civilian organizations. Adversaries may react through appeals to international “public opinion” through exaggerating humanitarian crises or

¹⁵ Nigel Aylwin-Foster, “Changing the Army for Counterinsurgency Operations,” *Military Review*, vol.85, n°6, 2005, pp.2-15; Gian P. Gentile, “A Strategy of Tactics: Population-Centric COIN and the Army”, *Parameters*, vol.39, 2009, pp.5-17.

active use of what may be called humanitarian ambushes. In our case, this logic was applied during the Second Lebanon War or Operation Cast Lead. In both cases, the IDF provided or allowed the provision of basic means to reach civilians during lulls in the armed conflict. During Operation Cast Lead for example, convoys bringing basic supplies were organized and then allowed to enter the Gaza Strip along “humanitarian corridors”.

Ideal-Types of Institutional Logics in the Military

Logic	Core Expertise	Legitimation	Practices	Civilians
High Intensity Conflict	Subjugating enemies	Conventional War	Fire-fights with weaponry	“Irrelevant”
Peacekeeping	Neutral and impartial monitoring	Stabilization of conflict	Visible presence	Usually irrelevant
Internal Policing	Maintaining public order	Rule of law	Restraint of violence	Objects of logic
Border Policing	Maintaining borders	National sovereignty over territory	Monitoring movement over national boundaries	National and non-national civilians
Antiterror	Preventing threats	National security	Violence directed against specific individuals	Must be differentiated from terrorist
Counter-insurgency	Winning hearts and minds	Supplanting legitimate government	Programmes	Objects of logic
Military Administration	Assuring day-to-day living	International law	Governmental administration	Object of logic
Humanitarian Assistance	Aid to survival	Humanitarianism	Food and medical assistance	Objects of logic

To be sure, there are other kinds of logics that characterize militaries in dealing with civilians – public relations, communication, or juridification are some examples – but we leave them aside since we now turn to analyzing the modes and problems the armed forces face in implementing and transitioning between logics.

Military Organizations and the Interplay of Logics: Hierarchies and their Effects

As in other fighting militaries, so in the IDF there is a clear hierarchy between the different logics in terms of the formal importance and informal status attached to each. For instance for many years, and to a great extent still today, many military thinkers used older paradigms centred on conventional wars to develop professional vocabulary regarding conflict. Various terms such as “war and lesser forms of conflict” or “Fourth Generation

Warfare”¹⁶ all use the intensity of the conflict as the major parameter for defining “new” conflicts. Such terms simplify the complexity of different conflicts by reducing them to the single criterion of level of armed violence involved. Accordingly, commanders and soldiers in many forces still see their “real” missions – in terms of training, resource allocation or seriousness of threat – as those approximating high-intensity conflict.

The continued primacy of the combat logic implies a hierarchy of logics with those closer to combat – counterterror or militarized policing – on a higher standing than internal policing and administration of civilians at the bottom. This higher standing is based on cognitive attraction and emotional appeal inculcated through childhood experiences, popular culture and intense intramilitary socialization. But what are the implications of this hierarchy when contemporary conflicts are no longer of the conventional kind and multiple logics are needed? Given the primacy of conventional combat in the minds of commanders and troops, it is not surprising that the military as an organization – and especially the IDF – uses a variety of overlapping (intentional and unintentional) ways to understand, categorize and act upon the need to deal with civilians in conflicts. Sociologically speaking, one set of practical organizational solutions to the existence of multiple logics has to do with putting in place organizational arrangements deriving from the hierarchy.

First, is *specialization*, entailing unique organizational structures mediating relations with civilian population¹⁷ – a prime example being CIMIC officers. A closely related process is that of *marginalization*, whereby civilian affairs are placed at the periphery of the military organization. Thus it is not surprising that CIMIC officers are often reservists (themselves rooted in civilian occupations) and thus – formal proclamations to the contrary notwithstanding – relatively subsidiary to the military. One finds similar in-between organizational forms in the IDF¹⁸: the Civil Administration charged with the daily lives of civilians in the territories and a new role known as “humanitarian officers”. These reserve officers are integrated into the combat arms to assist battalion and brigade commanders in planning operations while taking into consideration their effects on civilian populations. Among their roles are pointing out sensitive sites (such as UN institutions, infrastructure, or aid and medical centres) and aiding commanders in issuing orders related to contact with civilians. Among their responsibilities are coordinating the entry of ambulances and trucks ferrying food and equipment to civilians.

Such organizational forms, like CIMIC officers in other militaries¹⁹ “translate” the needs and demands of civilian populations into dictates that the IDF can react to and act

¹⁶ Thomas X. Hammes, *Insurgency : Modern Warfare Evolves into a Fourth Generation*, Washington, DC, National Defense University, Institute for National Strategic Studies, 2005.

¹⁷ Gary Lloyd & Gielie Van Dyk, “The Challenges, Roles and Functions of Civil Military Coordination Officers in Peace Support Operation: A Theoretical Discussion”, *Scientia Militaria*, South African Journal of Military Studies, vol.35, n°2, 2007, pp.68-94.

¹⁸ Eyal Ben-Ari, Ze’ev Lehrer, Uzi Ben-Shalom & Ariel Vainer, *Rethinking the Sociology of Combat*, Albany, State University of New York Press, 2010.

¹⁹ Sarah E. Archer, “Civilian and Military Cooperation in Complex Humanitarian Operations”, *Military Review*, March-April 2003, pp. 32-41.

upon. In addition, given the primacy of the logic of action of conventional battle, such in-between organizations create a symbolic and sometimes operational buffer between combat units and civilian populations. Their in-between position in the IDF, however, reinforces the marginalization of civilian affairs. By contrast, in other militaries there is more specialization in stability and police operations, with greater attention paid to culture and language and winning hearts and minds.²⁰

Another way in which militaries deal with civilians is through *enclavization* involving consigning units to tightly bounded domains so that they can be controlled organizationally. Here the principal example are counterterror units that have, over the years, been given special discretion for action, but sometimes become so independent as to pose the threat of rogue units.²¹ The IDF's Duvdevan counter-terror battalion offers an apt case. While very sought after by young recruits (given its close association with organized violence), it is placed in an enclave, under tight control, and used with extreme precision so as (to the fullest extent possible) not to harm the wider Palestinian population. Training includes Arabic language classes and simulations of local cultural situations along with preparation in counterterror measures.²²

Finally, we find *chronological arrangements* in which civilian affairs are categorized as merely “temporary” activities carried out before getting back to the “real” business of conventional war (like regulars who take up CIMIC roles for limited periods of time before returning to their “true” roles.). Here we refer less to a specific individual who takes up and then leaves a preoccupation with civilian affairs than the mind-set of military commanders who see a concern with civilian affairs as specialized, marginal and transitory. Yet these solutions raise problems any armed force faces : should they continue creating specialized units to deal with civilian affairs, or mainly train combat soldiers to carry out such roles? The latter option is problematic because combat soldiers usually resist civilian uses citing them as boring and repetitive work,²³ and the military may see too much policing as harming their combat abilities (as happened in Israel before the Second Lebanon War).

All these processes are at work in the IDF. For example, the training of the IDF's combat units is not aimed at preparing them for civilian contexts : from basic training through to advanced courses to the army's urban warfare centre, the emphasis is overwhelmingly on tactical challenges and combat skills with the presence of civilians in such contexts often ignored. While the IDF does have some soldiers “playing” civilians in its mock-up of Palestinians urban areas, recently it has established a dedicated unit for playing the role of enemy terror units and not “regular” civilians.²⁴

²⁰ Brian Selmeski, *Military Cross-Cultural Competence: Core Concepts and Individual Development*, Kingston, Ontario, Centre for Security, Armed Forces & Society, Royal Military College of Canada, 2007.

²¹ Maria Vivod, “Stronger than the State ?”, *Etnofoor*, vol.23, n°2, 2012, pp.99-114.

²² IDF website, accessed June 1, 2013 : <http://www.idf.il/1133-18416-he/Dover.aspx>.

²³ Erella Grassiani, *Morality and Normalcy*, Amsterdam, Vrije Universiteit, 2009.

²⁴ IDF ground forces website, Training facilities, accessed June 2, 2013 : <http://mazi.idf.il/4422-he/IGF.aspx>.

Similarly, the energy and motivation that commanders evince in developing combat knowledge stands in contrast to the lack of development of such knowledge in regard to civilians. In other words, it is high-intensity combat that is seen as the real or most serious challenge for professional military thinkers. Moreover, the set of assumptions and practices of this logic of action is constantly reinforced in training, incentive structures, self-images and popular culture. The mental model of combat soldier continues to be based on images of conventional war. From a sociological point of view, all of these solutions strive to spatially, temporally or organizationally limit the actions of combat troops dealing with civilians. But despite these attempts to solve the problem, the specific situations that troops face continue to necessitate the implementation of multiple logics. Thus we now turn from these structural answers to more processual ones.

Implementation: Identifying and Moving between Logics

To begin with, given that most combat troops do not specialize in dealing with civilians but continue to be used in civilian contexts, combat forces face difficulties in identifying a given situation and the logic of action needed within it. Observing the deployment of troops in former Yugoslavia during the 1990s or the West Bank, Battistelli and his colleagues²⁵ termed them fuzzy environments because they are characterized by unclear definitions of friend and foe, existence of many types of enemies, and the saturation of the “battlefield” with a variety of innocents, unknowns, or neutrals. In Israel, the lack of clarity is evident in the overlapping labels troops use to denote Palestinians: “civilians”, “the population”, “the locals”, “innocents”, or “uninvolved”. Each label, of course, has its own connotations and assumptions about the nature of bystanders and the appropriate actions that should be taken in regard to them.

In addition to blurred definitions, militaries must sometimes use mixed logics. Take militarized policing along the US border with Mexico. It involves border policing with weaponized semi-military units trained in anti-terror centres that sometimes treat individuals trying to cross the border as enemies (as would military units). Similarly black-garbed body-armoured SWAT teams are now used for routine domestic police work around the United States. Originally created for emergencies as terror attacks or hostage takings, for the past three decades they have increasingly been used in drug cases and non-violent crimes. But because of their training and mind-set they are extremely volatile and leave little margin for error.

Yet even if definitions of different situations are relatively clear or emerge quickly, there is a cognitive and emotional difficulty in switching logics. A case in point is how Israeli soldiers police the Egyptian border. One of the military’s missions is to stop illegal immigration but at the same time it must prevent armed militants from entering the country. The problem is thus that at times soldiers need to move between logics within

²⁵ Fabrizio Battistelli *et al.*, “Peacekeeping and the Postmodern Soldier”, *Armed Forces & Society*, vol.23, n°3, 1997, pp.467-484.

seconds. To take off from Krulak,²⁶ it is not enough to understand that soldiers may find themselves in “three-block warfare” because a crucial problem entails managing the move *between* the different urban blocks. Transitioning between tasks such as providing humanitarian aid, policing traffic and engaging in high-intensity battles within the proverbial three-block city is something that has not been hitherto studied.

While transitions are not necessarily crises in and of themselves, they do contain *potentials* for personal and organizational crises.²⁷ For example, transitions between work and home are frequent and recurring and usually not very challenging. But in situations where the actions of even small units may carry wider political implications, an unsuccessful move between situations may be disastrous. For instance, the shift from routine barracks life to high-intensity engagements may be problematic because everyday military life is characterized by routine and boredom could impede the attentiveness and aggressiveness needed in combat. Probably the most glaring example of this difficulty was the entry of Israel’s combat brigades into the Second Lebanon War. Because soldiers were expecting and operating according to logics of the West Bank and Gaza, they had problems in shifting to the high-intensity conflict. In fact, because the IDF learned this lesson, the move into Operation Cast Lead involved a much smoother transition. Similarly, a switch from a highly intense set of circumstances to policing carries the potential of inappropriate violence that is out of control. To a great extent, this is the situation that one finds in the West Bank today: the Palestinian Authority has moved from an insurgency against the IDF to constructing national institutions, and the IDF is required to restrain its forces and support a logic approximating nation-building. This change is far from trivial in the Israeli case since nation-building contradicts the way in which force has been used in the area for the past decade.

As a solution to the problems of shifts between modes of action, observers have suggested that the militaries be more ambidextrous or omni-competent²⁸: that is, they acquire an ability to move physically, operationally and psychologically between situations. But giving a label to this ability is not enough because what is missing is a delineation of the dimensions of this capacity and a demarcation of what can be changed more or less easily. In addition, hypothesizing as psychologists often do that transitions pose added stress in operations or that soldiers develop new coping skills for these situations does not suffice. This is because such contentions do not address the causes and dimensions of action causing stress.

²⁶ Charles Krulak, “The Strategic Corporal: Leadership in the Three-Block War”, *Marine Corps Gazette*, vol.83, n°1, 1999, pp.18-23.

²⁷ Judith A. Lyons, “Commentary on MHAT-IV: Struggling to Reduce the Psychological Impact of War”, *Traumatology*, vol.13, n°4, 2007, pp.40-45.

²⁸ Joseph L. Soeters, “Ambidextrous Military: Coping with Contradictions of New Security Policies”, in Monica den Boer & Jaap de Wilde (eds.), *The Viability of Human Security*, Amsterdam, Amsterdam University Press, 2008, pp.109-24. Also see : William J. Durch & Madeline L. England, *The Purpose of Peace Operations*, New York University, Center on International Cooperation, 2009.

Our contention is that the key problems in these transitions are multidimensional and interrelated since they involve cognitive perceptions, emotional states *and* bodily attitudes. Concretely, in transitions difficulties centre on the time-lines or “spillover” of emotions and body attitudes between circumstances: while the overflow in emotions occurs between specific situations (it takes time to calm down or to psych up), body attitudes are often trans-situational and are embedded in the corporeal reality of troops. Much has been written about the cognitive complexity involved in current operations. The scholarly consensus centres on the lack of classificatory clarity and solutions are either based on obtaining more information (actively or passively) or engaging in sense-making where the essential metaphor is one of booting up and rebooting.²⁹

The problem with emotions is that they have a “life of their own” beyond their initial triggering circumstances.³⁰ Hence, fear, anger or exhilaration experienced during high-intensity combat may dissipate after an armed battle but they take much longer to dissolve than the actual physical move away from the battlefield.³¹ In other words, soldiers are caught up in emotional rhythms that carry them to actions they would not normally approve of in calm, reflective moments. Ashforth and his colleagues³² note that highly segmented roles that may be relatively impermeable make transitions more difficult and may even be accompanied by a visceral difficulty in shedding the previous identity – for example the aggressiveness of an interrogator into a family member or from a soldier in battle to a trooper during a lull. It is for this reason that Americans talk about “psyching up” for combat as preparation involving both cognitive attention (adopting a new cognitive frame) and emotional arousal (affective awakening).

But emotions wax and wane according to very different rhythms than the slow changes bodies undergo. The bodily attitudes cultivated in combat soldiers during professional socialization are sometimes so internalized that they continue even if troops have left military service,³³ they are much longer-lasting than emotions. In other words, embodied stances have momentums that transcend specific circumstances and may contravene cognitive understandings and even emotional states. We are talking about things like posture, demeanour and motion that are nurtured during formal and informal training. One example involves British troops during what has come to be known as “Bloody Sunday” (1972) where the embodied aggressive attitudes of paratroopers came to dominate their actions.

²⁹ Uzi Ben-Shalom, Yechiel Klar & Yitzhak Benbenisty, “Characteristics of Sense-Making in Combat”, in Janice H. Lawrence & Michael D. Matthews (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Military Psychology*, 2012, pp.218-229.

³⁰ Ben-Ari, *Mastering Soldiers*, *op.cit.*

³¹ Sometimes after a battle, what Collins (2008, p.85) calls forward panic emerges: tension and fear come out in an emotional rush that is often accompanied by the use of violence.

³² Blake Ashforth, Glen E. Kreiner & Mel Fugate, “All in a Day’s Work: Boundaries and Micro-Role Transitions”, *Academy of Management Review*, vol.25, n°3, 2008, pp.472-91.

³³ Limor Samimian-Darash, *Violence, Control and Enjoyment – The Creation of a New Body*, Masters’ thesis, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 2003. In Hebrew.

Take socialization of soldiers that centres on the logic of high-intensity combat.³⁴ As Grossman and Collins³⁵ show, violence does not come easily or automatically to humans, so that much effort is invested in training in the use of weapons and the drills for using them. It is during the initial period of service (and constantly reinforced along the military life-course) that the necessities of waging violence in battle become internalized and embodied. As Hockey³⁶ puts it, the somatic memory of drills becomes deeply embedded so that it becomes taken for granted in the soldier's flesh, allowing knowledge, emotions and action to be meshed together.

It is within the hierarchy of logics that these embodied attitudes should be seen. Put simply, the closer the logic to that of high-intensity combat, the easier it is for troops to switch into it since they already have an embodied repertoire of appropriate actions. Conversely, shifts into logics located away from that of the violent battle are the more difficult, especially when they are sudden. Accordingly, transitions from combat to more controlled apprehension of suspects are easier to manage than activities supporting local civilians involved in nation-building. One expression of the difficulty of such transitions is the period of decompression needed by soldiers returning from an extended tour to civilian life. To be sure, there are individual and unit differences in this respect.³⁷ But, as Durch and England³⁸ argue, it is not clear that soldiers are collectively capable of doing much role-shifting as rapidly as formal directives seem to require. Such an ability to adapt could be expected only of a soldier with sufficient experience of training, say a special forces sergeant aged 34 but less of a new nineteen year-old infantry trooper.

Conclusion: Hybrid Conflicts and Mixed Logics

This article argues that an institutional logics approach is fruitful in understanding the behaviours of troops in contemporary armed forces. By moving away from a focus on a specific unit to the kinds of logics of action that a military uses, a better understanding may be obtained of the ways in which armed forces are structured, trained and deployed in ways that complement or contradict understandings of specific circumstances. This approach allows us to understand that definitions of situations are complex since they involve not only perceptions of circumstances, but because such perceptions are deeply embedded in the hierarchy of institutional logics and because there may be times when a number of logics are apt.

³⁴ Paul Higate, "The Body Resists: Everyday Clerking and Unmilitary Practice", in *The Body in Everyday Life*, in Sarah Nettleton & Jonathan Watson (eds.), London, Routledge, 1998, pp.180-198. Also see: John Hockey, "Switch On : Sensory Work in the Infantry", *Work Employment & Society*, vol.23, 2009, p.477.

³⁵ Dave Grossman, *On Killing*, Boston, Little Brown, 2005 ; Randall Collins, *Violence*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2008.

³⁶ Hockey, *Switch On*, *op.cit.*, p.477.

³⁷ Anders McD. Sookermany, "The Embodied Soldier : Towards a New Epistemological Foundation of Soldiering in the (Post-)Modernized Norwegian Armed Forces", *Armed Forces & Society*, vol.37, n°3, 2011, pp.469-93.

³⁸ Durch & England, *The Purpose of Peace Operations*, *op.cit.*

At the level of individuals, action in a situation does not only entail cognitive procedures but is dependent on an array of emotions and embodied behaviours that are internalized all along a professional military career. Hence, even if senior leadership identifies the suitable logic to be used in a given situation, the way this identification is “translated” at the level of field units is problematic. Thus we often find cases where there is a lack of fit between cognitive perceptions and embodied emotions on the one hand and actions on the other (for instance in situations necessitating policing but where troops act according to logics of antiterror). To emphasize : the default logic – that of high-intensity combat – is not only at the top of the hierarchy of logics but is most easily invoked by soldiers and commanders in cases of unclear situations. It takes many years for new default logics to emerge as policing and antiterror did in the IDF before the Second Lebanon War. Then these logics became so embedded in soldierly thinking and embodied attitudes that it took time for the “switch” to high-intensity combat against Hezbollah to emerge. It is against this background that the wider implications of our analysis should be seen. Civilians will continue to be a major preoccupation of the armed forces of the industrial democracies in the future. Such forces and among them the IDF, use a mix of logics of action in order to deal with this varied population of individuals and groups. In the new wars then, there is a need for a new conceptualization of the complexity of actions necessitated by interactions with civilians.